Kierkegaard\u27s Theology: Cross and Grace. The Lutheran and Idealist Traditions in his Thought by Hinkson, Craig Q.
Hinkson - Kierkegaard's Theology: Cross and Grace 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
KIERKEGAARD'S THEOLOGY: CROSS AND GRACE. 
THE LUTHERAN AND IDEALIST TRADITIONS IN HIS THOUGHT 
VOLUME ONE 
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVINITY SCHOOL 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY 
BY 
CRAIG QUENTIN HINKSON 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
DECEMBER 1993 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
VOLUME ONE 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................... iii 
A WORD CONCERNING SOURCES AND THEIR CITATION ................ vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. viii 
INTRODUCTION .................................................... 1 
CHAPTER ONE. LUTHER'S THEOLOGY OF THE CROSS .................. 18 
CHAPTER TWO. KIERKEGAARD'S THEOLOGY OF THE CROSS ........... 52 
CHAPTER THREE. JOHANN GEORG HAMANN AS LIKELY MEDIATOR OF 
LUTHER'S THEOLOGIA CRUCIS TO KIERKEGAARD ............... 95 
CHAPTER FOUR. THE APPROPRIATION OF GRACE AS ITSELF 
GRACE ..................................................... 121 
CHAPTER FIVE. KIERKEGAARD'S TEACHING ON THE WILL: 
LIBERUM ARBITRIUM OR SERVUM ARBITRIUM? ............... 144 
VOLUME TWO 
CHAPTER SIX. KIERKEGAARD'S CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD 
LUTHER .................................................... 177 
CHAPTER SEVEN. CROSS WITHOUT RESURRECTION .................. 227 
CHAPTER EIGHT. THE ROMANTIC-IDEALIST ROOTS OF SK'S 
EXISTENTIAL DIALECTIC .................................... 253 
CHAPTER NINE. THE COMPROMISE OF LUTHER'S GRACE TEACHING 
IN THE POLEMIC AGAINST LUTHERANISM ..................... 302 
WORKS CITED .................................................... 338 
ii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
The following list of short and abbreviated titles is used in citing Kierkegaard's works 
throughout the dissertation. If the relationship between the abbreviated and complete titles 
is not always apparent, this is due to the fact that individual volumes within the English 
corpus sometimes contain disparate materials, not all of which are adequately reflected by 
the English title. The abbreviated titles correct this deficiency. 
Armed Neutrality 
Attack upon Christendom 
Christian 
Discourses 
Concept of Anxiety 
Concept of Irony 
Eighteen Upbuilding Dis-
cOurses 
Either/Or I 
EitherIQr II 
Fear and Tremblin~ 
For Self-Examination 
Anned Neutrality and An Open Letter with Relevant 
Selections from His Journals and Papers 
Kierkegaard's Attack upon "Christendom" 1854-1855 
Christian Discourses and The Lilies of the Field and the 
Birds of the Air and Three Discourses at the Communion 
on Fridays 
The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically 
Qrientin~ Deliberation on the Do~atic Issue of Heredi-
tao' Sin 
The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to 
Socrates to~ether with Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lec-
tures 
Crisis in the Life of an Actress and Other Essays on 
Drama 
Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses 
EitherIQr: Part I 
Either/Or: Part II 
Fear and Tremblin~. Repetition 
For Self-Examination. Jud~e for Yourself! 
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Fragments 
Gospel of Suffering 
High Priest-Publican-Wom-
an Who Was a Sinner 
Johannes Climacus 
JP 
Judge for Yourself! 
Lilies and Birds 
My Activity as a Writer 
On Authority and Revela-
tion 
"Open Letter" 
Pap 
Point of View 
Postscript 
Practice in Christianity 
Present Age 
Purity of Heart 
Repetition 
Philosophical Fra2ffients. Johannes Climacus 
The GO&pel of Sufferin~ and The Lilies of the Field 
Christian Discourses and The Lilies of the Field and the 
Birds of the Air and Three Discourses at the Communion 
on Fridays 
Philosophical Fragments. Johannes Climacus 
S0ren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers 
For Self-Examination. Judge for Y Qurself! 
Christian Discourses and The Lilies of the Field and the 
Birds of the Air and Three Discourses at the Communion 
on Fridays 
The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report 
to History and Related Writings 
On Authority and Revelation: The Book on Adler. or a 
Cycle of Ethico-Religious Essays 
Armed Neutrality and An Open Letter with Relevant 
Selections from His Journals and Papers 
S0ren Kierkegaards Papirer 
The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report 
to History and Related Writings 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments 
Practice in Christianity 
The Present Age and Two Minor Ethico-Religious 
Treatises 
Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing: Spiritual Prepara-
tion for the Office of Confession 
Fear and Trembling. Repetition 
iv 
Sickness unto Death 
Stages 
SV 
Thoughts on Crucial Situa-
tions 
Two Discourses at Commu-
nion on Fridays 
Two Minor Ethico-
Religious Treatises 
Unchangeableness of God 
What We Leam from the 
Lilies and Birds 
The Woman That Was a 
Sinner 
Works of Love 
The Sickness unto Death: A Christian Psychological 
Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening 
Stages on Life's Way. Studies by Various Persons 
Sm-en Kierkegaards Samlede Vrerker. 1901-1906 
Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Hwnan Life: Three 
Discourses on Imagined Occasions 
For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves! and 
Three Discourses 1851 
The Present Age and Two Minor Ethico-Religious 
Treatises 
For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves! and 
Three Discourses 1851 
The Gospel of Suffering and The Lilies of the Field 
Training in Christianity and the Edifying Discourse which 
"Accompanied" It 
Works of Love: Some Christian Reflections in the Form 
of DiscQurses 
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The following list of abbreviations is used in citing sources other than Kierkegaard: 
En christelig Postille 
G 
LW 
N 
R 
WA 
TDNT 
En christelig Po stille. sammendragen af Dr. Morten 
Luthers Kirke- og Huuspostiller efter Benjamin Lindners 
tydske Samling udgiyen i ny dansk Qyersrettelse af 
.wrgen Thisted. 
Johann Georg Hamanns Leben und Schriften. Vol. 5, 
Briefwechsel mit Jacobi. Edited by Gildemeister. 
Luther's Works. American edition .. 
Samtliche Werke of 1. G. Hamann. Nadler edition. 
1. G. Hamann's Schriften. Roth edition. 
D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 
Theological Dictionruy of the New Testament 
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A WORD CONCERNING SOURCES AND THEIR CITATION 
Throughout the dissertation all references to Kierkegaard's collected works in Danish 
are to the first edition (1901-06) of Drachmann, Heiberg, and Lange. All quotations of it and 
other foreign language sources within the main text are given in English translation. Unless 
otherwise noted, the translation is that of the appropriate English edition, where such exists. 
Quotations appealing in the footnotes are generally given in the original language in the case 
of German, and in English in the case of the Scandinavian languages. Throughout the disser-
tation references to English editions follow those to the oliginal foreign edition and are set 
off by parentheses or brackets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There can be no doubt that Kierkegaard's situation was, in large part, determinative 
of his thinking. Finding himself in a context in which grace meant little more than possession 
of a baptismal certificate--which, naturally, all possessed--Kierkegaard saw it as his task to 
emphasize the enormous personal cost at which grace is appropriated by the Christian. Tire-
lessly he enjoins the infinite demand that Christianity places upon the individual--a demand 
from which there is no respite in this life, the presence of grace notwithstanding. This has 
led not a few theologians to deny that Kierkegaard understood the true meaning of grace. 
The mature Karl Barth, for example, reports that his break with crisis theology--and with 
Kierkegaard--was motivated in part by the displacement that the gospel suffered at the hand 
of law in each: 
Was it permissible in the long-run to continue, again and again, to bring to light the 
antitheses, contradictions, and abysses that Kierkegaard so masterfully demon-
strates--to formulate ever more rigorously the conditions of a thought and life in 
faith, in love, in hope--to make the truly necessary ne~ations in this matter into the 
theme of theology, and thus, again and again to enforce them--to give to those poor 
beggars who become Christians and who would like to think that they are Christians, 
again and again the bitterness of the required training in Christianity to taste? Was 
this permissible when the matter here should have been, namely, one of proclaiming 
and expounding to them the gospel of God, and therefore the gospel of his free 
grace? Curious how easily one fell prey, oneself, to a law that only kills, becoming 
sour, gloomy and sad!! 
The late Kierkegaard himselflends credence to this judgement by denying that Luther's way 
of speaking about law and gospel has its foundation in Christ's teaching.2 Such a pronounce-
ment can of course be "explained" by the justification, "Kierkegaard simply did not 
understand the refOimer" (the Lutherbild of the age perhaps obscuring the true Luther for 
IKarl Barth, "Dank und Reverenz," Evangelische Theologie 23 (1963):340. 
2Pap XII A 572 (lP 3:2554). 
I 
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him). Similarly, SKIS tendency to harp upon Christianity's crushing requirement, but not its 
liberating freedom, can perhaps be explained in terms of the situation to which he was (as 
he himself admits) a "one-sided corrective.,,3 Nevertheless, the conclusion lies close at hand 
that SKIS increasing antagonism toward Luther, and his presentation of Christianity 
principally as requirement, expressed at bottom a displeasure with the Lutheran teaching on 
grace and constituted a return to some sort of legalism. 
The question of the nature and extent of Kierkegaard's variance with Luther cannot 
be decided by a simple comparison of their statements regarding "law," "gospel," or "grace." 
For one thing, SK does not always employ traditional rubrics. For another, the relative 
infrequency of terms such as "gospel" or "grace" in his writings may indeed be due to the 
exigencies of his situation. And finally, a term such as "grace" receives its precise determi-
nation, in the final analysis, from the wider context of his thought. Dictated, then, is an 
analysis, not of isolated concepts, but of comprehensive theological frameworks. Here 
comparison becomes fruitful for it issues in the result that Kierkegaard and Luther do in fact 
share the same basic framework: they are both "cross theologians." More than this, their 
respective theologies bear comparison on a host of particulars, as we shall see. 
This raises the question of possible influences. Any direct influence exercised by 
Luther during the formative stages of Kierkegaard's thinking would seem to be out of the 
question. At the time that SK studied theology at the University of Copenhagen the faculty 
was under the firm leadership of H. N. Clausen, a rationalist theologian whose contempt for 
Lutheran orthodoxy was but thinly veiled.4 As was the case at many Lutheran theology 
faculties during the earl; nineteenth century, few of Luther's own writings were read. 
Clausen did, however, hold frequent lectures on the Augsburg Confession and SK probably 
3Pap Xl A 640 (JP 6:6467). 
4See Leif Grane, "Det teologiske Fakultet 1830-1925," in Det teologiske Fakultet. ed. Leif Grane, vol. 5 of 
K0benhavns Universitet 1479-1979, ed. Svend EIIeh0j et al. (Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Foriag, 1980),330. 
Clausen looked to Friedrich Schleiennacher as his ideal, eschewing radical criticism as greatly as he did an 
obscurantist orthodoxy. Grane writes that his approach could be characterized by the fonnula, "'Reason and 
Bible'--Le., philological-historical study of the Bible as the foundation of theology, reconcilable with faith in 
revelation, but irreconcilable with Lutheran confessionalism." In the latter Clausen saw "catholicizing 
tendencies" that were fundamentally at odds with "the scientific and Protestant temperament" (p. 356). 
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attended these during 1834.s Likewise he attended Clausen's dogmatics lectures.6 During 
1834-35 he took the rising young star, H. L. Martensen, as his private tutor. Martensen chose 
as his subject matter the principal points of Schleiermacher's Der christliche Glaube.7 In 
addition to these influences Kierkegaard may have received early exposure to the radical 
criticism of F. C. Baur and David Strauss, whose works, Die christliche Gnosis and ~ 
Leben Jesu, appeared in 1835 and 1835-36.8 Whether or not this is so, it is hardly surprising 
that by 1835 we encounter entries in SK's journals that are extremely critical of Lutheran 
orthodoxy. Nor is it surprising that at this time Kierkegaard was so far from his childhood 
faith that he could only continue his theological studies with difficulty.9 
SSee Sejer KOhle, S0ren Kierkegaards barndom ogungdom (Copenhagen: Aschehoug Dansk Forlag, 1950), 
78. Clausen was a capable and erudite commentator whose approach in these lectures seems to have been that 
of comparing Protestantism with Roman Catholicism (Grane, "Det teologiske Fakultet 1830-1925," 342). 
~e did so during 1833-34. Kierkegaard's notes are incomplete, which has led Niels Thulstrup to suppose 
that he found it unnecessary to attend the lectures straight through. Instead SK seems to have used Clausen's 
own sources in preparing for exams. As cited by Thulstrup in Pap I C 19 (vol. 12, p. 50) these included 
textbooks by K. G. Bretschneider, Karl August von Hase, August Hahn, Philipp Marheineke, and G. B. Winer. 
7 Concerning this early encounter, Martensen reports that SK was given to a sophistic wrangling "that came 
through on all occasions and often was wearisome." He notes that Schleiermacher's dogmatics yielded ample 
occasion for this given its teaching on election, which was, "so to speak, an open door for sophists." That 
doctrine, together with the atonement, exercised a particular fascination for the young theology student (KOhle, 
S0ren Kierkegaard's bamdom og ungdom, 77-78). A few years later we find SK in attendance at Martensen's 
lectures on speculative dogmatics (l837-38)andrecent philosophy (Descartes through Hegel, held in 1838-39). 
8Ibid. 89-90. Both of these figures are discussed in Kierkegaard's dissertation (1841), Baur frequently so. 
9Ku.'lk reports that SliJren's elder brother, Peter, confided in his journal of March 1835 that "S0ren does not 
seem to be reading toward his exams at ail now. May God help him out of all this inner ferment in a way that 
is good, and to his soul's salvation" (ibid., 86-87). KOhie also notes that, were S0ren to have followed in his 
older brother's footsteps, he would have taken and passed his theology exams already in 1834--instead of in 
1840 (p. 83). SK's special position as the "baby" of the family who wanted to exert his independence certainly 
had as much to do with his unwillingness to apply himself to his theological studies as did the overwhelming 
world of ideas to which he was being exposed at the university. 
In passing we may note that S0ren's elder brother was an extremely gifted intellect in his own right 
and was himself at this time on his way toward becoming a bright light in Denmark's theological firmament. 
Only the year before he had returned with his Doctor of Philosophy degree from Gottingen, where he had been 
dubbed "der Digputierteufel aug dem Norden." Grane writes that Peter's "abilities as a dialectician were in no 
way inferior to his brother, S0ren's" ("Det teologiske Fakultet 1830-1925," 358). Because of Peter's association 
with Grundtvig, however (whose confessionalism stood for "catholicizing tendencies" in the mind of Clausen, 
et al.), he was blocked from a theological appointment on the pretext that his degree was "only" in philosophy. 
To remedy this deficiency Peter took a licentiate in theology--yet his theological dissertation so enraged the 
faculty that he was thereafter blackballed from any appointment, though for a time he did give lectures as a 
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Along with the above-mentioned theological influences, other formative influences 
of a literary and philosophical nature were also at work upon the young Kierkegaard. Interest 
in German romanticism and idealism was high in Denmark during the 1830's, and the young 
university student certainly shared that interest. Emanuel Hirsch writes: 
The great theme of the deep stratum of German intellectual and religious history 
during the first half of the nineteenth century--the clash between Christianity, 
romanticism and idealism--played itself out once again in Kierkegaard under the 
aspect of finding an intellectually mature formation of a religious life-view that 
would be equal to the conditions of the age. IO 
OehlenschHiger, the chief representative of romanticism in Denmark, spoke glowingly of 
Goethe, who had only just died in 1832. So did virtually everyone else. I I Consequently SK 
did a great deal of reading on his own of Goethe. But his interest in the literature of 
romanticism was by no means limited to him. Hirsch writes that by 1837 Kierkegaard was 
"an excellent connoisseur of the more recent Gennan and Danish belles··lettres, and in 
addition, a close observer of the newspaper, theater, and art criticism in Copenhagen. ,,12 In 
Hirsch'sjudgement it was this fascination with romanticism--not Hegelianism--that precipi-
Privatdocent to a grateful student body. As late as 1851, after having given a series of1ectures for which only 
the largest audi torium was sufficient to contain all those in attendance, he was again passed over on yet another 
pretext--and that, after fifty-three students had requested his appointment! (pp. 358-59 and 332). Concerning 
any influence that Peter's views may have had on S0ren, however, Kuhle writes: "The brother was of great 
importance to him, but certainly in such a way that S0ren was more often aroused to opposition than to 
approval" (S0ren Kierkegaards barndom og ungdom, 78). 
'OEmanuel Hirsch, "Soren Kierkegaard," in Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie im 
Zusammenhang mit den allgemeinen Bewegungen des euroDaischen Denkens. V. Band, 2. Halfte (Giitersloh: 
C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1951), 434. A brief but helpful orientation on the nature of the influences exerted by 
romanticism and idealism upon Kierkegaard is included in: Michael Theunissen and Wilfried Greve, eds., 
Materialien zur PhiloSQDhie Swn Kierkegaards (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979),20-22. Far more 
extended is Hirsch's own treatment: Kierkegaard-Studien. Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Erste Studie 
(VaduslLiechtenstein: Topos Verlag, 1978),11-156 (457-602 in continuous pagination). 
"Including F. C. Sibbern, professor of philology and philosophy for whom SK had enormous respect 
(KUhle, S0ren Kierkegaards barndom og ungdom, 113). 
12Hirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien. Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Erste Studie, 48 [494]. We know that at this time 
SK not only frequented the Royal Theater, he even flirted with the idea of a career as an actor. 
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tated SK's break with Christianity in 1835.13 Yet some exposure to Hegelianism certainly 
had occurred by this time, whether through Clausen's dogmatics lectures (recall that he 
employed Marheineke as a source), or Martensen, or Poul Meller, Kierkegaard's philosophy 
mentor. Moreover by 1835 or 1836 Kierkegaard had begun to move in the literary circle of 
1. L. Heiberg, the most prominent proponent of Hegel's philosophy in Denmark. Heiberg's 
popularized, aesthetic Hegelianism afforded a clear point of access to Hegel's philosophy,14 
though one may doubt that the influence that he exercised was simply intellectual. He and 
Mme. Heiberg (a glamorous young actress) were bedazzling personages even by the 
standards of Copenhagen's cultural elite, and association with them can only have enhanced 
the young student's sense of estrangement from the stifling atmosphere of his father's and 
brother's house, and the faith it epitomized. 
This of course leads to consideration of yet another influence upon the young 
Kierkegaard, one that is by no means to be disparaged: viz., his strict upbringing within the 
confines of Lutheran pietism. Though Herrnhuters were not present in considerable numbers 
in Copenhagen, they were plentiful in Jutland, the region from which Kierkegaard's father 
had come. Thus it was only natural for Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard to attend the meetings 
of the Herrnhuter Fellowship in Copenhagen (being chosen at one point to oversee 
construction of their meeting hall, which was to seat six hundred), as well as churches the 
pastors of which were known for their pietist leanings. ls As is weB known, the elder 
Kierkegaard was a deeply melancholy man who dwelt upon Christianity'S darkest side (a 
feature typical of Jutland pietism). This dark, feeling-centered religion in which one 
I3Hirsch writes: "Der Hegelianismus ist 1835 fUr ihn noch keine lebendige Gro/3e" (ibid., 36 [482]). Direct 
acquaintance with Hegel's writings did not come until 183 8. Immediately preceding it in 1837 was immersion 
in the writings of Hegel's critics (in particular, Immanuel Hermann Fichte), as well as his proponents--e.g., 
Bruno Bauer, Karl Rosenkranz and Karl Daub (ibid., 54-56 [500-501 D. As previously noted, SKalso attended 
Martensen's lectures on recent philosophy and speculative dogmatics from 1837 to 1839. 
["Kuhle, S0ren Kierkegaards bamdom og ungdom, 102. Also Henning Fenger, Kierkegaard-Myter og 
Kierkegaard-Kilder (Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1976),111-13 (Kierkegaard. the Myths and Their 
Origins. Studies in the Kierkegaardian Papers and Letters. trans. George C. Schoolfield [New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 1980], 135-37). 
15Kiihle, S0ren Kierkegaards bamdom og ungdom, 17. 
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continually ransacked one's soul for secret sin and agonized over one's eternal fate was in 
tum handed down to the sons, Peter and Sereno 
From this brief accounting it is possible to isolate any number of significant 
influences upon the young Kierkegaard. Marie Mikulova Thulstrup, for example, has gone 
in depth into the pietist element, finding it to be crucial for interpreting SKIs authorship.16 
Emanuel Hirsch, on the other hand, sees German romanticism's "ideal humanity" as the 
foundation for SKIs thought. Romanticism's philosophy of the individual is given a 
paradoxical Christian development by Kierkegaard that not only guards, but completes its 
conception of the universally human. l ? Hirsch also finds the roots of SKIs conception of 
the unconditionedness of duty and freedom in Kant and Fichte.18 And he observes, despite 
16See Marie Mikulova Thulstrup, "S0ren Kierkegaard og Johann Arndt," in Kierkegaardiana IY, ed. by 
S0ren Kierkegaard Selskabet by Niels Thulstrup, (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1962), 7-17. See also Marie 
Mikulova Thulstrup, Kierkegaard og Pietismen. S0ren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populrere Skrifter XIII 
(Copenhagen: Munksgaards Forlag, 1967). (The latter work is also to be found under the English title, 
"Pietism," in Kierkegaard and Great Traditions. Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 6, ed. Niels Thulstrup and 
M. Mikulova Thulstrup [Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Foriag, 1981], 173-222.) In these works Thulstrup 
demonstrates Kierkegaard's first-hand acquaintance with certain Pietist authors--Arndt, Brorson, Gerhard, 
Spener, Scriver and Tersteegen. In my estimation, however, she postulates familiarity with still other figures 
on the basis of rather scant evidence. Moreover she quite overstates the influence of Pietism on SK's theological 
program as regards his doctrine of sanctification. On the one hand she acknowledges that Kierkegaard "never 
involved himself in a discussion about sanctification" (Kierkegaard og Pietismen. 42), and on the other, she 
asserts that "Kierkegaard seems, in principle, to have adopted the pietist schema for man's sanctification" (p. 
49). In fact, Kierkegaard shares orthodoxy'S criticism of Pietism--viz., that it tends to focus on the human 
being's moralistic efforts rather than upon God's free grace and works done spontaneously out of gratitude. 
Sanctification for SK--at least prior to the late period--is much more akin to Luther's daily conversion and 
embrace of justifying grace (the recurrent transition from totuspeccator to totus iustus) than to steady "growth" 
in holiness (contra Thulstrup, pp. 52-55). This is not to discount, however, that the priority that Kierkegaard 
gives to subjectivity throughout his authorship has, in a certain sense, made of him a "pietist of a higher order" 
after the pattern of Schleiermacher. Nor is it to discount that pietism's prudish disparagement of things sexual 
has decisively influenced his view of corporeality, and therewith his understanding of life under the cross. 
These matters will come up for discussion at a later point. 
l7"Soren Kierkegaard," 446. 
18Ibid., 451. Friedrich Hauschildt (Die EthikSoren Kierkegaards [Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshaus Gerd 
Mohn, 1982 n, too, has recently written on the proximity ofKierkegaard's ethical approach to those of Kant and 
Fichte. Of his contribution Henning Schroer writes: "Vorziiglich hat neuerdings Friedrich Hauschildt die 
Grundgedanken der ethischcn Theorie Kierkegaards herausgearbeitet ... und damit auch fUr das VerhaItnis 
Kierkegaards zum deutschen Idealismus Wesentliches beigetragen. Die Niihe zu den Anslit7..en Kants und 
Fichtes wird dabei allerdings m.E. etwas iiberschatzt, obwohl es richtig ist, daB Kierkegaard eben viel mehr 
das ethische Wirklichkeitsverstandnis jener beiden Denker teilt und damit auch immer christliche Forderung 
und Ideale im Zusammenhang denken kann. Aber mul3te nicht das Einwirken der reformatorischen Tradition, 
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their manifest differences, an exceedingly close affinity between Kierkegaard and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. SKIS tenet that "subjectivity is the truth," is said to reproduce in intensified 
fonn Schleiermacher's own fundamental view as to the relationship between religion and 
knowing, piety and dogmatic utterance. "In that respect," writes Hirsch, "Kierkegaard is the 
only genuine pupil of Schleiermacher in his entire generation.,,19 
While a certain influence stemming directly from Luther has also been acknowledged 
by scholars, it seems to date from a later period (1847 on).20 Niels Thulstrup correctly ob-
serves that "Luther had practically no influence on Kierkegaard's philosophy of subjectivi-
ty.,,21 Heywood Thomas and the Italian scholar, Cornelio Fabro, are constrained to agree 
that any influence had to have been indirect, that is to say, via the Lutheran milieu in which 
Kierkegaard found himself. Thomas speculates that the young SK "absorbed Luther in ideas 
from text-books" such as Bretschneider's and von Hase's. Yet he clearly is not terribly 
satisfied with this result, given the similarities that he himself perceives between 
Kierkegaard and Luther. The problem is a vexing one, and the dearth of attention that this 
historical question has received can only be explained by a failure to attend to the sweeping 
dogmatic similarities that obtain between Kierkegaard and Luther. 
An earlier generation of Kierkegaard scholarship certainly was well aware of these 
similarities, as evidenced by the young Barth's naming of Luther and Kierkegaard as princi-
auch wenn er Refonnation als Reduplikation versteht, sHirker beriicksichtigt werden?" ("Kierkegaard und 
Luther," Ketygma und Dogma 30 [1984]:243 n. 26). 
19"Soren Kierkegaard," 454. 
2Dntis is notto deny that SK has read (or more likely, read in) certain of Luther's works prior to 1847. There 
are indications in the earlier journals to this effect (e.g., Pap VI A 108 [JP 3:2460], dating from 1845). 
Moreover, references to Luther occur in the published works prior to 1847 (EitherlQr II, The Concept of 
Anxiety, PhilosODhical Fragments. The Concluding Unscientific Postscript. A Literary Review. Edifying 
Discourses. and Works of Love). Nevertheless, Regin Prenter writes that "the few quotations from Luther in 
the writings of Kierkegaard during that period are incidental and without real significance" ("Luther and 
Lutheranism," in Kierkegaard and Great Traditions. ed. Niels Thulstrup and M. Mikulova Thulstrup, 
Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 6 [Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1981], 127). Kierkegaard's surprise 
upon discovering the refonner's congeniality to his own point of view during Advent of 1847, together with 
his casual remark, "I have never really read anything by Luther" (Pap VIlli A 465 [JP 3:2463]) tend to 
corroborate the lack of significance that Luther had held for him prior to that time. 
21Quoted in 1. Heywood Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957),48. 
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pal intellectual ancestors.22 Certainly the presence of both men is everywhere discernible 
in the second edition of The Epistle to the Romans. That this should be so is not at all 
surprising. The Luther renaissance that had been stimulated by the discovery of the lost 
manuscript of Luther's Lectures on Romans, and given enormous momentum by the scholar-
ship of Karl Boll, occurred not long after the reception of Kierkegaard's works in Germany. 
Both events contributed to the rise of dialectical theology. The central role played by the 
Lectures on Romans in the Luther renaissance cannot but have caused Kierkegaard's works 
to have been read in a unique light, viz., that of the theology of the cross to which a number 
of those works (e.g., Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript and 
Practice in Christianity) possess a startling affinity. Similarly the converse: Kierkegaard's 
writings exercised a profound influence--whether directly as in the case of Karl Boll, or 
indirectly as in the case of dialectical theology--upon the Luther-interpretation of the peri-
od.23 In short, it was the Kierkegaard-interpretation of Barth and his circle, and the Luther-
interpretation of Boll and his followers, that called attention to this common theological 
horizon shared by Kierkegaard and the young Luther. 
Accordingly one finds in the earlier Kierkegaard literature a recognition, if not of 
actual dependence upon Luther, then certainly of affinity to him. Torsten Bohlin speaks of 
"the similarity between one side of Luther's 'theology of the cross' and Kierkegaard's faith 
and grace concepts," maintaining that because Kierkegaard remained fixed at the standpoint 
of the "pre-reformational" Luther, as it were, he "was not able to appropriate the reform a-
22Karl Barth, Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1924), 164. 
2·'Regarding the reciprocal influence that existed between dialectical theology and the Luther-interpretation 
of the time, Walther von Loewenich writes (concerning Paul Althaus's ground-breaking work on the theology 
of the cross): "1926 erschien sein Aufsatz 'Die Bedeutung des Kreuzes im Denken Luthers'. Die darin 
programmatisch ausgefUhrten Gedanken gaben die Anregung, der'lbeologia crucis' Luthers genauer nachzu-
gehen und dabei die innere Verwandtschaft mit Grundanschauungen der Dialektischen Theologie festzustellen." 
And again: " ... die Lutherdeutung von Althaus ohne die von der 'Dialektischen Theologie' empfangenen 
Anregungen und ohne die Auseinandersetzung mit ihr wohl nicht verstanden werden kann" ("Paul Althaus als 
Lutherforscher," Luther-Jahrbuch 35 [1968):13-14). Regarding the direct influence of Kierkegaard upon Karl 
Holl himself, Emanuel Hirsch writes: "Vielleicht darf ich hier nebenbei die Tatsache mitteilen, daB Karl Holl 
durch einen in seine Friihzeit fallen den EinfluB Kierkegaards zu demjenigen scharfen Gefiihl fUr Folgerichtig-
keit im Gottesverhaltnis gebildet worden ist, welches ihn dann befahigt hat, durch das traditionelle Lutherbild 
zum wirklichen Lutherdurchzubrechen" (Kierkegaard-Studien. Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Dritte Studie, 236 
[838]). 
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tional certainty of salvation in all its fullness.,,24 By way of response Walter Ruttenbeck 
enumerates the "unmistakable" similarities that exist between Kierkegaard's and Luther's 
respective theologies of the cross but denies that SK has any less appropriated Luther's "refor-
mational" view than did Luther.2s Walter Kiinneth points out the clear convergence of the 
thought of Luther, Kierkegaard and dialectical theology as regards the doctrine of sin--it is 
a transcendent entity, not discernible except by a reve1ation.26 Emanuel Hirsch and Eduard 
Geismar are particularly struck by the fusion of grace and judgement that is present in 
Kierkegaard: Hirsch speaks of the "paradox of grace at the bottom of judgement,,;27 
Geismar maintains that "this inner fusion is a rediscovery of authentic Lutheranism and 
should, according to Kierkegaard, prevent Christianity from becoming secularized.,,28 "It 
is Luther's honor," Geismar writes, "never to have forgotten his theologia crucis; it is the 
2'1<.ierkegaards dogmatiska askadning i dess historiska sammanhang (Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans 
Diakonistyrelses Bokforlag, 1925),487. The absence of the certainty of salvation as a present possession has 
as its correlate, for Bohlin, that "Kierkegaard never did really arrive at 'the freedom of a Christian' in his 
personal life, but in a certain sense always stood under 'the law'" (p.483). 
2SSoren Kierkegaard. Der christliche Denker und sein Werk (Berlin: Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1929),347 n. 473. 
The similarities noted by Ruttenbeck include the hiddenness of God and its accompanying dialectic, the 
"uncertainty" of faith, the subjectivity in which self-understanding consists, the stress upon the abasement of 
Christ and the offense that it prompts. Elsewhere (pp. 304-11) in discussing the characteristics that dialectical 
theology has in common with Kierkegaard, Ruttenbeck frequently uses language that is, in fact, Luther's. 
Dialectical theology and Kierkegaard are said to work with a concept of God as the Deus absconditus who is 
most deeply hidden precisely when he reveals himself, whose "back side" is ever turned toward his children, 
whose grace appears to be judgement, whose heaven seems like hell (p. 305). Christ is designated "the 
skandalon," faith in him as a "dare," a "leap into the void," into "the uncertain" (p. 307). While such turns of 
phrase certainly call to mind Kierkegaard, they conjure forth Luther with equal felicity. 
21Jie Lehre von der Sunde, dargestellt an dem Verhaltnis der Lehre Soren Kierkegaards zur neuesten 
Theologie (Gutersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1927). "In this fundamental question the most recent theology is fully 
in agreement with Kierkegaard; it, in particular, wants to elevate the theologia crucis to the decisive principle 
of all theological thinking once again" (p. 22). 
27Kierkegaard-Studien, Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Dritte Studie, 286-87 (888-89). 
28"Kierkegaard und Luther," Monatsschrift fUr Pastoraltheologie 25 (October-November 1929):229. Geismar 
observes: "Von Jesus Christus geht ein alles umfassendes Gericht aus, mit dem Bruch und den Leiden des 
Gerichts. Aber tiefer noch als das Gericht, gewissermal3en mit dem Gericht identisch, liegt Gottes unverander-
liche Gnade, die dem Leben Freimut in dem Gericht gibt. Und selbstversUindlich ist der Sinn des Ganzen, dal3 
aus derempfangenen Gnade ein Streben der Dankbarkeit entspringen soll,ein freiwilliges Streben, ob auch dies 
Streben immerfort in das Gericht wieder hineinfuhrt. Die Bewegung wiederholdt sich immer. Simul justus et 
peccator ist auch fUr Kierkegaard die Wahrheit" (p.231). 
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significance of Kierkegaard that he brought this theolo~ia crucis to bear against a secularized 
Christianity with unrelenting earnestness. ,,29 Henning Schroer observes that both Geismar 
and Hirsch are indebted to Holl for this basic understanding of Kierkegaard.30 And despite 
Geismar's disagreement with the Kierkegaard-interpretation of Barth in otherrespects, there 
29Ibid., 228. Cf. p. 237: "Das Verhaltnis zwischen Luther und Kierkegaard kann ... wie ich schon gesagt 
habe, so ausgedrUckt werden: Kierkegaard hat alle Mittel des Dichtens und Denkens darauf eingesetzt, die 
theologia crucis wieder in der lutherischen Kirche gel tend zu machen, in der Uberzeugung, daB wenn die 
theQlogia crucis ubersprungen wird, der Protestantismus die chronische Verweltlichung des Christentums 
wiirde. Wenn ich Kierkegaard so hoch schiitze, so beruht es darauf, daB ich in dieser Betrachtung mit ihm einig 
bin." 
In addition to his general description of SK's authorship as a reassertion of the theology of the cross 
vis-a.-vis a decadent Lutheranism, Geismar draws a considerable number of more specific parallels between 
Kierkegaard's presentation of Christianity and Luther's. For Luther the cross of Christ is experienced both as 
sacramentum and exemplum: inasmuch as our suffering under the cross has to do with God's judgement upon 
our sin, on the one hand, and Christ's vicarious sacrifice, on the other, the cross is sacramentum: but inasmuch 
as our suffering under the cross has to do with following in Christ's footsteps and suffering persecution for his 
sake, his cross is exemplum. Kierkegaard presents both aspects with unrivalled clarity (p. 228). In addition, 
he has arrived at the experience of grace in and through judgement as a result of the collapse of ethical 
idealism--precisely as did Luther (p. 230). Kierkegaard shares Luther's conception of sin as involving the whole 
person and as disclosed only through a revelation (p. 232). Faith, for SK, means accepting God's judgement 
and resting in his grace which has thus been set in motion. The greatest sin is to despair of the forgiveness of 
sin (p. 233). Kierkegaard and Luther alike deny that faith's certainty entails repose: "Alles Christliche ist nach 
Kierkegaard dadurch erkennbar, daB jede Bestimmung ihren Gegensatz enthalt, die GewiBheit die UngewiBheit, 
die Freude das Leiden usw." (p. 233). For Kierkegaard as for Luther, Anfechtung is "eine tief erlebte Reaktion 
Gottes dem Sunder gegeniiber, sie geht von dem heiligen Gott aus und wird so empfunden, als wiirde man 
abgesetzt undmit Gewalt von Gottes Nahe abgewiesen" (p. 237). Geismar notes that, like Luther, Kierkegaard 
suffered greatly from such Anfechtungen: only by means of the master's help (after "discovering" him in 1847) 
did SK attain to a measure of spiritual wholeness: "Ibm war es auBerordentlich schwer, an Gottes Gnade zu 
glauben, er hatte grade Luther selbst notig, urn das zu lemen. Er war wie dazu geschaffen, die theologia crucis 
wieder zu entdecken, und er war dagegen gesichert, diese theologia zu verlemen. Ibm ist das Gebet das einzig 
magtiche: So gib du in der Reue den Freimut, wieder Eines zu wollen. Nur in der Reue kann er den Freimut 
finden; ihn auf einer andem Stelle zu finden, ware fUr ihn Oberflachlichkeit gewesen. Die Reue ist der stetige 
Hintergrund der Gnade" (p. 239). 
These are some principal points at which Geismar finds a strong convergence between Kierkegaard 
and Luther--particularly the Luther of the Lectures on Romans. Geismar does not, however, play down the 
dissimilarities: e.g., SK's movement toward increasing asceticism and world-denial, which contrasts strongly 
with Luther's movement away from them. 
JO"Kierkegaard und Luther," 231 and 232. Schroer also regards Geismar, Hirsch and Bohlin as having been 
influenced by Holl in terms of the tendency to see Kierkegaard and Luther against the backdrop of a failed 
ethical idealism and its unconditional requirement (more precisely, the ethical idealism of Kant and Fichte) (p. 
233). 
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can be no doubt that his recognition of the centrality of the theology of the cross for under-
standing Kierkegaard owes to the stimulus supplied by him as well.3! 
Geismar is the only Kierkegaard scholar who has, to my knowledge, taken Luther's 
theolo~a crucis as the crucial interpretive key for understanding the significance of SK's 
authorship, though, lamentably, he does so in the limited confines of the cited article. The 
other early scholars (mentioned above) offer but passing comments concerning the similari-
ties that they have seen between Kierkegaard's and Luther's theologies of the cross--similar-
ities that had no doubt already been set in bold relief by the ascendancy of dialectical 
theology and the Luther-scholarship of the day, and therefore not in need of greater elabora-
tion. But in the decades since this first wave of Kierkegaard-scholarship, rather less notice 
has been taken of the theology of the cross as a means of evaluating Kierkegaard's theology 
vis-a-vis Luther's.32 This is particularly true of English-speaking scholarship which 
31See Jens Holger Schj0rring, "Barth - Geismar -Tidehverv," Dansk Teologisk Tidsskrift 39 (1976):79-83. 
While Geismar drew inspiration for histheologia crucis interpretation ofKierkegaard from both Karl Barth and 
Karl Holl, he was clearly closer to the school of Holl and his pupil, Emanuel Hirsch. Geismar was greatly 
concerned lest the all-consuming krisis proclaimed by Barth preclude even the possibility of "a theologically 
legitimate description of human obligations." His desire was to "retain the judgement, but without bursting the 
parameters for public life." Schj0rring notes that Geismar found in Holl's exposition of Luther's concept of the 
conscience "an authority that was suited to maintaining the seriousness of ethics' demands. II Like Holl and 
Hirsch, Geismar found in Kierkegaard no radical discontinuity between Christianity and the universally human, 
but rather a "connection that Christianity establishes to the human obligations" (p. 82). Along this line, Henning 
Schroer observes that Geismar was wont to cite Pap Xl A 59 (JP 2: 1383) as evidence that SK dialectically 
protects his leitmotif of "the infinitc1y deep qualitative distinction between God and man" from the use made 
of it by Barth in the forward to the second edition ofDer Romerbrief ("Kierkegaard und Luther," 232). In this 
particular entry SK writes: 'Notwithstanding that there naturally could be nothing, unconditionally nothing 
meritorious about any work ... ,everything nevertheless depends upon one's daring, in a childlike way, to get 
involved with God.'" 
32Henning Schroer, for example, observes that next treatments of Kierkegaard's relationship to Luther to 
come along were those of K. E. L0gstrup ("Die Kategorie und das Amt der Verkiindigung im Hinblick auf 
Luther und Kierkegaard" in 1949) and Ht:rmann Diem (Die Existenzdialektik yon SOren Kierkegaard in 1950). 
Schroer writes: "DaB Diem iiberhaupt nicht auf die Arbeiten von Bohlin, Geismar und Hirsch zu unserem 
Thema eingegangen ist, empfinde ich als Mangel. Dagegen hat er Stellung zu L0gstrups Aufsatz genommen, 
in dem 'die Kategorie und das Amt der Verkiindigung im Hinblick auf Luther und Kierkegaard' verglichen 
worden sind" ("Kierkegaard und Luther," 235). To my knowledge this overleaping of the earlier interpreters 
holds true of many of the more recent treatments of SK's theological relationship to Luther. Many have given 
either limited attention or--more frequently--no attention at all, to the manifestly Lutheran "cross" elements of 
SK's thought. Hermann Deuser's book (Dialektische Theologie. Studien zu Adornos MetaDhysik und zum 
Sp1itwerk Kierkegaards [Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1980]) strikes me as an exception inasmuch as it seeks 
to view SK's late work as a self-critical moment of Lutheran theology, taking traditional rubrics such as servum 
arbitrium. simul iustus et peccator. finitum est capax infiniti, Deus absconditus, etc., as loci of such self-
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overwhelmingly proceeds not from a theological standpoint, but from a philosophical one 
(whether it be analytic-philosophical, existential, or now, deconstructionist). lt might, 
indeed, not be too strong a claim were one to maintain that the shared "cross framework" of 
Luther and Kierkegaard, though a foregone conclusion on the continent earlier this century, 
has never been adequately observed in the English-speaking context. The present work 
seeks, among other things, to remedy this deficiency by delineating the similarities that 
obtain between Luther's and Kierkegaard's respective theologies in chapters one and two. 
lt also seeks--in an admittedly tentative way--to redress yet another glaring lacuna 
that afflicts research into the relationship of Kierkegaard to Luther: viz., the issue of how 
Kierkegaard came to adopt a theological framework so similar to Luther's (given the vast 
array of correspondences, this is a question that, it seems to me, absolutely begs for an 
answer). As noted, Luther's writings were not studied at the theology faculties of the day. 
The notion of a "theology of the cross" was not a current one--it was not associated with 
Luther's theology at all (such association did not occur until the highly inadequate 
treatments of it given by Theodosius Harnack and others later on in the century3\ And as 
also noted, any substantial direct acquaintance on the part of Kierkegaard with Luther's 
writings did not come until 1847. Nevertheless all the earmarks of Luther's theology of the 
cross are present in SK's writings prior to that time. How did they get there? In chapter three 
I will suggest that the uncanny likeness that Kierkegaard's thinking bears to Luther's is due 
to the influence of Johann Georg Hamann, that archfoe of the Enlightenment whom 
Kierkegaard did avidly read while yet a student and who was also the 18th century's most 
criticism. In general Deuser seeks, via Kierkegaard and Adorno, to rehabilitate the notions "paradox" and 
"dialectic" for use in theology once again. Still other continental Luther scholars--one thinks particularly of 
Valter Lindstrom and Per L0nning--interpret SK out of the Lutheran dogmatic tradition, taking into account 
the earlier generation of Kierkegaard scholars. But no one has, to my knowledge, exhaustively explored the 
affinities of the cross elements of Kierkegaard's thought with those of Luther. 
33See Walther von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 5th printing, rev. (Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1967), 
11 n. 2 (Luther'S Theology of the Cross, trans. Herbert J. A. Bouman [Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing 
House, 1976), 169 n. 2). 
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acute student of Luther.34 Such an account of the origins of Kierkegaard's thought will 
serve not only to explain the hitherto unexplained convergence between SK and Luther--it 
will also point up the divergence that later announces itself in their respective attitudes 
toward a number of theological issues. In comparing SK with Luther and Hamann on these 
points one will hardly escape the conclusion of Hirsch and others that influences of 
romantic-idealist provenance are at work upon SK's theology as well. 
Following the chapter on Hamann a provisional account of Kierkegaard's teaching 
on grace is undertaken in chapter four. It is based upon the previously demonstrated 
theologia crucis tenets and yields an understanding of grace that is consistent with Luther's 
own: grace as a divine operation that manifests itself paradoxically under the aspect of 
human freedom. Lest it be thought that the ostensible monergism of this conclusion 
inadmissibly harmonizes the determinist, Luther, with the "existentialist," Kierkegaard, SK's 
conception of the will is explored in chapter five. The result of this investigation, however, 
only corroborates the prior finding: Kierkegaard is shown to share Luther's conviction 
concerning the bondage of the will and the impossibility of a synergistic understanding of 
conversIon. 
Were this all that is to be said about Kierkegaard's teaching on grace, we could 
conclude our study at this point. But it is not all that is to be said, for it is based upon the 
Kierkegaard of the early and middle periods, and as we noted in our opening remarks, the 
late Kierkegaard is not only less well-disposed toward Luther, but less inclined to think in 
traditionally Lutheran ways. Some account must be given of the swing away from Luther. 
~ile some Luther and Hamann scholars have pointed out Hamann's debt to Luther, and a few 
Kierkegaard scholars have acknowledged Kierkegaard's debt to Hamann, a common thread linking the three 
has not, to my knowledge, been recognized. Neither has the full extent of Kierkegaard's debt to Hamann. For 
example, so eminent a scholar as Hirsch disposes of Kierkegaard's relation to Hamann in a mere paragraph. 
After observing the parallel that Hamann draws between law and reason--one that Kierkegaard finds "recht 
interessant"--Hirsch concludes: "Nimmt man noch hinzu, daB Hamann ihm der Vermittler zu Sokrates 
geworden ist und daB die (vor Hamann in seinen Gesichtskreis getretnen) Begriffe Ironie und Humor von nun 
an durch Hamann in ihm zu immer neu iiberdachten ernstlichen Denkaufgaben werden, so ist aber auch aile 
entscheidende Einwirkung Hamanns erschOpft" (Kierkegaard-Studien. Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Erste 
Studie, 44 [490], emphasis added). Hirsch utterly fails to see that, though Kierkegaard's acquaintance with 
Hamann has not led him directly to Luther, the possibility nevertheless exists that Hamann has served as an 
indirect mediating link: "Wunderlich ist, daB ihm [Kierkegaard] Hamann damals nicht gleich Brucke zu Luther 
geworden ist" (pp. 43-44 [489-90], n. 3). 
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Chapter six seeks to do this by surveying the factors that led to Kierkegaard's initial enthusi-
asm for the refonner (factors that had mainly to do with SK's discovery of his own 
theological principles in Luther) as well as the factors that lay behind his final disillu-
sionment with him. Two ends are sought by this historical study of SK's changing relation-
ship to Luther. First, it seeks to enlarge upon other such studies, all of which attempt a 
detennination of the dynamics (whether situational or theological) that were operative in 
SK's widening breach with Luther.35 In so doing it hopes to contribute to an area that even 
today requires further research.36 And secondly, it sets the stage for the subject matter of 
the latter part of the dissertation: viz., the non-Lutheran elements that are tacitly present 
from the very beginning in Kierkegaard's theology and that increasingly gain the ascen-
dancy. These are elements that significantly qualify SK's cross perspective--and ultimately 
his teaching on grace--so that these cannot in the final analysis be simply equated with Lu-
ther's. Yet they come fully to light only in the final attack against Luther and Lutheranism. 
Chapter seven takes up the situational elements that cause a skewing in Kierke-
gaard's theology of the cross during the middle and late periods so that he departs from 
Luther. For reasons of a sociological-historical sort (and reasons grounded in his psyche as 
well) Kierkegaard's own variant of the theologia clUcis is characterized by a "remaining 
standing" at the cross. Naturally SK's incessant and quite one-sided emphasis upon painful 
contemporaneity with Christ in his abasement is a didactic measure calculated to shake the 
church out of its complacency, compelling it to take up its commission anew to be a church 
militant. But his fear of contributing to the conceit that the church already has triumphed 
in time causes him to eschew every consideration of the exalted Christ's presence in his 
3SE.g., Eduard Geismar, "Wie urteilte Kierkegaard tiber Luther?" !&ther-lahrbuch 10 (1928): 1-2 7; Hermann 
Diem, "Kierkegaard und Luther," in Die Existenzdialektik von S. Kierkegaard (Ztirich: Evangelischer Verlag 
Zollikon, 1950), 155-81 ("Kierkegaard and Luther," in Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence. trans. Harold 
Knight [Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957], 158-84); Viggo Mortensen, "Luther og Kierkegaard," in 
Kierkegaardiana IX, ed. S0ren Kierkegaard Selskabet by Niels Thulstrup (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde og Bagger, 
1974), esp. pp. 171-181; Regin Prenter, "Luther and Lutheranism," 121-72; Henning Schroer, "Kierkegaard 
und Luther," 237-44. 
36Schroer writes: "Hirsch hat, weil er in seinen Kierkegaard-Studien 'das lehrreiche Fragmal "Kierkegaards 
Urteil tiber Luther" nicht historisch erschOpfend' behandeln konnte, dort erkliirt: 'Hier ist Raum fUr eine 
Sonderuntersuchung' (838). Er hat sie selbst aber nicht durchgefiihrt, sie bleibt bis heute Desiderat" 
("Kierkegaard und Luther," 227-28). 
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Church, and consequently, to ignore the proleptic nature of redemption in this life. Instead 
Kierkegaard focuses entirely upon the individual in the situation of contemporaneity with 
the suffering Prototype. Thus does SK's situational concern effect a downplaying, a 
distortion--and in its extreme consequence, even a denial--of such dogmas as the church and 
marriage. The emphasis upon suffering as the sole locus of the God-relationship also makes 
of suffering a kind of law. In all of these ways we see a departure from traditional Christian 
dogma that could perhaps be justified by an orthodox defender of Kierkegaard if it could be 
attributed entirely to the exigencies of Kierkegaard's extraordinary situation. 
But it cannot. Behind the critique of Luther and Lutheranism there also lies an 
ideational component that sets Kierkegaard's theology quite at odds with that of Luther in 
the ways descdbed above. That component is to be traced to the romantic-idealist roots of 
SK's existential dialectic. It is, paradoxically, the Hegelian influence upon Kierkegaard's 
anthropology (though Fichte and Schelling also come into play) that, in the end, forces him 
to deny the significance of creation and its orders for the God-relationship. The absolute 
power that is accorded finite subjectivity in constructing itself and its world, together with 
the "deworldization" and overdrawn "superhumanity" that ensue therefrom (posited is a 
pro~essus toward becoming absolute "spirit"), have repercussions not only for SK's anthro-
pology, but for nearly every other doctrine, whether it be creation, church, scripture, ethics, 
christology, soteriology--and yes, grace. Chapter eight explores the romantic-idealist roots 
of the existential dialectic and the impact of that dialectic, over time, upon a broad range of 
theological issues as Kierkegaard draws its implications with increasing consistency. 
The end goal of this study, however, is to come to terms with Kierkegaard's 
understanding of grace: just how Lutheran is it? Accordingly the final chapter analyzes 
utterances from the middle and late periods in which an "indulgence" understanding of grace 
comes increasingly to the fore (i.e., a provisional reduction in spirit's demands). Grace qua 
"indulgence" effectively asserts the continuing claim of Christian ideality (with intermittent 
rescissions), forestalling the abuse of forgiveness by keeping the individual in striving. 
Kierkegaard defends this postulate of a species of "grace" beyond mere forgiveness on the 
ground that forgiveness can apply only to the past, and that some other provision must be 
made for the future. This sharp disjunction between the respective spheres of influence of 
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forgiveness (the past) and indulgence/ requirement (the immediate future) coincides with a 
bifurcation in SKIS christology: the office of Christ the Model (which holds sway during the 
situation of contemporaneity) is distinct from, and essentially unqualified by, that of Christ 
the Redeemer (which goes into effect after our failure to fulfill contemporaneity's demands). 
This grace teaching and christology in effect deny the present applicability of redemption; 
seeking to forestall an over-realized eschatology, they posit an under-realized one (chapter 
seven). The "fissure" in SKIS christology is, in particular, attributable to the equation of one 
of its halves--Christ qua Model--with "absolute spirit" (chapter eight). This fissure cannot 
be overcome however much Kierkegaard may try, and in the end his understanding of the 
Christian life is inevitably characterized by the alternating hegemony of two Christs: the 
Christ who is the embodiment of the superhuman demands of "absolute spirit," and the 
Christ who embodies pure forgiveness. Kierkegaard is not able to hold fast the simultaneity 
of judgement and grace that obtains in the theologia crucis, a simultaneity wherein the law 
is continually present, but as overcome by grace. Consequently Barth's charge of legalism 
with which we began is confirmed: on the late Kierkegaard's schema, Christians are 
repeatedly bereft of grace and thrown back onto a soteriology according to which they strive, 
unassisted, to realize the infinite demands of spirit. 
This compromise of the Lutheran teaching on grace that is effected by the late 
Kierkegaard amounts, in his own eyes, to the spiritual use of the law brought to bear against 
the abuse of grace by a decadent Lutheranism. It is by no means intended to abolish the need 
of grace, but to impel all to flee rightly unto grace. Certainly if one prescinds from the 
criticism just brought (viz., that it in principle bars reliance upon forgiveness in the present, 
thereby forcing Christ to assume the role of judge), the Pattern - Redeemer dialectic serves 
as an apt description of the Christian's experience of law and gospel; indeed, to the "old 
man," Christ does assume the role of judge. Moreover Kierkegaard's understanding of the 
movement from repentance to faith as an ever repeated movement, with faith providing the 
point of departure for "imitation," bears a striking resemblance to what Wilfried Joest has 
designated the "partial" or progressive aspect of Christian existence. These elements of 
Kierkegaard's presentation of the Christian life, together with the cross elements outlined 
in the early chapters, lend credence to the claim that, despite his divergence from Luther on 
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key points, Kierkegaard has taken up Luther's mantel as perhaps no other theologian of the 
nineteenth century. By championing the theology of the cross within the context of a 
decadent Lutheranism, Kierkegaard has demonstrated its indispensability as a self-critical 
moment of Lutheran theology. Eduard Geismar writes: 
After having gained insight into Luther's theologia crucis it has become easy for me 
to say what Kierkegard's primary significance is within the Lutheran church: just as 
it is Luther's distinction never to have given up the theol02ia crucis, so is it 
Kierkegaard's significance to have reintroduced it at a time when it had vanished. If 
one is of the opinion that the Lutheran form of piety becomes secularized when the 
theolofPa crucis is forgotten, we have here a standpoint from which Kierkegaard's 
significance can become clear.3? 
One might add that the theology of the cross is a self-critical moment of all theology, a 
moment that all theology--not just Lutheranism--forgets at its peril. Yet any formulation of 
it that unduly obscures--or silences--"the deep and secret 'yes' that is under and above the 
'no,,,,38 is subject to an opposite tendency than that of secularization. And this, too, belongs 
to Kierkegaard's theological legacy. 
37Religionsfilosofi. En Undersf3gelse afhvad Religion og Kristendom er, 2ded. (Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads 
Forlag, 1930), 342. 
3SW A 17u, 203. 
CHAPTER ONE 
LUTHER'S THEOLOGY OF THE CROSS 
At the heart of the theological program set forth by Luther's Heidelberg Disputation 
(1518) lies a distinctive principle of cognition.! It has even been suggested that this 
principle provides "the point of departure not only for a theological, but for a universal 
theory of knowledge. ,,2 While it is undeniably true that Luther's theology of the cross is the 
product of a theoretical insight with considerable explanatory powers, it is also the case that, 
like his theology as a whole, it grows out of a practical context and is a critical response to 
it. The immediate situation eliciting the Ninety-five Theses (1517) was, of course, the prac-
tice of selling indulgences. The Heidelberg Disputation begins at the very point at which the 
Ninety-five Theses leave off insofar as it carries the attack one stage further to the theoretical 
outlook allied to the suspect praxis. Luther coins the term theol02ia 210riae to describe that 
outlook's underlying attitude. 
The theology of glory is the attempt to know God's invisible nature through his 
created works. Luther rejects this approach in theses nineteen and twenty of the Heidelberg 
Disputation, saying, 
The one who beholds what is invisible of God, through the perception of what is 
made, is not rightly called a theologian. But rather the one who perceives what is 
visible of God, God's 'backside,' by beholding the sufferings and the cross.3 
(Walther von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis. 5th printing, rev. (Witten: Luther-Verl~g, 1967),16 
(Luther'S Theology of the Cross, trans. Herbert 1. A. Bouman [Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 
1976], 13). 
2Edmund Schlink, "Weisheit und Torheit," Kerygma und Dogma. Zeitschrift fUr theologische Forschung 
und kirchliche Lehre 1 (1955):19. 
3WA 1, 354, 17ff. ("Theses for the Heidelberg Disputation," trans. Karlfried Froehlich, in Martin Luther: 
Selections from His Writings. ed. John Dillenberger [Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961],502). 
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The pseudo-theologian referred to in thesis nineteen is the practitioner of the 
scholastic method. Since the time of Peter Lombard (1100-60) it had been held that human 
beings excelled other creatures, in part, because of a unique faculty of intellectual 
apprehension, intellectus. By its exercise in concert with the lower faculties, humans had 
access to the invisible spiritual world. Such intellectual illumination did not overleap God's 
created works, but ascended from them.4 Luther's rejection of intellectus as a point of 
contact with the divine is characteristic of his consistent rejection of every attempt at 
knowing God that would proceed from beneath upwards.s Since the advent of sin, if God 
is to be known at all this can only occur through an act of divine condescension into the 
visibilia of cross and suffering. Luther can speak of "seeing" God in such visible things; he 
can even speak of "understanding" (intelli~ere);6 yet such understanding is not that of reli-
gious speculation, but of faith. 
A certain ambiguity, however, exists in Luther's use of the word "works," for in the 
explanation that he offers for thesis twenty-one he speaks not of God's creative works but 
of the ethical works of human beings. Similarly, in that same explanation Luther plays upon 
the meaning of the word "cross." No longer does it have reference simply to the cross of 
Christ, but to that of the Christian as well: 
He who does not know Christ does not know God hidden in suffering. Therefore he 
prefers works to suffering, glory to the cross .... These are the people whom the 
apostle calls "enemies of the cross of Christ," for they hate the cross and suffering 
and love works and the glory of works .... [By contrast] the friends of the cross say 
that the cross is good and works are evil, for through the cross works are dethroned 
and the old Adam, who is especially edified by works, is crucified. It is impossible 
for a person not to be puffed up by his good works unless he has first been deflated 
4Hans Joachim Iwand, "Theologia Crucis," in Nachgelassene Werke, ed. Helmut Gollwitzer, Walter Kreck, 
Karl Gerhard Steck, and Ernst Wolf (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1966),2:385. 
5Luther denies the fitness of any of the faculties to which medieval theology had ascribed the knowledge 
of God. Intellectus. or man's capacity for apprehending invisible realities (and hence, the seat of the 
consciousness of God); synteresis, or man's moral faculty; and finally, ratio (reason)--a function that had 
already been relegated to a status beneath, and in opposition to, fuk.s. (faith) and auctoritas (authority) by 
Occam--all are incapable of cognizing God. After the Fall, human beings are bereft of anypointof contact with 
the divine. For closer discussion of Luther's attitude toward the above faculties the reader is referred to von 
Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 54-86 (52-77). 
1wand, "Theologia Crucis," 386. 
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and destroyed by suffering and evil until he knows that he is worthless and that his 
works are not his but God's.7 
The deliberate ambiguity of Luther's usage of "works" and "cross" signifies that 
epistemology and ethics are not unrelated; rather, they are mutually conditioning. As applied 
to Luther's adversaries this means that religious speculation and works-holiness are theoreti-
cal and practical manifestations of one and the same demand for direct intercourse with 
God.s The theolo~a gloriae, like works-righteousness, is an expression of human pride that 
would attain to God by its own powers. This indicates why it is destined to failure from the 
start. It is a manifestation of the selfsame sinful impulse that, in the beginning, rendered 
creation a closed book to man. With the Apostle Paul (Romans I :21-22) Luther concludes 
that sinful humans cannot, and must not, try to know God by reason of works (ex operibus), 
but rather, through suffering and cross (per passiones et crucem). Here, too, we see the con-
vergence of theory and praxis. God is known by the means through which he has chosen to 
reveal himself: through the cross of Christ, the meaning of which is only disclosed to those 
who themselves stand under the shadow of the cross and suffering. 
It has often been observed that a great many "theologies of the cross" preceded 
Luther's, and that common to them all was a shared conviction about the necessity of 
suffering for a true knowledge of God. Moreover each such theology was, in its own way, 
a reaction to the perceived aridity of scholastic thinking. There can be no doubt that Luther's 
theologia crucis belongs in the company of these, for it did not arise in a vacuum. In addition 
to its manifest debt to Paul, Luther's theology was influenced by the devotio modema, 
humility, and mystical traditions that preceded it.9 Nevertheless Luther's understanding of 
7WA 1,362 (LW 31, 53). 
sPaul Althaus, "Die Bedeutung des Kreu7..es im Denken Luthers," Luther. Vierteliahrsschrift der 
Luthergesellschaft 8 (1926):100. 
9Enough so that von Loewenich can claim: "A study of the Imitation [Thomas a Kempis's book] shows 
clearly that Luther could never have arrived at his theology of the cross if he had not been a monk" 
(Luthers Theo10gia Crucis. 191 [164 D. Martin Elze has pointed out the affinities of Luther to late medieval 
spirituality ("Ztige spatmittelalterlicher Frommigkeit in Luthers Theologie," Zeitschrift fUr Theologie und 
Kirche 62 [1965]:381-402), though Erwin Iserloh warns, "still there are decisive differences to be noted," 
("Luther's Christ-Mysticism," in Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther. ed. Jared Wicks [Chicago: Loyola 
University Press, 1970], 40). 
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Luther encountered the humility tradition at firsthand in the theology of his mentor, Johann von 
Staupitz. Staupitz taught that the way of salvation is a way of judgement and humiliation: the one who suffers 
himself to be humbled by God's judgement will be exalted, since this is how God effects the humility by which 
the sinner is made righteous. Ernst Bizer points out the similarities between the theology of the Dictata super 
Psalterium (1513-15) and Staupitz's teachings (Fides ex Auditu. Eine Untersuchung tiber die Entdeckung der 
Gerechtigkeit Gottes durch Martin Luther, 3d ed. [Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1966], 19-22). The work of 
David C. Steinmetz affords the most recent scholarship on the relation ofStaupitz's theology to that of Luther: 
Misericordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes von Staupitz in Its Late Medieval Setting (Leiden: E. 1. Brill, 
1969) and Luther and Staupitz: An Essay on the Intellectual Origins of the Protestant Reformation, Duke 
Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, no. 4 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1980). 
Finally, the late medieval mystical work, Eyn theologia deutsch, together with the sermons of 
Johann Tauler impressed the young Luther greatly. Ofthe former Luther wrote in 1518: "No book except the 
Bible and St. Augustine has come to my attention from which I have learned more about God, Christ, man, and 
all things." Of the latter he wrote (also in 1518): "I have found in him more solid and sincere theology than is 
found in all the scholastic teachers of all the universities or than can be found in their propositions." Heiko 
Oberman and Erwin Iserloh maintain that this positive attitude was not merely fleeting; it remained essentially 
unchanged throughout Luther's life (Oberman, "'Simul Gemitus et Raptus': Luther and Mysticism," in The 
Dawn ofthe Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1986], 138-40; Iserloh, "Luther's Christ-Mysticism," 39). The basis for Luther's positive estimate is not far to 
seek: in many respects the theology of early medieval Augustinianism seems to have survived in the works of 
these German mystics (so contends A. V. Milller and Bengt Hagglund--see Hagglund, The Background of 
Luther's Doctrine of Justification in Late Medieval Theology. Facet Books, Historical Series, no. 18 
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971], 3). For example, both Tauler and the Frankfurter teach man's hopeless 
depravity; consequently each counsels complete inactivity or passivity (Le., selfless humility) as the way of 
salvation. This is carried to the point of acceding to God's righteous judgement, and so resigning oneself to hell 
(the resignatio ad infemum so familiar in the young Luther). The presupposition behind such passivity is that 
God is the active agent of salvation, effecting a supernatural righteousness in the soul through the "birth of 
God" in it, or mystic union with Christ. Still other parallels exist between the German Theology and Luther, 
particularly as regards their understanding of sin as self-will (incurvatus in se) and of the nature and role of 
Anfechtung in making a theologian (for a brief summary of parallels see Brian Gerrish, "By Faith Alone: 
Medium and Message in Luther's Gospel," in The Old Protestantism and the New. Essays on the Reformation 
Heritage [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982],313 n. 93). Finally, one other salient feature marks 
off "German mysticism" (along with "Latin mysticism"--Bemard, Bonaventure, Gerson, et al.) from "Dionysian 
mysticism" in Luther's mind: viz., its christocentricity. Whereas Dionysian mysticism regarded the incarnate 
Word as but a means to union with (or absorption into) the uncreated Word (and hence constituted for Luther 
a theology of glory), non-Dionysian mysticism regarded the incarnate Word as the unsurpassable object of such 
union, and hence held to the cross, God's indispensable potentia ordinata. 
A considerable body ofliterature exists on the relation of Luther and mysticism. Aside from the works 
already cited (and Eric Vogelsang's still influential study, "Luther und die Mystik," Luther-Jahrbuch 19 
[1937] :32-54), some of the more recent scholarship includes: Martin Brecht, "Randbemerkungen in Luthers 
Ausgaben der'Deutsch Theologia'," Luther-Jahrbuch 47 (1980):11-32; Bengt Hoffmann, Luther and the 
Mystics: A Re-Examination of Luther's Spiritual Experience and His Relationship to the Mystics (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Publishing House, 1976); Karl-Heinz zur Milhlen, Nos extra nos: Luthers Theologie zwischen 
Mystik und Scholastik, Beitrage zur historischen Theologie, no. 46 (Tilbingen: 1. B. C. Mohr, 1972) and 
"Mystik des Wortes," Zeitwende 52 (1981):205-25; Steven E. Ozment, "Eckhart and Luther: German 
Mysticism and Protestantism," The ThQmist 42 (1978):259-80 and Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study 
of the AnthrQpology Qf Johannes Tauler. Jean GersQn and Martin Luther (1509-1516) in the CQntext of Their 
TheQlogical ThQught(Leiden: E. 1. Brill, 1969); and Reinhold Schwartz, "MystischerGlaube--die Brautmystik 
Martin Luthers," Zeitwende 52 (1981):193-205. 
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the cross distinguishes itself from most of its medieval antecedents in that Christ's cross qua 
exemplum plays a markedly subordinate role. lo Overriding significance is attached to 
Christ's cross qua sacramentum. Our cross of sin and judgement is part and parcel of His 
cross as sacrament, from which ensues derivatively the cross of imitation. In bearing the 
latter the Christian seeks not to replicate the way of salvation blazed by Christ the example. 
Rather, in the strength of Christ the sacrament he seeks to take up those crosses that are 
given by God in the course of mundane life, crosses of His own choosing. I I For Luther the 
I~is of course does not hold true of the early Luther--the Luther of the Dictata (1513-15), Lectures on 
Romans (1515-16) and Lectures on HebrewS (1517), who views Christ's work largely in tenns of Augustine's 
exemplum/sacramentum distinction (De Trinitate. bk. 4,chap. 3, par. 6), using it in a manner typical of the day. 
Early on in this period, Luther is under the sway of the tropological interpretation of scripture. Whereas the 
literal sense has to do with Christ, who is the principal sense of all Scripture, what is said uniquely of him 
nevertheless has tropological application to the individual Christian. This interpretive schema lends itself to 
stress upon Christ as exemplum (so, too, do the Dictata's Neo-Platonic contrasts between "shadow" and 
"reality," "sensible" and "intelligible," "exemplar" and "image"--see Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the 
Gospel. New Light upon Luther's Way from Medieval Catholicism to Evangelical Faith [Saint Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1951],61-62). On this schema Christ is the pattern of the way in which God deals 
with Christians. The way that Christ trod is the way that the Christian must go: a way of utmost humiliation 
and hidden exaltation, a way whose reality is not what it appears, a way along which the Christian, by hope, 
is transfonned into that for which he hopes. In a word: the way of salvation is the way of humility, as 
exemplified by Christ (Bizer, Fides ex Auditu, 27). 
Matters do not remain thus. As Nonnan Nagel documents, the sacramentumlexemplum fonnula proves 
inadequate to the young Luther's emerging understanding of justification. "Sacramentum is the loser to 
exemplum as long as [Christ's] death is thought of paradigmatically and not as unique and vicarious. When 
Christ's death is first of all a saving death such as only He could die, and not first of all a death that provides 
the paradigm of dying, then its unique achievement can be fully apprehended" ("Sacramentum et exemplum 
in Luther's Understanding of Christ," in Luther for an Ecumenical Age: Essays in Commemoration of the 450th 
Anniversaty of the Refonnation, ed. Carl S. Meyer [Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967], 182). 
Accordingly, the weight is increasingly transferred from Christ's passion qua exemplar of God's way of 
salvation to his passion qua sign of salvation with the power to effect what it signifies. Even where this process 
is not yet complete--as in the Lectures on Romans and Lectures on Hebrews--Luther's teaching that true 
humility is the work of God, effected by his word of judgement, already gives the priority to Christ's cross as 
sacramentum. 
IIRegin Prenter writes: "Das Kreuz, das unsere Werke zerschliigt, ist ... kein 'selbstgewahltes' Kreuz, wie 
in so vielen Fonnen mittelalterlicher Kreuzesmystik. Denn in diesem FaIle ware ja eben das Tragen des 
Kreuzes ein gutes Werk geworden. Nein, das Kreul, das uns und un sere Werke zunichte macht, ist das Kreul, 
das in den wirklichen Leiden und Anfechtungen un seres eigenen Lebens tiber uns kommt. Weil es aber fiber 
uns kommt und nicht von uns selbst gewablt wird, ist es in einer geheimnisvollen Weise mit dem Kreuze Jesu 
Christi identisch. Sein Kreuz wird von Gott uns zum Heil auf uns gelegt, damit der SUnder gekreuzigt werde 
und ein neuer gerechter Mensch auferstehe .... Diese geheimnisvolle Identitat des Kreuzes Jesu Christi auf 
Golgatha mit meinem eigenen Kreuz ist das Wesentliche in der Kreu7.estheologie Luthers, das jede Idee einer 
'Nachfolge' des Gekreuzigten als eines 'guten Werkes', als 'frommer Ubung'radikal aufhebt. Die Theologie des 
Kreuzes, nach der das Kreuz meines eigenen Lebens alle meine Eigengerechtigkeit zerschlagt und so das am 
Krellze Christi fiber mich gefallte Urteil in meinem Leben vollzieht, damit ich nur noch in dem stellvertretenden 
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difference is crucial. To the extent that the aforementioned theologies of the cross (including 
his own in its earliest version) attend principally to Christ's example, they make of him a law 
and transfer the burden of salvation (psychological if not theological) to the person himself. 
They bear traces of the theolo~a gloriae against which they were a reaction. 1 2 
We have already indicated that the theoretical basis that Luther gives in support of 
his cross-principle of knowledge is the circumstance that pride has so blinded human 
powers of perception that God can no longer be known from works.13 Whatever dim light 
Kreuztragen Jesu Christi meine Gerechtigkeit vor Gott finde, ist also mit dem lutherischen Hauptartikel von 
der Rechtfertigung des SOnders allein durch den Glauben schlechthin identisch. Der rechtfertigende Glaube, 
der als reine Zuflucht des SOnders zum stellvertretenden Leiden Jesu Christi die Verurteilung aller 
Eigengerechtigkeit in sich schliel3t, ist mithin selbst seinem Wesen nach ein Tragen des Kreuzes, wie wir es 
in der 2l. Heidelberger These hOrten" ("ZurTheologie des Kreuzes bei Luther," in Theologie und Gouesdienst. 
Gesammelte Aufsatze [Arhus: Forlaget Aros, 1977],249-50). 
l1'bis tends to be true of the piety of the devotio moderna. Iserloh writes: "Luther was critical of such a 
piety, since for him it was not enough to immerse oneself only meditatively in the Passion of Christ and then 
to live out the Passion in an ethical-moral imitation of Christ. In fact, Luther forcefully denied any possibility 
of such a following of Christ, unless a man is first one with Christ in the depths ofhis person in a union which 
is prior to all deeds and which is usually not consciously experienced" ("Luther's Christ-Mysticism," 40). Such 
external imitation, however, is foreign to Tauler and the Frankfurter, for whom a prior sacramental union with 
Christ causes the Christian to be conformed unto his life and death. Moreover, this "birth of God" in the soul 
is viewed as the work of God, not man. This leads Hagglund to write of the German mystics: "It is therefore 
not true when it is said that mysticism knows Christ only as an example and empha<;i7..es in this connection only 
the imitation of Christ" (The Background of Luther's Doctrine of Justification, 15). Similarly, Brian Gerrish 
writes: "Mandel thought that the German Theology presented Christ as merely the ideal or the model for 
imitation, and the treatise does in fact seem, at points, to teach a naively exemplary concept of Christ's work 
and person: we are told, for instance, that as Christ's soul had to visit hell, this is the path also for the souls of 
men (chap. 11; cf. chap. 52). But the constant emphasis on the work of God within the soul transcends the 
category of example (see esp. chap. 9); and even if it is not a very prominent feature, the treatise does speak 
of sacramental participation in Christ (chap. 43)" ("By Faith Alone," 313 n. 97). Nevertheless, Gerrish also 
points out that disagreement exists among scholars concerning the alleged Augustinianism of the German 
mystics. Steven Ozment, for example, detects "even inthe subtle mystical form of passive resignation--a 'doing' 
which is a 'doing nothing'" (Mysticism and Dissent: Religious Ideology and Social Protest in the Sixteenth 
Century [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973],24; cf. Saarnivaara, who sees in the Seelengrund 
an uncorrupted divine kernel akin to the scholastics' synteresis [Luther Discovers the Gospel, 76]). But if 
German mysticism'S "doing nothing" does in fact bear traces of Semi-Pelagian ism's facere quod in se est, then 
the focus has most certainly, if subtly, been shifted--in this respect at least--to Christ as model. Depending upon 
whether German mysticism truly is Augustinian in its view ofwhat man can contribute toward salvation, it does 
or does not anticipate Luther's theology of the cross. 
13Thesis twenty-two (WA 1,362-63 [LW 31, 53-54]). Luther of course goes farther, maintaining that the 
depth of man's impairment is such that he no longer knows himself. The deportment of the theologians of glory 
testifies amply to this, for they neither know that their faculties are impaired, nor that this impairment is due 
to sin. In general, so corrupted are fallen man's powers of perception that he neither knows what sin is nor that 
it is present in him. Cf. W A 56, 229 (LW 25, 213-14): "Man of himself could not know that he such a person 
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of nature still remains to humanity's fallen faculties proves singularly unhelpful, for it is 
inevitably misused. Therefore no longer is God knowable through his effects (Thomas), but 
instead by his cross and suffering, or "back parts" (posteriora Dei) as Luther puts it, alluding 
to Exodus 33:18-23.14 There seems, however, to be an even more fundamental reason for 
the theology of glory's untenability as a cognitive principle than the debilitating effects of 
pride, for even in the absence of pride God remains fundamentally unknowable. The fact that 
God is transcendent rules out all knowledge of him as he is in himself. Fundamental to 
Luther's rejection of the knowledge God by his effects, then, is not only the sinful presump-
tion that vitiates it, but his strong sense of the transcendence of God, which can just as easily 
manifest itself in a manner contrary to what we customarily regard as his "effects." 
Luther frequently uses the designation, "naked deity" (Deus nudus), in referring to 
God as he is in himself--i.e., in his transcendent unknowability. Over against this he 
contrasts "God clothed" in his Word (Deus indutus). Luther's constant warning is to avoid 
the Deus nudus, whose works are "terrible," and to seek out God clothed in his word: 
Some through their speculations ascend into heaven and speculate about God the 
creator, etc. Do not get mixed up with this God. Whoever wishes to be saved should 
leave the majestic God alone--for He and the human creature are enemies. Rather 
grasp that God whom David [Psalm 51] also grasps. He is the God who is clothed 
in his promises--God as he is present in Christ. ... This is the God you need. May 
you as you are yourself never be confronted by the unclothed God .... We know no 
other God than the God clothed with his promises. If he should speak to me in his 
majesty, I would run away--just as the Jews did. However, when he is clothed in the 
voice of a man and accommodates himself to our capacity to understand, I can 
h h· 15 approac 1m. 
before God [Le., a liar and unrighteous], unless God Himself had revealed it to him .... But now God has 
revealed what He thinks about us and what He judges us to be, namely, that all are in sin. Therefore we have 
to yield to this His revelation." Cf. also the Smalcald Articles, Part III, art. 1: "Hereditary sin is so deep a 
corruption of nature that reason cannot understand it. It must be believed becauo;e of the revelation in the 
Scriptures" (The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. and trans. 
Theodore G. Tappert [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959], 302). 
I-Thesis twenty and its explanation (WA 1,362 [LW 31, 52-53]). 
ISW A 401l, 329ff. ao; quoted in Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 20. Similar in tenor is W A 3111, 38, 21 ff. (LW 16, 54-55): "I have often 
advised and still advise younger theologians today that they must so study the Holy Scriptures that they refrain 
from investigating the Divine Maj esty and his terrible works. God does not want us to learn to know him in this 
25 
Now, the contrast between the "clothed" and "unclothed" God, particularly as it is 
elaborated in the above passage, brings us to an important point not previously touched upon 
in our discussion of the Heidelberg Disputation. Precisely because God in his absolute 
majesty is unapproachable to his creatures, he must wrap or veil himself in sensuous media--
yisibilia--if they are to have commerce with him. These media are sundry: the word of prom-
ise, God's saving acts, the sacraments, the man Jesus Christ. From this it becomes evident 
that the concept of the hidden God lies at the heart of the theology of the cross qua 
cognitive principle, and that in a two-fold respect. In his naked deity God is perforce hidden, 
and in his revealed deity he is again hidden since he can only reveal himself by an act of 
veiling. The supreme instance of this is his hiddenness in Christ, the "God hidden in suffer-
ing" (Deus absconditus in passionibus). The theology of the cross qua cognitive principle 
instructs us that if we are to know God at all, this can only occur by his entry into conceal-
ment--the concealment of the cross.16 
way. You cannot nakedly associate with his naked Godhead. But Christ is our way to God. Those who 
speculate about the majesty are crushed and led to despair by Satan." Other text~ illustrative of the ~ 
nuduslDeus indutus distinction, and unremitting in their attacks upon speculation, include W A 401 76-80 (L W 
26,28-30) and WA 42, 11 (LW 1, 14). 
I~eses twenty and twenty-one and their explanations are the point in the Heidelberg Disputation at which 
the indispensability of hid den ness for revelation comes to the fore. In the explanation to thesis twenty Luther 
cites Isa. 45:15 ("Truly, thou art a God who hidest thyself') as a warrant for the claim that God is to be found 
in the cross and suffering rather than works. Immediately on the heels ofthis John 14:8-9 is cited, where Philip 
asks Christ to show him the Father, to which Christ replies, "He who has seen me has seen the Father." In citing 
these texts, Luther intends that two inferences be drawn: first, that God "hides" himself in visible things 
precisely in order to reveal himself, and second, that Christ is the primary such locus of revelation, in 
particular, the crucified Christ who is the "God hidden in suffering." Ifwe ask the further question, "But why 
the cross? Why does God conceal himself so deeply--or conversely--why does he manifest himself so 
paradoxically as this?" the Heidelberg Disputation offers but one explanation: God does so in order to crush 
human pride so that man, having ceased to work, might be prepared for God's work (thesis twenty-four, 
explanation). Elsewhere, however, Luther identifies still other factors that contribute to God's choice of the 
cross as his medium of revelation--God does so, e.g., in order to make room for faith; or he does so simply 
because he is God and can, accordingly, reveal himself in whatever manner he plea~es. We should, therefore, 
not be surprised that he chooses to reveal himself by creating something out of nothing, or by creating a thing 
out of its very opposite (Paul Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 1st ed. [GGtersloh: GGtersloher 
Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1962],41 [34 D. Finally, Luther can ascribe the strange impression that God's revela-
tion makes, not to the modus operandi of revelation itself, but to sin's legacy upon man's perceptual apparatus: 
because sin has so altered our perception of existing orders and relationships, God's revelation will necessarily 
appear the reverse of what it "should" be (von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis. 52-53 [50]). 
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The essential hiddenness of God has as its corollary the paradoxical, and even 
offensive, nature of revelation. Luther glories in this essential characteristic, making it the 
hallmark of his own theology. Quite deliberately he refers to the Heidelberg Disputation's 
theological theses as "theological paradoxes" and in so doing makes use of an expression 
most uncommon for the time. Precisely because of its paradoxical, provocative character the 
Wittenberg theology occasioned considerable controversy from the moment of its 
appearance.17 The ill reception with which it met was due in large part to its refusal to 
countenance the role that had been traditionally assigned to Aristotelian ontology and logic 
within theology.ls Yet Luther's was not merely a love of paradox (and scandal) for its own 
sake. The various paradoxes of the Heidelberg Disputation are not without connection to 
each other; on the contrary, they have as their common center Christ crucified.19 The cross 
of Christ itself shatters all human ways of thinking about God. It is the great source of 
scandal and the ultimate reason that the gospel awakens opposition wherever it is preached: 
Our wisdom is offended at God's Word; it is scandalized by the cross of 
Christ. But Luther knows that it must be so (WA 5, 263, 15). If the church's proc-
lamation is no longer a rock of offense to the people, this is a sign that it has betrayed 
the gospel (W A 2, 60 I, 25 [L W 27, 387]). The cross of Christ vehemently opposes 
natural understanding (W A 3, 367, 36ff. [L W 10, 310]). For nothing but lowliness, 
disgrace and shame are to be seen there, unless we recognize the divine will, yes, 
God himself under this cloak (WA 5, 108, Iff.). It is generally true of the divine 
17Heinrich Bomkamm, "Dietheologischen Thesen Luthers bei der Heidelberger Disputation 1518 undseine 
theologia crucis" in Luther. Gestalt und Wirkungen. Gesammelte Aufsatze (GUtersloh: GUtersloher Verlagshaus 
Gerd Mohn, 1975), 131. Of Luther's glee for paradox--and his opponents' constemation--Bomkamm writes: 
"Es war ihm [Luther] ein Lieblingsbegriff fUr die Disputationsthesen geworden, mit denen er und seine 
Wittenberger Kollegen seit anderthalb Jahren die herrschende Theologie aufschcuehten. Er konnte ein wahres 
Spiel damit treiben. Die Thesen seines Kol\egen Karlstadt vom April 1517, die er begeistert an einige Freunde 
versehickte, wiirden den Gegnem nicht nur als paradoxa, sondem als kakodoxa, ja kakistodoxa erscheinen, 
wahrend er sie als eudoxa, kalodoxa, aristodoxa pries." 
1BSchlink, "Weisheit und Torheit," 4-6. Schlink contrasts the fundamental axioms of Aristotelian ontology 
and logic with the premises that are operative in Luther's Heidelberg Disputation and concludes: "So erfolgte 
in Luthers Paradoxen ein Angriff auf die ontologische Grundstrukturdes aristotelischen Denkens, undes brach 
geschichtlich-existentielles Denken durch das Gehause der aristotelisch-scholastischen Denkform hindurch" 
(p.6). 
19"Die verschiedenen Paradoxe der Heidelberger Thesen stehen also nicht beziehungslos nebeneinander, 
sondem sie haben ihre gemeinsame Mitte in dem gekreuzigten Christus, dem 'absoluten Paradox' 
(Kierkegaard)" (ibid., 2). 
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works that reason does not know what to make of them and tends to despair because 
of this (WA 5, 615, 17ff.; WA 19, 195, 3lff.). Thus the gospel becomes a rock of 
offense, a scandal. But in that scandal lies the power of the gospel. "The gospel is it-
self an offense, not just offensive" (W A 31 11, 500, 9ff. [L W 17, 311 D. We see that 
the incompetence of reason in spiritual things is based chiefly on the idea of the 
offense. Reason refuses to come to terms with the paradoxical character of the divine 
•• 20 
actIvlty. 
Quite in contrast to reason,21 faith does come to terms with the hiddenness of God 
in Christ's cross and suffering. Yet it does not do so in such a way that the hiddenness is 
abrogated by a higher "seeing," or even in such a way that the offense is once and for all re-
moved. Both conditions persist until the veil of revelation is lifted and God's mysteries are 
made manifest by the light of glory. Until then faith is the means by which God's hiddenness, 
and the offense attendant thereto, are overcome. Indeed, the very existence of faith depends 
upon such negative experience. Hebrews 11: 1, accordingly, retains the force of a definition 
of faith for Luther throughout his life.22 In the well-known passage from The Bonda~e of 
the Will he writes: 
20von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 85 (76-77). It is ever Luther's contention that God in his Word 
"promises us absurd, unbelievable, and impossible things" (W A 40111, 46). Wherea'i man, possessed of natural 
reason, "deals with those matters which are possible," it is "the office and art of the Christian ... that he deals 
with impossibilities" (W A 27,275). Among the impossibilities-absurdities taught in Scripture are the doctrines 
of the Trinity, creation, sin, the Virgin Birth, the Incarnation, Christ's two natures, his crucifixion and 
resurrection, the resurrection of the saints, the present hiddenness of their estate, the sacraments (see Brian 
Gerrish, Grace and Reason. A Study in the Theology of Luther [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1979], 20 n. 1, for texts illustrative of most of these. WA 401 361 [LW 26:227-28] is particularly apt). In 
response to reason's rejection of the Virgin Birth, Luther writes: "We shall hoid to the wOid in faith against all 
such temptations and speculations" (WA 37,55). And regarding reason's refusal to accept the teachings of the 
Trinity and Incarnation on scriptural authority, he curtly replies: "God does not want us to master it and fit it 
together, he wants us to believe it" (WA 37, 44). Not satisfied with this, but seeking to "comprehend" these 
mysteries, reason has devised the trinitarian and christological heresies of church history (WA 1 O~I, 191 ff.; 
WA 37,39, 42ff.). The above citations and their translations are to be found in Althaus, The Theology of 
Martin Luther, 68,67,52-53,68. 
210r as should, by now, be apparent, in defiance of reason, from which it follows that no one can give 
himself faith: "It is up to God alone to give faith contrary to nature, and ability to believe contrary to reason" 
(WA 39\ 91 [LW 34,160]). And again: "Let no one assume that he has faith by his own powers, as so many 
do when they hear about faith and then undertake to gain it by their own ability. They thus undertake a task 
which belongs to God alone, for having true faith is really a divine work" (WA 12,422, 33ff., as quoted in 
Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, 48). 
22von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 36, 94 (36, 85). 
28 
Faith has to do with things not seen [Heb. 11: 1]. Hence in order that there may be 
room for faith, it is necessary that everything which is believed should be hidden. It 
cannot, however, be more deeply hidden than under an object, perception, or 
experience which is contrary to it. Thus when God makes alive he does it by killing, 
when he justifies he does it br making men guilty, when he exalts to heaven he does 
it by bringing down to hell.2 
This passage is most significant because it declares hiddenness to be the sine qua non of 
faith, even asserting that God's true intentions are "the exact opposite of what we see, sense, 
and experience.,,24 God reveals himself "under the opposite form" or, as Luther can also 
express it, "he does an alien work in order to do his own work.,,25 It is this further feature 
of revelation--viz., that not only is it concealed, but concealed so deeply as to appear SYb. 
contraria specie--that accounts for the offense that reason takes at revelation.26 And because 
believers, too, are possessed of reason that is not wholly regenerate, the possibility of offense 
is a necessary concomitant of their faith.27 
23WA 18,633 (LW 33,62). 
2~is rendering ofW A 18,633 is that of Packer and Johnston (The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer 
and O. R. Johnston [Westwood, N.J.: Fleming H. Revell, 1957], 101). 
2sne distinction, opus proprium/opus alienum, is taken from Isa. 28:21 an~ is used, together with the 
formula, sub contraria specie. to describe the paradoxical nature of the divine deportment: 
For the Lord will rise up as on Mount Perazim, 
he will be wroth as in the valley of Gibeon; 
to do his deed--strange is his deed! 
and to work his work--alien is his work! (Isa. 28:21) 
26A1though the teaching that God works sub contrariis is given forceful expression at a great many points 
in Luther's writings, perhaps nowhere is this more the case than in his first Psalm lectures: "If under the glory 
of the flesh God gave the glory of the Spirit, and under the riches of the flesh the riches of the Spirit, and under 
the graciousness and honour of the flesh gave the grace and honour of the Spirit, then the latter would rightly 
be described as profoundly concealed. But as it is, since he gives it under his contrary, and contradicts 
what is signified by the sign itself, it is not merely profoundly but far too profoundly concealed. For who 
could realize that someone who is visibly humbled, tempted, rejected, and slain, is at the same time and to the 
utmost degree inwardly exalted, comforted, accepted and brought to life, unless this was taught by the Spirit 
through faith?" (W A 4, 82, 14-21, as quoted in Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to his Thought, trans. 
R. A. Wilson (London: Collins, 1970), 236, emphasis added). 
27"Offense must constantly be overcome by faith. Where this offense is excluded we are no longer dealing 
with a life in faith" (von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 158 [135]). 
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The hiddenness of faith's realities and resultant severance of faith from reason and 
experience lead Luther to characterize it as "blind. ,,28 The "blind eye" that faith turns to 
experience has to do not only with outward states of affairs, but--far more importantly--with 
the believer's own inner condition. Faith is not an observable psychological state.29 Rather 
28In Luther's 1517 exposition of the penitential psalms we are told that faith sees nothing, walking a dark 
path, declining to follow the light of reason (WA 1,217, 8ff. [LW 14,201)). The prototype offaith is Abraham 
who,letting go of his own understanding, was led like a blind man along the right way (WA I, 171, 29ff. [LW 
14, 152)). In the same manner, the godly are instructed to keep their eyes shut since God's eyes are always upon 
them (W A I, 172, 10ff. [L W 14, 152)). The motif of darkness is, likewise, much in evidence in the Lectures 
on Romans of 1515-16. There we are told that enlightened zeal for God takes place "in pious ignorance and 
mental darkness .... without understanding, without feeling, wi thout thinking" (W A 56, 413, 22 [L W 25, 404]). 
In Luther's Operationes in Dsalmos (1519-21) faith is said to be "the entrance into darkness, where everything 
that the feeling, reason, mind and understanding of man is able to grasp will be dissolved" (WA 5,69, 20ff. 
[L W 14, 342]). "God alone knows the way of the righteous. It is hidden even to the righteous; for his right hand 
leads them in such a wonderful way that it is not the way of the senses or of reason but of faith alone, which 
is able to see even in darkness and behold the invisible" (WA 5,45 30ff. [LW 14,309)). Luther's exposition 
of the Magnificat (1521), too, draws the contrast of not thinking or feeling, but believing (WA 7, 586, 11f. [LW 
21,340)). At such times as we feel nothing of God's love we must descry his arm through faith. In order for 
this to happen "our sense and our reason must close their eyes" (WA 7,587, 8ff. [LW 21, 341]). Luther 
describes the darkness in which faith has its abode by likening its seat, man's spirit, to the holy of holies of the 
tabernacle: "In this tabernacle we have a figure ofthe Christian man. His spirit is the holy of holies, where God 
dwells in the darkness of faith, where no light is; for he believes that which he neither sees nor feels nor 
comprehends" (WA 7, 551, 19ff. [LW 21, 304]). Such descriptions ofblind fait.~ are byno means confined to 
the young Luther who, as is well known, was very much under the influence of the language of mysticism. In 
the Lectures on Isaiah (1527-29) believing means committing oneself, with eyes shut, to God's guidance along 
an unknown path (WA 31 n, 320, 26ff. [LW 17,76]). In the famous definition of faith that is given in the 1535 
Lectures on Galatians, Luther refers to faith as "a sort of knowledge or darkness that nothing can see. Yet the 
Christ ofwhom faith takes hold is sitting in this darkness as God sat in the midst of darkness on Sinai and in 
the temple" (WA 40[, 228, 31ff. [LW 26,129]). And finally, in the Lectures on Genesis (1535-45) blind faith 
is enjoined for the purpose of grasping God's providential care as well as the highest articles of faith (W A 44, 
378, 3ff. [LW 7, 106]). In these late lectures, faith is said to recognize not only that it has not yet become sight, 
but that it exists in total contradiction to sight(WA 43, 393, 9ff. [LW 4, 357)). In view of these many instances 
where faith is portrayed as being in blind opposition to experience (most of them gathered by von Loewenich, 
pp. 86-99 [77-88)), we are not surprised when he remarks that the frequency with which Luther enjoins blind 
faith can at times border upon tedium (Luthers Theologia Crucis, 129 [113]). 
29WA 40rn, 46,7: "Faith ... is the knowledge of things hoped for and not seen; this knowledge consists in 
the promise and word of God and, like them, it is divine even though it cannot be grasped or felt" (as quoted 
in Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther. 68). "Therefore faith in Christ is an exceedingly arduous thing, 
because it is a rapture and a removal from everything one experiences within and without to the things one 
experiences neither within nor without, namely, to the invisible, most high, and incomprehensible God" (W A 
5in, 144 [LW 29,149]). von Loewenich writes: "Faith comes directly from heaven and ... can in no way be 
anchored psychologically." It "is not a psychological given; it cannot be recognized objectively." "Faith itself 
is a work and a power of God and therefore never a psychological given. Ultimately its subject is not man at 
all, but God himself ('in faith, where it is not man who sees, but God.' WA 3, 542, 34f.)" (Luthers Theologia 
~ 88-89, 109 [79,97,98]). 
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it is a clinging to God's Word, whatever one's psychological state. Because faith's presence 
is compatible with even the most palpably felt despair/o Christians must maintain a reso-
lute ignorance of their own inner condition, placing all their confidence, not in some quality 
or feeling that they may perchance find in themselves, but in God's gracious promise alone: 
Faith is ardently opposed to all human feeling and all human observation (W A 5,86, 
33ff.). It must be considered a temptation of Satan when man judges on the basis of 
what he feels within himself. Faith does not ask about that; it is simply 'insensibility' 
(WA 5, 623, 36ff.). Of course it is a great miracle that man, who feels nothing but 
his God-forsakenness, may still believe in the gracious God. But faith lives in this 
miracle (WA 5, 270, 17ff.).31 
The fact that faith and the Christian's standing before God are hidden realities inac-
cessible to introspection is intimately connected with Luther's understanding of justification. 
Various scholars have noted that the theol02ia crucis is but an expression of Luther's teach-
ing on justification.32 We are in the position to observe, however, that not even this is a 
strong enough claim for, as an underlying methodological principle of his theology, the theo-
logia crucis "determines Luther's understanding of justification.,,33 There is no direct 
cognition of God or his activity. Faith affirms his "proper work" in the "alien work" of the 
cross and suffering. It affirms, hidden in Christ's cross, God's gracious will toward us. By 
means of the cross God has effected our redemption and conferred upon us a new life that 
is likewise hidden in Christ. We are simul iustus et peccator. Visible is the sinful reality of 
30"For it happens, indeed it is typical of faith, that often he who claims to believe does not believe at all; and 
on the other hand, he who doesn't think he believes, but is in despair, has the greatest faith" (W A 26, 155 [LW 
40,241)). 
31von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 92 (82). Cf. Paul Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers. 62 
(60): "To believe means to be certain of God's word; but this does not include faith's being certain of its own 
existence as faith." 
32Regin Prenter's identification of the two is to be found in the excerpt quoted earlier. In like fashion, 
Heinrich Fausel writes: "In Wahrheit ist Luthers Theologie des Kreu7.es nichts als ein anderer Ausdruck fUr 
seine Rechtfertigungslehre" (D. Martin Luther: Leben und Werk 1483 bis 1521 [Giitersloh: Giitersloher 
Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1977], 107-8). 
33Paul Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 40 (32), emphasis added. Walther von Loewenich renders 
an identical judgement: "Luther's doctrine of justification isa concrete application of his theology of the cross" 
(Luthers Theologia Crucis. 133 [116]). 
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the old Adam; hidden is our righteousness in Christ.34 This object of faith, like every such 
object, is held fast in defiance of all purely human understanding and in the absence of any 
immediate experience. Our reliance is not upon any visible holiness of our own. Where ratio 
would place its trust in lex (both being determined by the creature's attitude of self-assertion) 
faith humbly acknowledges in Christ's shameful death a redemptive act that is not directly 
to be seen, receiving there a righteousness that is not its own. This is to the Greeks 
foolishness, and to the Jews a stumbling block.3s 
Now, the severance that the theology of the cross effects between faith, on the one 
hand, and reason and experience, on the other, would seem to imply a corresponding 
demarcation between faith and knowledge. And so it does. This demarcation is due not only 
to the occult nature of faith's objects, but to their eschatological character as well.36 The 
fact that faith's domain is the future rather than the present causes Luther to identify faith 
34All his people are concealed even from themselves fYl A 9, 196, 16f.) so that they have no conception of 
their adornment before God (W A 9, 191, 3 ff.). "A Christian is even hidden from himself; he does not see his 
holiness and virtue, but sees in himself nothing but unholiness and vice" (WA, DB 7, 420 [LW 35,411 D. The 
profound hiddenness of the Christian standing is particularly in evidence in the Lectures on Romans where, 
in a gloss to Rom. 6:8, Luther asserts that "no one knows that he has life or feels that he has been justified, but 
he believes and hopes" (WA 56, 58 [LW 25, 52]; cf. WA 40",24-25 [LW 27, 21-22]). In the scholium to Rom. 
9:3 Luther enlarges upon this theme: "For what is good for us is hidden, and that so deeply that it is hidden 
under its opposite. Thus our life is hidden under death, love for ourselves under hate for ourselves, glory under 
ignominy, salvation under damnation, our kingship under exile, heaven under hell, wisdom under foolishness, 
righteousness under sin, power under weakness. And universally our every assertion of anything good is hidden 
under the denial of it, so that faith may have its place in God ... Thus 'the kingdom of heaven is like a treasure 
hidden in a field' (Matt. 13:44). The field is dirty in contrast to the trea~ure; while the one is trodden underfoot, 
the other is picked up. Andyet the field hides the treasure. So also 'our life ishid with Christ in God' (Col. 3:3), 
that is, in the negation of all things which can be felt, held, and comprehended by our reason. So also our 
wisdom and righteousness are not at all apparent to us but are hidden with Christ in God. But what does appear 
is that which is contrary to these things, namely, sin and foolishness" (WA 56, 392 [LW 25, 382-83]). 
3SWA 5,68 (LW 14,342). 
3~ese are not unrelated. The present hiddenness of faith's objects stands in intimate relation to the futurity 
of those objects. Hebrews 11: 1 which, as we have noted, retained the force of a definition of faith for Luther 
throughout his life, explicitly connects the two. Referring to Luther's exegesis of this verse in the Romans 
lectures (WA 56, 409, 8ff. [L W 25, 399]), von Loewenich writes: "As the evidence ofthings that do not appear, 
faith draws the believer away from all that is visible; as the assurance of things hoped for it directs him to 
eternal things, which are, however, not present but future" (Luthers Theologia Crucis, 89 [80]). Cf. WA 56, 
424, 27ff. (LW 25, 416). 
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with hope, and to distinguish it from knowledge.37 The relationship between faith and 
knowledge is given in negative terms--right knowledge consists in knowing that one knows 
h. 38 not mg. 
If this be the nature of faith, then it is a venture to believe,39 yes, a daring leap into 
the dark.40 In this life faith's certainty can only be a fighting certainty, firmitas, not 
securitas that presumes to possess more than God has deigned to give--himself in..Jili: 
31von Loewenich (Luthers Theologia Crucis, 100 [89]) writes: "Faith and hope are almost identical for 
Luther in the first period. For also faith is in the first instance directed to the future; therein lies its difference 
from knowledge which has to do with the present (WA 4, 323, 20f.). But it is distinctive of hope that it stands 
in contrast to the reality surrounding us. Hope (~) and physical reality ([§) are two members of a disjunctive 
relationship (WA 3, 301, 11f. [LW 10,249])." 
38"For the highest knowledge is to know that one knows nothing; true faith accomplishes this knowledge" 
(W A 57,207, 1 Off. as translated by W. Pauck in Luther; Lectures on Romans. The Library of Christian Classics 
[Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961),287). It is to be noted that, while this text distinguishes faith from 
knowledge, it also identifies it with knowledge. Accordingly, one must exercise caution in developing the 
antitheses, faith vs. reason, faith vs. experience, and faith vs. knowledge. Luther does not, for example, deny 
that regenerate rea~on has a role to play in "things higher." Neither does he deny that religious experience has 
a positive, as well as negative, content. Similarly, he can describe faith as knowledge, the seat of which is 
intellect--N.B., intellect "in-formed" by faith (WA 40n 25-27 [LW 27,22-23]). The fact that the intellect isthe 
seat of faith leads Luther, in this text, to distinguish it from hope, whose seat is the will. Hence despite their 
close association, they are by no means to be identified wholesale. 
39"To believe means to abandon the viewpoint of reason and of our own heart and take a chance on God's 
word." "As a human act, faith is simply the taking of a chance: I stake my life on the word" (Althaus, ~ 
Theologie Martin Luthers. 59, 62 [57, 60]). The fact that faith is a dare causes Luther to contrast it with 
worldly shrewdness, which prudently avoids risk and its attendant dangers. In contrast to shrewdness, which 
"looks around with endless deliberation," it "is the nature of faith to walk in such danger where reason always 
argues, 'Where will this end?'" (W 31", 321 [LW 17, 76-77]). 
40Heinrich Bornkamm writes: "Luther's faith is a daring faith; it looks to Christ. His open eyes for reality 
with all its profundities and tensions had made it apparent to him that God is not visible, not demonstrable, not 
calculable, but that belief in Him calls for a venture, a leap into the dark .... Luther once described this daring 
leap of faith very beautifully as follows: 'If God chose to show us life in death, and showed our soul place and 
space, way and manner, where and how it is to appear, whither it is to go and remain, then death would not be 
bitter; it would be like a leap over a shallow stream on the banks of which one sees and feels firm ground. But 
He does not reveal any of this to us, and we are compelled to jump from the safe shore of this life over into the 
abyss where we feel nothing, see nothing, and have no footing or support, but entirely at God's suggestion and 
with his support' [WA 19,217,15)" (Luthers Geistige Welt [Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 
1953), 102-3 [Luther's World ofThoughl trans. Martin H. Bertram (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1958), 87]). 
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d' 41 Th hI' .. hI' . yf h I 42 Th . scan ItO. e t eo ogta cruCIS IS a t eo ogta Vlatorum, a wa arer t eo ogy. at IS to 
say: the Christian life is a striving, a perpetual process of coming-to-be, not a steady-state 
quality of being.43 
41Lennart Pinomaa, Sieg des Glaubens: Grundlinien der Theologie Luthers, ed. Horst Beintker (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), 110-13, especially p. 110: "Luther unterscheidet von seiner Friihtheologie 
ab zwischen zwei Arten von Sicherheit, zwischen fmnitas und securitas. Die firmitas ist die echte christliche 
Gewi13heit, securitas die falsche pharisaische Sicherheit. Die christliche Gewil3heit ist jedoch so beschaffen, 
da13 man sie sieh nieht als einen festen Besitz ein flir allemal aneignen kann. Vielmehr gibt es sie nur als immer 
neu zu erkampfende Gewil3heit." The reason that the Christian's certainty isever a "fighting certainty" is rooted 
in the incompleteness of justification in this life: "Wei! jedoch in diesem Leben die Gerechtigkeit niema1s 
vollendet wird und daher auch die firmitas niemals vollstandig werden kann, ist die rechte Gewil3heit immer 
ringende Gewil3heit, das hei13t der Zustand, in dem die Anfechtung besiegt wird" (p. 113). The fact that 
certainty must ever be won anew through faith's appropriation of the divine promise leads Wilhelm Walther 
to remark: "Wenn Luther von 'Gewi13heit Glaubens' redet, sowillerdiese Gewi13heit absondern vonjeder sonst 
bekannten Wahrnehmung. In dem Wort 'Glaubensgewi13heit' ist demnach der Ton auf die erste, nicht auf die 
letzte Halfte zu legen" (Das Erbe der Reformation in Kampf der Gegenwart, 4 Hefte [Leipzig: 1903, 1904, 
1909, 1917], 2:91). Corroboration of this claim can certainly be found in Luther--see WA 26, 155 (LW 40, 
241): "One must believe but we neither should nor can know it for certain." The converse, however, must be 
affirmed as well--namely, that faith's certainty "is more certain than empirical or rational certainty" (von Loewen-
ich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 167 [142 ]).It is so because it is a God-given certainty that repeatedly overcomes 
doubt: "The Holy Spirit is no Skeptic, and it is not doubts or mere opinions that he has written on our hearts, 
but assertions more sure and certain than life itself and all experience" (WA 18,605,32 [LW 33,24]). The 
Holy Spirit is the ultimate, and only, guarantor of certainty for the angefochten believer (see Regin Prenter, 
Spiritus Creator. Studier i Luthers Theologi, 2d ed. [Copenhagen: Samlerens Forlag, 1946],213-17). From our 
communion with him issues a an "experiential knowledge" which is neither speculative nor historical, but 
similar to conjugal love (see Erwin Iserloh, "Luther's Christ-Mysticism," 46). 
42Pinomaa, Sieg des Glaubens, 97-99; von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 134-35 (117). 
43von Loewenieh writes, "Faith is a contending, not a possessing"; "Our Christian existence is ... a 
'becoming rather than a being'" (Luthers Theologia Crucis, 90,134 [80,117], translation mine). Iwand puts the 
matter powerfully, and in a most Kierkegaardian way, when he remarks: "Eigentlich kann man ein Christ nie 
sein, man kann es nurwerden" ("Theologia Crucis," 394). A multitude of statements by Luther himself can be 
marshaled on this point. For example, in his Defense and Explanation of All Articles (1521), he writes: "This 
life, therefore, is not godliness but the process of becoming godly, not health but getting well, not being but 
becoming, not rest but exercise. We are not now what we shall be, but we are on the way. The process is not 
yet finished, but it is actively going on. This is not the goal but it is the right road. At present everything does 
not gleam and sparkle, but everything is being cleansed" (WA 7, 337, 30ff [LW 32, 24]). Implicit in this 
characterization of the Christian life is Luther's resolute rejection of every exclusively realized cschatology that 
would wrest from faith its restless, wayfaring character. The theme is a constantly recurring one. As early as 
the first lectures on the Psalms (1513-15) Luther writes: "For it is not sufficient to have done something, and 
now to rest, but, as philosophy tells us, movement is an uncompleted act, always partly comprehended, and 
partly still to be comprehended, always lying midway between two contraries, and belonging at the same time 
both to the starting-point and to the goal. Ifwe existed in one only, there would not be any movement. But this 
present life is a kind of movement and passage, or transition ... a pilgrimage from this world into the world 
to come, which is eternal rest" (W A 4, 362, 35 - 363, 2 as quoted in Gerhard Ebeling, Luther. An Introduction 
to his Thought trans. R. A. Wilson [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970], 161-62). We encounter this same 
ontology in the Lectures on Romans (1515-16), as applied to justification: "For just as there are five stages of 
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natural growth, ... not-being, becoming, being, action, and being acted upon, ... so it is also with the Spirit: 
not-being is something without a name and man in sins; becoming is justification; being is righteousness; acting 
is to act and live righteously; to be acted upon is to be made perfect and complete. These five are somehow 
always in motion in man .... Man is always in not-being, in becoming, in being; ... Le., always a sinner, 
always penitent, always righteous. For by repenting he becomes righteous from being unrighteous. Repentance 
is, therefore, the medium between unrighteousness and righteousness. And thus he is in sin as the terminus a 
ill!Q and righteousness as the terminus ad quem. If, therefore, we are always repenting, we are always sinners, 
and precisely thereby we are righteous and being made righteous" (WA 56, 442 [Luther: Lectures on Romans, 
trans. Wilhelm Pauck, 322]). 
These early statements of the simul iustus et peccator teaching are followed by many others throughout 
Luther's career. Up to 1518-19 the teaching is understood primarily in its Augustinian sense: the Christian is 
sick, but in the process of being made well. Justification is conceived as a process of acquiring actual 
righteousness. By contrast, after 1518-19 it is generally interpreted in the light of the two realms distinction: 
the Christian is already completely righteous in God's sight, though in his own sight he remains completely 
sinful. This total righteousness is imputed or "passive"; from it issues an active, partial righteousness as its fruit 
(F. Edward Cranz, An Essay on the Development of Luther's Thought on Justice. Law and Society. Harvard 
Theological Studies, vol. 19, [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959], xvi-xvii, 56-57, 73-94). 
Accordingly the mature Luther interprets the simul formula in a two-fold sense. The Christian is ~ 
i.YSYs/totus peccator (completely righteous by imputation, although empirically a sinner) and DID1im. 
~/12artim l2eccator (gradually being made righteous by impartation). On both interpretations of the formula 
an ongoing transitus is occurring from one state to another (in the case of the ~ aspect it is the repeated flight 
from one's complete unrighteousness to Christ's complete righteousness; in the case of the 12artim aspect it is 
the incremental growth in righteousness--see Wilfried Joest, Gesetz undFreiheit. Das Problem des Tertius usus 
legis bei Luther und die neutestamentliche Parainese, 3d ed. [Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961],60-
65 and 65-70). 
Were this all that is to be said about the two kinds of righteousness, we could make a clear 
demarcation between their status: imputed or passive righteousness has to do with justification, imparted or 
active righteousness with sanctification and the Christian's activity in the world. The mature Luther, however, 
draws no such clear distinction between justification and sanctification. In the Lectures on Galatians (1535), 
for example, justification is said to be based upon both kinds of righteousness. As the "first fruits of the Spirit" 
faith is an actual, if partial, righteousness to which the nonimputation of sins for Christ's sake must be added. 
Christ's righteousness supplements what we lack in real righteousness, in effect enlarging the real righteousness 
that has begun to be in faith (WA 401 408-9 [LW 26, 260-61]; see Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit, 67). The lines 
between the two kinds of righteousness are not at all clearly drawn, and with good reason since Luther is not 
talking about two fundamentally different kinds of righteousness or complementary schemes of justification 
(see Brian Gerrish, "By Faith Alone," 82-85). Perhaps surprisingly, the concept that integrates "justification 
by imputation" with "justification by impartation" is none other than "formed faith": not the scholastics' fid§ 
caritate formata but fides Christo formata. faith "in-formed" by Christ or "Christ working effectually within" 
(p. 83). Heiko Oberman makes the same point in his essay, '''Iustitia Christi' and 'Iustitia Dei': Luther and the 
Scholastic Doctrines of Justification" (in The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early 
Reformation Thought [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986],122 and 123-24). So, too, does Erwin Iserloh, who 
emphasizes that a real union takes place with Christ through faith so that the Christian assumes Christ's 
righteousness as his own. This union can only be described as mystical since the Christian is "cemented to 
Christ," "made his 'substance'," "becomes one with the Word made flesh," "quasi una persona," is "seized and 
transformed in Christ," "tom away from [himself] and glued to Christ." Hence in contrast to the fanatics who 
say that Christ "is in us spiritually, that is, speculatively, while being realiter in heaven," Luther insists that 
"Christ and faith must be joined together, and we must dwell in heaven while Christ is in our hearts. This does 
not happen speculatively, but realiter" (W A 40\ 546. See Iserloh, "Luther'S Christ-Mysticism," 45-46 for the 
above references). Through such union there occurs a "happy exchange" in which a real, not merely forensic, 
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It is this "in transit" character of Christian existence that makes possible the recurrent 
episodes of doubt and despair that characterize the walk of faith. Christians lack any 
empirical assurance of their standing before God since whatever actual righteousness they 
possess is only partial, submerged under their greater unrighteousness. On the other hand, 
their total righteousness is imputative so that their true estate remains "hid with Christ in 
God." As a consequence they are repeatedly angefochten and faced with the challenge of 
making faith's leap from judgement into life.44 The spiritual trials that call forth this leap 
are the most intensive kind of suffering, occurring at such times as the Christian is unable 
to press through from the Deus absconditus to the Deus reyelatus, from the opus alienum to 
the opus proprium.45 In the absence of faith's experience of God, the Christian is alone with 
his human experience and bereft of God. Indeed, at such times he has experience against 
himself, for the God that is experienced in Anfechtung appears to be a devi1.46 
corrununicatio idiomatum takes place (pp. 47-51). Iserloh writes that Luther describes this same event by his 
use of the sacramentum et exemplum formula (pp. 51-57). As sacramentum, Christ effects a real conformity 
of our natures unto his, from which the imitation of Christ as exemplum proceeds. In all of these ways it is clear 
that Luther's view of justification is not merely forensic. Christ is not merely present to God as our total 
righteousness. He is also present to faith, his presence rendering it a real, if inchoate, righteousness. 
The sum of the matter is that the mature Luther, like the young Luther, comprehends under the simul 
formula a simultaneous presence of two contradictories with a continual Kl V" 0\ C; being effected from the 
one to the other. Justification is a continual passage from unrighteousness to righteousness, and that, in a two-
fold sense. Christians are constantly involved in the struggle to realize what they already are in Christ, whether 
forensically coram Deo (throUgh daily repentance and conversion) or formally coram hominibus (through the 
growth of faith, which is actively engaged in subduing the flesh and serving the neighbor). This is not an 
insignificant element of Luther's theology. On the contrary, Gerhard Ebeling writes: "Man's existence in a 
transitional state is to be properly understood as the fundamental tension to which all the antitheses in Luther's 
thought are related" (Luther. An Introduction to his Thought 165). 
44"The Christian is constantly angefochten," writes Paul Althaus. He "stands in Anfechtung throughout his 
entire life, beset by what is visible, the empirical, and therefore ever in battle with doubt. Anfechtung is not an 
exception; rather, it is the rule for the believer" (Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 40 [33] and 59 [56], translation 
mine). 
45von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 159 (136). 
46"Peter says truthfully (2 Peter 1: 19) that the word is like a lamp shining in a dark place. Most certainly it 
is a dark place! God's faithfulness and truth always must first become a great lie before it becomes truth. The 
world calls this truth heresy. And we, too, are constantly tempted to believe that God would abandon us and 
not keep his word; and in our hearts we begin thinking he is a liar. In short, God cannot be God unless he first 
becomes a devil. We cannot go to heaven unless we first go to hell. We cannot become God's children until we 
first become children of the devil. All that God speaks and does the devil has to speak and do first. And our 
flesh agrees. Therefore it is actually the Spirit who enlightens and teaches us in the Word to believe differently. 
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This terrifying experience of God having assumed the visage of the devil occurs 
whenever the law gains the upper hand in the conscience of the Christian. Unable, in faith, 
to descry the God who has graciously hidden himself in sufferings, the Christian finds 
himself face to face with that other hidden deity--the terrifying God of predestination. At 
such moments the Christian is persuaded that God has consigned him to perdition; yes, he 
is even tempted to believe that God is a malevolent being who delights in his destruction.47 
During such episodes of Anfechtung the Christian experiences a desolation similar 
to that felt by Christ on the cross. "As Christ on the cross no longer felt his own deity, so the 
Christian according to his outer man may 'no longer feel the faith' through which he is God's 
By the same token the lies of this world cannot become lies without first having become truth. The godless do 
not go to hell without first having gone to heaven. They do not become the devil's children until they have first 
been the children of God .... To summarize, the devil does not become and is not a devil without first having 
been God. He does not become an angel of darkness unless he has first been an angel of light (2 Cor. 
11: 14) ... .'1 know well that God's word must first become a great lie, even in myself, before it can become 
truth. I also know that the devil's word must first become the delicate truth of God before it can become a lie. 
I must grant the devil his hour of godliness and ascribe devilhood to our God. But this is not the whole story. 
The last word is: "His faithfulness and truth endure forever"'" (WA 31 " 249 [LW 14, 31-32)). 
47This is, after all, what the Deus nudus appears to do. In his distinction in The Bondage of the Will between 
the God who is preached and the God who is hidden, Luther acknowledges that the Deus praedicatus does not 
will that any should perish; indeed, he does everything to prevent this from happening. The same cannot, 
however, be said of the Deus absconditus who, "hidden in his majesty neither deplores nor takes away death, 
but works life, death, and all in all. For there he has not bound himself by his word, but has kept himself free 
over all things." This God "wills many things which he does not disclose himself as willing in his word. Thus 
he does not will the death of a sinner, according to his word; but he wills it according to that inscrutable will 
of his" (WA 18,685 [LW 33, 140)). Luther freely admits the offensiveness of this: "Admittedly, it gives the 
greatest possible offense to common sense or natural reason that God by his own sheer will should abandon, 
harden, and damn men as ifhe enjoyed the sins and the vast, eternal tonnents of his wretched creatures, when 
he is preached as a God of such great mercy and goodness, etc .... And who would not be offended? I myself 
was offended more than once, and brought to the very depth and abyss of despair, so that I wished I had never 
been created a man, before I realized how salutary that despair was, and how near to grace" (W A 18, 719 [L W 
33, 190]). Of course, the possibility of offense is salutary--if one has faith. But as Luther points out, the 
disparity between the behavior of the hidden and the revealed God is so enonnous as to present an intractable 
dilemma to faith, the task of which it is to unite the two: "God hides his eternal goodness and mercy under 
eternal wrath, his righteousness under iniquity. This is the highest degree of faith, to believe him merciful when 
he saves so few and damns so lnany, and to believe him righteous when by his own will he makes us necessar-
ily damnable, so that he seems ... to delight in the tonnents of the wretched and to be worthy of hatred rather 
than of love. If, then, I could by any means comprehend how this God can be merciful and just who displays 
so much wrath and iniquity, there would be no need of faith. As it is, since that cannot be comprehended, there 
is room for the exercise of faith when such things are preached and published, just as when God kills, the faith 
of life is exercised in death" (WA 18,633 [LW 33,62-63]). 
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child. At such times faith 'crawls away and hides.",48 When this happens Luther's only 
counsel is to cling to the word of promise.49 More concretely, he instructs us to cling to 
Christ--f1eeing, in effect, from the God who is hidden to the God who is revealed.so Luther 
urges the Christian on such occasions to fight against God himself'--a bold exhortation 
48 Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers. 63 (61), citing W Ali, 72. 
49Luther's sennon on the Syro-Phoenician woman provides a striking example of the sense of abandonment 
that overwhelms the believer in Anfechtung, as well as the vital necessity that he or she cling to the word in 
faith. Althaus writes: "What makes this particular trial so grievous is the fact that Jesus Christ himself assumes 
a stance identical to that which our heart in its moment of perplexity and doubt ascribes to him. He himself 
speaks the 'no' and our heart thinks of this 'no' as absolutely finaL But this is not the way it really is. 'Therefore 
the heart must tum its back on such feelings and with strong faith in God's word grasp the deep and secret "yes" 
that is under and above the "no. III This is what Christ's encounter with the Syro-Phoenician woman teaches us. 
The story is 'written to instruct and comfort all of us, so that we may know how deeply God hides his grace and 
notthinkofhim according to our own feelings and reactions but exactly according to his word' [WA 17",203]" 
(Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 60 [58)). 
5OS0 observes Brian Gerrish in "'To the Unknown God': Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God" in 
The Old Protestantism and the New. Essays on the Refonnation Heritage (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 140, where WA TR 5, 294, 24, 34 and 295, 5 are cited: "Begin from below, from the incarnate 
Son .... Christ will bring you to the hidden God .... If you take the revealed God, he will bring you the hidden 
God at the same time." While the revealed God is absolutely indispensable as the tenninus ad quem of faith, 
so too is the hidden God as its tenninus a quo: "The hidden God is never the object of faith. But faith nonethe-
less takes on an urgency, perhaps even a passion, because ofthe hidden God, who prevents faith from becoming 
complacent. Faith, in Luther's sense, was a dare, a risk, oro-in one of his favorite words--a 'flight.' Under 
Anfechtung, a man must dare against God to flee to God (ad deum contra deum [W A 5, 204, 26)). Faith is not 
a repose, but movement. Hence faith really does take into itself something of the meaning of God's hiddenness 
even though it is not directed toward that hidden ness; rather it is movement away from the hidden God" (pp. 
147-48). 
While faith in the revealed God provides the only means for overcoming Anfechtung, and while this 
revealed God is, first and foremost, to be sought in Christ, it is also tl'ue, as Kari Holl and others after him have 
pointed out, that in times of Anfechtung Luther drew particular comfort from the first commandment, "I am 
the Lord your God .... You shall have no other gods before me" (Ex. 20:2-3). While any discussion of the 
"helps" in overcoming Anfechtung remains incomplete apart from a consideration of why Luther found this 
ostensible word oflaw so helpful, we choose to take it up at a later point where the usefulness of the command 
in Kierkegaard's experience will be discussed. 
51"There is sufficiently abundant protection in the promise of God not only against the devil, the flesh, and 
the world but also against this lofty temptation. For if God sent an angel to say: 'Do not believe these promises!' 
I would reject him, saying: 'Depart from me Satan, etc.' Or, if God himself appeared to me in his majesty and 
said: 'You are not worthy of my grace; I will change my plan and not keep my promise to you,' I would not 
have to yield to him but it would be necessary to fight most vehemently against God himselP' (W A 44, 97,3 8ff. 
[LW 6,131]). Cf. also WA 10~', 130: "The word itself without regard for the person must satisfy the heart and 
must so convince and grasp a man that he immediately feels compelled to admit that it is true and right even 
though all the world, all the angels, and all the princes of hell disagree; yes, even though God himself would 
immediately say otherwise." Luther's answer to the question as to how this is possible is that faith "is 
omnipotent just as God himself is" (VIA I Om, 214, 26). It is so because it has its source in God (WA 17', 73, 
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that suggests that God himself is the source of Anfechtun2.52 And in fact, though Luther 
generally ascribes these assaults to the devil, he can as well attribute them to God. Indeed, 
the very ascription of Anfechtung to the devil is tantamount to an ascription to God, the devil 
being God's devil, or "mask. ,,53 But herein lies the dilemma that Anfechtung poses for 
faith. If, in Anfechtung, God is our assailant, then perhaps it is not merely with his "mask" 
that we have to do; perhaps it is with God himself--i.e., the predestinating God already dis-
cussed. This circumstance that God himself assails the Christian is accordingly what makes 
Anfechtung so unspeakably horrific, for in the absence of faith the Christian is utterly with-
out a clue as to the true nature of the deity that assails him. Out of this soul-crushing desola-
tion to which the believer feels himself abandoned in the midst of Anfechtung there emerges 
the characteristic passion of faith: Luther likens it to hanging from a cross, suspended 
33). Both texts are quoted by Paul Althaus in Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 52-53 (48-49). 
52Luther rejects the apostle James's claim (Jas. 1: 13) that "God tempts no one" (WA 43,201, 25ff. [L W 4, 
92]). Among the reasons why God might choose to withdraw the tokens of his presence from the believer von 
Loewenich gives three: (1) to destroy pride and teach a humble estimate of oneself--WA 5,397, 30ff.; WA 2, 
125, 8ff. (LW 42, 74); WA 43, 203, 26ff. (LW 4, 95); WA 42, 491, I Iff. (LW 2, 320); WA 42, 551, 37f. (LW 
3,5)--(2) to strengthen faith through the repeated challenge that offense poses--WA 31 n, 506, 30f. (LW 17, 
319); WA 43, 230, 37ff. (LW 4, 132)--and (3) to teach prayer (WA 6, 223, 14ff. (LW 44, 46-47); WA 3, 62, 
19ff. (Luthers Theologia Crucis, 163 [139]). It should be noted that Luther can speak in very practical terms 
about God's reasons for "attacking" the Christian. For example, he describes God as behaving no differently 
than an earthly father who thrashes his son more soundly and frequently than he does his servant. Indeed, the 
more cherished the child, the bigger the rod that the father uses, whereas he does not use a rod at all on the 
disobedient servant, but simply runs him out of the house. Yet it is to the son that the father gives the 
inheritance (WA TR 2, 2701). Anfechtung, then, is an expression of fatherly discipline; it is the "school" 
through with God puts his children in order that they may come to know themselves, and him (see Paul Bi.ihler, 
Die Anfechtung bei Martin Luther [Zi.irich: Zwingli-Veriag, 1942],217-20). 
530n the devil as the mere instrument of God's effective agency, von Loewenich cites WA 401U, 519, 13ff. 
(Luthers Theologia Crucis, 160 [13 7]). Althaus cites WA 16, 143, where God is said, first, to incite the devil 
to evil, and then, to cause man to sin. Althaus writes: "Luther finds himself compelled to assert that God both 
forsakes and incites to sin--though neither of these is intended to signify that God is the author of sin. But what 
does this mean? Does it mean that God's will is in contradiction with itself! He gives us the law and wants us 
to fulfill it and yet he incites the devil to seduce us to sin? There is a real conflict between these two and 
theology cannot resolve it. Luther finally is able to say nothing more than 'lbis is too deep for us. God's will 
is involved, but I am not supposed to know how this all happens'" (Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 143 [158-
59]). It would seem that in Luther's teaching about God as the effectual cause of sin, we meet once again with 
The Bondage of the Will's chilling tenet that the hidden God "works ... all in all." 
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midway between heaven and earth.s4 "The Christian is," he says, "the sort of hero who 
constantly deals with absolutely impossible things. ,,55 
In circumscribing the religious phenomenon of Anfechtun2 and connecting it with 
God's hiddenness we have not, however, exhausted the implications of that hiddenness for 
the Christian life. Certainly Luther's identification of Christ's cross with that of the Christian 
entails that the latter, like Christ, will be an6!efochten; but it also means that he or she will 
be subj ect to all manner of negation. It cannot be otherwise, for in whatever specific manner 
God chooses to reveal his presence, he does so paradoxically, under the sign of the cross. 
Hence, though Anfechtung is certainly the most intense and terrifying fonn of suffering that 
attaches to the "sub contraria specie" of revelation, it is not the only fonn. "Christians must 
become like their Master in all things." Just as the ultimate reality about Christ was hidden 
in manifold degree, so too must the Christian's true estate be: "its glory must present itself 
in lowliness, its nobility in disgrace, its joy in suffering, its hope in despair, its life in 
death .... The hiddenness of the Christian life is a following of Christ's suffering."s6 And 
just as the way of the cross signified a way of annihilation for Christ, so too does it signify 
this for the Christian.s7 This is God's alien work, the end of which is his proper work, the 
impartation of life. 
Luther describes the Christian life as a "being crucified with Christ" (concrucifi~i 
Christo) in order to drive home the truth that it is a veritable process of dying. This assumes 
both inward and outward fonns. Inwardly the Christian suffers the martyrdom of the 
consciousness of sin for, as we have already had occasion to observe, he or she is simul 
S-WA 1,102, 39ff. 
5SWA 27, 276 (cited by Althaus in Die Theologie Martin Luthers. 61 [59]). 
56von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 136 (118), the translation ofwhich is slightly amended from 
the English version. 
57Ibid., 139 (120-21). Cf. WA 2,548, 28f. (LW 27, 308): "It is necessary that we be destroyed and rendered 
formless, in order that Christ may be formed and be alone in us." 
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iustus et peccator--i.e., ever in the process of being condemned and justified.58 The practi-
cal significance of the "in transit" character of Christian existence, however, is not limited 
to this, for it also includes the daily crucifixion ofthe flesh. The latter, in particular, is sym-
bolized in baptism, a sacramental act that effects the death of the old man and the rising of 
the new. This event, however, is not consummated once and for all at the beginning of the 
Christian life; rather, it is reenacted daily with the renewed putting to death of the old man 
through the mortification of the flesh. This means that baptism is peculiarly connected with 
the Christian's daily, inner experience of death and suffering. 59 
In identifying mortificatio as one of the forms of suffering that constitute the 
believer's crucifixion with Christ, we come face to face with a crucial determinant of 
Christian suffering--viz. that it is voluntarily incurred. The Christian life is a process of 
willed dying--yet, N .B., not in such a way that this is conceived as something that Christians 
accomplish on terms of their own choosing, but rather, as something set before them by 
God.60 The Christian is not to seek out suffering for its own sake--about this Luther is quite 
58"The real and true work of Christ's passion is to make man conformable to Christ, so that man's conscience 
is tormented in like measure as Christ was pitiably tormented in body and soul by our sins" (W A 2, 138, 19ff 
[LW 42, 10]). The German is as follows: "Das eygene naturlich werck des leydens Christi ist, das es yhm den 
menschen gleych formig mache, das wie Christusam leyb unnd seel jamerlich in unsem sunden gemartert wird, 
mussen wir auch ym nach alszo gemartert werden im gewissen von unszemn sunden." "Martem" in middle 
high German can mean "to torture" or "torment" as it does in modem German. But it can also mean "to martyr," 
"to nail to the cross." 
59"As long as we live we are continually doing that which baptism signifies, that is, we die and rise 
again .... Thus, you have been once baptized in the sacrament, but you need continually to be baptized by fai th, 
continually to die and continually to live .... You will understand, therefore, that whatever we do in this life 
which mortifies the flesh or quickens the spirit has to do with our baptism. The sooner we depart this life, the 
more speedily we fulfill our baptism; and the more cruelly we suffer, the more successfully do we conform to 
our baptism" (WA 6,534-35 [LW 36, 69]). Baptism "establishes a covenant between us and God to the effect 
that we will fight against sin and slay it, even to our dying breath, while he for his part will be merciful to us" 
(WA 2, 731, 35ff. [LW 35,35]). 
~owever vehemently Luther may condemn the "self-chosen" works upon which the monastic vocation 
prided itself, his rejection of such works cannot be a rejection of the voluntary nature of Christian suffering. 
Consider what, at the time ofthe Lectures on Romans. he sees as positive about this vocation that is otherwise 
fraught with meritmongering: "I think that to become a monk is a better thing today than it has been for the last 
two hundred years, and for this reason: up to now the monks drew away from the cross and it was something 
glorious to be a monk. But now people begin to dislike them again, even the good ones among them, on account 
of their foolish garb. For this is what it means to be a monk: to be detested by the world and to let oneself be 
taken for a fool" (W A 56,497 [Lectures on Romans. ed. and trans. Wilhelm Pauck, 385]). What can be said 
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clear.61 But by the same token, this does not mean that he or she leans back in ease, regard-
ing only those vicissitudes that are the ordinary human lot as Christian suffering. von 
Loewenich writes: 
Not every suffering may claim to be discipleship of the cross (WA 10111, 115, 15ff.) 
What does it mean to bear Christ's cross? 'The cross of Christ is nothing else than 
forsaking everything and clinging with the heart's faith to Christ alone, or forsaking 
everything and believing that this is what it means to bear the cross of Christ' (W A 
1, 101, 19ff.),,62 
to the credit of at least some monks, then, is that they have not drawn back from the cross, but willingly 
embraced it. It is the voluntary nature of their suffering that prompts the world to deride them as fools, but 
elicits Luther's praise. The undesirable accretions to this pure intent of monasticism, of course, soon lead Luther 
to abandon it altogether as a useful vehicle for mortification. God wills that we be humbled by works of his 
choosing--works that truly destroy the Old Adam--rather than works of our choosing that build him up. Hence 
in 1517, one year after the Lectures on Romans, Luther records God's estimate of "self-chosen" works: 
"Therefore not you, not a man, not a creature, but I, through My Spirit and the Word, will teach you the way 
you must go. You must not follow the work which you choose, not the suffering which you devise, but that 
which comes to you against your choice, thoughts, and desires. There I call; there you must be a pupil; there 
it is the time; there your Master has come" (WA 18,489 [LW 14, 152)). Henceforth the secular world is to 
be the setting for the Christian's asceticism: The "true mortifications," writes Luther, " ... do not happen in 
deserts, away from the society of human beings. No they happen in the household itself and in the government" 
(W A 43, 214, 3ff. [LW 4, 109)). Accordingly, the theologia crucis finds its practical expression in Luther's 
ethic of vocation: "Das wirkliche Leben--das ist der Weg des Kreuzes. Nicht das abstrakte, das selbst-
gezimmerte, das in einer bestimmten Isolierung von der Welt verbrachte, womoglich mit eigenen Martern und 
Kasteiungen geformte Dasein" (Iwand, "Theologia Crucis," 395). As Luther demonstrates in his Treatise on 
Good Works (1520), ordinary life offers endless possibilities for the mortification of the flesh. His ultimate 
rejection of monasticism therefore in no way rescinds the requirement of the theQlogia crucis that Christians 
voluntarily embrace suffering. "God himself wants us to be conformed in all things to the image of his Son 
(WA 1,571, 34ff. [LW 31,153)), and do this altogether voluntarily (WA 4,645, 21ff.)" (von Loewenich, 
Luthers Theologia Crucis, 143 [123], emphasis added). 
61"God does not want us to search for misfortune and to choose it ourselves. Walk in faith and love. If the 
cross comes, accept it. If it does not come, do not search for it. Therefore those hotheaded spirits do wrong by 
scourging and beating themselves or by killing themselves and trying in this way to take heaven by stonn" (W A 
12,364 [LW 30,109-10]). 
62Luther's Theologia Crucis, 138 (120). The view that ordinary vicissitudes do not constitute discipleship 
of the cross is already evident from the context of the above proscription against seeking out misfortune (W A 
12,364 [LW 30, 109-10)). There Luther observes that all people, good and evil alike, are "subjected to 
misfortune"--a circumstance that makes it all the more necessary for "those who want to come into eternal life 
to bear the cross!" Similarly, in the text cited byvon Loewenich here (W A 10m, 115, 15ff.) Luther categorically 
denies that ordinary misfortune counts as the Christian's "cross" (though it may well be considered an 
Anfechtung--see Paul Buhler, Die Anfechtung bei Martin Luther [Zurich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1942],35-36). But 
more on this later. 
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"Forsaking everything"--in a word, voluntary self-denial. As a part of such self-denial Luther 
advocates physical asceticism.63 The voluntary, though not self-imposed, character of 
Christian suffering can be summed up in the following way: "God disciplines the Christian, 
but he does it in such a way that he also summons the Christian to discipline himself and 
to struggle actively with his old man throughout his life. ,,64 
But Christians are not only subject to struggle, the locus of which lies within; out-
wardly, too, they contend. To be sure, they are blessed of God. Yet viewed from without, 
this blessing appears to be the greatest curse.65 The blessedness of the Christian estate is 
6.1 " Here the works begin; here a man cannot enjoy leisure; here he must indeed take care to discipline his 
body by fastings, watchings, labors, and other reasonable discipline and to subject it to the Spirit so that it will 
obey and conform to the inner man and faith and not revolt against faith and hinder the inner man, as it is the 
nature of the body to do ifit isnotheld in check" (WA 7, 30 [LW 31, 35S]). To a statement like this the caveat 
must be added that human nature is not dualistically conceived by Luther, as though the body were the ultimate 
obstacle to the exercise of man's higher faculties. It is not our corporeality, but our self-will ("flesh"), that 
perverts our faculties, lower and higher alike. Consequently it is our self-will that must be annihilated. In this 
regard, the mortification of the body is of limited utility: "One can weaken and mortify the body with fasting 
and works; but one does not expel evil lust in this way. Faith, however, can subdue and restmin it, so that it 
gives room to Spirit" (WA 12,296 [LW 30,41]). Physical asceticism is useful and necessary in reigning in the 
lusts of the body, but only in conjunction with the libemting presence of faith in man's higher faculties: "Since 
by faith the soul is cleansed and made to love God, it desires that all things, and especially its own body, shall 
be purified so that all things may join with it in loving and pmising God. Hence a man cannot be idle, for the 
need of his body drives him and he is compelled to do many good works to reduce it to subj ection. Nevertheless 
the works themselves do not justify him before God, but he does the works out of spontaneous love in 
obedience to God" (W A 12,30-31 [LW 31,359]). In sum, all our efforts at discipline count for nothing unless 
God first gives faith, and then the works--including acts physical asceticism--wherein faith is to be exercised. 
A closer discussion of this "incarnational movement of faith" into the sphere of corporeality may be found in 
Wilfried Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit. 104-S. 
64Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther. tmns. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 
22. Because the theologia crucis provides the context for Luther's ethic of vocation, the latter is anything but 
spiel3bUrgerlich in character. von Loewenich observes: "If it is ever asserted that Luther made lesser pmctical 
demands of men than medieval Catholicism, one glance at Luther's theology of the cross should be sufficient 
to convince one of the opposite. The most mdical asceticism and the most sublime mysticism, stripped of their 
false tendencies, are here given their due in their rightful concerns and are even surpassed in the seriousness 
of their approach. Unvaried in its emphasis, the melody sounds forth from Luther's theology of the cross: 
Whoever would follow me, let him deny himself and take up his cross, and follow me!" (Luthers Theologia 
Q:yill, 136 [liS]). 
65"Outwardly His grace seems to be nothing but wmth, so deeply is it buried under two thick hides or pelts. 
Our opponents and the world condemn and avoid it like the plague or God's wmth, and we too do not feel much 
differently about it" (WA 31',249,15 [LW 14,31]). "God's gifts and benefits are so hidden under the cross that 
the godless can neither see nor recognize them but mther consider them to be only trouble and disaster" (W A 
31 " 51, 21 as quoted in Althaus, Die Theologie Luthers. 38 [30)). "Thus the favor bestowed by God on this 
little group is completely hidden from the world and appears to be nothing but eternal wmth, punishment, and 
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not externally evidenced by the material blessings that it brings. If anything, the situation is 
precisely the reverse: it is identifiable by the tribulation that follows in its train.66 In this 
Christians are completely as their King, who distinguishes himself from all other kings in 
that he 
offers the cross and death. He advises contempt for the good that one sees, and 
likewise for the evil, since He will confer on you a much different good, namely, that 
which the eye has not seen, the ear has not heard, and has not entered into the heart 
of man (I Cor. 2:9). You must die if you would live under this King. You must bear 
the cross and the hatred of the whole world. You must not flee from ignominy, 
poverty, hunger, and thirst, in other words, all the evil that floods the earth. For this 
is the King who became a fool to the earth and died, and who thereupon destroys 
His own with a scepter of iron and smashes them like a potter's vessel. How can 
anyone stand such a King if he relies on his own senses, defines things rationally, 
and stands in the doorway of his tents and cannot see the face of Moses (Ex. 33:7-
I O)? Therefore instruction and training are necessary, that you may rise above this, 
regard the visible things with contempt, and be drawn to the invisible, as you aspire, 
not to that which is on the earth but to that which is above, where Christ is (Col. 3: 1-
2).67 
Chief among the outward perils that the Christian must endure is "the hatred of the 
whole world." It cannot be otherwise, for "the world and its rulers cannot tolerate a man who 
through this [spiritual] 'desire' wants to be blessed and scorns their blessings.,,68 The world 
behaves like a spumed lover; its blandishments give way to increasingly vicious recrimi-
nations. Even at the outset when it dismisses this little band of Christians as a lot of fools, 
it recognizes them as far more dangerous than that, for their deportment constitutes nothing 
less than the not-so-tacit condemnation of it and all that it deems wise, good, and estimable. 
tonnent from Godhimselr' (WA 31[, 91, 21 [LW 14,58]). 
66Cf. Luther's exposition of "the righteous man" in Psalm 1: "I have said that the blessedness of this man is 
hidden in the spirit, i.e., in God, so that it cannot be known except through faith or experience .... Therefore 
the man whom the prophet here calls blessed is unanimously declared by the world to be the most wretched 
of all, as Isaiah looked upon Christ, the Head and Model of the blessed, whom he calls the lowest of all" (W A 
5,36 [LW 14,298]). And a little later on: "[Beware 1 that prosperity is not understood a<; prosperity of the flesh. 
This prospering is hidden; it is so deep within the spirit that if you do not hold fast to it in faith, you might 
rather call it the greatest adversity" (WA 5, 41 [LW 14,304]). 
67WA 5,69 (LW 14,342), emphasis added. 
~A 5,36 (LW 14,298). 
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Thus do its fulminations mount until, in the end, the Christian is forced to bear the brunt of 
its fury: 
We teach that all men are wicked; we condemn the free will of man, his natural 
powers, wisdom, righteousness, all self-invented religion, and whatever is best in the 
world .... This is not preaching that gains favor from men and from the world. For 
the world finds nothing more irritating and intolerable than hearing its wisdom, 
righteousness, religion, and power condemned. To denounce these mighty and 
glorious gifts of the world is not to curry the world's favor but to go out looking for, 
and quickly to find, hatred and misfortune, as it is called. For if we denounce men 
and all their efforts, it is inevitable that we quickly encounter bitter hatred, persecu-
tion, excommunication, condemnation, and execution.69 
~ A 40', 121 (LW 26, 58). Particularly noteworthy is the phrase, "to go out looking for, and quickly to 
find, hatred and misfortune." Because the gospel is an offense to the world, one cannot proclaim it without 
"looking for" misfortune. Luther is "certain that the Word of God cannot be rightly treated without incurring 
hatred and danger of death, and that if it gives offense--especially to the rulers and aristocrats of the people--
this is one sign that it has been treated rightly" (WA 2,601 [LW 27,387]). Accordingly, the fact that the 
Christian does not "search for misfortune" (W A 12,364 [LW 30, 109-10], cited above) cannot mean that he 
or she maintains silence concerning God's Word, or tones it down to the point of acceptability to the world. 
Again, therefore, we see that properly Christian suffering is voluntarily incurred--this time as the inevitable 
outcome of the service of God and one's neighbor. In Luther's Treatise on Good Works--the very writing in 
which the earlier, more "monastic" formulations of the theologia crucis are translated into the eminently 
secular prescriptions of the ethic of vocation--Luther describes the risk entailed in defending God's name: "It 
is not enough that I for myself and in myself praise God's name and call upon him in prosperity and in adver-
sity. I must step forth and for the sake of God's honor and name bring upon myself the enmity of all men .... 
Here we must provoke father, mother, and the best of friends to anger. Here we must strive against spiritual 
and temporal authorities and be accused of disobedience. Here we must stir up against us the rich, the learned, 
the holy, and all that is of repute in the world. And although this is especially the duty of those who are 
commanded to preach God's word, yet every Christian is bound to do so too when time and place demand. For 
the holy name of God we must risk and give up all that we have and all that we can .... By this we confess that 
we regard him as the highest good, for whose sake we renounce and give up all other possessions" (W A 6, 226 
[LW 44, 50]). 
No less danger is incurred in the service of one's neighbor. Luther points out that "it is very easy to 
fight. .. against the wrong done to popes, kings, princes, bishops, and other big shots. Everybody wants to be 
the most pious in this, where the need is not so great. ... But where anything goes against a poor, insignificant 
man, the deceitful eye finds little pleasure, though it sees the disfavor of the mighty well enough; therefore, he 
lets the poor man remain unhelped. And who could tell the extent of this vice in Christendom? ... What good 
would it be for a man to do all manner of good, make pilgrimages to Rome and to all the holy places, acquire 
all indulgences, build all churches and found all endowments, ifhe were found guilty of sin against the name 
and honor of God by not speaking, by deserting the truth, and by regarding his possessions, honor, favor, and 
friends more highly than the truth? Or who is he at whose door and into whose house such good works do not 
present themselves every day?" (WA 6, 226-27 [LW 44,50-51]). 
Whether the Christian be engaged in defending God's name against an official Christendom that 
defames it, or in redressing the injustices done to his neighbor, he does so with the knowledge that it could well 
cost him all that he has--yea, his very life. These things he risks voluntarily. Hence here, as in the case of 
mortification, we have to do with an ignominy that is voluntarily incurred. This is what it means to bear the 
cross. All other suffering is mere vicissitude which, though it be borne in a Christian manner, nevertheless 
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Naturally, the world will charge that Luther prevaricates in the most perverse manner 
by claiming that the Christian risks daily the loss of everything for the sake of the gospel: 
"Certainly we are not so wicked as that--on the contrary, our pope is God's vicegerent on 
earth. Did not Christianity prevail among us long ago, establishing its reign in Christendom? 
How, then, could such imminent danger exist unless it were brought by the Turks from 
without?" To this Luther's response is that it is not the Turks who are the most dangerous 
enemies of the gospel, but the very guardians of Christianity, those who are "Christians" in 
eminent degree: 
If persecution of this kind has become a rarity, it is the fault of the spiritual prelates 
who do not awaken people with the gospel but just let it get buried. By doing this 
they have abandoned the very thing on account of which martyrdom and persecution 
should arise .... But if the gospel should be revived and heard once again, no doubt 
the whole world would arise and bestir itself. The greater part of the kings, princes, 
bishops, doctors and clergy, and all the great ones would oppose it and grow furious, 
as has always happened when the word of God has come to light, for the world 
cannot tolerate what comes from God. This is proved in the case of Christ, who was 
. . . the very best of all. . . . Yet the world not only did not receive him, but 
persecuted him more cruelly than all the others who had ever come forth from 
God.70 
With the mention of Christ's crucifixion we arrive at Luther's honest expectation 
concerning the fate of the Christian in the world (N.B., the "Christian" world!): his 
comes unbidden from without. Luther clearly distinguishes the two: "Aber kranckheit, annut, wetag etc. heist 
nit Creutz, sonder leydenn. Passio ignominiosa, das ist wann einer umb seines glauben willen verfolgung leyd, 
das heyst creutz." And again: "Creutz bedeutet eigentlich ein Leiden, das mit Schmach undSchande verbunden 
ist. Davon spricht Paulus [Phil. 3,8] 'Christus ist gehorsam worden bis zum Tode', aber nicht zu einem 
schlechten Tode, sondem setzet hinzu 'zum Tode am Creuz', das ist zu einem schandlichen Tode. So hat 
Christus auf das allerschmachlichste leiden miissen. Daher heisset das Creuz das eigentliche Leiden der 
Christen. Denn anders leidet ein Christ, anders die andern, als JUden, Heyden etc. So musten die Martyrer, ob 
sie auch gleich ganz unschuldig waren, dennoch allerley Schmach lciden urn Christi willen" (WA lOrn, 115, 
18ff. and 116, 27ff.). 
70W A 6,274 (LW 44, 111-12). 
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testimony to the gospel will probably cost him his life.71 Of Luther's strong conviction 
about the likelihood of martyrdom, Walther von Loewenich writes: 
Luther reckons with martyrdom in all earnestness as a not at all surprising further 
addition to the Christian condition. It seems to Luther to be a characteristic differ-
ence between the Old and New Testaments that God only allowed his own to come 
into danger of life in the old covenant, whereas he abandons them to death itself in 
72 the new covenant (WA 5, 276, Iff.) 
In this connection von Loewenich reminds us that, contrary to the prevalent perception that 
Luther encouraged the politicization of the reformation and thereby the domesticizing of 
Protestant Christianity in its turn, Luther was ever of the opinion that "a church that is all too 
militant and vocal in its politics is suspect (W A 5, 227, 7ff.). The true church is, on the con-
73 trary, a church of martyrs." 
We may summarize our treatment of suffering in its various forms by reiterating that 
these eminently practical phenomena possess epistemological import: they are part and 
parcel of the theologia crucis's necessarily indirect form of communication.74 So signifi-
cant an index is persecution, for example, that in the Lectures on Romans Luther regards its 
absence from a Christian's experience as an almost certain indication that God is not well-
71 Luther concludes his Treatise on Good Works by noting that "much more ought to be said about this kind 
of dying these days, for things are much worse .... No more shameful cover for infamy has been found on 
earth than the most holy and blessed name of Jesus Christ! ... It is high time that we earnestly pray God that 
he hallow his name. But it will cost blood, and those who enjoy the inheritance of the holy martyrs, the 
inheritance which was won with the blood of martyrs, must in their turn take on the role of martyr" (WA 6,229 
[LW 44, 53-54]). 
72Luthers Theologia Crucis, 141-42 (122-23), translation mine. 
7J1bid., 148 (127). 
71n the litany of sufferings cited above, it must be held firmly in mind that these will occur with a kind of 
apodictic, or theoretical, certainty since hiddenness is a necessary qualification of faith and it is precisely in 
suffering that we have to do with the hidden God (ibid., 96 [86]). Thus can Luther assert in his Treatise on 
Good Works: "The sufferings which are borne in this kind of faith [in the hidden God] excel aJl works of faith. 
Therefore there is an immeasurable difference between such works and sufferings, and the sufferings are 
better" rNA 6, 208 [LW 44, 28-29], emphasis mine). 
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pleased with that individual yet.7S Similarly, in On the Councils and the Church (1539) 
Luther numbers suffering in all its fonns--but persecution in particular--as one of seven 
essential "marks" of the church. Suffeling constitutes, as it were, the "negative sign" that one 
truly is a child of God: 
The holy Christian people are externally recognized by the holy possession of the 
sacred cross. They must endure every misfortune and persecution, all kinds of trials 
and evil from the devil, the world, and the flesh ... by inward sadness, timidity, fear, 
outward poverty, contempt, illness, and weakness, in order to become like their head, 
Christ. And the only reason they must suffer is that they steadfastly adhere to Christ 
and God's word .... No people on earth have to endure such bitter hate; they must 
be accounted worse than Jews, heathen, and Turks. In summary, they must be called 
heretics, knaves, and devils, the most pernicious people on earth, to the point where 
those who hang, drown, murder, torture, banish, and plague them to death are 
rendering God a service. No one has compassion on them; they are given myrrh and 
gall to drink when they thirst. And all of this is done not because they are adulterers, 
murderers, thieves, or rogues, but because they want to have none but Christ, and no 
other God. Wherever you see or hear this, you may know that the holy Christian 
church is there.76 
We have quoted the above passage at length because, in addition to identifying 
suffering as the badge of membership in Christ's church, it discloses the ultimate purpose 
of that suffering: viz., that Christians may "become like their head, Christ." Conformity 
with Christ is the concept that, in the final analysis, most aptly characterizes the unity of 
contrasts that obtains in the life under the cross. In it "both the hiddenness and lowliness, as 
well as the supreme glory and greatest riches of the Christian life are comprehended.,,77 
Luther prefers this designation, confonnitas cum Christo, to imitatio Christi because of the 
latter's tendency to elevate Christ as model at the expense of Christ as gift. While, for Luther, 
75"As long as we are doing good and do not experience as a result of it opposition, hatred, trouble, or hann, 
so long we have reason to worry that our work has not pleased God as yet. ... But if our work is immediately 
attacked, then let us be of good cheer and finnly trust that it is weB-pleasing to God, that is, believe that it is 
of God Himself, for what is of God must be crucified in the world. So long as it does not lead to the cross (that 
is, to shameful suffering), it is not recognized as a work that comes from God, inasmuch as the only-begotten 
Son was not protected against this experience but rather was appointed the example of it" (W A 56, 194 [LW 
25, 177]). 
7rwA 50,628-29 (LW 41, 164-65). 
77von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 144 (123). 
48 
Christ is certainly also model, "the decisive thing about our relationship to Christ is exactly 
what does not admit of description by this category.,,78 Imitation devoid of inner renewal 
remains within the bounds of the m01ralistic; like the theology of glory in general, it concerns 
the activity of the person. Conformitas, on the other hand, 
bursts these bounds; it stands in connection with suffering, and not a self-chosen one 
at that, but a suffering sent by God. Conformitas does not primarily have to do with 
an endeavor of the person, but with an activity of God. In a word: the concept of 
conformitas is not to be severed from that of the cross in the pregnant sense--which 
cannot be said of imitatio.79 
In the concept of conformity with Christ, we arrive at the ultimate and hidden "synthesis" 
that God seeks to effect by the means of the manifold, repellant paradoxes of the cross. 
This concludes our resume of Luther's theology of cross. The various aspects that we 
have treated are by no means restricted to the young, "pre-reformational" Luther.so On the 
78Ibid., 143 n. 157 (196 n. 157). Translation mine. 
79Ibid. Translation mine. 
80Utis is not to deny that the theologia crucis undergoes a development coincident with Luther's general 
development from an Augustinian view of justification to a view stressing the Christian's already present, total 
righteousness. Indeed, in its earliest fonn (that ofthe Dictata) the theology ofthe cross is not even Augustinian. 
There grace is given to the person who first "does what lies within him" (explanation ofPs.I13:1, WA 4, 262). 
Heiko Obennan observes that the usual nominalist grounds are cited: viz., that "man's disposition is not 
meritorious de condigno but de congruo due to God's merciful commitment" ("Facientibus Quod in se est Deus 
non Denegat Gratiam: Robert Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther's Theology," in The Dawn of the 
Refonnation: Essays in Late Medieyal and Early Refonnation Thought [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986],99). 
Oberman goes on to show that the decisive shift in Luther's attitude to the doctrine of the facere quod in se est 
occurs at some point during the Lectures on Romans (November 1515 to September 1516) since toward their 
end Luther explicitly repudiates it (W A 56, 503 [sch. Rom. 14: 1 D. Saamivaara traces this evolution more 
precisely still by documenting Luther's changing attitude to synteresis within the lectures themselves (ranging 
from initial acceptance in WA 56,177,14 [sch. Rom. 1 :20] to outright rejection in WA 56,275,18 [sch. Rom. 
4:7]--see Luther Discovers the GOSl)el. 77). 
Despite Luther's abandonment in the Lectures on Romans of his earlier nominalistic presupposition 
of justification, his depictions of justification and justifying faith remain largely those of the Dictata. 
Justification continues to be understood as a process of being made just, justice consisting in the confession 
of one's complete injustice and impotence in the matter of salvation. We are apprised that this is our condition 
by God's word of judgement, to which we can only accede. Therefore humility is the desideratum; it is the 
quality wherein man's fonnal righteousness consists. Faith enters into the schema insofar as we must believe 
that Christ's way of humiliation was a way of secret exaltation prototypical of the way that we must go. And 
it enters in vis-a-vis the word of judgement that brings low--faith is the means by which God effects the 
humility by which the sinner is truly, if inchoately, made righteous. In effect, it is the scholastics' fonned faith, 
or more aptly, humilitate fonnata. (N.B. We observed earlier the importance of humility in the teachings of 
Staupitz and Gennan mysticism. Oberman notes that it is also "characteristic for nominalistic theology where 
it appears as a refined fonn of the facere quod in se est," citing its occurrence in Biel--"Facientibus Quod in 
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se est Deus non Denegat Gratiam," 100 n. 90.) Such humility commences the healing of our nature. Because 
this healing, or increase in formal righteousness, remains incomplete in this life, it must be supplemented by 
the non-imputation of sins. Yet such non-imputation is granted on account of the commenced cure. Seminal 
treatments of Luther's understanding of justification at the time of the Lectures on Romans have been given 
by Bizer, Fides ex Auditu, 23-52 (pp. 51-52 providing an excellent summary of his position); Uuras 
Saamivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel. 74-87; and F. Edward Cranz, An Essay on the Development 20-40. 
Saamivaara, Bizer, and Cranz alike maintain that this sanative framework prevails in Luther's view 
of justification up to 1518-19 (roughly the date that Luther himself assigns to his breakthrough regarding "the 
righteousness of God" in the 1545 preface to his Latin works). They document its waning influence from about 
1517 on, while observing a concomitant emergence of "reformational" insights. Ifthey have not succeeded in 
convincing the entire field of scholars that Luther's reformational theology did not come into its own until 
1518-19 (and they have not), it is principally because each assumes a specific theological content in which 
Luther's breakthrough is assumed to have consisted, tracing its emergence and deVelopment throughout the 
period. Both the limitations and fruitfulness of this approach become apparent inasmuch as each assumes a 
different content as "reformational," and yet each arrives at a date corresponding to that which Luther himself 
gives. The limitation ofthe approach has to do with the fact that "the complexity of Luther's thought makes for 
a plurality of levels on which his development took place" (Oberman, "Facientibus Quod in se est Deus non 
Denegat Gratiam," 100): one seeks in vain to isolate a single concept that is "of such incomparable moment 
for understanding the origins of Luther's theology" (Leif Grane, Modus LoQuendi Theologicus. Luthers Kampf 
urn die Emeuerung der Theologie (1515-l5l8)[Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975], 12). Nevertheless, the fact that these 
scholars have arrived at the same date using three different "reformational" insights does abundantly confirm 
that a development does occur in Luther's thought, and that the mature theology is the product of a confluence 
of developing insights. 
The problem, however, is that by selecting other insights than those employed by Bizer et al. one can 
arrive at a dating that puts Luther's breakthrough considerably earlier. This being the case, it is doubtful that 
"the line of demarcation between the young and the mature Luther can be so sharply drawn" (Gerrish, "By Faith 
Alone," 81). Two evidences can be adduced for this. First, "there are already in the Lectures on Romans 
elements that strain to the breaking point the conception of Christian righteousness as, so to say, a magnitude 
that admits of growth and increase" (pp. 76-77). Gerrish calls attention to no less than eight: the notions of 
hidden righteousness, imputation, and the happy exchange; the proleptic character of righteousness in hope; 
the simul formula's approach to a~ aspect at certain points; the understanding of faith as the organ by which 
Christ indwells the believer; the beginnings of a sharp distinction between law and gospel; and the insight that 
the righteousness of God is a gift, not a threat (pp. 77 and 80). Conversely, Gerrish notes that "Augustinian 
patterns of thought have an embarrassing habit of turning up again in the later writings, even when the tidy-
minded scholar would have preferred their permanent retirement" (p. 76). Reference is to the persistence ofthe 
partim understanding ofthe simul formula in Luther's later statements regardingjustification (see n. 43 above). 
Gerrish demonstrates how Luther's mature doctrine of justification embraces both imputed and imparted 
righteousness ("By Faith Alone," 82-85). In view of these factors, he writes: "I still find it more plausible to 
view the Lectures on Romans as the work of a man who, as we can see more clearly in retrospect, had already 
struck out along a fresh path" (p. 77). 
The significance of this discussion about the nature and date of Luther's "reformational breakthrough" 
becomes clear when we consider that Bizer and others have championed anew Otto Ritschl's view that the 
theology of the cross is "pre-reformational" (Bizer, Fides ex Auditu, 93 and 202-3). Singling outthe importance 
that the word as sacrament assumes for Luther from 1517 onward, Bizer contends that the theology of the 
cross has been supplanted by a theology of the Word. Yet this is but one aspect ofthe mature Luther's theology 
(as is the teaching of the "two realms" [Cranz] and imputed righteousness [Saamivaara]); and other teachings 
with no less claim to "reformationality" begin to make their appearance much earlier on. Specifically, cross 
motifs are to be found early and late. Accordingly, the presumption lies close at hand that their early 
occurrence foreshadows the direction that Luther's later theology will take. The most judicious approach 
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other hand, neither will it be denied that the theology of the cross is but a perspective from 
which Luther's total theology can be viewed, and that any balanced presentation must take 
into account the shift in emphasis in the mature Luther toward a more "cataphatic" theology. 
There faith is defined, for the most part, not negatively, as having to do with inyisibilia, but 
positively, as directed toward the Word and Christ.81 Likewise in the later Luther we find 
a much more generous role assigned to "experience." Because faith can, and ultimately must 
be felt,82 it is increasingly bound up with experience. Nevertheless, even in the mature 
Luther faith is not experience, nor is it dependent upon experience. Rather, it is the divinely 
wrought prius of experience, the invisible source from which experience proceeds.83 
Similarly, the material determinateness of faith in Christ and the Word does not abrogate 
faith's formal delimitation, as having to do with inyisibilia. Faith's directedness to the Word 
is, as we have seen, precisely its directedness away from all objectifiable experience. 
Moreover, the Christ who is laid hold of by faith is no "brute fact" that can be directly 
perceived.84 Hence the negative determination of Luther's faith concept provides the 
therefore seems to be to evaluate these motifs in relation to the changing contexts in which they occur, and, 
rather than maintain their incompatibility with later developments, trace how they have conspired to lead Luther 
to the final form of his theology. Saarnivaara, in fact, adopts something of this approach. He holds that, in the 
Dictata and the Lectures on Romans, the theology of the cross is "more a teaching of how God deals with 
sinners according to the 'pattern' of Christthan good news of what Christ had done for them" (Luther Discovers 
the Gospel. 116). He contends, however, that this same theology of the cross undergoes modification during 
the period leading up to the "tower experience," whereupon it assumes a fully reformational character. For 
Saarnivaara, the cross-elements were not what retarded Luther's theological development; rather, it was his 
allegiance to the tropological interpretation of scripture that did this, since it "practically forced one to 
understand justification as a renewal, wherein man was lifted up, step by step, from sin to righteousness and 
conformity to Christ" (pp. 116-17). While one might look to still other factors than just this one, the point is 
that cross motifs were not what impeded Luther in his efforts to understand the meaning of "the righteousness 
of God"; if anything, they tended to impel him forward to the conception of passive righteousness. 
81von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia Crucis, 113-21 (10 1-7). 
82Ibid., 105-6 (95). 
83Ibid., 11 0-11 (98). 
~ereas fides historica can well grasp the historical facticity of Christ, the ultimate truth about him is 
concealed from it and only accessible to fides special is. This leads to what one might designate a "contempora-
neity concept" in Luther. von Loewenich writes: "Historical faith keeps its distance from its object, and does 
so in a double respect: it does not leap over the historical chasm that is between us and the time of Jesus, and 
it views these events purely as a spectator. Special faith, however, receives these accounts for their effect, that 
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critically delimited field within which the positive definition has its place, and apart from 
which the latter must give an entirely false impression.85 It has been the intent of this 
chapter to provide a sketch of just this negative moment of Luther's total theology. 
is, it is not neutral over against them, but feels itself participating in them to the highest degree. This faith 
knows that 'this concerns me.' For this event. to which faith is directed, is not historical in the sense of an event 
that is closed and lies behind us, but one that is new every day through faith (W A 401, 523, 3 Off. [L W 26, 340])" 
(ibid., 120 and 114 [106 and 101-2]). 
85Ibid., 104 (93). 
CHAPTER TWO 
KIERKEGAARD'S THEOLOGY OF THE CROSS 
In SKIS Judge for Yourself! (1851) we read that "the cross ... belongs together with 
everything that is essentially Christian." I These words indicate the central role that the 
theology of the cross plays in his critique of Lutheranism. They also testify, if only 
indirectly, to the affinity that the mature Kierkegaard felt to Luther. While the awareness of 
that affinity had dawned only gradually, it was certainly present by the time of the Conclud-
ing Unscientific Postscript (1846). There Kierkegaard had attacked Lutheran orthodoxy's 
one-sided emphasis upon the sole efficacy of grace in baptism, pointing out its failure to 
observe Luther's equally strong insistence that the sacrament is effectual only where faith 
is present. "What is baptism without personal appropriation?" Kierkegaard asks: 
Take appropriation away from the essentially Christian, and what is Luther's merit 
then? But open his books. Note the strong pulse-beat of appropriation in every 
line .... Did not the papacy have objectivity and objective definitions and the 
objective, more of the objective, the objective in superabundance? What did it lack? 
Appropriation, inwardness.2 
Central to the kinship that Kierkegaard perceived between Luther and himself at the 
midpoint of his career was their shared concern for introducing the personal appropriation 
ISV XIV 434 (Judge forYourselfl, 161). 
2SV VII 317 (Postscript. 366). Certainly it must be noted that Kierkegaard--here in the guise of Johannes 
Climacus--does not share Luther's postulate of a fides infantilis. Consequently, he ridicules the very notion that 
this most serious of matters--becoming a Christiano-could possibly be decided at infancy (pp. 250, 318, 322-23 
and 514-15 [292-93,367-68, 372-73,and 590-92]). Nevertheless, his departure from Luther on this point does 
nothingto diminish the authentically Lutheran basis for his criticism of nineteenth century orthodoxy: viz., that 
by virtue of its hyperorthodoxy vis-a-vis baptism, it had lapsed into heterodoxy vis-a-vis regeneration (p. 518 
[595]). 
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of grace into a context in which the means of its conferral had come to be conceived as an 
opus operatum.3 
In the case of Kierkegaard this attempt took the form of the pseudonymous 
authorship. Because the majority of his contemporaries lived their lives according to 
aesthetic categories and were not even aware of the existence of the ethical, Kierkegaard felt 
compelled to initiate them into the despair of the aesthetic lifestyle and to set before them 
the ethical way of life that can, alone, secure from despair.4 At this early stage Kierkegaard 
is silent about the fact that the ethical itself is despair. As Luther painfully discovered in the 
monastery, the conscience that is trained in the ethical can only progressively discover its 
own guilt and incapacity. With each essay at doing the good, a new and even greater sin is 
discovered of which one must first repent; hence the movement is backward into deeper 
guilt-consciousness, not forward into triumphant ethical endeavor.s If Kierkegaard, in the 
guise of Either/Or's Judge William, is less than forthright on this point, it is because his 
readers must first receive a thorough schooling in the ethica1.6 But the ethical is only a way 
3Kierkegaard, in fact, uses this very term (Pap Xe A 25 [JP 1 :368]) in describing the status that baptism had 
assumed in his day. 
4E.g., SV XIII 529-43 (Point of View, 22-43) and Pap VIII I A 548 (JP 5: 6107). While it perhaps 
oversimplifies Kierkegaard's use of the term, det tEsthetiske. to identify it with eudaemonism, a close corre-
spondence nevertheless exists. Such a system of ethics is no ethics at all on SK's understanding. The life-view 
that is truly ethical is determined solely by considerations of duty, though--N.B.--not in the Kantian sense, as 
though duties were self-legislated; on the contrary, God alone is their originator (Pap X2 A 396 [JP 1: 188] and 
SV IX 111-14 [Works of Love. 119-22]). Yet before one can come to the point of experiencing the liberating 
force of the limits that duty imposes (Pap VIe B 235, pp. 160-61 [On Authority and Revelation. 127-28]), one 
must first have been made to taste of the anxiety, melancholy and despair in which unfettered aesthetic connois-
seurship ends. It is the task of Judge William to clarify this to his young friend and to urge that he despair of 
his condition qua aesthete, and thereupon embrace duty (SV II 166-193 [Either/Or II, 183-215]). 
SSV VII 459-60 (Postscript. 526-27). Because the ethical requirement is so enormous "that the individual 
always goes bankrupt," the highest to which the ethical life-view can attain is repentance (SV III 146n [~ 
and Trembling. 98n]; SV VI 443, 451-52 [~476, 486]). This state of affairs in which ethics finds itself 
is a "self-contradiction" (Pap IV A 112 [JP 1 :902]; SV III 146n [Fear and Trembling. 98n]; SV IV 385 
[Concept of Anxiety. 117-18]) since its ultimate 't Ho~ is, after all, action. The result is despair. The ethical 
individual can effect nothing. His repentance is an "infinite annihilating power" (SV VI 443 [~ 476]). 
6SV VII 217-18 (Postscript. 257-58). 
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station;7 it has no identity independent of the religious.s Its tenninus ad quem is the despair 
of the anguished conscience that acutely feels its need of grace. Only after one has reached 
this extreme state of ethical bankruptcy is one in the position to appropriate grace, and the 
grace thus appropriated--it goes almost without saying--does not achieve its effect ex opere 
operato.9 
7SV VI 443 (~ 476). 
BSV VII 252 (Postscript. 294). Cf. p. 111 (137). 
9Leading his readers into ethical bankruptcy in order thus to forestall the possibility of taking grace in vain 
is certainly the greater part ofwhat Johannes Climacus understands under his authorial task of "making things 
difficult" (ibid., 155 [186-87]). His intent is, in the first place, to show the aesthetic sufferer that, "even if he 
winces ever so much," he "can most likely come to suffer even more, and then when he sends for the ethical--
well, it first helps him out of the frying pan into the fire so that he really has something to scream about--and 
only then does it help him" (pp. 372-73 [429]). Yet the help that the ethical affords is exceedingly short-lived, 
for Climacus next introduces Christianity which makes the way the most difficult of all, confronting the ethical 
enthusiast with a beginning wherein "everything becomes much more difficult than ever" (pp. 372-73 [428-
29]). Christianity does so by positing a teleological suspension of the ethical wherein the ethical continues 
to be "present at every moment with its infinite requirement," yet in such a way that "the individual is not 
capable of fulfilling it." "The suspension consists in the individual's finding himself in a state exactly opposite 
to what the ethical requires. Therefore, far from being able to begin, every moment he continues in this state 
he is more and more prevented from being able to begin: he relates himself to actuality not as possibility but 
as impossibility. Thus the individual is suspended from the ethical in the most terrifying way, is in the 
suspension heterogeneous with the ethical, which still has the claim of the infinite upon him and at every 
moment requires itself ofthe individual, and thereby at every moment the heterogeneity is only more definitely 
marked as heterogeneity" (p. 226 [266-67]). N.B. Johannes Climacus's usage of the expression, "teleological 
suspension of the ethical," in this context clearly differs from Johannes de Silentio's in Fear and Trembling. 
There the divine command that Abraham slay Isaac entailed the supersession of ethics' claim to universality. 
Here the demands of ethics are assumed to retain their force for all, without exception. Nevertheless ethics 
itself suffers shipwreck due to Christianity'S teaching on sin. How so? "Ought implies can" is ethics' operative 
premise (SV IV 288 [Concept of Anxiety, 16]); where there is no ability, neither is there--from ethics' point 
of view--obligation. Hence if Christianity's postulate of sin is true, then ethics finds itself superseded, this time 
absolutely. Christianity, however, is hostage to no such premise; it is perfectly free to press ethics' claims (the 
theological use of the law) in order to make known the person's true status: sin, "this dreadful exemption from 
doing the ethical, the individual's heterogeneity with the ethical" (SV VII 227 [Postscript, 267]). 
Now--to return to our main point--to labor thus into greater and greater difficulty, only, in the end, to 
land in an impossible situation that only grace can remedy--this is the antithesis to an objective, mechanistic 
understanding of the same. One must first have gone through the entire preceding ethical development: 
"Religiousness A must first be present in the individual before there can be any consideration ofbecoming 
aware of the dialectical B. ... Thus it is evident how foolish it is if a person without pathos wants to relate to 
the essentially Christian, because before there can be any question at all of simply being in the situation of 
becoming aware of it, one must first of all exist in Religiousness A .... Of course, to become a wohlfeil [cheap] 
edition of a Christian in all ease is much easier and is moreover just as good as the highest--after all, he is 
baptized, has received a copy ofthe Bible and a hymnbook as a gift; is he not, then, a Christian, an Evangelical 
Lutheran Christian? ... In my opinion, Religiousness A (within the boundaries of which I have my existence) 
is so strenuous for a human being that there is always a sufficient task in it. My intention is to make it difficult 
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The "theory" of the stages is therefore a process of upbringing in the ethical, the aim 
of which is to bring SKIs readers to the point at which there can first be talk about receiving 
grace. In what may be an allusion to Luther's teaching that God must first slay in order to 
make alive, Kierkegaard states that God's Spirit does bring life, but only after we have 
died.!O The penultimate stop prior to Christianity in the progression of the stages is reli-
giousness A's dying to the world. Because the religious individual seeks an absolute relation 
to the absolute 'teAOe;, he strives for a relative relationship to relative 'teA,,--an outcome 
that can only be had by their continual, complete renunciation. In enjoining such renuncia-
tion Johannes Climacus points to the Middle Age's monastic movement as exemplary. He 
does so, not because he views outward renunciation of the world as desirable in and of itself, 
but because such outward renunciation provides an index as to whether one really has 
inwardly submitted to "the absolute danger and the absolute strenuousness ... solitary and 
silent association with the absolute."!! By so submitting one arrives at the ultimate stop on 
the way to Christian existence: the discovery of guilt as total determinant of one's being.!2 
Here, too, those "deep and earnest souls who found rest in a monastery" in days bygone 
receive high praise, for they were willing to "scrutinize in sleepless vigilance every single 
secret thought, so that ... [they might] in anxiety and horror discover and lure forth ... the 
dark emotions hiding in every human life.,,!3 
to become a Christian, yet not more difficult than it is" (p. 486 [556-57], slightly amended). 
IOSV XII 360-61 (For Self-Examination. 76-77). The scriptural allusion is to 2 Cor. 3:6 ("For the written 
code kills, but the Spirit gives life"). Kierkegaard, however, enlarges upon it in a decidedly Lutheran way 
since, on his rendering, it is the Spirit that kills in order subsequently to give life. On the necessity of 
experiencing the dread of judgement prior to the comfort of forgiveness see SV VII 218 (Postscript. 258). 
llSV VII 361 (Postscript. 416).1t is interesting to note that in this passage Kierkegaard offers the identical 
observation about the monastic estate that we found in Luther--viz., that the monk is praiseworthy precisely 
because of his ostensible buffoonery in the eyes of his contemporaries: "In our time, a person would be 
regarded as lunatic if he entered a monastery, if one were established .... This I regard as an extraordinary 
bonus" (pp. 360-61 [416]). And like Luther, SK repudiates the misdirection of medieval monasticism, i.e., its 
elevation of "outwardness" to an end in itself (works-holiness). 
l2Ibid., 458-90 (525-61). 
13SV III 147-48 (Fear and Trembling, 100). 
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There is likely an allusion to Luther here, and it is not without justice that Karl Holl 
has credited Kierkegaard with having rediscovered the same ideality of the ethical that lay 
at the foundation of Luther's own religious experience. HoB writes: 
The distress in which Luther saw himself get embroiled with the act of 'awakening' 
and with contritio was, in reality, only the unavoidable result of his understanding 
of the ethical. With it, Luther comes up against the problem that had first become 
apparent to Paul, the great trailblazer, and for which, not until the nineteenth century, 
did Soren Kierkegaard and, in his own way, Nietzsche, seek to awaken understand-
ing. It has to do--this is the meaning of his struggles--with the feasibility at all of 
an ethical striving that is directed to the unconditioned. 14 
"Unconditioned" or "absolute" are, in fact, precisely the tenns that, for Kierkegaard, best 
describes ethics' demand--or what is identical with it, Christianity's.ls Holl is quite right 
in calling attention to SK's discovery--in the manner of Luther--of Christianity's ethical 
ideal. In a discussion that is no less than a locus classicus on the subject, Climacus writes: 
There is and can and shall be in every human being this privy understanding with the 
ideal, which requires everything and comforts only in annihilation before God .... 
In the relation of silence to the ideal, a judgment is passed upon a person. Woe to 
him who as a third party would dare to judge a person in this way. There is no appeal 
from this judgment to anything higher, because this is absolutely the highest. ... In 
the relation of silence to the ideal, there is a criterion that changes even the greatest 
effort into a trifle, changes the year-after-year striving into a chicken step .... The 
one, then, who turns upon himself with the absolute criterion will of course not be 
able to go on living in the bliss that, if he keeps the commandments and has no 
sentence pending and is regarded by the clique of revivalists as a really sincere 
person, that he then is a splendid fellow who, if he does not die too soon, will in a 
li<.arl Holl, "Was verstand Luther unter Religion" in Luther, vol. 1 of Gesammelte Aufsatze zur 
Kirchengeschichte. 4th and 5th printing (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1927),24-25. The Swedish 
LutherlKierkegaard scholar, Torsten Bohlin, concurs completely with HoIl's assessment (see Kierkegaards 
dogmatiska AskMning i dess historiska sammanhang [Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses 
BokfOrlag, 1925], 464-65). 
lS"The ethical as the absolute is infinitely valid in itselr'--i.e., valid without respect to mitigating 
considerations of human frailty (SV VII 116 [Postscript, 142]). Similarly, "Christianity did not come into the 
world as a showpiece of gentle comfort, as the preacher blubberingly and falsely introduces it--but as the 
absolute .... Therefore all the relativities people have hit upon about why and wherefore are untruth. Perhaps 
they have hit upon them out of a kind of human compassion that thinks it has to haggle and bargain--for God 
presumably does not know man; his demand .. are too extravagant, so there have to be pastors to haggle and 
bargain .... But all this is untruth, is a distortion of Christianity, which is the absolute" (SV XII 59 [Practice 
in Christianity, 62]). 
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short time become all too perfect for this world. He will, on the contrary, again and 
again discover guilt and in tum discover it within the totality-category: guilt.16 
The outcome of religiousness A's discovery of guilt qua total determinant is the 
wretched condition of the Quidam-figure of Sta~es on Life's Way (1845) who, crushed by 
resignation and repentance, cannot see the possibility of being raised to life again. And yet 
the despair is not complete, for Christianity and its decisive category, sin, have not yet been 
brought forward. Only with the introduction of sin--the transmutation of human nature 
whereby the possibility of all truck with the divine is cut off--does the individual's ethical 
bankruptcy become complete.17 Kierkegaard's conception of sin as constituting an absolute 
16SV VII 478-79 (Postscript 548-49, slightly amended). Note in this regard Climacus's amusement at the 
attempts of medieval piety to assuage the anxious conscience through penance (p. 473 [542]). 
17The distinction between the concepts "guilt" (which belongs to "religiousness A" or religious 
"immanence"--Le., universal piety) and "sin" (which belongs to "religiousness B," the "paradoxically religious," 
or Christianity) is strictly observed by Kierkegaard. Humans can, through their innate powers of perception, 
win through to the insight that their condition is one of total guilt--a qualitative (not merely quantitative) 
determination by which they are stamped, and from which they are powerless to escape (SV VII 459-66 
[Postscript. 526-34]). This seems to be a doctrine of sin. Yet it is not, for within the framework of guilt one 
retains a tenuous link to God via conscience's "eternal recollection of guilt" (pp.466 and 467 [534 and 535-36]). 
Not so with sin. There the relationship has been completely severed, and not even conscience is of avail, for 
it is not privy to sin. Sin is so complete a transformation of human nature that "the existing person does not 
discover it by himself, but gets to know it from without" (p. 466n [534n, slightly amended]); he "cannot acquire 
sin-consciousness by himself, as is the case wi th guilt-consciousness. . .. [T]hat power which enlightens him 
... must be outside the individual. ... That power is the God in time" (p. 509 [584], translation mine). There-
fore, in contrast to guilt, sin is a transcendent category, a veritable cipher: "No man of himself and by himself 
can declare what sin is, precisely because he is in sin; ... That is why Christianity begins in another way: man 
has to learn what sin is by a revelation from God (SV XI 205-6; cf. also 200-1 and 206-7 [Sickness unto Death, 
95; cf. 89 and 96]). The fact that man can be, and apart from Christianity is, in such ignorance concerning his 
own nature is the thrust of the Postscript's paradox, "Subjectivity is truth"I"Subjectivity is untruth" (SVVII 174 
[Postscript. 207]). The revelation of sin means that the individual is without any faculty for perceiving truth 
(including the truth about himself) and hence, for relating to God. Insofar as he has been born into sin, "a 
change so essential has taken place in him that he in no way can take himself back into eternity by Socratically 
recollecting" (p. 174 [207-8]). He is cut off, not only from God, but from himself: "Sin-consciousness is the 
breach; by coming into existence the individual becomes another ... for otherwise sin's definition is placed 
within immanence. From eternity the individual is not a sinner; so when the eternally conceived being, who 
at birth comes into existence, becomes a sinner at birth or is born a sinner: then it is existence that surrounds 
this being on all sides so that every communication within immanence via recollection's way of retreat into the 
eternal is cut off, and the predicate 'sinner,'--which first, but also immediately, emerges through the act of 
coming into existence--gains such a paradoxically overwhelming power that the act of coming into existence 
makes him into another .... [G]uilt-consciousness is an alteration of the subject within the subject itself; sin-
consciousness, on the other hand, is an alteration of the very subject itselP' (pp. 508-9 [583-84], translation 
mine). To sum up: becoming a sinner is the ultimate qualitative change: it is not a mere change of predicate 
(as shuffling off temporality and assuming eternity would be); rather it is a change of subject. 
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breach between the divine and the human lies at the heart of his theology of the cross, with 
its correlate of blind faith in an authoritative, paradoxical revelation. ls 
This parallels in significant respects Luther's understanding of sin which, as we have 
seen, is so deep-seated a disturbance of humans' cognitive capabilities that they are not even 
aware of its presence. The similarity is not surprising for Kierkegaard was himself 
influenced by Luther's teaching on sin.19 Now it will be recalled that, for Luther, sin was 
the crucial category that foreclosed the possibility of human beings knowing God SiX 
operibus--whether the works in question were those of God or man. The various faculties 
that were supposed to convey innate knowledge of God--synteresis, intellectus, ratio--had 
all been disabled by sin. Similarly, we read in Philosophical Fragments that human beings, 
by virtue of their sin, have deprived themselves of the condition for receiving the truth, with 
the consequence that God is no longer knowable via "immanence." A new organ of 
knowledge is needed,20 for after the fall "the God" is merely that frontier at which the 
understanding continually arrives but beyond which cannot pass, whether it essays to do so 
via negationis or via eminentiae. As the "Unknown" or "absolutely different,,21 God is 
denotable by categories the opacity of which is reminiscent of the Deus nudus/absconditus 
of The Bondage of the Will. 
It is important to note that while Kierkegaard can refer the hiddenness of God to the 
qualitative abyss that distinguishes the divine from the human,22 the stress is not upon 
God's predicateless being qua Deus nudus, but upon man's self-inflicted benightedness--sin 
18SV XI 206-7 (Sickness unto Death. 95-97). 
19See Pap vnl A 192 (JP 3:2641), written in 1846, where Kierkegaard applauds Luther's teaching that "man 
must be taught by a revelation about how deeply he lies in sin." See also The Concept of Anxiety. 26 (SV IV 
298), written in 1844, where he quotes from the Smalca1d Articles (Part III, Art. I) concerning the depth of 
corruption of nature due to hereditary sin. 
20SV IV 272 (Fragments. 111). 
2IIbid., 212 (44). 
22Eg., SV VII 182 (Postscript. 217); SV XI 235, 237 (Sickness unto Death. 125-26, 127); Pap vn2 B 235, 
p. 145 (On Authority and Revelation. 112). 
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has issued in the "qualitative distinction" that conceals God from human view;23 it has 
compelled the expedient that God reveal himself by assuming the form of a humble 
servant.24 It is within this context that the hiddenness due to transcendence subsequently 
comes into play. Because divinity's "absolute difference" (eternity, infinity, etc.) is not a di-
rectly recognizable feature, every act of unveiling must entail an act of veiling.2s SK's "God 
23SV IV 184-87,214 (Fragments. 15-17, 46-47) and SVXI 208-11, 227-231 (Sickness unto Death. 98-100, 
117-22). This is important to note for it means that the qualitative abyss that separates God and humans is not 
primarily ontological in nature. In that case the breach would be built into our very make-up and without 
remedy. No, sin is what separates and it is acquired in freedom (SV IV 185, 214 [Fragments. 15,46-47]; SV 
XI 206 [Sickness unto Death, 95]). Certainly Torsten Bohlin is correct when he observes that in the Postscript 
Kierkegaard frequently represents the breach between God and humankind as ontological: it is the difference 
between time and eternity, the relative and the absolute, the finite and the infinite--distinctions borrowed from 
idealism. Yet he seems deliberately to overlook that the "breach" is so defined only within "the Socratic": a 
framework that assumes that human beings are possessed of the qualifications for attaining to truth, and hence 
in immanent possession of it. Accordingly that breach is not absolute; the person is conceived as a synthesis 
of the temporal and the eternal and on his or her way toward becoming one of the two. Such an anthropology 
is not the radical dualism that Bohlin claims it to be. On the contrary, it is Hegel's notion of "Spirit" transferred 
to individual human beings. As such there is no breach--the breach becomes qualitative and absolute onlywith 
the introduction of sin. We may therefore categorically deny that the Postscript defines sin in ontological terms 
(Kierkegaard "gebt im Grunde von einer metaphysischen Bestimmung vom Wesen der Sunde aus, in der die 
Sunde dasselbe wie die Endlichkeit selbst bedeutet" (Bohlin, "Luther, Kierkegaard, und die dialektische Theo-
logie," trans. Anne Marie Sundwall-Hoyer, in Zeitschrift ftirTheologie und Kirche, neue Folge 7 [1926]: 176). 
The text that Bohlin cites in confirmation ofhis claim, SV VII 499 (Postscript, 573), admittedly uses terms 
borrowed from religiousness A in describing sin's effects--sin is depicted as effecting an absolute breach 
between the eternal and the temporal (thereby breaking the fluid continuum presupposed by "immanence"). SK 
is not here referring sin's breach to the time/eternity distinction, but describing it in terms ofit: humankind has 
been cut off from all access to the eternal. From the preceding discussion of sin and guilt (n. 17) however, it 
could be supposed that sin's breach is referred to "coming into existence," and therewith to some change 
wrought in the individual by temporality. Yet when, in the Postscript. Johannes Climacus asserts that the predi-
cate, "sinner," emerges through the act of coming into existence, he cannot mean that it is caused by that act, 
for in the Fragments he had previously declared sin to be an act of freedom. What is more, coming into 
existence [Tilblivelse] was itself said to occur by an act offreedom (the "Interlude"). Intended, then, is that the 
person, in being brought into existence (God's free act), simultaneously becomes a sinner (the person's free act--
God leaving to human freedom the kind of being that it will assume). We must therefore reject Bohlin's claim 
that SK has conceived sin along the lines of a dualist ontology in the attempt to counter Hegel's all-embracing 
monism. SK makes it very clear that sin is not simply identical to finitude, temporality and sensuousness even 
if it does profoundly transform them so that they become sinful (see SV IV 342-43,363 [Concept of Anxiety, 
73,93]). 
24SV IV 199-202,221-30 (Fragments, 31-35,55-66); SV XI 235-37 (Sickness unto Death, 126-28). 
2\vhen God, who is absolutely different, reveals himself this cannot be in the guise of his absolute 
difference for "the understanding cannot even think the absolutely different; it cannot absolutely negate itself' 
(SV IV 212 [Fragments, 45]). Divinity is "not an immediate qualification" (p. 256 [93]) and true deity will 
accordingly be unrecognizable: "If Christ is true God, then he also must be unrecogni7..able, attired in unrecog-
nizability .... Direct recognizability is specifically characteristic of the idol" (SV XII, 127 [Practice in 
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incognito,,26 and Luther's Deus absconditus in passionibus are equivalent expressions of the 
necessity of such "indirect communication,,27 where revelation is concerned. If God is to 
reveal himself at all to sinful humanity, such revelation will necessarily entail an act of 
condescension that simultaneously conceals him or, more accurately, that preserves intact 
the essential secrecy that is intrinsic to godhead.28 
This gives rise to paradox, the characteristic mark of revelation, for not only is 
divinity not directly recognizable in the medium of revelation--the man Jesus--it stands in 
direct contradiction to what is visibly present.29 But as we learned from Luther, scandal 
is the inevitable concomitant of hiddenness in this degree: when God "gives [his Spirit] 
under its contrary, and contradicts what is signified by the sign itself, it is not merely pro-
foundly but far too profoundly concealed.,,30 Kierkegaard makes the same point in a 
startlingly similar way: 
In Scripture the God-man is called a sign of contradiction .... In addition to being 
what one is immediately, to be a sign is to be a something else also. To be a sign of 
contradiction is to be a something else that stands in contrast to what one immediate-
Christianity, 136]. Cf. SVVII 176,204-7 [Postscript. 210,243-246]). Becauore ofthe impossibility in principle 
of the God-man offering any immediate token of his godhood, his advent can be no ordinary (that is to say, 
verifiable) fact. Luther, too, was aware of this: as we have seen, it was his contention that while "historical 
faith" could well grasp the "facts" about Christ, it could not know the ultimate truth about him, since this was 
accessible only to "special faith." A precise analog of this in Kierkegaard is to be found in the distinction drawn 
in Fragments between the "historical eyewitness" and the "contemporary follower" (SV IV 225 [Fragments. 
59]). For Kierkegaard and Luther alike, the incarnation is no brute fact. Kierkegaard calls it the absolute fact 
that, while "indeed also historical" (pp. 262-63 [100]), must nevertheless be distinguished from every other 
simple, historical fact. 
26SV IV 229 (Fragments, 64); SV XII 119-24 (Practice in Christianity. 127-33). 
27SV IV 228 (Fragments. 63); SV XII 123-27 (Practice in Christianity. 132-36). 
2S"Secrecy is the indication thatthe revelation is a revelation in the stricter sense, ... the secrecy is precisely 
the only thing by which it can be recognized" (SV VII 206-7 [Postscript, 245], translation mine). 
2~e "absolute fact" of the incarnation distinguishes itself from every simple, historical fact by virtue of 
the "contradiction" that it embodies: that "that which can become historical only in diametric opposition to all 
human understanding has become such"--ibid., 177-78 (211), translation mine; cf. pp. 504-5 (579) and SV IV 
226-27,255-56 (Fragments. 61,93). As such it declares itself to be "the absurd fact" (SV VII 177-78 
[Postscript. 211]) or simply "the absurd" (p. 176 [210]). 
lOW A 4, 82 as quoted in Gerhard Ebeling, Luther: An Introduction to his Thought, trans. R. A. Wilson 
(London: Collins, 1970),236. Emphasis mine. 
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ly is. So it is with the God-man. Immediately, he is an individual human being, just 
like others, a lowly, unimpressive human being, but now comes the contradiction--
that he is God.31 
The idea is of course preposterous: "Humanly speaking, there is no possibility of a crazier 
composite than this, either in heaven or on earth or in the abyss or in the most fantastic 
aberrations of thought.,,32 The possibility of offense is therefore not to be avoided. It must 
be taken seriously and Kierkegaard--like Luther before him--seeks to do so by returning the 
CJKeXv8aAov to its rightful place in theology.33 
31SV XII 118 (Practice in Christianity. 125-26). Simeon's prophesy concerning Jesus (Luke 2:34: ''taou 
oU'tOt; Ke\'tcu eit; 1t't6>OlV K«l !ivCtO't«OlV 1tOAA6>V ev 't4) 'Iop«i)A K«l eit; 
oTJlJ.eiov !iV'tlA€y0IJ.€Vov") provides the context for Kierkegaard's remarks. It must be conceded that 
SK's rendering of oTJIJ.€iov !iV'tlA€y0IJ.€VOV (a sign that is opposed) as "sign of contradiction" is a 
forced construction. Nevertheless, it superbly expresses the sub contrariis character of revelation. 
J2SV XII 79 (Practice in Christianity, 82). 
33It is important to note in this regard that the OKCt va «AOV is not "merely" a theological construction on 
the part of Kierkegaard and Luther. It is biblical in origin and denotes "an obstacle in coming to faith and a 
cause of going astray in it" (TDNT. S.V. "oKCtva«AOV," p. 345). While SK normally uses the terms 
Forargelse or Scan dale to designate "0 ffense," he occasionally emp loys the NT term itself, as in Pap Xe B 155, 
p. 249 where he writes: "New Testament Christianity is simply sheer scandal--the word itself is, after all, the 
Greek term oKCtva« AOV, which is used constantly in the New Testament about Christianity." A brief survey 
of NT texts yields ample evidence that Kierkegaard bynomeans exaggerates the concept's importance--though, 
to be sure, he gives it a characteristic, Chalcedonian bent. In Matt. 15: 12 the Pharisees take umbrage at Christ; 
in Mark 6:3 (par. Matt. 13:57) Jesus' hometown acquaintances are likewise offended. In Matt. 11:6 (par. Luke 
7:23) Christ pronounces a blessing upon all who do not take offense at him; in Matt. 24:10 he predicts that 
offense will be widespread among his followers at the end of the age owing to persecution for his name's sake; 
in Matt. 26:31 (par. Mark 14:21) he predicts the falling away of the twelve, themselves, at the time of his 
passion; and in John 6:60-67 desertion due to offense is said to occur among the ranks of his disciples already 
during the time of his ministry. The gospels' frequent mention of OKCtVa«A« in relation to Christ make it 
clear that his contemporaries were confronted with two possibilities: "that offaith and that of unbelief, and both 
in Jesus; for the presence and work of Jesus have the power to awaken faith but they can also result in the 
missing of faith. He [Jesus] realizes that a OKCtVa«AOV, a cause of unbelief, attaches to His words and 
deeds, and that this cannot be avoided" (mNI, s.v. "OKCtVa«AOV," p. 350). Perhaps nowhere is this more 
apparent than in Matt. 21:42 (par. Luke 20: 17) where, quoting Ps. 118:22, Christ refers to himself as the stone 
rejected by the builders but chosen by God to become the chief cornerstone. This notion that Christ is not only 
the cornerstone of salvation, but simultaneously the 1tE'tp« OK«VaCtAOU, or stumbling block, is taken up 
in Rom. 9:32-33 and 1 Pet. 2:6-8. These texts make it clear that Christ's operation is twofold: "He who is placed 
there for faith Himself becomes an 'obstacle to faith.' Hence He who is appointed for salvation can also be a 
'cause of perdition. '" This being so, "the message about Jesus contains an offence which neither can nor should 
be avoided" (mNI, s.v. "OKCtVa«AOV," p. 352). Paul drives this point home when he warns the Galatians 
against abolishing "the stumbling block of the cross" (Gal. 5: 11), the preaching of which is necessarily "a 
stumbling block to Jews, and folly to Gentiles" (I Cor. 1 :23). But if this is so, then "an essential part of faith 
is the overcoming of the skandalon •••• Offence is of the very essence of the Gospel. This is not to be 
abandoned at any cost, nor is it to be softened" (IDNT. S.v. "OdVa«AOV," pp. 353-54, emphasis added). 
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It has been maintained that SKIs understanding of faith and offense is more 
intellectualistic than Luther's inasmuch as it derives from the logical contradiction posed 
by the incarnation.34 This is a misrepresentation not only of Kierkegaard but of Luther since 
the latter shares SKIs Chalcedonian christology, fully acknowledging its absurdity from the 
standpoint of unregenerate reason.35 Conversely Kierkegaard shares Luther's estimate of 
the fallen status of all human faculties, not just reason.36 Above all, the incarnation shatters 
human pretensions to selfless love and in so doing strikes as firmly at the root of ~ as of 
34Such is, again, Bohlin's contention: "Wenn er [SK] die Offenbarung nach dem Gesichtspunkt eines 
Schutzes gegen die Rationalizierung des G1aubens a1s 'Kreuz der Spekulation' bestimmt, an dem die Reflexion 
gekreuzigt und getotet werden soll, so legt er 'anti-intel1ektualistisch intel1ektualistisch' den Ton auf das 
G1aubensobjekt in der Bedeutung einer logisch metaphysischen Unsinnigkeit, dieohnejedes 'warum' geglaubt 
werden muD. Aber dadurch erhalt der Glauben den Charakter eines intellektuellen, krampfbaften Festhaltens 
eines historischen Faktums, das eine unsinnige complexio oppositorum ist. Wenn er in gewissem 
Zusammenhang GUiubigsein mit dem Anerkennen Christi als Gott identifiziert, stellt er in der Tat irreligios-
dogmatisch die Anerkennung einer bestimmten Vorstellung von der Eigenart von Christi Natur als die 
notwendige Bedingung fUr die Gewif3heit von der Lebensgemeinschaft mit Gott aur' ("Luther, Kierkegaard 
und die dialektische Theologie," 176). 
Bohlin's thesis is that SK's interpretation of Christian doctrine is governed by the overriding concern 
to maintain a radical diastasis between God and man. The controlling axiom of SK's theology is therefore the 
"infinite qualitative distinction." This axiom is said to manifest itself in the representation of sin as the 
time/eternity distinction and Christ as the one who mediates it in his own person (he being the single point at 
which the tangent [eternity] intersects the circle [temporality)). Bohlin's charge is that Kierkegaard, in 
attempting to refute idealism's monistic conception of Christianity, unwittingly waged the battle on ground 
marked by idealism. Consequently it is idealism--not biblical Christianity--that "frames" SK's presentation of 
doctrine, thereby giving it a metaphysical coloration. Herein does Bohlin see the fundamental difference 
between SK and Luther, whose cross theology was forged solely in the personal experience of sin-
consciousness. While Bohlin is certainly correct about the influence of idealism upon Kierkegaard, its adverse 
effect has not been felt so much in a radical diastasis as in a radical similitudo Dei, as we shall demonstrate 
in chapter eight. Accordingly, SK's teachings about the paradox, faith and offended reason are not the real 
casualties of his receptiveness to idealism. Rather one must look to his anthropology (on which the human 
being is said to be a "synthesis" of the finite and the infinite) as the point at which idealism has exerted an anti-
Pauline, anti-Lutheran influence. 
35Cf., e.g., WA 401361 (LW 26, 227-28). Bohlin himself acknowledges this ("Luther, Kierkegaard unddie 
dialektische Theologie," 277 n. 4), minimizing, however, the significance of "the metaphysical" in Luther's 
christo logy, even as he maximizes it in Kierkegaard's. Responding directly to Bohlin's claim that Luther's 
theology is "personal-experiential" in character without any admixture of the "intellectualistic," Walther von 
Loewenich writes: "Even if Luther simply borrowed these paradoxes from [Occamist] tradition, they still 
constitute an important ingredient of his theology, no less important than that which may be termed 'the line 
of experience'" (Luthers TheolQgia Crucis. 5th printing, rev. [Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1967], 82 [Luther's 
Theology of the Cross, trans. Herbert 1. A. Bouman (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1976) 74)). 
31n fact it is principal1y the will that has been depraved by the fall so that the difficulty in becoming a 
Christian lies not in the understanding, but in the doing. See SV X 173-74 (Christian Discourses, 178-79); SV 
XI 201-7 (Sickness unto Death, 89-96); SV XII 396-97 (Judge for Yourself!, 115-17). 
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ratio.37 The difference between Luther's and Kierkegaard's understanding of faith and 
offense is accordingly more one of nuance than substance, and one cannot dismiss the 
relationship that obtains between their theologies of the cross on that basis. 
In any case it cannot be denied that for Kierkegaard, as for Luther, the fundamental 
basis for offense resides in the hidden ness of God's revelation in Christ. To seek, via 
speculation, to eliminate the essential mystery that attaches to this revelation is to eliminate 
Christianity itself. At the heart of the speculative project is the desire to render Christianity 
inoffensive.38 The possibility of offense, however, is inseparable from Christianity: 
wherever Christianity goes it is accompanied by signs of offense.39 It cannot be otherwise 
when a holy God who is infinitely qualitatively distinct assumes our common humanity as 
his incognito.40 It is out of love that God behaves thus, and the very real possibility that his 
love may result in offense and perdition for the beloved constitutes his deepest SOITOW.41 
37See especially "Love is the fulfilling of the Law" in Works of Loye. 99-136 (SV IX 90-129). It is not 
ultimately the contrarationality of Christianity's teaching about the God-man that arouses offense, but the 
absoluteness of its ethic. The latter condemns our civil righteousness as altogether unrighteous (SV XII 105 
[Practice in Christianity, 111]) and, offended, we seek to reduce Christianity's requirement to terms that allow 
usto "take heaven by storm" (SV XII 427-28 [Judge for Yourself!. 154-55]). Hence it is that SKrefers offense 
at Christianity not to the absurdity of its teachings, but to the seditious spirit of the human heart: "It is 
claimed that arguments against Christianity arise out of doubt. This is a total misunderstanding. The arguments 
against Christianity arise out of insubordination, reluctance to obey, mutiny against all authority. Therefore 
until now the battle against objections has been shadowboxing, because it has been intellectual combat with 
doubt instead of being ethical combat against mutiny" (Pap VIII' A 7 [JP 1 :778); cf. Pap VIII' A 331 [JP 
3 :3049]). Reason's inability to reconcile itself with the God-man is at bottom a refusal to accept God's decree 
concerning the depth of reprobation that afflicts the human heart and the consequences that this holds for the 
other human faculties. Once this depravity has been acknowledged, not only is the person able to admit to the 
limitation ofhis will and intellect alike, he feels the utmost need of a redeemer. Kierkegaard observes that only 
the anxious conscience "understands Christianity," only it "grasps the Atonement" (Pap VII2 192 [JP 3 :2461]). 
The paradox of the God-man is therefore not nonsense to the anxious conscience, but the sole remedy for sin 
that inspires it to venture everything (SV XII 106 [Practice in Christianity. 112]). Contra Bohlin, belief in the 
God-man does not ultimately have the character of a sacrificium intellectus for Kierkegaard, but a remedy for 
the anxious conscience. 
38SV VII 179-81 (Postscripl 213-16). 
39SV IX 191,64, 190 (Works of Love. 193,74, 192-93). SK's pronouncement of woes upon the one who 
purges the offense from Christianity's message is reminiscent of Luther's warning, that when the church's 
proclamation is no longer offensive to people, it has betrayed the gospel (W A 2, 601,25 [LW 27, 387]). 
40SV XI 227, 235, 237 (Sickness unto Death, 117, 125, 127-28). 
4'lbid., 235-37 (126-28). 
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Yet there is no other way, for the possibility of offense is simultaneously the possibility--
indeed, the indispensable condition--for faith. It is impossible to come to faith without 
having first undergone the possibility of offense, impossible to live by faith without 
overcoming the offense at every moment.42 
It should come as no surprise that Kierkegaard's remarks concerning the scandalum 
are suggestive of Luther, for on the occasion of his first extended treatment of the subject 
("Offense at the Paradox" in Philosophical Fra~ents), he explicitly declines the honor of 
having contributed anything new, simply referring the reader to, among others, Luther.43 
Still other points held in common will come as no surprise. When, for example, SK speaks 
of faith as "beginning precisely whe~e thought stops" or as "leaving worldly understanding 
behind,,,44 this certainly owes far more to Luther's rejection of ratio vis-a-vis "things 
higher" than to Kant's antinomies, which likewise dictate that room be left for faith. What 
is at issue for Kierkegaard is not a religion that resolves apparent contradictions within the 
limits of reason alone, but one that prostrates itself completely before a realm of being that 
is impervious to thought. Because SK insists that Christianity trades in irreconcilable 
42SV VII 510 (Postscript 585); SV XII 38, 74, 133 (Practice in Christianity, 39,76,143). So close is the 
relation between faith and offense that Kierkegaard calls them the "happy" and "unhappy" passions with which 
the understanding encounters the paradox (SV IV 216 [Fragments. 49]). Because of their interrelatedness, SK 
will not speak of faith without also speaking of offense. The fact that large segments of a number of works are 
devoted to "offense" [SV IV 215-21 (Fragments 49-54); SV IX 189-94 (Works of Love. 191-96); SV XI 194-
99,223-41 (Sickness unto Death. 83-87, 113-31); and SV XII 66-134 (Practice in Christianity, 69-144)] 
signifies the centrality of this concept for a true delineation of faith. 
43SV IV 219 (Fragments. 53). 
44SV III 69, 103 (Fear and Trembling. 17, 53). Other texts on the mutual exclusivity of faith and 
understanding include SV IV 224 (Fragments. 59): "How, then, does the learner come to an understanding with 
this paradox, for we do not say that he is supposed to understand the paradox but is only to understand that this 
is the paradox"; SV VII 179 (Postscript. 214): "Suppose that it [Christianity) does not want to be understood 
and that the maximum of any eventual understanding is to understand that it cannot be understood"; p. 183 
(218): "The only possible understanding of the absolute paradox is that it cannot be understood"; p. 495 (568): 
"The believing Christian both has and uses his understanding ... in order to see to it that he believes against 
the understanding"; SV XII 365 (For Self-Examination. 82): "Faith is against understanding." 
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contradictions and yet is the truth, he has been charged with irrationalism, much as Luther 
has been accused of advocating a "theory of double truth. " Yet neither charge is accurate.45 
But faith is not only against the understanding; it is also against experience. When 
Abraham received the command to sacrifice Isaac on Mt. Moriah, he had no unambiguous 
experience to which he could appeal: how could he be certain that his were not the delusions 
4SB. A. Gerrish ("The Refonnation and the Rise of Modern Science" in The Old Protestantism and the New. 
Essays on the Refonnation Heritage [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982], 171-73) has shown that 
Luther did not, in fact, advocate the putative "theory of double truth" (the view that a statement may be true 
in philosophy but not in theology, and vice versa). To be sure, in his Disputation on the Proposition, "The Word 
was made flesh" (1539) "Luther begins byaffinning that the proposition 'The Word was made flesh' is true in 
theo logy, but simp ly impossible and absurd in philosophy (thesis 2)" (p. 171). Nevertheless, by careful analysis 
of the text Gerrish demonstrates that Luther has not set forth a theory of double truth, but rather one of multiple 
discourse. Luther's position is that "each of the various disciplines (professiones) operates with its own special 
discourse" (p. 172). Because the meaning of a proposition is fixed by the domain of discourse to which it 
belongs, it cannot be transferred to another domain and retain its original meaning; in the process of transferral 
it becomes another proposition, the meaning of which is dependent upon the new context. Consequently, 
though the proposition "The Word was made flesh" is ostensibly the same proposition in theology and 
philosophy alike, it in fact is not, for different things are meant by the tenns. Gerrish observes that by his theory 
of meaning Luther seeks "to give each discipline autonomy in its own 'sphere"'--an intent that is "not out of 
harmony with his general theological position, in which theology and philosophy are related to the doctrine of 
the two realms" (p. 173). F. Edward Cranz likewise grounds Luther's "realms of discourse" in his general 
doctrine of the two realms (An Essay on the Development of Luther's Thought on Justice, Law. and Society 
[Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1964],66-67). 
For his part, Kierkegaard has not advanced the theory of double truth: SV VII 262 (Postscript 305) 
in fact explicitly rejects it. Neither has he advocated rank irrationalism. Notwithstanding his tenet that faith 
in the God-man is faith in "the absurd" and therefore tantamount to a "martyrdom ofthe understanding" (p. 195 
[232]), Kierkegaard's intent has been to point out--contra Hegei!--the inadequacy of human categories (and 
their presumed dialectic) for dealing with divine revelation. In this connection, one may cite p. 495 (568), Pap 
X2 A 354 (JP 1 :7), and Pap X6 B 79-80 (JP 1:10-11). In the second of these entries SK writes that "Christianity 
... turns the natural man's concepts upside down and gets the opposite out" (N.B., not in Hegelian fashion, i.e., 
according to a rational calculus). Kierkegaard stresses, however, that this complete overturning of human 
categories byno means entails "that 'the absurd' is not a concept, that all manner of absurda are equally at home 
in 'the absurd'" or "that it is nonsense." Pap X6 B 80 (JP 1: 11) reinforces this contention by refusing to construe 
the absurd's constituent parts as flat-out contradictories in any ultimate sense (i.e., sub specie aetemitatis). 
Rather, their ultimate senses are incommensurable with what we, here and now, think them to be, thereby 
giving the appearance of contradiction: "The absurd is the negative criterion of that which is higher than 
human understanding and human knowing" (emphasis mine). One may therefore argue that SK, too, entertains 
a "theory of multiple discourse," and that he, too, relates it to the "two realms" (existence on the one hand, 
eternity on the other). Nevertheless, despite the impassable gulf that separates us from the ultimate sense of 
Christianity'S terms, Kierkegaard clearly accords human discourse about Goda relative coherence, for beyond 
its "impossible" axioms and imperfectly grasped terms there is a certain dogmatic precision to be won. The 
Book on Adler. for example, is just such an attempt "to get a clarity about certain dogmatic concepts and an 
ability to use them which otherwise isnoteasy to be had" (Pap VIII2 B27,p. 75 [On Authority and Revelation. 
li]). 
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of a lunatic or the promptings of a devi1?46 He could not. Hence, just as Luther could praise 
him for letting go of his understanding and allowing himself to be led like a blind man along 
the way, so too can Kierkegaard marvel at the manner in which he closes his eyes, plunging 
confidently into the absurd.47 Abraham is like a sleepwalker who securely negotiates the 
abyss.4s He is so because faith does not depend upon feeling nor is it an observable psycho-
logical condition.49 Faith perceives nothing at all, least of all its own existence.5o Yet, 
blind though it is, faith sees perfectly well in the dark.51 
If faith's verities do not merely transcend those of reason and experience, but in fact 
contradict them, then it is not a knowing.52 The further circumstance that faith can only ex-
46"One approaches [Abraham 1 with a horrorreligiosus. as Israel approached Mount Sinai. What ifhe himself 
is distraught, what if he had made a mistake?" (SV III 111 [Fear and Trembling, 61]). 
47Ibid., 85 (34). 
48lbid., 111 (61). 
49See ibid., 118 and 130 (69 and 82), where it is denied that faith is a feeling or a mood. 
SOPap IX A 32 (JP 1 :255): "I cannot get an immediate certainty about whether I have faith--for to believe 
is, after all, precisely this dialectical suspension that is constantly in fear and trembling and yet never despairs; 
faith is just this infinite self-concern that keeps one vigilant in ha7..arding everything, this self-concern as to 
whether one also really has faith--and see, just this self-concern is faith. But what has brought such enormous 
confusion into Christianity is that at times one preaches dialectically, and at times as though faith were the 
immediate, the immediate certainty" (translation mine). 
SlSV VIII 324 (Gospel of Suffering, 32): "When human wisdom cannot see a hand's breadth before it in the 
dark night of suffering, then faith can see God, for faith sees best in the dark." Cf. Luther, for whom it likewise 
applies that God leads in a way "that is not the way of the senses or of reason but of faith alone that is able to 
see even in darkness" (WA 5,45, 30ff. [LW 14,309]). 
S2SV IV 227 (Fragments, 62): "It is ea"y to see then (if, incidentally, the implications of discharging the 
understanding need to be pointed out), that faith is not a knowledge, for all knowledge is either knowledge of 
the eternal, which excludes the temporal and the historical as inconsequential, or it is purely historical 
knowledge, and no knowledge can have as its object this absurdity that the eternal is the historical." See also 
SVVII 179-81 (Postscript. 213-16) where the claim that faith is not a knowing is advanced on the grounds that 
Christianity is an essential secret, the object of which is, in principle, hidden. This claim ofKierkegaard's that 
faith is not a knowing should be interpreted with the same caution as the similar claim that we encountered in 
Luther. Kierkegaard does not deny that a kind of cognition occurs in faith. His claim is that it is sui generis. 
This is evident from the first text cited, in which Kierkegaard takes up Lessing's distinction between "necessary 
truths of reason" and "contingent truths of history" (cf. SV VII 77 [Postscript. 97]). In its chief tenet (the 
Incarnation) Christianity involves neither. That is to say, it has as its object neither "eternal fact" nor "historical 
fact," but "absolute fact" which possesses characteristics of both (SV IV 262-63 [Fragments, 99-100]). This 
absurd hybrid cannot be known by any of the ordinary ways of knowing. 
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ist in the absence of experience and in defiance of the understanding [Christianity's 
scandalum!] marks it out as the most highly charged of passions.53 Kierkegaard compares 
it to being suspended over a depth of 70,000 fathoms of water;54 Luther, as we have seen, 
likens it to hanging from a cross, situated midway between heaven and earth.55 For both 
men faith is a leap,56 a dare that entails risk: 
53SV III 116, 166-67 (Fear and Trembling. 67, 121-22), SV IV 224 (Fragments. 59), and SV VII 107 
(Postscript. 132) all identify faith as a "passion" (Lidenskab>. The intent of this designation, according to 
Gregor Malantschuk (FI)'gtog Breven. Indledning ogGennemgang ved Gregor Malantschuk [Copenhagen: C. 
A. Reitzels Boghandel, 1980), 105), is to distinguish faith from "knowing" or "feeling" and to ally it with 
"willing" (or acting, yet not as though it were the will's own act, as we shall see). Malantschuk's interpretation 
is corroborated by the circumstance that offense, the opposite passion (SV IV 215-18 [FragillentS. 47-51)), is 
not something that merely "befalls" one. It is, to be sure, something suffered, yet it is also willed (p. 215 [47)). 
As a proof that this is so Kierkegaard cites linguistic convention: one is offended and yet one takes offense. 
Accordingly, while passion involves being "carried away," one wills to be so transported--that is to say, passion 
contains elements of ~ and actio alike. Close synonyms to Lidenskab include Subiektivitet (subjectivity) 
and Interesse (interest). SK writes: "Christianity is spirit; spirit is inwardness; inwardness is subjectivity; 
subjectivity is essentially passion, and at its maximum an infinite, personally interested passion for one's eternal 
happiness. As soon as subjectivity is taken away, and passion from subjectivity, and infinite interest from 
passion, there is no decision whatever" (SV VII 21 [Postscript. 33), emphasis mine). Although pa'ision 
involves ~ (being acted upon)--and hence, feelings--it is certainly more than feeling, and the fact that SK 
differentiates the two (p. 303 [350)) only confirms our preceding claim that faith is not reducible to "experi-
ence"; it is not a feeling of confidence, optimism and the like, perceptible through introspection. Indeed, insofar 
as faith is, in the first instance, an act of willing (actio wherein God is the agent), it can exist in the absence of 
experience. If one can take SK's thoughts on love (which is also a thing more affecting than affected) as an 
indication of his views on faith (indeed, he draws a parallel between the two in the text that we are about to 
cite), then faith is the divine source whence experience proceeds--a source that is, itself, not discemable 
precisely because it lies hidden in God--precisely as we learned from Luther (SV IX 12-14 [Works of Love, 
26-28)). 
54SV VI 414, 437-38,443 (Sillges, 444,470-71,477); SVVII 114, 171,195,246 (Postscript. 140,204,232, 
288); Pap VI B 18, p. 94 (JP 5:5792); Pap VIe B 235, p. 194 (On Authority and Revelation. 157-58); Pap VIII 
A 221, p. 145 (JP 5:5961); Pap VUe B 105,3; Pap IX A 94, p. 50; Pap X2 A 623, p. 447; Pap X2 A 494 (JP 
2:1402); Pap X4 A 114,290 (JP 2:1142, 4:4937); Pap X6 B 123, p. 163. 
5SWA 1,102, 39ff. A somewhat similar statement in Kierkegaard reads: "But suppose Christianity ... is 
inwardness, and therefore the paradox, in order to thrust away objectively, so that it can be for the existing 
person in the inwardness of existence by placing him decisively, more decisively than any judge can place the 
accused, between time and eternity in time, between heaven and hell in the time of salvation" (SV VII 180-81 
[Postscript. 215]). 
56SV VII 78-85 (Postscript 98-106). The "leap" is the category of decision (p. 79 [99)). As relates to 
Christianity, it is the decision of faith in the God-man. It cannot be arrived at on the basis of facts about Jesus' 
life--not even the resurrection--for from none of these (however remarkable they may otherwise be) can it be 
inferred that Jesus was God. Of that inference Lessing says: "If that is not a 1l€'tIl~(Xa\~ ei.~ cd.Ao 
yfvo~ [transition to another category-sphere) then I do not understand what Aristotle understood by this 
designation .... That--that is the nasty wide ditch over which I cannot come however often and earnestly I have 
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Without risk, no faith .... If I am able to apprehend God objectively, I do not have 
faith; but because I cannot do this, I must have faith. If I want to keep myself in faith, 
I must continually see to it that I hold fast the objective uncertainty, see to it that in 
the objective uncertainty I am "out on 70,000 fathoms of water" and still have 
faith.s 
The risk attaching to Christianity, however, is no calculated one that can be absorbed with 
a high degree of certainty as to a successful outcome. Such would be the case if Christianity 
merely traded in objective uncertainties. But in point of fact it trades in a supremely 
disquieting certainty: "the certainty that, viewed objectively, it is the absurd."s8 
Faith, therefore, is the absolute antithesis to "shrewdness" that trades in probabilities. 
Even as he ventures, the believer does so with knowledge that, humanly speaking, he is 
going to his own destruction.s9 Yet what makes this venture the more appalling is the fact 
attempted the leap." SK goes on to note that "the leap" is associated with Lessing's name in yet another way: 
when Jacobi, in the self-appointed role of "father confessor," bade his Spinozist friend make the one and only 
saving saIto mortale ["death leap" of faith], the latter responded by saying that he could no longer expect such 
a leap of his old legs and heavy head. SK uses both accounts to illustrate the existential--as opposed to logical--
character offaith ("it is left to the single individual to decide whether he will by virtue of the absurd accept 
in faith that which indeed cannot be thought"--p. 80 [100]), and to point up the risk that the leap entails and 
the impossibility of making it on one's own powers (each person being "essentially taught solely by God" 
in this matter--p. 81 [101]). 
57Ibid., 170-71 (204). Also p. 176 (210): "For without risk, no faith; the more risk, the more faith." Such 
statements are, of course, an assertion of the necessity of hiddenness for faith. 
58Ibid., 176 (210). 
59Contra worldly prudence, the essentially Christian "is to be victorious in such a way that one goes under" 
(Pap Jr A 509 [JP 4:4899]). Cf. SV X 185 (Christian Discourses, 191); SV XI 151-52 (Sickness unto Death. 
38-39); SV XII 383 (Judge for Yourself!, 1 00). It is no exaggeration to say that, for Kierkegaard, shrewdness 
is the cardinal vice, for it is the primary obstacle to faith. Whereas the believer willingly embraces "the 
martyrdom of believing against the understanding, the mortal danger of lying out on 70,000 fathoms of water, 
and only there finding God," the wader "feels his way with his foot, lest he go out so far that he cannot touch 
bottom. In the same way, with his understanding, the sensible person feels his way in probability and finds God 
where probability suffices." "To believe against the understanding is something else," says Kierkegaard, "and 
to believe with the understanding cannot be done at all" (SVVII 195-96 [Postscript. 232-33]). Oftheman who 
relied upon his understanding the entire way, never letting go of probability, the epithet applies: he "never 
became involved with God" (SV XII 383 [Judge for Yourself, 99-100]). 
It is exceedingly important to note that the "martyrdom of the understanding" that SK enj oins is not 
primarily an intellectual affair, a "being crucified to the paradox." No, it is an eminently practical matter, as 
the vast majority of SK's declamations against Klogskab [shrewdness] indicate. Consider, for example, his 
claim that "there is ... no sin so heinous in God's eyes as the sin of shrewdness" (SV X 183 [Christian 
Discourses. 189]). Why? Because shrewdness, calculating just how far it can venture on behalf of "the good" 
so as to win the world's acclaim, knows equally well when it must draw back in order to secure this advantage; 
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that it is not a thing once done and forever put behind; no, it must be entered upon ever 
anew. Faith is "a task for a whole lifetime," its way "narrow, stony, and thomyuntil the very 
end. ,,60 It cannot be otherwise since Christian existence is a passionate contending, not a 
possessing, a "becoming," not "being. ,,61 
for to venture farther would be to risk the world's contempt--even outrage--for being too good. Shrewdness has 
the approval of the world, for it "knows cunningly how to give this appearance of the Good." But "good" it is 
not; on the contrary, "what the world admires as shrewdness is really an understanding with evil" (SV IX 272 
[Works of Love. 266]). When SK speaks of venturing against the understanding, then, he primarily has in mind 
an ethical venture--a "decisive act" wherein there can first be talk of becoming a Christian. Here--and only 
here--is where God can "get hold of one" (Pap X2 A 396 [JP 1 :188]). For when ethical earnestness, taking 
Christ as its paradigm, goes out into the world and acts as altruistically as possible, it inevitably collides with 
the world. It is at this point that the venturer begins to need help in order to hold out, not only against the world, 
but against himself, against the doubt that the error lies with him. Thus his ethical venture gives birth to 
religious need which finds its satisfaction in grace (Pap X2 A 284 [JP 1:513]. Cf. Pap X~ A 470 [JP 4:4933], 
xt A 349, 459 [JP 2:1902, 2:1908], SV XII 459, 462, 464 [Judge for Yourself!. 190-91, 194, 196-97]). 
Contemporaneity with Christ the ethical paradigm is the "existential first step" that leads to faith. Through 
such contemporaneity, Christ comes to be seen for what he also iso-the God-man in whom there is atonement 
for sin. Venturing "against the understanding" qua faith in the God-man and "venturing against the 
understanding" qua decisive action are complementary aspects of faith's dare. Accordingly, the importance of 
the former must not be exaggerated at the expense of the latter. 
Once again we see the parallel with Luther, whose claim it was that the meaning of Christ's cross is 
disciosed only to those who themselves stand under the shadow of the cross and suffering. Contemporaneity 
with Christ's suffering is the necessary condition of beholding the Deus absconditus in passionibus. This, for 
Kierkegaard, does not occur through "imitation" as such; rather it takes place through the venture at imitation 
and the resultant failure and judgement. There faith is to be found, there the truth of Christian revelation: in 
the "soul's anxiety," in the "mortal danger of the spirit" that attends the ethical venture (SV X 243 [Christian 
Discourses. 249]). There is where Luther found it: in the decisive act, the ventured imitation, amid the "horror" 
of which he discovered "faith's blessed way out" (SV XII 462 [Judge for Yourself!. 194]). 
60SV III 59 (Fear and Trembling. 7) and SV VII 350 (Postscript. 404). 
6lKierkegaard's kinship to Luther in this regard is especially noticeable in his blistering attack upon the 
notionofa "Church triumphant" (SVXII 185-212 [Practice in Christianity, 201-232)). One could easily substi-
tute theologia gloriae for ecclesia triumphans--either way, the heart of the matter is that Christendom has 
adopted the vain conceit that its time of strife is over. Against this overly realized eschatology SK asserts: "In 
this world Christ's Church can, in truth, only exist by contending, i.e., by fighting for i tsexistence every instant" 
(SVXII 195 [Training in Christianity and the Edifying Discourse which 'Accompanied' it, trans. Walter Lowrie 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947],207]; cf. SV IV 270 [Fragments. 108]). "The Church militant," 
he says, "is in process of becoming, established Christendom simply is, does not become" (SV XII, 194 
[Training in Christianity, 206]; cf. Pap Xl A 552 [JP I :593]). This view of Christian existence as perpetual 
becoming is grounded in SK's view of existence in general: "Existence is continually in the process of 
becoming." And again: "What is existence? It is that child who is begotten by the infinite and the finite, the 
eternal and the temporal, and is therefore continually striving" (SV VII 63, 73 [Postscript. 81,92]). The 
similarity to Luther is great, whose theologia viatorum. as we earlier noted, derives from the temporal nature 
of existence and resultant primacy of becoming over being. 
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The fact that Christians are in a continual process of becoming means that truth can 
never assume the form of a finished result in this life; it ever remains a way to the truth--its 
moment by moment appropriation, in faith.62 Accordingly, "the certain spirit of faith" is not 
something got "once for all" but is a "daily" acquisition "which at every moment has within 
itself the infinite dialectic of uncertainty. ,,63 The assurance of forgiveness of sins, to take 
but one example, never becomes entirely unproblematic in this life. It remains an 
inescapable paradox the ground of which lies in the circumstance 
that the poor existing human being is existing, that he is half-godforsaken even when 
in the inwardness of faith he is victorious against the understanding; ... only eternity 
can give the eternal certainty, whereas existence has to be satisfied with the 
struggling certainty, which is gained not by the battle becoming easier or illusory but 
only by it becoming harder.64 
However little we may like this disposition of things, the fact is that a fighting 
certainty is the one thing needful--it alone delivers from the hubris to which our flesh is 
heir. Not only is no other certainty attainable within existence, every other certainty bolsters 
hubris. Kierkegaard gladly rejects them all--whether they issue from religious speculation 
or works-righteousness--precisely in order to make room for God's sovereign grace: 
No, away from me pernicious security, save me, 0 God, from ever becoming 
absolutely sure, preserve me until the last in insecurity, so that then, if I attain 
blessedness, it might be absolutely sure that I receive it of grace!6S 
62SV XII 190 (Practice in Christianity. 206). The fact that the eternal truth cannot manifest itself as a 
finished result to an existing individual owes to the circumstance that, qua existing or becoming, he cannot 
assume God's standpoint sub specie aeterni (SV VII 62-63, 67 [Postscript. 80-81, 86]). As a consequence, the 
eternal truth "must remain for him a paradox as long as he exists" (p. 169 [202]). It is quite impossible to attain 
to the objective certainty of a result; the only certainty that can be had is that of relating to this inaccessible--
and therefore uncertain--result in truth ("The objective uncertainty, held fast through the appropriation 
of the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing person"--p. 170 
[203, slightly amended]). This, as we saw earlier, is tantamount to a definition of faith, except that in the case 
of Christianity the truth is not merely an "objective uncertainty," but the absurd itself (p. 176 [210]). 
63SV VII 41 (Postscript. 55). Cf. p. 138 (167). 
~bid., 190 (226, slightly amended). 
6SSV X 211 (Christian Discourses. 219), translation mine. The text continues: "The true ... expression that 
it is by grace is precisely the fear and trembling of insecurity. There lies faith, ... precisely just as far from 
despair as from security." The underlying tenet of this passage is that the certainty of salvation is not based 
upon any quality that one finds within oneself, but rather upon the acknowledgement of God's righteous 
71 
The circumstance that, for Kierkegaard, Christian certainty has particularly to do 
with the forgiveness of sins gives a still closer indication of why it must be a fighting cer-
tainty. It will be recalled that, for Luther, Christian "becoming" was a "becoming 
righteous"--i.e., the process of ever repenting, and ever being justified. This process was 
characterized by the uncertainty of becoming insofar as it entailed the continuing presence 
of unrighteousness as the terminus a quo of the movement. The same applies for Kierke-
gaard: 
It is eternally certain that it will be done for you as you believe, but the certainty of 
faith, or the certainty that you, in particular, believe, you must win at every moment 
by God's help, consequently not in some external way. You must have the help of 
God to believe that you are saved by baptism; you must have the help of God to 
believe that in communion you receive the gracious forgiveness of your sins .... Be 
it done for you as you believe. But everything in you which is of flesh and blood, of 
timorousness and attachments to the earthly, must despair that you cannot get an 
external certainty, a certainty once for all, and, in the most convenient way. You see, 
it is the striving of faith in which you get occasion to be tried every day.66 
While fallen human nature must despair of getting an unambiguous certainty, it has its own 
continuing vitality to thank for this. In the place of such certainty God dispatches a "peniten-
tial preacher," the anxious conscience, that keeps the believer "awake in uncertainty so that 
he longs for certainty." This certainty God, alone, can give.67 And because it is God who 
judgement and justification of the sinner. Torsten Bohlin comments: "When faith is here characterized as 'the 
fear and trembling of insecurity,' this does not mean that the believer should be uncertain about the forgiveness 
of sins and God's grace; rather it implies that grace is truly grasped by man as grace only when he has 
abandoned all his own worthiness and merit-grounded self-certainty and, before God, acknowledged his infinite 
sin and guilt" (Kierkegaards dogmatiska askadning. 461). A similar warning against "too much confidence and 
too careless an intrepidity" is to be found in SV XII 273 (Two Discourses at Communion on Fridays, 11), 
where SK denies "that by one effort everything [is] decided," asserting instead that the certainty of forgiveness 
is the product of constant struggle with God's preservation. 
66SV IX 359 (Works of Love, 348, amended). Note the direct quote from Luther as well as the concept of 
daily appropriating one's baptism. 
67SV X 194, and especially p. 196 (Christian Discourses, 201 and 203): "The [penitential] preacher in his 
inmost parts can help him to become attentive, help him to seek with personal concern the certitude of the 
Spirit, when God's Spirit witnesseth with this man's spirit that he loves God. But God alone can give him this 
certitude. " 
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gives it, it is more certain than that which human possibilities afford.68 But as already 
noted, the Spirit's witness does not come without the individual first having ventured "out 
into the dangers and decisions where faith comes into existence." "The most reliable intelli-
gence," says Kierkegaard, "is to be had in mortal danger.,,69 
What is the nature of the faith that is born of danger? If the danger is that of entering 
into contemporaneity with Christ in his cross and suffering, then faith will be a personal act 
of "seeing" (autopsy) that discerns the concealed presence of the deity in this lowly, servant-
form.70 Such a condition is miraculously conferred in the moment by God himself.71 The 
moment, an atom of time filled with eternity, recreates the person such that he becomes a 
68SV VII 440 (Postscript 506) and Pap Xl A 481 (JP 3 :3608). SV X 177 (Christian Discourses. 182) 
expresses admirably the absolute conviction that faith possesses amid the uncertainty: "There is no assurance 
so heartfelt, so strong, so blissful, as that of faith .... Faith is the assurance, the blissful assurance which is 
found in fear and trembling. When faith is seen from the one side, the heavenly side, one sees in it only the 
bright reflection ofb1essedness; but seen from the other side, the merely human side, one sees sheer fear and 
trembling. " 
69SV X 243 (Christian Discourses, 249). God's bestowal of faith and its certainty presupposes that one has 
ventured a "decisive act," where God can get hold of one--Pap X) A 470 (JP 2: 1902), X' A 349 (JP 2: 1908), 
and SV XII 459 (Judge for Yourselfl, 190-91): "Venture a decisive act; the proof does not precede but follows, 
is in and with the imitation that follows Christ." In such a situation of danger one has not the lUxury of 
doubting--one has no choice but to trust, and that trust is not betrayed. This applies not only at the beginning, 
but throughout the Christian life: first the exposure of oneself to danger, then the Spirit's witness (whose 
witness is: that it is blessed to suffer--Pap X' A 593 [JP 4:4688]; X5 A 37, 72, p. 79 and 79, p. 90 [JP 4:4346, 
6:6837 and 3:3774)). Texts detailing the priority (first the suffering, then the certainty) include Pap X) A 365 
(JP 2: 1658): "For truly, one must be far out before one is actually served by the witness of the Spirit, one must 
essentially be in the process ofbecoming spirit" (translation mine). Cf. also X) A 360; X4 A 472,588,620,660; 
X5 A 37, 49 (JP 2: 1657; 6:6792, 2:1661, 4:4690, 4:4694; 4:4346, 2:1662). SK argues for an existential, as 
opposed to intellective, kind of certainty: "Is there not, according to the N.T., but one proof, a single one, that 
one has a conviction: that one's life expresses it?" (Pap X6 B, 227 [JP 3:35801, translation mine); "The demon-
stration of Christianity really lies in imitation" (SV XII 352 [For Self-Examination. 68)); "The Christian 
thesis is not intelligere ut credam [I understand in order that I may believe], nor is it credere. ut intelligam [I 
believe in order that I may understand]. No, rather it is: act according to the command and orders of Christ; do 
the will of the Father--and you will come to faith. Christianity in no way lies within the sphere of 
intellectuality" (Pap XII A 339 [JP 3:3023], slightly emended). 
70SV IV 233 (Fragments. 70). "Autopsy" literally means "seen by oneselr' (from lIu.oc;, self + 
OWOj.LII\, to see). Faith penetrates through from the Deus absconditus (the lowly servant) to the ~ 
revelatus (the God-man). 
7IIbid., 227-30 (62-64). "Faith itself is a wonder [~l," in respect of which the believer owes God 
absolutely "everything." Cf. SV III 100, 116 (Fear and Trembling. 51,67), where faith is designated "a marvel" 
(et Vidunder) that no one can achieve on his or her own strength. 
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new creature.72 No longer is his aspect simply that of temporality devoid of eternity. He 
has become simul aeternalis et temporalis.73 To be sure, Kierkegaard does not himself use 
this expression that, admittedly, is constructed in parity with Luther's simul iustus et pecca-
tQr. Nevertheless, throughout the authorship Kierkegaard operates with an ontology 
according to which Christianity is the bringing forth of the new nature (variously designated 
72SV IV 190 (Fragments. 21). All continuity, all identity of the new creature with the old is absent, thanks 
to dialectic of "the moment" (0jeblikket). This concept is used by Kierkegaard in two senses. One is the general 
ontological sense with which The Concept of Anxiety concerns itself: the moment is the "medium for coming 
into existence [Tilblivelsel as this is developed in Fragments' 'Interlude'" (Per Lenning, "Samtidighedens 
situation." En studie i Seren Kierkegaards kristendomsforstaelse, [Oslo: Forlaget Land og Kirke, 1954],48). 
Such "coming into existence" occurs in freedom; its occurrence cannot be explained by any antecedent 
condition (cf. Hume's analysis of causality). It is what Plato called 'to E~IX\4>VTlC; (the sudden). The 
moment, as having to do with coming into existence, is time qualified by being. As such it is an anticipation 
of eternity, "the first reflection of eternity in time, its first attempt, as it were, at stopping time" (SV IV 358 
[Concept of Anxiety, 88]). "The moment" as Kierkegaard develops it in Fragments, however, is something 
different. Lenning writes: "In The Concept of Anxiety, the moment comes into consideration as the space in 
which the person [through freedom's choice] posits himself as synthesis of time and eternity, in Fragments the 
moment is the place where 'the God in time,' that very special synthesis of time and eternity, meets the person 
and compels offense or faith" (Samtidighedens Situation. 48). One might only add that insofar as the person 
to whom God reveals himself in the moment becomes a new creature by an act of divine freedom, this 
"coming into existence" in the moment in its pregnant sense shows itself to be in close parity with the general 
ontological sense. 
73SV VII 500 (Postscript. 573, emended): "The issue continually dealt with here was: how can a historical 
point of departure be given etc. In Religiousness A there is no historical point of departure. The individual 
merely discovers in time that he must presuppose himself to be eternal. The moment in time is therefore ~ 
swallowed up by the eternal. In time, the individual reflects upon his being eternal. This contradiction is only 
within immanence. It is different when the historical is outside and remains outside, and the individual, who 
was not eternal, now becomes eternal, and therefore does not reflect on what he is but becomes what he was 
not, and, plea<;e note, becomes something that has the dialectic that as soon as it is it must have been, because 
this is the dialectic ofthe eternal. --What is inaccessible to all thinking is: that one can become eternal although 
one was not eternal." 
Immanence's version of the same paradox (that the eternal is present in and under the temporal) is 
elaborated earlier in the Postscript (e.g., pp. 63, 73, 149, 182 [82,92, 180,217]). It differs from Christianity'S 
version in that it regards eternity as incipiently present at every step of the way. Now, SK's rendering of the 
Christian paradox--eternity as coming to be for the first time with the new birth--seems problematic insofar 
as it denies eternity to those who have not experienced the new birth. This formulation brings SK into 
ostensible conflict with his own anthropological premises on which even unregenerate individuals are said to 
be a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal (SV IV 355, 358-59 [Conce]t of Anxiety. 85, 88-89]). The fact 
that SK sees no conflict here can only owe to his understanding of eternity in the Christian sense as realized 
eternity. The "eternity" of the unregenerate person is ever unrealized--it remains but a bare possibility. 
Accordingly while immanence correctly postulates that human beings are existing spirits whose task it is to 
realize the synthesis of time and eternity within themselves, it is wrong in thinking that they possess this 
possibility without further ado. Only with the bestowal of the condition in the moment are they able to realize 
their true nature qua "spirit." Much more will be said of Kierkegaard's anthropology in chapter eight. 
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"being," "eternity," "infinitude") into time.74 In the Postscript the negative consequence of 
this is generally drawn--viz., that since we continue to be children of temporality and 
becoming we can at no point assume the status of pure Being, sub specie aeterni. But the 
positive consequence is that we do catch a glimpse of eternity in time, even if this eternity 
is eschatologically conceived owing to the fact that eternity, when qualified by time, always 
assumes the aspect of the future.75 This view of Christian existence as simul aeternalis et 
temporalis, while conceived along idealist lines, provides a structural analog to Luther's 
understanding of the Christian's dual status as visible sinner possessing invisible righteous-
ness. In Luther the faith that perceives the hidden reality is, as we have seen, also eschato-
logically conceived as hope. Together with Paul, Luther and Kierkegaard maintain that what 
we now see "as in a mirror darkly," we will one day see face to face, faith having been done 
away with. But until then we have a dual status and are in the process of transition from the 
one reality to the other. It is faith that ever effects this transition, penetrating from the visible 
through to the invisible, from the temporal to the eternal. 
74SV IV 352 (Concept of Anxiety. 83): "The Christian takes the position that non-being is everywhere ... 
as the temporal forgotten by the eternal; consequently, the task is to do away with it in order to bring forth 
being." Cf. SV IV 190 (Fragments. 21), cited above: "In the moment, a person becomes aware that he was 
born, for his previous state, to which he isnot to appeal, was indeed one of 'not to be'." The continuous process 
of transition from non-being to being is already described in religiousness A: "In existence, where the existing 
person finds himself, the task is ... whether he will be so kind as to exist. As an existing person, then, he is 
not supposed to form existence out of the finite and the infinite, but, composed of the finite and the infinite, 
he, existing, is supposed to become one of the parts" (SV VII 364 [Postscript. 420, slightly emended]). 
While we postpone in-depth discussion ofSK's use of the tenns "eternity" and "infinity" until chapter 
eight, we take occasion here to note that these are inspired by German idealism. In no way do they belong to 
Kierkegaard's Lutheran heritage. This will, in the late authorship, lead to consequences quite anathema to 
Luther--viz., the destruction ofthe finite and the temporal by the infinite and eternal, and hence a denial of the 
goodness of creation. Yet if we prescind from this for the moment, it is clear that SK's adaptation of idealist 
anthropology serves the purpose of restating the Lutheran conception of aconstantly effected transitus between 
one's empirical condition (totus peccator) and one's actual condition in Christ (totus iustus). By means of this 
transitus an empirical process of sanctification isset into motion whereby one becomes partim peccator--partim 
~. SK describes this as "becoming spirit," or realizing the "eternal" all the while remaining in the 
"temporal." 
7SSV VII 262 (Postscript 306): "For an existing person, is not eternity not eternity but the future, whereas 
eternity is eternity only for the Eternal, who is not in a process ofbecoming?" See also p. 368 (424) and SV 
IV 359 (Concej)t of Anxiety, 89). 
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This circumstance leads to Anfregtelse, the possibility of offense as experienced by 
the believer.76 For Kierkegaard as for Luther, the condition for the possibility of faith and 
Anfregtelse alike is God's hiddenness. In the absence of any immediate experience of God, 
the believer must relate to him in faith by means of a decisive venture undertaken on his own 
responsibility.77 This most problematic state of affairs persists as long as life lasts, leading 
SK to designate Anfre2!else "the essential continuance" of religious suffering.78 The lack 
of immediacy is itself grounded in God's transcendent majesty. Not only does that majesty 
defy every attempt at direct perception or comprehension, it is experienced by the one who 
draws near in faith as an almost intolerable suffering.79 In relating to God, therefore, An: 
fregtelse is not to be avoided; it must be faced "head on" in the "daring of faith" that trusts 
in God and Christ.80 The pain and potential offense of having to do with God will be 
twofold. First, because the decisive venture lies at the heart of all commerce with the hidden 
deity, the believer will repeatedly be called upon to expose himself voluntarily to suffering 
76Pap xe 422 (JP 1 :731); SV XII 104 (Practice in Christianity. 109). Anfregtelse = Anfechtung. 
77The difficulty thatthe lack of an immediate (sensible) relationship to God occasions vis-a-vis determining 
the sort of venture that is required of one is explored, e.g., in Pap IX A 32; XS A 88, 95, 96 (JP 1 :255; 2: 1922, 
4:4479, 3:2898). 
78SV VII 400 (Postscript 460). 
79Pap Xl A 279 (JP 1:334): "I constantly retumto this dialectic: Christ comes into the world in order to save 
men, to make them eternally happy ... and yet Christianity itself teaches that to be a true Christian is, humanly 
speaking, to be the most wretched of all, that consequently Christianity makes a person, humanly speaking, 
more wretched than he would otherwise be. This I have understood only in this way, that there is a collision 
between the divine and the human qualities, that ... to be drawn up so high, is for a human being the greatest 
possible suffering, just as it would be for an animal if it were treated as a human being or if it were required 
to be a human being" (cf. SV XII 60 [Practice in Christianity. 63]). And again: "If for only one single day 
Christ had expressed what it is to be absolute spirit, the human race would have blown up" (Pap X2 A 86 [JP 
1 :347]). And yet again: "I doubt ... that there lives a single person who in the remotest way has any impression 
of, or could hit upon wanting to relate to [the Unconditioned, or Bcing-in-and-for-itself] ... which naturally 
could only be done by obeying unconditionally, by willing to let oneself be annihilated, if one will; for the 
unconditioned is, after all, lethal for the relative being, and only by means of this killing, enlivening" (Pap Xe 
A 205 [JP4:4918], translation mine). A multitude ofsimiJar texts can be cited on the suffering of having to do 
with God's majesty or absolute nature, and the Anfregtelse arising from this. I cite but a few: SV XII 110-11 
(Practice in Christianity. 116-17), Pap X4 A 456, 487, 570 (JP 4:4680, 4:4949, 4:4682); Pap XS A 39 (JP 
2:1433). 
80Pap ~ A 95; Xl A 637 (JP 4:4378; 4:4023). 
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and danger only to be dogged by doubts as to whether this particular venture was really com-
manded by God at all: it could be an act of hubris, in which case the bitter recompense that 
the believer expects to follow as a matter of course will not issue from the world, but from 
God himsele1 Next, even if the venture has been commanded, the possibility of offense 
will again confront the believer, for in that case God's demeanor will not be one of sheer 
love, but rather, sheer cruelty.82 
The fact that Anfregtelse derives from the very nature of the God-relationship causes 
Kierkegaard to refer it to God rather than to the devil. In this he agrees with Luther without 
Sipap IX A 392 (JP 1 :964): "Anfregtelse is precisely the suffering of the voluntary: whether one has not 
ventured too much," it is the misgiving as to whether "the whole thing might really be lunacy" (Pap Xl A 22 
[JP 4:4372]). That is to say, with each venture whereby one puts oneself beyond the pale of human help, one 
must wonder whether one has put God to the test in an illicit way (Pap X" A 95 [JP 4:4378]). Anfregtelse is 
the sense that one ought to return to the purely human, repenting of what is, in the decisive sense, the more 
Christian; it is the sense that one should repent of the pride that may have motivated one's having ventured so 
far out, for pride is what becoming decisively involved with God (Christianity) resembles in a moment of 
weakness (Pap X2 A 182 [JP 4:4376]. Concerning this issue of faith's deceptive resemblance to presumption 
and Anfregtelse's qualms as to whether egoism is the ultimate motivation for the venture see also: SV X 157-58 
[Christian Discourses, 160]; Pap IX A 21 [JP 1:610]; Pap X" A 411, 509, 584 [JP 4:4379, 4899, 6:6808]; Pap 
X3 A 43 [JP 4:4950]). Abraham is, of course, the prototype of the anfregtet venturer. In contemplating the 
sacrifice of his son, Isaac, Abraham places himself above the universally human (paternal duty toward one's 
son). In the moment of Anfregtelse. therefore, he must wonder whether the act that he contemplates is an act 
of self-arrogation rather than faith. Johannes de Silentio writes: "The person who gives up the universal in order 
to grasp something even higher--what does he do? Is it possible that this can be anything other than an 
Anfregtelse? And if it is possible but the individual makes a mistake, what salvation is there for him?" (SV III 
60 [Fear and Trembling. 110]). Abraham's is an extreme case (though not totally without parallel to the Chris-
tian's quandary as to what it means to "hate" his family--SV X 186 [Christian Discourses, 193]). One thing, 
however, that Abraham's venture has in common with every venture is the characteristic ambiguity as to 
whether it is God who has put the individual to the test by commanding the venture, orthe individual who puts 
God to the test by essaying what has not been commanded. 
82SK notes that the high price that Christianity exacts of human beings has occasioned the charge that it is 
"misanthropic, as indeed the early Christians were called odium totius generis humani [haters of the human 
race]. The connection is this. In relation to what the natural man ... regards as love ... Christianity resembles 
a hatred of what it is to be a human being, the greatest curse and tonnent upon what it is to be human. Indeed, 
even the more profound person can have many weaker moments when to him it is as if Christianity were 
misanthropy" (SVXII 111 [Practice in Christianity. 117]). Cf. Pap Xl A 155,547 (JP 1 :547). This is so because 
in the eyes even of God's beloved "phenomenally it must appear as though God sided precisely with the 
opponent whom he lets have power--and this in every respect--to maltreat this person; ... phenomenally it 
constantly appears as if the opponents were God's beloved, were those with whom he sided, all the while that 
this person comes to suffer worse than any criminal at the hands of those mighty, highly regarded persons, etc.; 
... phenomenally [God's love] will be expressed by [the beloved one's] coming to suffer more and more the 
more he holds to God (quite as if God were constantly leaving him more and more in the lurch)" (Pap X5 A 49 
[JP 2:1662], translation mine). Cf. also Pap X" A 487, 488, p. 307, and 593, p. 410 (JP 4:4949, 6:6794, and 
4:4688). 
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having recognized it.83 He refers to Anfre21else as the "divine repulsion in the quid nimis 
[too much]," "the response of the boundary against the finite individual.,,84 In contrast to 
Fristelse [alluring temptation] that beckons from beneath, Anfre~lse [deterrent temptation] 
repels from above.85 It is "the Nemesis over the [the person's] strong moment." Just when 
one seems to be on the verge of establishing an absolute relation to the absolute, then "it is 
the higher that, seemingly envious of the individual, wants to frighten him back. ,,86 The 
similarity to Luther's way of speaking about the predestinating God wearing the devil's mask 
is striking. Yet like Luther, Kierkegaard does not impute actual devilishness or cruelty to 
God. Anfregte1se is that strict upbringing to which Christians are subjected in order that their 
innate anxiety and distrust of God may be transmuted into faith's spontaneity that regards 
everything with good cheer and confidence.8? 
As we have seen, it is the voluntary nature of Christian suffering that constitutes an 
indispensable condition of Anfregtelse;88 and as we shall later see, it is Luther's presumed 
failure to have recognized the voluntary nature of Christian suffering that earns SKIs sharpest 
83Pap IX A 292; Xl A 22; ~ A 487; X5 A 39; Xe A 130 (JP 1:486; 4:4372; 4:4949; 2:1433; 2:1447). 
B4Pap Xl A 22 (JP4:4372); SVVII 399 (Postscript. 459). The definition, it will be noted, is given within the 
categories of religiousness A. 
851n Fristelse one's lower nature is the target of the alluring power. In Anfregtelse the situation is otherwise. 
There one's better nature is repelled [i.e., anfregtetj by the paradoxical aspect that the relationship with God 
assumes--and this, while being tempted [fristet] by none other than the ethical (SV III 160 [Fear and Trem-
hling, 115]). The latter circumstance, of course, only serves further to compound the repellency (N.B.: I am 
indebted to Walter Lowrie for the terminology "alluring temptation" and "deterrent temptation"--see For Self-
Examination and Judge for Yourselves! and Three Discourses 1851, trans. Walter Lowrie [Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1944],44). 
86SV VII 399 (Postscript 459). 
87Pap X2 A 493 (JP 2:1401). 
880ther texts stressing the voluntary character of Anfregtelse or Christian suffering in general include: SV 
X 181-82 (Christian Discourses, 187-88); SV XII 104 (Practice in Christianity, 109); SV XII 351 (For Self-
Examination, 66-67); SV XII 458-62 (Judge for Yourself!. 189-94); Pap Xl A 260 (IP 6:6385); Pap X3 A 43 
(IP 4:4950); Pap )f A 459 (JP 2: 1908). 
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rebuke.89 Now the correlation that Kierkegaard draws between voluntariness and Anfre2!-
~ appears to be at odds with Luther's narrower understanding of Anfre~lse as having to 
do with dread of the predestinating deity. Yet Kierkegaard himself can present Anfre2!else 
in terms similar to Luther's,9o a circumstance that raises the question of whether the two 
understandings do not have more in common than meets the eye. The common thread 
between SK's broader, and Luther's narrower, understanding of Anfre~else is certainly the 
hidden ness of God's intention toward the individual. In each case the possibility is 
confronted that God may be willing the person's downfall--in the one case, by pennitting his 
self-destructive, willful venture, in the other, by ignoring his agonizing despair over sin. 
Moreover, in the latter instance the Anfre~else can only have come about as a result of the 
individual having ventured to get involved with God in the first place--a venture the advis-
89Pap X2 A 263 (JP 3 :2509); Pap X3 A 43 (JP 4:4950). Kierkegaard is not consistent in his evaluation of 
Luther--see SV XII 461 (Judge for Yourself!. 193). One must assume, however, that the private view expressed 
in the journals is the more authentic one. Regin Prenter has correctly observed that this view--on which Luther 
is supposed to have been unclear about the voluntary nature of Christian suffering, thereby encouraging later 
orthodoxy to abandon it--is simply incorrect. It rests upon a confusion ofSK's concept, "voluntary sufferings," 
with Luther's notion, "self-chosen works." The reason that Luther rejects the latter is not that they are 
voluntarily incurred, but that they are incurred with a view to becoming righteous (this, as well as that they are 
not works that God has commanded!). Hence SK misinterprets Luther and finds a lack of clarity where 
there is none (see Regin Prenter, "Luther and Lutheranism," in Kierkegaard and Great Traditions. vol. 6 of 
Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana ed. Niels Thulstrup and M. Mikulova Thulstrup [Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels 
Forlag, 1981), 161-62). 
WWe have already seen that the daily appropriation of the forgiveness of sin constitutes nothing less than 
"the striving of faith in which you get occasion to be tried every day" (SV IX 359 [Works of Love. 348)). 
Clearly, then, Anfregtelse can have to do with the anxious conscience. This becomes apparent from a multitude 
of other texts. For example, we are told that at the root of Anfregtelse lies the fear that a given situation is a 
test sent by God with the intent that one shall fail (Pap X2 A 493 [JP 2: 140 1)); Anfregtelse is said to have to 
do with sin's legacy of dread that fears (Pap Xl A 637 [JP 4:4023)) and that consequently gives birth to new 
sin (Pap IX A 331 [JP 4:4368)); the anfregtet person does not really believe that Christ will deliver him from 
temptation (Pap Xl A 477 [JP 4:4375]). And so on. Of particular interest is what SK tenns a "seldom" and 
"difficult" Anfregtelse: that of the person who, try as he might, cannot find a "gracious God" (Pap Xl A 790 
[JP 2:1421)). Of it SK says, "the one dangerous thing is to let go of God; even ifhiswrath were to remain over 
one throughout one's entire life, this would not be nearly so dangerous [as to let go of God)." One is reminded 
of the immense comfort that Luther drew from the ftrst commandment--viz., that his very relationship to God 
as Lord--if not as Savior--required him unconditionally to fear God as his God. Because ofthiscommandment 
Luther knew that, whatever his eternal destiny, his relationship to God could not be broken. 
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ability of which was questionable from the outset.91 The only possible triumph over one's 
misgiving lies in the continued venture. So we see that Kierkegaard's and Luther's respective 
understandings of Anfregrelse are not so far removed from one another after all. 
In fact, both kinds of Anfregtelse have something else in common: both evince a 
basic attitude of incredulity that balks at the grandiosity of the thought that one should 
really be able to comport oneself on such intimate tenns with God.92 In the absence of any 
immediate assurance that this is so, everything that the individual does in faith must needs 
have the appearance of the most prideful audacity. And indeed, apart from the standpoint of 
faith there really is no sure criterion that faith's daring is not sheer presumption. Consequent-
ly, the only means of overcoming Anfregtelse is that very faith the reality of which 
Anfregtelse calls into question. SK writes: "Anfregtelse can only be fought by the rashness 
of faith, which charges head-on.,,93 Such faith is a marvel, and its champion a hero. In this 
Luther and Kierkegaard are fully agreed.94 
While Anfregtelse is that fonn of suffering that specifically derives from the 
hiddenness of God, it is but one of several kinds of religious suffering. Nevertheless, it is 
related to all of the other kinds, adding a potentiating factor to them insofar as the divine 
91The questionability of this venture is signaled by the offense that accompanies Christ wherever he goes. 
Getting involved with him means undergoing the possibility of offense--Anfregtelse--that is inseparable from 
becoming a Christian. So great are the sufferings that lie in store for the would-be Christian that only the 
anxious conscience can constrain one to involve oneself with Christ in this way (Pap Xl A 133 and 190, p. l37 
[JP 4:4018 and 1 :496j--especially the latter, which warns: "If, humanly speaking, you desire good and happy 
days, then never get involved in earnest with Christianity"). The first suffering to be encountered is, of course, 
precisely the HOllenfahrt of the anxious conscience. This is not something that happens willy-nilly, but only 
by choosing to allow oneself to get involved. 
92The crucial text on this cause of Anfregtelse is to be found in SV XI 195-99 (Sickness unto Death. 83-87): 
"There is so much talk about being offended by Christianity because it is so dark and gloomy, offended because 
it is so rigorous etc., but it would be best of all to explain for once that the real reason that men are offended 
by Christianity is that it is too high, because its goal is not man's goal, because it wants to make man into 
something so extraordinary that he cannot grasp the thought" (p. 195 [83]). 
93Pap X A 95 (JP 4:4378). 
94 Abraham is, in fact, an entire category removed from every ordinary human hero, and that, because of his 
faith that believes by virtue of the absurd: "The dialectic of faith is the finest and most extraordinary of all; it 
has an elevation of which I can certainly form a conception, but no more than that ... the marvelous I cannot 
do--I can only be amazed at it" (SV III 87 [Fear and Trembling, 36]). 
80 
intent behind the respective suffering remains hidden from the sufferer. This is certainly true 
of the martyrdom of sin-consciousness, the torment of which is not so much the grief of 
repentance as the uncertainty whether the penitent's pleas are heard by a gracious God. 
Similarly, the reprisals of flesh against spirit and falsehood against truth only intensify with 
each step that is taken toward God. The more earnestly that one seeks to mortify the flesh 
and testify to the truth, the more resistance and persecution one encounters. God's essential 
concealment in sufferings becomes the more fearfully apparent, adding a new suffering to 
that with which one already contends. The unrecognizability of his visage together with the 
realization that one may have voluntarily exposed oneself to affliction and danger without 
his sanction only generates new suffering. 
Now all of these further forms of suffering are addressed by Kierkegaard, just as they 
were by Luther. We have seen that already within the confines of universal piety Kierke-
gaard thoroughly explores the ethical act of repentance--the suffering that obtains here is the 
increasing discovery of guilt and moral incapacity. Kierkegaard himself knew the besetting 
terror of guilt-consciousness as few modems have, his protracted struggle to experience the 
forgiveness of sins and release from melancholy offering a close parallel to Luther's own 
experience. Like Luther he conceived of the withering assaults of conscience as an 
excruciating death that one must endure in advance of any quickening. God's opposition 
to sin, he writes, "weighs more heavily ... than the sleep of death,,;95 it effects "an 
annihilating abasement" that prevents one from being able to lift up one's eyes.96 Yet 
wonderfully, such abasement yields the possibility of exaltation: 
To be exalted to God is possible only by descending .... For self-accusation is 
precisely the possibility of justification .... Before God 'to wish to justify oneself,' 
that precisely is to denounce oneself as guilty; but before God to smite oneself upon 
the breast, saying, 'God be merciful to me a sinner,' that precisely is to justify one-
self, or rather it is the condition for God's pronouncing thee justified.97 
95SV XI 266 (High Priest-Publican-Woman Who Was a Sinner, 374). 
91bid., 268 and 266 (376 and 374). 
97Ibid., 268 (376). 
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The instrument of the sinner's abasement is of course the law; and because the very 
law that brings low simultaneously provides the condition for elevation, Kierkegaard gladly 
accedes to its authority: 
If I am to be involved with God ... flunking out every day, it is true, but still being 
involved with God ... then I must also countenance that the requirement is the 
unconditioned .... 0 God in heaven, above all never rescind the unconditioned 
requirement. ... No, let it above all remain the unconditioned requirement! ... I 
can ... nevertheless continue to be related to you, for ... I let the unconditioned 
requirement incessantly transfonn into worthless rags and wretchedness myself and 
what I have become .... [So] let the annihilation, the inner annihilation before God, 
have its terror, have its pain.98 
From the preceding texts it appears that the law that brings low is rather more than a mere 
condition for elevation; it seems in some sense actually to effect what it conditions. In order 
for this to occur faith must present. And so it is: inasmuch as the law succeeds in humbling 
the sinner it already is codetennined by faith. In this way the humbling itself is effectively 
an exaltation, and its instrument--the law--is a paradoxical manifestation of the gospel: 
But can something that is intended to humble--can it be too lofty? Or if someone 
feels it to be too lofty for him, is it not because he has placed himself in a wrong 
relation to it so that by putting himself in a wrong place he receives the pressure in 
a wrong place and the requirement crushes him instead of humblingly exerting a 
pressure that lifts up in joy over and in bold confidence through grace? ... What, 
then, does lifting up mean? Is not all lifting related to the pressure of humiliation? 
But can there be too much pressure toward humiliation--in that case complaining 
could be interpreted to mean that the lifting up was too high. In the physical world 
it is indeed the case that lifting can be done by means of a weight--thus if someone 
mistakenly thought he was supposed to lift the weight instead of being lifted by the 
weight--well, then he is crushed. But it would not be due to the weight but to him. 
So it is with the unconditioned requirement; if I am supposed to lift it, I am crushed. 
But this is not the intention of the Gospel. Its intention is that by means of the 
requirement and my humiliation I shall be lifted, believing and worshiping--and then 
I am light as a bird. What lifts up more, the thought of my own good deeds or the 
thought of God's grace? And when that lifts up the most, so that one is most 
98SV XII 438-39 (Judge for Yourself!, 166-67). Cf. SV X 102 (Christian Discourses. 101-2): "For what is 
the edifying? ... [T]he edifying first is ... the dismaying .... Where there is nothing at all dismaying and no 
dismay, there is nothing at all edifying and no edification. There is forgiveness for sin, that is edifying, the 
dismaying thing is that there is sin; and the degree of the dismay in the inwardness of sin-consciousness 
corresponds to the degree of edification." 
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blessedly dizzy--I wonder if it is not when my best deed is changed before God into 
something base and grace becomes all the greater.99 
The tenet of the theolo~ia crucis that the sinner's exaltation proceeds by way of 
humiliation is given a somewhat different fonnulation when SK declares the need of God 
to be the only true motivation for loving him: 
99SV XII 427 (Judge for Yourself!, 153). This text has affinities to a postil with which SK was familiar 
(Christ's changing water into wine, John 2:1-11). There Luther rejoices that the law demands so much. He 
would not have it any other way. On the contrary, he would deeply regret it if the law asked any less since its 
transformation into the "wine" of the gospel would be less sweet. In this passage Luther brings gospel into a 
close relationship to law by assigning it a double office: first, it interprets the law spiritually ("For the gospel 
comes ... and expounds the law's meaning in the most perfect way and tells us that everything that is ours is 
nothing but sheer sin"), and second, it offers grace and comfort (Martin Luther, En christelig Postille. sammen-
dragen af Dr. Morten Luthers Kirktt oS Huuspostiller efter Benjamin Lindners tydske Samling udgiven i ny 
danskOversrettelse afJmgen Thisted. 2vols. [Copenhagen: Wahlske Boghandling, 1828],1:158). This stands 
in contrast to usual practice of the mature Luther, who prefers to speak of a two-fold office oflaw, identifying 
the gospel solely with the offer of grace (F. Edward Cranz, An Essay on the DevelQpment. 99). 
In general, the younger the Luther, the closer the connection that is made between gospel and law. 
In the Dictata super Psalterium the gospel is designated by such terms a'i "the spiritual law, " "the law of grace," 
"the law of Christ." Its difference from Mosaic law consists in the fact that it "not only obligates, but also gives 
the grace to meet the obligation" (An Essay on the Development. 15). This means that justification is based on 
an observance of law whereby one is actually made righteous (i.e., made righteous in part, one's lack of 
righteousness being compensated for by the non imputation of sin). In the previous chapter we called attention 
to this early sanative view. Because it not only predicates justification in general, but also that component 
which involves the nonimputation of sin, upon an incipient actual righteousness, the burden of having to be 
righteous continues to weigh upon the Christian psyche. This is true despite Luther's abandonment of the 
Dictata's nominalistic presupposition of justification ("God grants his grace to those who first do what lies 
within them") and his discontinuance of such usages as "law of grace." Because Luther's depictions of 
justification and justifying faith remain those of the ~ the Lectures on Romans continue to evince a close 
association between gospel and law: to be justified means to be made righteous, if in ever so slight a degree; 
to have saving faith means to possess humility. And because faith "formed" by humility is what ultimately 
justifies, faith must be directed first and foremost at the word of judgement that consigns to hell. 
Now Luther's early understanding of justification is certainly not Kierkegaard's. The young Luther's 
outlook is strongly Augustinian, justification being predicated upon an actual justice that is wrought in the 
sinner. Nevertheless like him, Kierkegaard tends to blur the distinction between law and gospel. Subjection to 
the law and assent to its righteous judgement--"that precisely is to justify oneself, or rather it is the condition 
for God's pronouncing thee justified." The intention of the gospel "is that by means of the requirement and my 
humiliation I shall be lifted, believing and worshiping." This is significant. What the mature Luther would call 
"law" Kierkegaard calls "gospel": the gospel's means are the requirement and the humiliation, not the promise 
and the trust! Through faith's directedness at the word of judgement God intervenes so that this word of 
judgement becomes a word of promise, and the faith that had hitherto inspired fear becomes fiducia. The 
conclusion lies close at hand that, where the mature Luther seeks to separate law and gospel as far as possible, 
the young Luther--and Kierkegaard with him--seeks to bring them as close as possible (see Cranz, An Essay 
on the Development. 180, with reference to Johannes Heckel's Luther interpretation). As such, Kicrkegaard's 
presentation of the theologia crucis bears a clear affmity with that of the young Luther, at least as regards the 
crucial matter of law-gospel. 
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It may seem so natural that in order to love God one must raise oneself to heaven 
where God dwells: the best and surest way, however, to love God is to remain on 
earth. It may seem so lofty a thing to love God because He is so perfect, it may seem 
so selfish to love Him because one needs Him: yet the latter way is the only way in 
which a man can in truth love God. Woe to the presumptuous man who would make 
bold to love God without needing Him! ... Thou shalt not presume to love God for 
God's sake; thou shalt humbly understand that thy life's welfare eternally depends on 
this, and for this reason thou shalt love Him.loo 
Anfregtelse and the conscience's annihilation before God are of course not the only 
sufferings to afflict the pious. As we learned from our overview of the stages, there is yet 
another detenninant of universal piety, that of dying to immediacy [Afdeen fra Umiddel-
barheden]--mortificatio in Luther's terminology. Because the believer lives in the sphere of 
immediacy (or "the finite," as Johannes Climacus can also call it)IO\ he is absolutely 
enmeshed in relative ends and must struggle to disentangle himself through renunciation 
[Forsagelsen]; only thus is it possible to enter into--and by fits and starts, sustain--an abso-
lute relation to the absolute. The fact that this suffering, as a qualification of inwardness 
rather than misfortune, is actively incurred leads SK, already within the parameters of 
religiousness A, to stress the voluntary nature of religious suffering.lo2 "Dying to" is a 
form of self-annihilation, a voluntarily incurred martyrdom.lo3 Nonetheless, even within 
religiousness A all meritoriousness is excluded since the acknowledgement of God's abso-
IOOSV X 190-91 (Christian Discourses, 197). SK is clearly inveighing against a fonn ofthe theo1ogia gloriae 
in this text. A similar invective is to be found in SV XI 278 (High Priest-Publican-Woman Who Was a Sinner, 
384). While the need of God is not identical to self-love (and certainly need not imply it) Kierkegaard does 
nevertheless recognize a proper self-love based not upon selfishness, but--so one must assume--creaturely 
reverence toward the Creator (SV IX 26-27 [Works of Love, 39-40]). In this he differs from Luther, who flatly 
denies that self-love can be selfless and therefore rejects the notion in any straightforward sense. Christ's 
command is to "cease loving yourself and, forgetting yourself, love your neighbor." "True love for yourself is 
hatred of yourself .... Therefore he who hates himself and loves his neighbor, this person truly loves himselP' 
(WA 56, 516-18 [LW 25,512-14]). 
IOI"The religious person, in his human lowliness, is bound in the finite with the consciousness of the absolute 
conception of God" (SV VII 420 [Postscript. 484]). 
102Ibid., 375-86 (431-45). 
I03Ibid., 401,441 (461,507-8). 
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luteness already entails man's nothingness, i.e., his total incapacity to do anything--in-
eluding to "die to."I04 
Now this particular form of suffering is also proper to Christianity. SK writes: 
"Wherever Christianity is, there is also self-renunciation, which is Christianity's essential 
form. ,,105 Such self-renunciation is necessary in order to purge every last vestige of willful-
ness from the Christian: 
The fact is this. When God is to love a person, and a person is to be loved of God, 
then this person qua selfish will must be totally annihilated. This is to "die to," the 
most intensive agony. But even if the religious person is willing enough according 
to his better will, he can neither immediately nor entirely get his will, his sub-
jectivity, thus into the power of his better will; indeed, the former, after having 
initially offered the most desperate resistance, constantly remains on the prowl, 
seeking to disturb the entire upheaval by which it was dethroned. 106 
Because the lower self that Christianity seeks to extirpate is so exceedingly tenacious, the 
Christian's entire life must be devoted to bringing it into subjection, and this occurs by a 
process of" dying to." Yet this voluntarily incurred selfannihilation is not ultimately the work 
of the Christian (any more than it was simply the work of the pious individual in reli-
giousness A). On the contrary, it is the Spirit who kills, in so doing, giving life: 
This life-giving in the Spirit is not a direct heightening of the natural life in a person 
in immediate continuation from and connection with it--what blasphemy! ... [N]o, 
it is a new life, literally a new life--because, mark this well, death goes in between, 
dying to, and a life on the other side of death--yes, that is a new life. Death goes in 
between; this is what Christianity teaches, you must die to. The life-giving Spirit is 
the very one who slays you; the first thing the life-giving Spirit says is that you must 
enter into death, that you must die to.107 
I~Ibid., 401-2 (461-62). It should not surprise us that human capability, and with it meritoriousness, are 
already excluded within religiousness A, the essential contrast of which is finitude v. infinitude (i.e., absolute 
dependence ofthe creature upon the creator). This is consistent with SK's view that the lower stages are always 
incorporated into the higher ones notwithstanding the introduction of superseding categories. Hence general 
religious piety's categories of the absoluteness of God and the absolute dependence of man become 
Christianity'S categories of the priority of grace and the bondage of the will once the category "sin" is 
introduced. 
lOS SV IX 58 (Works of Love, 68). 
I06Pap Xe A 132 (lP 4:4384). Translation mine. 
l07SV XII 360 (For Self-Examination. 76-77). Cf. Pap X3 A 351 (IP 3:3752). 
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Kierkegaard goes on to describe the nature of this "dying to" as a leave-taking, not only of 
one's selfishness but of the world itself since the severance of ties with fonner issues in just 
such a severance with the larter. los As we earlier noted, such a leave-taking is most 
excruciating: at issue is a clash between what it means to be a holy God and what it means 
to be a sinful man: 
There is, namely, an infinite chasmic difference between God and man, and therefore 
it became clear in the situation of contemporaneity that to become a Christian (to be 
transfonned into likeness with God) is, humanly speaking, an even greater tonnent 
and misery and pain than the greatest human tonnent, and in addition a crime in the 
f ' . 109 eyes 0 one s contemporanes. 
As indicated in this citation, however bitter it may be, "dying to" is not the Christian's 
final suffering (though, to be sure, it is final insofar as it continues to the very end, 
quenching all zest for life, thereby preparing the individual for etemity"o). To Afd0en is 
added yet another fonn of suffering, one that comes from without: maltreatment at the hands 
of one's contemporaries. Characteristically SK conjoins these two fonns of suffering, calling 
them the "double danger,',lll and even refers this teaching to Luther. ll2 And to be sure, 
IOSSV XII 361 (For Self-Examination. 77). 
I09SV XII 60 (Practice in Christianity. 63). 
IIOPap Xe A 439 (JP 6:6969). 
111"Deny yourself--and then suffer because you deny yourself." And again: "There is self-denial only when 
there is a double danger .... [T]he second danger, the danger of suffering because one denies oneself, is the 
decisive qualification" (SV XII 196and 204 [Practice in Christianity. 213 and 222]). Cf. SV IX 182-87 (}Yorks 
of Love, 185-90) and SV XII 472-73 (Judge for Yourself!. 20b-7). 
112SV XII 440 (Judge forYoursclf!, 169): "This is Christian piety ... to deny oneself in order to serve God 
alone--and then to have to suffer for ito-to do good and then to have to suffer for it. It is this that the prototype 
[Christ] expresses; it is also this, to mention a mere man, that Luther, the superb teacher of our Church, 
continually points out as belonging to true Christianity." This text and Pap X3 A 125 (JP 3 :3677) make it a point 
to attribute the teaching of "the double danger" to Luther. And with justice. When one peruses the collection 
of Luther's sermons that Kierkegaard owned and regularly read for edification, passages of this sort are not 
atypical. In the sermon on the Gospel for the fourteenth Sunday after Trinity, for example, Luther speaks of 
"how far a Christian's life surpasses the natural life. In the first place it disdains itself. In the second place it 
thirsts after disdain. In the third place it reproves everything that will brook no disdain, and thereby incurs all 
the world's opposition. In the fourth place it is disdained and persecuted because of this disdain and reproof. 
In the fifth place it does not account itself worthy to suffer any persecution" (En christelig Postille. 1 :512 -13). 
In like manner, in his sermon on the Gospel for the first Sunday after Christmas Luther warns: "To bless Christ 
... is quite a high and rare deed, and this by reason of the fact that Christ and human nature are totally at odds 
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the two fonns do belong together, for not only does the practice of dying to oneself and to 
the world evoke the world's enmity, this very entry into conflict with the world--clearly fore-
seen as it is by the Chri stian 1 13--itself amounts to a further stage of "dying to." 
The question of course arises as to why self-denial--or what is identical with it, love 
of neighborI14--should evoke so violent a reaction. Really, the answer is not difficult: such 
self-denial on behalf of one's neighbor constitutes a tacit judgement on the world's 
selfishness."s By selflessly loving one's neighbor one acknowledges the lordship of the 
with each other. He, namely, condemns everything that the world chooses, gives cross and tribulation, takes 
away all pleasure, riches and honor, and teaches that everything that the world's people concern themselves 
with is sin and folly. See, no one can or will tolerate this from him. Therefore they curse, mock, and persecute 
Christ and all who belong to him. There are precious few Simeons to be found who bless him. But the world 
crawls with those who curse him and wish him all evil, disgrace and misfortune. For whoever is not inclined 
willingly to disdain all things and prepared to suffer all manner of evil, he does not bless and praise Christ for 
long, but is offended at him, oh so quickly! Thus is Simeon, as a preacher of the cross and an enemy of the 
world, in this blessing that he wishes upon parents and child, a great and high example of praising and honoring 
Christ in the despised, accursed and rejected form that he formerly had in his own person and still does have 
in his members who, for his sake, must suffer poverty and ignominy, death and accursedness, without anyone 
aiding them or caring about them, let alone blessing them" (En christelig Po stille. 1: 1 08). 
IllPap VIII
' 
A 127 (JP 1:1046, slightly amended): "Even if! achieve nothing else, I nevertheless hope to 
leave very accurate and experientially based observations concerning the conditions of existence. In this regard 
I am now convinced above all that these conditions are always essentially the same .... On my schema a young 
person should be able to see very accurately beforehand, just as on a price list: if you venture this far out, then 
the conditions are thus and so, this to win and this to lose; and if you venture out this far, these are the 
conditions, etc." Or Pap VIlli A 145 (JP 1 :315): "Please, simply choose, and you do not need to guess; the 
specific conditions of existence can be calculated very well. If you will unconditionally risk everything for the 
good--then you will be persecuted, unconditionally persecuted, tertium non diltur." Cf. Pap IX A 392 (JP 
1:964). 
1141n other formulations of the "double danger," Kierkegaard identifies love of neighbor as that for which 
the Christian is made to suffer. Cf. SV IX 74 (Works of Love. 83-84): "He ... who will love his neighbor, ... 
such a person easily becomes like the one who does not fit in with earthly existence, not even with so-called 
Christendom; he is readily exposed to attacks from all sides." To love the victim of injustice is a thankless 
task--not only is one regarded as a traitor by one's peers, it often happens that one is misunderstood and reviled 
by the very one whom one wishes to help (pp. 76 and 80-81 [86 and 90)). The person who is willing to involve 
himself with his neighbor in this way "is always exposed to double danger" (p. 82 [91 )). Hence Christian love 
of neighbor cannot be practiced without self-denial. We need only recall an earlier cited passage from Luther's 
Treatise on Good Works in order to recognize the essential relationship that obtains between the two. 
1l1bid., 350-51 (339-40): "From what has been developed here it is easily seen that the conclusion is by no 
means correct which without qualification concludes: he who praises love must himself be or become loved--
[not] in a world which crucified him who was love, in a world which persecuted and liquidated so many 
witnesses to love." On the contrary, such a person is regarded as unlovable, for "without requiring anything 
of anyone, by rigorously and earnestly requiring much of himself," he is Ita reminder that there is such a 
requirement. In his company the excuses and escapes do not look very good .... In his company one cannot 
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God who has commanded such love and, in so doing, passes judgement upon the world's 
mutiny against him. One does not perpetuate the mutiny by saying, "I cannot stop it; the 
others must." On the contrary, by unconditionally obeying, the solitary individual expresses 
for his or her own part "that God exists and is the only master.,,116 By such absolute devo-
tion to this single master one makes oneself utterly heterogeneous to the world. The world 
cannot understand the Christian's fealty to a master whose claims are so exaggerated. 117 
The natural mind regards authentic Christianity as high treason against what it is to be 
human and Christians as traitors that cannot be punished too severely,118 for they are bent 
upon dissolving all natural bonds, dismantling all alliances among people, branding all 
manifestations of human love as collusions in self-Iove.119 To exalt oneself in this way 
above what it is to be human is the height of arrogance. Accordingly, Christian love is 
simply take his ease; even less does he help one adjust the pillow of ease by temporal or even by good-natured 
pious indulgence." Cf. p. 122 (130). 
l1~bid., 114 (122). 
117SV XII 442 (Judge for Yourself!. 170). 
118SV XII 416 (Judge for Yourself!, 140). Cf. SVXII 111 (Practice in Christianity. 117) and Pap Xl A 155, 
547 (JP 1 :547), all previously cited. 
119SV VII 510-11 (Postscript, 585-86); SV IX 47-62, 94-129 (Works of Love. 58-72, 103-36); SV X 186 
(Christian Discourses, 193); SV XI 157 (Sickness unto Death, 45); SV XII 366-67 (For Self-Examination, 83-
85); SV XII 380,441-43 (Judge for Yourself!. 96, 169-72). There is an irreconcilable conflict between what 
the world, and what God, understands by love: "The facts are these: extreme self-love the world also calls 
selfishness; the self-love of a group the world calls love; a noble sacrificial high-minded human love, which 
still is not Christian love, is ridiculed by the world as foolishness; whereas Christian love is hated and detested 
and persecuted by the world" (SV IX 116 [Works of Love. 124]). 
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denounced as the most intolerable egoism and blasphemy against God,120 Its fate in the 
world is to be hated, mocked and crucified,121 
As with Luther, then, so too with Kierkegaard: Christian love is inevitably persecuted 
in this world,In This was true at the time of Christ, and it is true today regardless of the 
present age's pretended enlightenment. For the world has not, nor does it ever, change--it 
remains at all times essentially evi1. 123 Because persecution is the ineluctable fate of the 
Christian in the world, Kierkegaard can write: "Being a Christian is neither more nor less, , , 
120SV IX 116 (Works ofLoye 123-24); SV XII 55, 82,182 (Practice in Christianity, 58, 86-87, 197); Pap 
X2 A 508. Such was, of course, the accusation brought against Christ: "How to get rid of him? ... There is 
nothing else to do but to defend oneself against him by means of the category of guilt, by denouncing his life 
as being the most appalling egotism, the most shocking arrogance. But this is not sufficient; he is too strong 
for the human race. Then there is only one thing left! We human beings, ... we will circumspectly draw back 
to the category 'God,' and from that location we will aim at him and direct our attack against him with God on 
our side; it has been found--that he blasphemes God. So that will be the charge!" (SV XII 446 [Judge for 
Yourself!, 176]). 
121SV XII 367 (For Self-Examination, 84). 
122The fact that Luther considered persecution to be the decisive index of the genuineness of one's Christian 
commitment was not lost upon Kierkegaard--in Pap X) A 125 (JP 3 :3677) SK remarks: "Luther says that to a 
Christian life belong faith, works oflove, and then persecution on account of the faith and love (the place is 
marked in my copy ofhis sermons). He says also in another place (that is similarly marked in my copy) that 
where there is no persecution, there is something wrong with the proclamation." Over and over again SK 
stresses the essential relationship ofpersecution to Christianity--e.g., SVIX 184 (Works of Love, 187): "People 
lookupon the world's opposition as an accidental relationship to Christianity rather than as an essential relation-
ship: opposition may perhaps come, but it may also, perhaps, never arise. But this view is altogether 
unchristian .... Christianly, the opposition of the world stands in an essential relationship to the inwardness 
of Christianity." Cf. SV XII 417, 440-41 (Judge for Yourself!, 141,169-70) and Pap IXA 325,392 (JP 3:2643, 
1:964). 
I23SV IX 185 (Works of Love, 188): "If anyone, therefore, can prove that the world or Christendom has now 
become essentially good ... then I will also prove that Christian self-renunciation is made impossible and 
Christianity is abolished." P. 350 (339): "Even if conditions are no longer so extreme and inexorable that 
witnesses to the truth must give up blood and life: the world has nevertheless not become essentially better; it 
has merely become less impassioned and more petty." SV XII 212 (Practice in Christianity, 232): "It is ... 
untruth, this talk whereby people flatter the human race and themselves that the world is advancing. The world 
is going neither forward nor backward; it remains essentially the same, like the sea, like the air, in short, like 
an element. It is, namely, and must be the element that can provide the test ofbeing a Christian." Pap VIlli A 
145 (JP 1 :305): "The fact that Christ was crucified cannot mean that the Jews happened to be demoralized at 
that time and that Christ therefore came, if I dare say so, at an unfortunate moment. No, Christ's fate is an 
eternal fate, it indicates the human race's specific gravity, thus will it befall Christ at all times" (translation 
mine). Cf. Pap VII2 B 270, p. 310,1. 11; Pap VIlli A 127 (JP 1:1046); Pap Xl A 346 (JP 1:168); SVX227-31 
(Christian Discourses, 234-37); SV XII 473 (Judge for Yourself!, 207). 
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than being a martyr; ... every true Christian is a martyr.124 And lest it be thought that this 
is meant only figuratively--i.e., that the days of physical martyrdom are past--SK speaks of 
his own very real peril as a preacher of repentance within "Christendom": 
The situation could, however, easily become fatal. The situation is neither more nor 
less than that Christianity has been abolished in Christendom, and that Christendom 
nevertheless will still not give up the claim of being Christian. If I were to fight over 
doctrines--Oh, it is not likely the conflict would become so dangerous, at least in our 
time when tolerance is so broad or when indifference is honored in the name of 
tolerance. No, what is involved in Christendom's abolition of Christianity is: self-
denial, renunciation of the world, etc.--about such things it does not want to hear a 
word and yet wishes to be Christian. And to have to speak of this could easily 
become fatal. 125 
So certain is Kierkegaard that martyrdom will be the fate of the Christian who does not strike 
any compromise whatsoever with the world (Pap Jr A 340 [lP 2:1901]) that he can assert: 
"There is only one consistent conception of Christianity, and that is to be slain for the sake 
of the truth, to become a martyr.,,126 Like Luther, he sees a day approaching when 
Christianity will again rise up, powerful in the possibility of offense;127 but "blood will 
again be required ... that of the martyrs, these mighty deceased ones who are capable of 
what no living person ... is: to force a raging mob into obedience just because this raging 
mob was permitted, in disobedience, to slay the martyr.,,128 
We may, as we did in the case of Luther, summarize our treatment of suffering in its 
various forms by stressing that these eminently practical phenomena possess epistemologi-
124Pap IX A 51 (JP 1:481). 
12SPap Xl A 460 (JP 1 :383). cr. Pap X2 A 460 (JP 1 :516) where SK observes that in order to disabuse 
Christendom of the colossal delusion that it is Christian, a battle will have to be joined "more horrible than 
when Christianity came into the world." This battle will claim martyrs, the only difference being thatthese "will 
not bleed as formerly because they are Christians--no, it is almost insane!--they will be put to death because 
they are not Christians." SK had, as early as 1847, publicly expressed the conviction that the true preacher of 
repentance would be put to death by his hearers (SV XI 81-82 [Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises. 121)). 
He reaffirms this again in 1848 in his Christian Discourses (p. 195 [SV X 189]) and Practice in Christianity 
(pp. 116-17 [SV XII 110]). 
126Pap Xl A 217 (JP 1 :497). Cf. Pap IX A 51 (JP 1 :481). 
127SV IX 190 (Works of Wve. 193), previously cited. 
128p ap IX B 20, p. 317. 
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cal import: they serve as marks of the God-relationship. Insofar as they seem to indicate the 
opposite--viz., the sufferer's God-forsakenness--they are part and parcel of the theology of 
the cross's cognitive principle that God ever reveals his presence under its opposite. Already 
within religiousness A this is the case. There suffering is said to constitute the essential ex-
pression for ethico-religious pathos, which is the pathos of action.129 It is, of course, 
paradoxical that a passive determinant such as suffering should characterize an active 
posture on the part of the religious individua1.130 The fact that it does so is taken by 
Johannes Climacus as an indication that, within the religious sphere, the positive is 
recognizable by the negative. 131 
The principle that the positive is recognizable by the negative applies equally to 
Christianity, though it undergoes some modification in the aftermath of the ostracization that 
SK suffered as a result of the "Corsair affair."m An interesting initial formulation of how 
129SV VII 375 (Postscript. 432). 
I3°Attention has already been called to the fact that religiousness A's suffering is active (Le., voluntary) in 
nature, for otherwise it would be on a par with adversity, misfortune, etc., which "befall" one. The active 
character of religious suffering is, of course, not outwardly apparent. Such internal sufferings (the cultivation 
of guilt-consciousness, the strenuous efforts at dying to self and world, and the conflicted state of mind as to 
whether these voluntarily incurred woes do not constitute a kind of presumption) are not betrayed by the 
slightest outward appearance of suffering (on the contrary, the "knight of the hidden inwardness," as Climacus 
calls him, gives every appearance of being a philistine who enj oys the comfortable appointments of this earthly 
regime while giving nary a thought to the spiritual one). Such a religious sufferer has "the comic" as his 
incognito (ibid., 439-44 [505-11)). He "lets himself be constrained by his surroundings to do what the 
dialectical inward deepening requires ofhim--to place a veil between people and himself in order to guard and 
protect the inwardness of his suffering and his relationship with God. This does not mean that such a religious 
person becomes inactive; on the contrary, he does not leave the world but remains in it, because precisely this 
is his incognito. But before God he inwardly deepens his outward activity by acknowledging that he is capable 
of nothing" (po 440 [506)). 
I31"The reader will recall that revelation ismarked by secrecy, eternal blessedness by suffering, the certitude 
of faith by uncertainty, easiness by difficulty, truth by absurdity" (ibid., 375 [432, amended slightly)). This 
theme that the positive is recognizable in the negative is a frequent one in the Postscript: see pp. 396,457, and 
465 (455, 524, and 532), especially p. 457 (524): "The religious continually uses the negative as the essential 
form. Thus the consciousness of sin definitely belongs to the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin. The 
negative is not once and for all and then the positive, but the positive is continually in the negative. and the 
negative is the distinctive mark" (emphasis added). 
132 At the time of the writing of the Postscript SK did not view persecution as a form of religious suffering 
on account of its accidental character: such suffering "can come and it can be absent" {ibid., 394 [453 D. His 
public confrontation in the name of human decency with The Corsair (a widely-circulated scandal sheet), 
however, taught him otherwise: disinterested ethical action necessarily brings persecution in its train. From 
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he applies this principle to the Christian "witness to the truth" is to be found in "the book on 
Adler" (English title: On Authority and Revelation). There he works out the dialectic of "the 
special individual" (one chosen by God to pronounce judgement upon established Christiani-
ty), noting that this dialectic possesses two moments, one stemming from Aristotle, the other 
from Christianity. With regard to the former, it is well-known that Aristotle's teleological 
mode of consideration presupposed that nature strives toward a 'tEAOt;, thereby tending to 
express the rule, and accordingly, to produce what is normal. Whatever is different and does 
not fulfil its appointed d AOt; falls into the category, 't 6 't e p« t;.133 Hence, for Aristotle, 
the special individual constitutes "the wonder"--yet this in the Greek sense of what is 
abnormal, deformed, imperfect. 
Next, turning to the Christian moment of the dialectic, Kierkegaard observes: 
We, however, as Christians, are accustomed to regard "the wonder" as the 
extraordinary, as higher than the norm, as above the universal. Yet the wonder's true 
dialectic is precisely the unity of these two moments. Hence Christianity must be to 
the Greeks folly. For the fact that the God revealed himself in suffering was precisely 
this paradox. Suffering is the abnormal, is weakness, and yet it is the negative form 
for the highest; the straightforward form is beauty, power, splendor, etc., but that the 
highest should have its adequate form in the straightforward form shows precisely 
that the highest is not the extraordinarily highest. The wonder's dialectic is, in one 
sense (the Greek sense), to be lower than the universal, and only then, in the 
paradoxical sense, to be higher than the universal. The wonder is not the universal 
and then a little bit more, no, the wonder is lower than the universal, and only then 
h· h 134 Ig er. 
this new recognition two consequences followed. First, the piety of "hidden inwardness" that he had espoused 
at the time of the Postscript (really, an extreme and misleading version of the Lutheran "two kingdom" ethic) 
gave way to an outwardly evidenced piety that openly testifies to the truth and against the evil (no longer was 
there any room for the humoristic retraction of one's own superior ethical qualifications). And second, this 
outwardly directed piety, in contradistinction to the hidden piety that preceded it, carried with it the 
consequence that the positive really is directly discernible as the positive, and the negative as the negative. As 
such, persecution does in fact bear some resemblance to the aesthetic conception of suffering. Nevertheless, 
as we shall see, insofar as it remains a suffering, it continues negatively to connote what is positive in 
character--God's blessing. Hence the "cross" principle of theological cognition continues to dominate SK's 
thinking. 
I33"Portent," "marvel," "wonder" or anything serving as an omen, such as a monster or strange creature. 
134Pap VII2 B 235, pp. 66-67. 
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Kierkegaard goes on to say that the special individual will possess no straightforward 
superiority over the universal, but rather, a suffering superiority; he or she will be a unity 
of abasement and exaltation. This is, of course, supremely the case with Christ. Yet 
Kierkegaard is ever at pains to stress that it applies with equal aptness to the one who bears 
his or her own cross in imitation of Christ: 
Just as the essentially Christian always places opposites together [the theology of the 
cross's coincidence of opposites!], so the glory is not directly known as glory but, 
just the reverse, is known by inferiority, debasement--the cross that belongs together 
with everything that is essentially Christian is here also. The Christian cross is not 
a superficiality, externality ... a decoration, a cross in a medal. No, seen from one 
side it is quite literally, fearfully literally, a cross, and no eye sees the cross and the 
star [that was present at Christ's birth] combined in a higher unity, so that the 
radiance of the star is perhaps diminished but the suffering of the cross also becomes 
somewhat less excruciating. From the other side, conversely, the star is seen, but the 
star is not worn (a later invention!); alas, it is the cross that is carried (see the 
GospeU), the badge of the order and the distinctive mark. This is and always has 
been and always will be an offense to the understanding.13S 
The identification of Christ's cross with that of the Christian brings us to the role that 
the important notion, imitation [Efterf~dgelse], plays in Kierkegaard. As the above citation 
indicates, it is in bearing their own cross in daily suffering that Christians come to experi-
ence the identity of abasement and exaltation that was present in Christ. This is not unlike 
what we observed in Luther. Kierkegaard is persuaded that his emphasis upon the Christian's 
13SSV VII 434 (Judge for Yourself!, 161). Bruce Kinnmse notes that "this is an attack upon the Hegelian 
speculation, which sees the Christian opposites bound together in a synthetic 'higher unity.' And this is at the 
same time a broader blow directed at the entire status-seeking Christian haute bourgeoisie, for whom there was 
no higher reward than to be awarded the "Knight's Cross" [Ridderkorset], worn by all the luminaries--Mynster, 
Heiberg, Martensen, both 0rsteds, etc. --and which was, literally, a large and glorious star containing a cross" 
(Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990], 432). Kierkegaard's 
reference to the cross as "the badge of the order and the distinctive mark" is, however, more than a satirical 
reference to membership in Denmark's royal order of knights; it is simultaneously a reference to Qn...!lli;. 
Councils and the Church, in which Luther identifies possession of the holy cross as one of the seven "marks" 
of the church (WA 50, 628 [LW 41,164]). Kierkegaard was familiar with this writing (see Pap IX A 7 [IP 
2: 1845]) and on the basis ofthat familiarity draws a stark contrast between the meaning that the cross possessed 
in Luther's theology, and the meaning that it had come to possess in the decadent Lutheranism ofKierkegaard's 
day. 
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imitation of Christ in suffering reproduces Luther's fundamental intent.136 And to be sure, 
from his reading of Luther he knew that the latter did regard Christ as exemplum as well as 
sacramentum.137 For Kierkegaard, as for Luther, imitation is not to be construed as meri-
torious or as contributing to justification in any way. Nonetheless it is incumbent upon every 
Christian to be an imitator of Christ, first, because Christ called for disciples, not admirers, 
and second, because it is through imitating him that we are brought low and compelled to 
fl h· h f' d' 138 ee to 1m, t ere m mg grace. 
Now, despite the convergence of attitudes as regards suffering discipleship that 
undeniably exists between Kierkegaard and Luther, it must again be pointed out that Luther 
found the concept confonnitas cum Christo preferable to that of imitatio; the fonner ex-
presses more adequately for him the hidden divine operation that effects the unity of 
abasement-exaltation in the believer, and in so doing guards against any incursion of moral-
ism into the Christian life. In using the concept, Efterf0lgelse, to bring contemporary Luther-
anism back into consonance with its refonnation ancestry Kierkegaard may unwittingly have 
run the risk of just such moralism. This is a matter of no small importance that will have to 
be considered at a later point. For now, however, we content ourselves with the positive 
aspect of Kierkegaard's notion, Efterf0lgelse: like Luther's confonnitas cum Christo, it 
removes the theology of the cross from the realm of mere cognitive theory (and hence from 
the danger of being just another theology of glory), and transports it into the hard realm of 
praxis. By its emphasis upon praxis, Kierkegaard's theology ofthe cross combats the danger 
136SV XII 461 (Judge for Yourself!, 193): "Let us not forget, Luther did not therefore abolish imitation, nor 
did he do away with the voluntary, as pampered sentimentality would like to have us think about Luther. He 
affinned imitation in the direction of witnessing to the truth and voluntarily exposed himself there to dangers 
enough." Throughout nearly all ofthe authorship SK blames Lutheranism, not Luther himself, for the abolish-
ment of works and imitation--see Pap X2 A 30 (JP 3:2503) and Pap XJ A 510 (IP 3:2528). 
mIn his postils Luther frequently maintains that Christ must be both gift and example to the Christian (e.g., 
En christelig Postille, 1 :xiii, 15, 24 and 2:97). In the previously cited journal entry (Pap X2 A 30 [JP 3 :2503]) 
SK applauds this identification of Christ as gift and example, using it to justify his emphasis upon imitation 
vis-a.-vis contemporary Lutheranism. The latter, he says, has fastened solely upon Luther's emphac;is upon 
Christ as gift (an emphasis that was entirely justified in its day) and, content with faith's "hidden inwardness," 
merely plays at Christianity (Spilfregteri). 
138SV XII 464-66 (Judge for Yourself!, 197-99). Also Pap X2 A 30 (IP 3:2503) and SV XII3l4 (For Self-
Examination. 24). 
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of grace being "taken in vain" within the Lutheran context. J39 It there takes on the function 
that Luther's theology of the cross had possessed within an earlier, Catholic context. Doing 
away the "objective" mode of consideration in which grace is the product of a mechanically 
efficacious sacrament that demands no personal involvement, Kierkegaard's theology of the 
cross forges an indissoluble bond between the presence of grace in the life of the believer, 
on the one hand, and contemporaneity with Christ's cross and suffering, on the other. As 
such it fully embodies the spirit of its theological ancestor. 
139 Again, SV XII 314 (For Self-Examination, 24). 
CHAPTER THREE 
JOHANN GEORG HAMANN AS LIKELY MEDIATOR 
OF LUTHER'S THEOLOGIA CRUCIS TO KIERKEGAARD 
In the introduction I stated that the question how Kierkegaard came to adopt a 
theological framework so similar to Luther's begs for an answer. It is of course possible that 
no relationship of dependence obtains whatsoever--the relationship might simply be one of 
affinity. Moreover even if Kierkegaard has been dependent upon an antecedent figure for 
the cross elements of his theology, it is possible that the predecessor was not himself 
beholden to Luther. In a journal entry from 1850 we encounter the following reference to 
Pascal: 
Pascal writes in a letter to Mademoiselle Roannes (on the occasion of little 
Perrier's healing at Port Royal by a miracle): Only for a few people, and seldom, 
does God emerge from the secrecy of nature that hides him. Prior to the Incarnation 
he has kept himself hidden beneath it. Then he has hidden himself all the more 
inasmuch as he shrouded himself by being man. For he was more recognizable as 
long as he was invisible. Now he has hidden himself still more deeply in the 
sacrament. All things are veils that hide God; but the Christians should recognize 
him in everything, and we have him to thank all the more for having revealed himself 
to us in sufferings while hiding himself from others .... 
Here is the dialectic that Joh. Climacus advances: a revelation [or] the fact 
that it is a revelation is recognized by its opposite: that it is the mystery. God reveals 
himself--this is recognized by his hiding himself. Consequently, nothing of that 
which is straightforward. l 
Might it be that SK has read and been influenced by Pascal at an early date? Probably not, 
for the journals indicate that SK began reading Pascal at about the time of his initial study 
of Luther (1847). Either he has discovered an affinity with both thinkers long after the initial 
formation of his thought, or he has been exposed to a mediating influence much earlier on. 
IPap X3 A 626 (JP 3:3110), translation mine. 
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Another entry from 1850 yields a clue as to who such a mediating influence might 
have been. In that entry we read: 
Erasmus concludes a letter to Zwingli with these words (cited by Hamann, 
vol. 3, p. 145): "yideor mihi fere omnia docuisse. Quae docet Lutherus. nisi Quod non 
tam atrociter. quodque abstinui a Quibusdam reni2matibus et paradoxis." 
I think of my lesser relationships. Scharling is likewise of the opinion that 
Martensen has urged that Christianity is an existence-relationship and contended for 
its ethical side just as strongly as I, presumably with the exception of some 
paradoxes, and that it is not tam atroc iter. 2 
It is noteworthy that Kierkegaard identifies his own theology with the paradoxes of 
Luther and that his impression of the latter has come, on this occasion at least, via Hamann 
(1730-88). No less a Luther scholar than Heinrich Bornkamm has observed that Hamann 
engaged in repeated study of Luther's works throughout his life and was "the best Luther 
expert of his day.,,3 What was the nature of his Luther-interpretation? Was it anything like 
SKIs, as the above citation would seem to indicate? In his study on Hamann and Luther, Fritz 
Blanke cites the very Hamann-text that Kierkegaard does in order to contrast Hamann's 
Lutherbild with that of the Enlightenment. The latter's proponents viewed Luther as the hero 
who had inaugurated the liberation of individual conscience from external authority. They 
viewed themselves as Luther's successors, whose task it was to purge "the gold of religious 
and moral autonomy in Luther" from the anti-intellectual "dross" that afflicted it.4 In a 
word: the Enlightenment's Luther was the champion of reason's autonomy. Hamann's Luther, 
by contrast, was very different: 
How does Hamann describe the faith of Luther? In one place he illustrates what is 
most important to him in Luther's religion by means of the contrast between Luther 
and Erasmus. Erasmus had written to Zwingli in 1523 (August 31), saying that he 
believed himself already to have taught almost everything that Luther taught, with 
the exception of Luther's riddles and paradoxes. Hamann adds, however, that these 
Lutheran paradoxes are precisely what especially pleases him, the Magus. 
2Pap X3 A 69, translation mine. 
3Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther im Spiegel der deutschen Geistesgeschichte. Mit ausgewiihlten Texten von 
Lessing bis zur Gegenwart. 2d ed., rev. and en!. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970),22. 
4Fritz Blanke, "Hamann und Luther," in Hamann-Studien. Studien zur Dogmengeschichte und 
systematischen Theologie, vol. 10 (Zurich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1956),44. 
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What does he understand by these paradoxes of Luther? He cites one such: 
Theolo~s 210riae dicit malum bonum et bonum malum: Theol02Us crucis dicit id 
quod res est. This Luther citation is the twenty-first thesis from the Heidelberg 
Disputation in which Luther distinguishes two types of theology, the theol02ia 
210riae (Le., that of Catholicism) and the theol02ia crucis (Le., his own). The 
theolo~a crucis teaches that one experiences God's love in his wrath, God's mercy 
in his punishment, that consequently one must apprehend God in his opposite; the 
theolo~a gloriae, however, thinks that God's qualities can be recognized in a direct, 
unbroken way. 
That Luther's God revealed in Christ is simultaneously a hidden God, that 
God, according to Luther, conceals his revelation of love in the appearance of the 
opposite--this Hamann has perceived to be the heart of Luther's faith. Lutheranism 
for him is faith in the eternal God's entry into time, an entry that is both an 
abasement of God and therefore an offense to the one who thinks naturally.s 
One need not confine oneself to this citation in order to receive this impression of 
Hamann's Lutherbild. His writings are replete with it, for it was precisely this provocative 
Luther--the one who revelled in paradoxes and absurdities--who helped early on to shape 
Hamann's theological attitudes vis-a-vis those of the age. Dissatisfied with its Zeitgeist but 
without a compass by which to chart a new course, Hamann had withdrawn from his studies 
at the university and set out from his native Konigsberg in the employ of his friend and 
prospective brother-in-law, Berens, on a business venture to London. The venture ended in 
failure and Hamann experienced some of the darkest days of his life at this time, until, 
through intensive reading of the Bible, he underwent a conversion experience. While still 
in London (1758-59) Hamann wrote his Biblische Betrachtungen in which he contemplates 
the paradox that, when God reveals himself, he does so in the form of a servant.6 Upon his 
5Ibid., 45-46. 
6See Fritz Blanke, "l G. Hamann als Theologe," in Hamann-Studien. Studien zur Dogmengeschichte und 
systematischen Theologie, vol. 10 (ZUrich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1956),31. Blanke writes that this Knechtgestalt 
of revelation is one of Hamann's central ideas. The lowliness of God in Christ illustrates (albeit uniquely) the 
general principle that God always abases himself when he reveals himself (p. 30). This is already true of God's 
authorial activity in creation (which is the language of God). And it is true of his activity in Scripture. The 
Biblische Betrachtungen begin as follows: "Gott offen baret sieh, der Schopfer der Welt ein Schriftsteller--Was 
ffir ein Schicksal werden seine Bucher erfahren mussen?" (N I, 9). On Blanke's summary, Hamann describes 
that fate as follows: "Andere Schriftsteller mustern das Buch, es genit, eben, weil es ein Buch ist, in die Hande 
von Kunstrichtem und Kri tikem, sie mustern es besonders scharf und gespannt, wei! j a Gott der V erf asser sein 
soli. Und was ist ihr Urtei!? Sie lacheln, spotten, tadeln. Dieses Buch soll das hOchste Wesen geschrieben 
haben? Ware es so, dann hatte sich das hochste Wesen philosophischer ausdriicken, es hatte auf die Kunstregeln 
und den Zeitgeschmack Rucksicht nehmen mussen und seine Offenbarung vor aHem nicht an das Volk der 
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return to Konigsberg in 1759, Hamann found his father's collection of Luther's works and 
began to read them assiduously. It was an avocation that was to continue throughout his life, 
though the reading was to be concentrated about two periods in particular: 1759-60 (the 
outset of the first period of Hamann's authorship, in which he unleashed his campaign 
against the Enlightenment) and again in 1780 (the beginning of his third period of activity).7 
Blanke observes that what Hamann found in Luther at the time of his initial encounter 
"seemed to have issued from his own heart." Hamann's letters were "full of effusions of 
astonishment over this and over the fact that this Luther was so little known. ,,8 Hence-
forward Luther became Hamann's mentor in confronting the "new scholasticism and new 
papacy" of the day--the speculative rationalism and moralism that presumed to adjudicate 
dummen Juden binden diirfen. So rufen sie aus. Hamann aber antwortet: Die Schriftsteller und Philosophen 
wiirden auch injeder andem Offenbarungsweise Gottes Fehler gefunden haben. Sie habenja iiberhaupt keine 
Offenbarung notig. Sie sind die Gesunden, die des Arztes nicht bediirfen" (Blanke, "J. G. Hamann als 
Theologe," 31). Of the reason why God has chosen to conceal himself in such lowliness, Hamann can reply 
that it simply pleased him to do so and that his motive must remain inscrutable to us (N I, 10). But he can also 
give a twofold reason for God's paradoxical deportment: Gcd has hidden his loftiness in lowly servant-form 
in order to make himself repugnant to the wise and proud with whom he will have no truck (N I, 158). Yet at 
the same time he seeks to break their arrogance and thereby establish the condition whereby his self-revelation 
can be received (N I, 100): "Er hat sich selbst gedemUtigt und will, dass wir uns unter die Tatsache beugen 
lemen, dass das Gottliche auf Erden in Niedrigkeit einhergeht. Als Gebeugten, d. h. Glaiibigen, kann er uns 
seine Gnade offenbaren" (Blanke, "J. G. Hamann als Theologe," 33; cf. Erwin Metzke, 1. G. Hamanns Stellung 
in der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts. Schriften der Konigsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, vol. 10, no. 3. 
[Halle (Saale): Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1934),153-54). The similarity to Luther's description of the divine 
economy is of course striking, despite the fact that at the time of the writing of the Betrachtungen Hamann has 
not yet encountered Luther. 
7Blanke, "Hamann und Luther," 61-62. 
8Ibid., 59. In a letter from this period Hamann writes: "Was fUr eine Schande fUr un sere Zeiten, dass der 
Geist dieses Mannes, der unsere Kirche gegriindet, so unter der Asche liegt. Was fUr eine Gewalt in der 
Beredsamkeit und Auslegung--was fUr ein Geist der Auslegung--was fUr ein Prophet! Wie gut wird Ihnen (an 
G. E. Lindner gerichtet) der alten Wein schmecken und wie soltten wir uns un seres verdorbenen Geschmacks 
schfunen. Was sind Montaigne und Baco, diese zwei Abgotter des witzigen Frankreichs und tief..,innigen 
Englands gegen ihn!" Blanke comments that at the time of this letter Hamann had been reading nothing but 
Luther for weeks on end while caring for his sick father. When asked by his friends what he was doing to pass 
the time, his response was: "lch lutherisire." It is illuminating to note that the young Kierkegaard has read these 
very same letters from 1759-60 (the Roth edition, vol. 1), citing them frequently and with enthusiasm in his 
early journals and later in the published works. The inference lies close at hand that by his exhaustive reading 
of Hamann he, too, has been led to "lutherisiren!" 
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biblical revelation by its own infallible counsels.9 In the Enlightenment's autonomy of 
reason Hamann saw but a new version of the old theolo~ia 210riae.lo Not surprisingly, in 
combatting it he fixed upon the paradoxes of the theol02ia crucis which he himself had 
discovered in London and in which he had subsequently been confirmed by Luther. It was 
precisely this aspect of Luther's theology--the one that had been so objectionable to 
"rationalists" such as Erasmus--that especially pleased Hamann, and in his turn, Kierkegaard. 
The question arises whether Kierkegaard met with this general theological approach 
during his initial encounter with Hamann, which occurred while he was yet a student. We 
know from his journals that his reading of Hamann was by and large concentrated in two 
~aturally the AufkHirer thought the charge preposterous, for they perceived themselves to be Luther's 
successors against any and every form of "popery" that would defraud individuals of autonomy. Nevertheless, 
Hamann regarded the labels, "crypto-catholicism," "crypto-papism" and "crypto-jesuitism" as completely 
applicable to them: "Da nun die Aufklarung die Religion mit Moral gleichsetzte, also die guten Werke zur 
Grundlage der Einung mit Gott machte und zugleich glaubte, wir dUrften, statt von der Offenbarung zu leben, 
Gott mit der Vemunft erdenken, so traf nach Hamann auf sie die Definition des Katholizismus zu. Dazu kam 
das Unfehlbarkeitsbewusstsein der Aufklarung, ihre hierarchische Herrschsucht und ihre Bibelfeind<;chaft, alles 
Ziige, die sie in des Magus Urteil mit dem Papsttum gemeinsam hatte. Die Aufklarung ist ihm 'der wahrhafte 
Papst' und als solcher antilutherisch, ob sie es weiss und will oder nicht. Gerade weil die Aufklarer als die am 
meisten antikatholische Gruppe ihrer Zeit erscheinen, wird der Magus nicht mUde, ihnen selbst verkappten 
Katholizismus und damit Abfall von Luther vorzuwerfen und ihnen die Vorwiirfe, die sie dem Katholizismus 
machten, mit ebensolchem Rechte zuruckzugeben. Die Berufung der Rationalisten auf die Reformation 
bezeichnet er als 'Reformationsschwindel'. Man hat den Eindruck, dass fUr Hamann das Aufklarungspapsttum 
ein weit gef<ihrlicherer Feind des Luthertums als das wirkliche Papsttum ist. Der wirkliche Papst is vor aller 
Augen, aber das P~psttum des Rationalismus ist versteckt und night sofort als solches zu erkennen. Darum 
wendet der Magus die ganze Kraft daran, dem Kryptokatholizismus der Aufklarung die Maske herunterzu-
reissen" (ibid.,4S-49). 
l'This identification was founded upon Hamann's conviction that the assumption of reason's health is bogus--
it has been corrupted by sin and its absolutization is but an indication that this is so. Met7ke writes: "Die 
'Gesundheit der Vemunft ist das '1t p G>-cov 1\J€ii~o<;' (R IV 441). Die 'gesunde Vemunft' ist eine 'Einbildung' 
(R I 43S), eine 'Chimare' (R II 421), ein 'Gotze' (R IV 324, vgl. auch R II ISlff., 347ff., 367ff.)--ebenso wie 
der 'gute Geschmack' und die 'schOne Natur' (R II 421,492). 'Die Gesundheit der Vemunft ist der wohlfeilste, 
eigenmachtigste und unverschamteste Selbstruhm, durch den alles zum voraus gesetzt wird, was eben zu 
beweisen war!' (R IV 324, vgl. 323). Man baut auf den 'unmoglichsten und iibertriebensten Postulaten' auf (R 
IV 124). Man hat einfach die 'gesunde Vernunft' 'usupiert' und ein 'Vorurteil' in ein 'Gesetz' verwandelt (R VI 
43), wobei es letztlich das Ich ist, das man 'durch Abstraktion zur allgemeinen Vemunft vergottert' hat (R IV 
306), wie man auch jeweils den eigenen Geschmack, den Geschmack einer bestimmten Zeit, zu dem 
Geschmack erhoben hat (R IV 492). Durch diese Grundvoraussetzung aber und ihre Verabsolutierung wird der 
Vemunftdogmatismus sanktioniert und 'alle freie Untersuchung der Wahrheit gewaWitiger als durch die 
Unfehlbarkeit derromisch-katholischen Kirche ausgeschlossen' (R IV 3 24)" (Met7ke, Hamanns Stellung in der 
Philosophie, 159-60). In contrast to the Enlightenment's optimism concerning man, one observes in Hamann 
the most profound pessimism: "Nichts als Nachlassigkeit, Untreue und Betrug ist der sich selbst geiassene 
Mensch bei den besten Naturgaben und Neigungen!" (R I SIS). 
100 
periods, one early (1836-39), and one late (1850).11 Ironically, it is possible that the Magus 
was first brought to the young Kierkegaard's attention by none other than Hegel, who in 
1828 had written an article reviewing the first volumes of the Roth edition of Hamann's 
Schriften. The article was subsequently reprinted in Hegel's collected works in 1835.12 
Hamann is first mentioned in ajoumal entry dated September 10, 1836 (Pap I A 100 [JP 
2: 1539]). The interesting thing about this entry is that it is added as an afterthought to a 
much earlier entry, Pap I A 95 (JP 1:416), dated October 19, 1835. The earlier entry had 
been written at the time of the young Kierkegaard's abandonment of faith. To persons on the 
outside of Christianity (among whom he, at that time, numbered himself) faith gives every 
appearance of being an idee fixe such as Don Quixote's, in which Christians nourish 
themselves until they at last become immune to every doubt, every counterproof. Conversely 
Pap I A 99 (JP 3:3247), written at about the same time, describes how the world appears to 
the Christian: it is trapped in sin so that it cannot regard the gospel as other than stupid and 
offensive. In short, a complete lack of understanding obtains between the Christian and the 
world. If this gulf between faith and reason is to be spanned it can only occur by a desperate 
leap, writes Kierkegaard. The addition that he makes to these entries in 1836 ratifies this 
view, only now he regards such mutual unintelligibility as an evidence of Christianity's 
transcendence and recreative power. It is in this context that Hamann is adduced: 
Regarding a Christian's view of paganism, cf. Hamann, vol. 1, pp. 406,418 and 419, 
especially p. 419: "Nein--wenn Gott selbst mit ihm redete, so ist er genothigt das 
Machtwort zum voraus zu senden und es in Erfiillung gehen zu lassen--Wache auf, 
der Du schHiftst." From p. 406 one observes the complete misunderstanding that 
exists between a Christian and a non-Christian inasmuch as Hamann responds to one 
of Hume's objections "Yes, that is precisely how the matter stands."l3 
lIPap I and II contain many references to Hamann, and in Pap IX B 33,3 (from 1848) Kierkegaard speaks 
of "the time of my Hamann reading," referring to a journal entry (Pap II A 420) from 1839. 
12See Steffen Steffensen, "Kierkegaard und Hamann," in OrbisLitterarum, International Review of Literary 
Studies, vol. 22, ed. Steffen Steffensen and Hans Sorensen (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1967),400. 
I3Pap I A 100 (JP 2:1539), translation mine. The contexts for the two Hamann citations that occur in this 
entry are as follows: In the first, Hamann states that the Christian is to the natural man as the waking person 
is to the somnambulist. "A dreamer may have images more vivid than a man who is awake, may see more, hear 
and think more than he, may be conscious of himself, dream with more orderliness than a waking man thinks, 
may be the creator of new objects, of great events. Everything is true for him, and yet everything is 
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Hamann's conception of faith as contrarational and a miracle has reinforced SK's prior 
conviction of a gulf between Christianity's and paganism's world-views. The difference is 
that now he regards faith's possibility as deriving, not from the power of an illusion, but 
from God. 
From this first entry pertaining to Hamann we may infer that he was of inestimable 
importance in helping lead SK back to Christianity.14 Walter Lowrie writes: "Undoubtedly 
the factor which most profoundly influenced this change of mind was Hamann. I am inclined 
to say that he is the only author by whom Seren Kierkegaard was profoundly influenced." ls 
Ronald Gregor Smith writes that "between Johann Georg Hamann (1730-88) and Seren 
illusion .... The question is whether it might in any way be possible for a waking man to convince a sleeper 
(so long as he sleeps) of the fact that he is asleep. No--if even God himself would speak to him, He is obliged 
to dispatch ahead the authoritative word and bring it to pass: Awake, thou that sleepest!" In the second context 
Hamann cites David Hume's wry remark that "The Christian religion ... cannot be believed by any reasonable 
person without a miracle. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity; and whosoever is moved 
by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person which subverts all the principles 
of understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience"--to 
which Hamann replies: "Hume may have said this with a scornful and critical air, yet all the same, this is 
orthodoxy and a witness to the truth from the mouth of an enemy and persecutor--all his doubts are proofs of 
his proposition." The translations are Walter Lowrie's (Kierkegaard. 2 vols. [New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1962], 1:165-66). 
14Judging from the journals, Hamann's effect upon Kierkegaard at this time was profound. Gregor 
Malantschuk calls attention to a number of entries in which SK embraces Hamann's view that the self-
contradictory character of Christianity's propositions is a testimony to their truth (Dialektik og Eksistens hos 
S(3ren Kierkegaard [Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 1968],61-62). Only two days after the entry cited 
above, SK again quotes Hamann: "1st es nicht ein alter Einfall, den du oft von mir gehOrt: incredibile sed 
verum? Uigen und Romane mussen wahrscheinlich sein, Hypothesen und Fabeln; aber nicht die Wahrheiten 
und Grundlehren un seres Glauben" (Pap I A 237 [JP 2:1540)). A week after this he writes: "Just how little the 
understanding can achieve in a speculative respect can best be seen from the fact that when it comes highest, 
it must explain the highest precisely in a self-contradictory expression. Several examples from the Formula 
of Concord can serve as examples" (Pap I A 243 [JP 3:3656]). As he reads more of Hamann, SK seems to come 
ever more firmly to the conviction of the necessity of the paradox for describing reality: " ... But there is a view 
of the world according to which the paradox is higher than every system" (Pap II A 439 [JP 3 :3071], dated May 
of 1839). 
In general, a fair number of Kierkegaard specialists have acknowledged the enormity Hamann's 
influence upon the young Kierkegaard (though not as many as one would desire!). Some, such as Wilhelm 
Rodemann, Ronald Gregor Smith, and Steffen Steffensen, have enumerated certain particulars in which 
Hamann has had lasting impact upon SK's thinking. But none, to my knowledge, has specifically entered into 
the "cross" features of Hamann's thought and traced the role that these have almost certainly played in forging 
SK's theological method. 
15Kierkegaard. 1:164. 
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Kierkegaard (1813-55) there was an extraordinary connection. Hamann indeed was the 
figure who more than any other of modern times influenced Kierkegaard both in the form 
and content of his authorship and also, at a deeper level, in his very existence. ,,16 The 
influence on the form of SKIs authorship is evident. In all likelihood it was from Hamann 
that Kierkegaard learned of the concept and method of "indirect communication.,,17 
Hamann published none of his writings under his own name, and hence was a more con-
sistent practitioner of the maieutic method than was Kierkegaard.18 Like Kierkegaard, his 
style is witty, ironic, humorous; like him he is desirous to seem a more contemptible person 
than he really is in order not to fall prey to his own ironical assaults upon the moralism of 
his opponents.19 In this he has no doubt been instructed by Socrates, for whom he has as 
ardent a fervor as does Kierkegaard.20 Yet Socrates is more than a model of maieutic art 
and irony, for these formal elements of his deportment are but ancillary features of his chief 
16"Hamann and Kierkegaard," in Kierkegaardian y, ed. S0ren Kierkegaard Selskabet by Niels Thulstrup 
(Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1964),52. 
17Steffen Steffensen ("Kierkegaard und Hamann," 410) observes that Hamann's employment of "indirect 
communication" in the Socratic Memorabilia provided a pattern for Kierkegaard's own. Though ostensibly 
directed at a wider audience, the work was in fact intended for Hamann's friends, Berens and Kant, whom he 
was seeking to convert from rationalism to faith. Since conversion was his aim, Hamann knew that his role 
could not be one of direct persuasion. Placing himself, instead, at the deity's disposal as a "midwife," he seeks 
only to give place to God to do his work. In passing, we note that the idea of respecting the freedom of other 
persons, and using only such means as are consistent with their freedom to induce them to embrace the truth, 
is strongly held by Fichte and may likewise have contributed to SK's conviction about indirect communication--
see Fichtes Werke. ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte, 11 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971),2:311 (The 
Vocation of Man, trans. William Smith [La Salle, IL.: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1955], 166-67). 
18Smith, "Hamann and Kierkegaard," 63-64. 
19Metzke illamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 226-27) quotes the following passages: "Eine strenge Moral 
kommt mir schnoder und schaler vor als der mutwilligste Spott und Hohn. Das Gute tief herein-, das BOse 
heraustreiben--schlechter scheinen, als man wirklich ist, besser wirklich sein, als man scheint; dies halte 
ich fUr Pflicht und Kunst" (R VI 339). And: "SolI ich sagen: Ihr Heuchler! Das kann Gott tun durch sein Wort 
und seinen Geist, ich nicht, ich bin seiber einer." 
2~n fact, Hamann's work in praise of Socrates, Socratic Memorabilia almost certainly inspired 
Kierkegaard's own interest in the Greek philosopher, the first fruit ofwhich--but bynomeans the last--was SK's 
doctoral dissertation, The Concej)t ofIrony. Of the connection between Hamann's Socrates and Kierkegaard's, 
Erwin Met:zke writes: "DaB Hamanns Sokratesauffassung christlich ist, ist offenbar .... Wie Hamann hat auch 
Kierkegaard seine geistige StelIung an Sokrates zu bestimmen gesucht,--nicht ohne tiefe innere Sach-
zusammenhange mit Hamann" (Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 158 n. 1). 
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aim, which is self-knowledge. Here, too, a remarkable convergence exists between Socrates, 
the Magus, and Kierkegaard.21 Directly traceable to Hamann's penchant for self-knowledge 
that is concrete, personal, and divinely conferred is the anti-systematic character of his 
writings. For Hamann a system is "already in itself an obstacle to the truth.,,22 Hence he has 
21All three are "existential" thinkers in the sense that they have self-knowledge as their aim--in § 1 of 
Brocken Hamann writes that "alle un sere Erkenntniskrafte die Selbsterkenntnis zum Gegenstand haben" (R 
I 131). Further, all three are impenetrable enigmas to themselves. Hamann agonizes over this repeatedly: "Wie 
ist es moglich gewesen, daB man mich hat filreinen klugen, geschweige brauchbaren Menschen halten konnen, 
wo es mir niemals moglich gewesen, mich, was ich bin und sein kann, zu entdecken" (R I 184; for other 
texts see Metzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 140-43 and 215-17.) One is reminded ofSK's remark 
about Socrates: viz., that though eulogized "as the person who knew man best--he nevertheless admitted 
that ... he still was not quite clear about himself, whether he ... was a more curious monster than Typhon or 
a friendlier and simpler being, by nature sharing something of the divine" (SV IV 204 [Fragments. 37]). For 
Hamann and Hamann's Socrates, however, as for Kierkegaard and Luther, self-knowledge can only occur via 
divine revelation: "Die Erkenntnis unser selbst," Hamann writes, "ist nicht in unserer Macht" (R I 133). "Alles 
ist Labyrinth, alles Unordnung, wenn wir selbst sehen wollen" (R I 80). Yea, the more deeply reason probes 
our nature, "desto gro!3er ist das Labyrinth, in das sie sieh verliert" (R I 103). Knowledge of ourselves is to be 
had only through Christ and the Scriptures (see Metzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 143-44). Such 
self-knowledge, the seat of which is the conscience, does not occur except by a "Hollcnfahrt" (R II 198): 
"Wenn wir zur Selbsterkenntnis gelangen, wenn wir von ungefahr uns selbst in un serer wahren Gestalt zu 
Gesieht bekommen, wie wGnschen, wie fiehen, wie angstigen wir uns" (R I 82; see Metzke's discussion, 
Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 216). 
From the foregoing it is apparent that Hamann, like Kierkegaard, is strongly Lutheran in his thinking. 
And his philosophy, like Kierkegaard's, is existentialist inasmuch as his concern is with "the meaning of his 
own existence" and with a personal approach to theology that is grounded upon an "I-Thou relationship," a 
relationship that takes place between God and "the concrete person," not between God and "humanity" in 
general (Metzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 126 and 129). For Hamann homo sum constitutes "das 
Fundament aller ubrigen Verhilltnisse" (R VII 145), and by it he means "nieht irgendeine Idee 'Mensch', 
sondem sehr konkret mich in meiner 'kleinen Welt, in der ich lebe' (R V 192, G 109)" (Metzke, Hamanns 
Stellung in der Philosophie. 215). 
22G 285. Metzke traces this anti-systematic bent to Hamann's epistemology on which all knowledge isgiven 
by personal divine revelation, not wrested from nature by dint of man's reasoning abilities: "Diese 
Systemfeindschaft verscharft sich bei Hamann ... dadurch, daB jedes Wirklichkeitserleben fUr ihn zugleich 
das immer emeute Erleben einer Offenbarung Gottes ist, die nur hingenommen und niemals deduziert werden 
kann. 'System' bedeutet die Vorweg-Festlegung der Wahrheit und den AusschluB der Offenbarung, gegenuber 
derman sich ja gerade immer wieder neu und radikal offen halten muB" (Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 
203). Hamann sees a spirit ofinsubordination at work in humankind's attempts to apprehend reality via ratio. 
And because of this hubris, its attempts cannot but fail. It is Hamann's contention that "ein vollig neues 
Seinsverhaltnis des Menschen notig ist ... das nicht ein eigenwilliges Selbstnehmen, sondem Hinnahme des 
von Gott Gegebenen ist ... ,das nicht in 'Eitelkeit' und 'Eigendunkel' besteht, sondem in 'Furcht und Zittem, 
Ehrerbietung und Dank' (R VII 343), in 'Demut' (a.a.O.) und 'Gehorsam' (G 397), 'Bescheidenheit' (R 1169, 
263; R II 22) und 'Selbstverleugnung' (R 1263; R II 432). Es kommt nieht auf unser Wollen, sondem auf Gottes 
Willen an. 'Mitgeteiltes' Sein ist 'Gnade' (G 21), nicht Erfolg menschlichen Tuns. Nicht unser Zugriff, sondem 
Gottes Eingriff entscheidet. Auch die Vemunft ist nur ein Vemehmen! Nicht Selbst-ergreifenwollen und 
Verfugen-wollen, sondem die Bereitschaft des 'Empfangens' (R IV 462; G 55), nicht Herrschen, sondem 
Dienen ist unser Teil! (G 16; R II 79)" (Metzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 181). Kierkegaard of 
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no choice but to express himself in "fragments," even entitling one of his works, Brocken. 
Kierkegaard follows suit in order to demonstrate his own antipathy to "the System," in the 
process conferring lavish praise upon the Magus.23 
As is evident from the citations already given, Hamann's influence upon the content 
of Kierkegaard's authorship would seem to be as great as his influence upon its form. His 
attack upon rules and systems of thought is at bottom an attack upon reason that, by its 
hubris, has cut itself off from divine revelation and now seeks to take heaven by storm. If 
we look at those Hamann-texts that Kierkegaard specifically cites, it is clear that his attack 
upon reason and insistence upon faith in a paradoxical revelation are influenced by Hamann, 
though the degree of influence is not always easy to determine.24 
course shares Hamann's dismay over modem man's insurrection against divine authority. 
23SV VII 210-11 (Postscript 250). SK's polemic against Hegel's system naturally goes deeper than mere 
antipathy. It, too, rests upon manifestly epistemological grounds. In the Fragments the ultimate truth about God 
and man is ascertainable by personal revelation alone. In the Postscript SK is at pains to demonstrate that reality 
in general cannot be comprehended in thought. In particular its temporal character makes it elusive and renders 
abstract knowledge approximative at best. At its deepest core existence is a mystery that announces itself to 
reason via paradox. All of these themes are to be found, in their own way, in Hamann. Of the mysterious and 
paradoxical character of reality, Metzke writes: "Das wahre Sein liegt iiberhaupt im Verborgenen .... Das 
Geheimnis ist die der ratio nicht verfiigbare Offenbarung des wahren, des gottlichen Seins (R II 158,276; vgl. 
R I 86, 100). Geheimnis und Gott gehoren zusammen (R IV 326). Das Geheimnis ist die Sprache der 
Transzendenz. Es ist 'Gottes Finger' (R VI 7), die offen bare Gegenwart des Transzendenten selbst. Eine 
spezifische Form, in der das Geheimnis dem Denken in Denken selbst aufdringlich entgegentritt ist der 
Widerspruch. Zugleich aber bezeichnet er einen bestimmten und eigenen Charakter der Wirklichkeit selbst" 
(Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 169-70). Of the temporal quality that helps render reality impervious 
to reason, Metzke writes: "Zu einer weiteren zentralen Erschutterung der Herrschaft der ratio fiihrt Hamanns 
Aufdeckung des Zcitlichkeitscharakters der Wirklichkeit. Fur die rationalistische Philosophie ist das Sein in 
seinem Wesen und seinen Prinzipien zeitlos. An diese Zeitlosigkeit ist zugleich die Unbeschranktheit und 
Absolutheit der Herrschaftsanspruche der ratio gekniipft. ... An diesem Punkt--Dberspringen der Zeitlichkeit--
muf3 daher die Frage nach dem VerHigungsrecht der ratio ... neu aufbrechen, sobald die wesenhafte 
Zeitlichkeit der Wirklichkeit wieder entdeckt wird. Das eben geschieht durch Hamann" (p. 174). In sum: "Es 
sind vor allem drei Grundtatsachen, auf die Hamann immer wieder zuriickkommt: 1. der Geheimnischarackter 
der Wirklichkeit, 2. der Widerspruchscharakter der Wirklichkeit, 3. der Zeitlichkeitscharakter--, ein Jedes nicht 
als negative IrrationaliUit verstanden, sondem als positiver Seinscharakter" (p. 167). 
24Steffensen has enumerated most of the texts to which SK had demonstrable exposure ("Kierkegaard und 
Hamann," 399-400). Kierkegaard seems to have been drawn to the letters, citing, for example, the Hamann-
Herder correspondence particularly often. His predilection for the letters makes it difficult to determine the 
precise scope of Hamann's influence, for Kierkegaard has obviously not commented upon each and every letter 
that he read. Moreover he has cited relatively few of Hamann's writings. These include the Sokratische 
Denkwiirdigkeiten (see SV IV 276 and SV VII 487, both of which cite R II 12), Gedanken iiber meinen 
Lebenslauf. which contains Hamann's account of his conversion (see Pap I A 233 which cites R 1172), Funf 
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The Socratic Memorabilia, however, has doubtless played a considerable role in 
Kierkegaard's view of reason, faith and revelation. That work proceeds from the assumption 
that God has not left himself without a witness in paganism. Socrates is for Hamann, as for 
Kierkegaard, a prophetic precursor whose teachings point to those of Christ, even if they can 
only be truly grasped in the light of Christ. 25 The significance of Socrates lay in the fact 
that he 
recognized and proclaimed the limits of human wisdom, indeed, the impotence of all 
human knowing, thereby preparing the way for Jesus .... What Socrates taught is 
also an essential part of Jesus' message, except that Jesus deepened the Socratic 
preaching of ignorance still more and completed it with the preaching of faith. 
Therefore insofar as he freed the people from the deification of knowledge, Socrates 
led them to a truth that he himself did not know, a truth that lay in concealment, a 
secret wisdom, the service of an unknown God.26 
Hirtenbriefe das Schuldrama betreffend (see Pap II A 12, p. 15 which cites RII 412ff., Pap II A 12, p. 16 which 
cites R II 424ff., Pap II A 102 which cites R II 434, and SV VI 131 which cites R II 424ff.), Leser und 
Kunstrichter (see SV I 218 which cites R II 397), and either Wolken or Des Ritters von Rosencreuz letzte 
Willensmeynung (see Pap III B 20, which is a citation either ofR II 95 or R IV 23). In addition to the Hamann-
citations mentioned, the editors of the Papirer find one other possible allusion--Pap II A 259 seems to refer to 
the opening words of Kreuzzijge des Philologen (R V 105). In addition to these texts, Steffensen contends that 
it can be rendered probable that Kierkegaard read Konxompax since he cites the notes to this writing. Lars 
Bejerholm believes, on the basis of the parallels that he sees between The Concept of Anxiety and k:sthetica 
in nuce, that SK has read the latter and been influenced by it as regards language's divine origins ("Meddel-
elsens dialektik". Studier i S"ren Kierkegaards teorier om Spnll<. kommunikation och pseudonymitet 
[Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1962],43). One can make the same argument about Brocken. owing to the parallels 
that it affords to positions that SK has taken vis-a-vis self-knowledge and self-love. Walter Leibrecht writes 
that "Soren Kierkegaard ... redet von Hamann als seinem 'einzigen Lehrer'. Wie Hegel studierte er die Werke 
Hamanns sorgfaltig, undes warwlihrend der Lektlire von Hamanns Biblische Betrachtungen, daB Kierkegaard 
seine 'grof3e Wende' erlebte" (Gott und Mensch bei Johann Georg Hamann [Giitersloh: Carl Bertelsmann 
Verlag, 1958],12). I have not been able to locate the source for Leibrecht's claims, and consequently cannot 
attest to their veracity, though it would seem likely that SK did read Biblische Betrachtungen since it occurs 
early in vol. 1 ofthe Roth edition. It seems to me that one cannot foreclose the possibility that SK read Hamann 
exhaustively. Commenting in Pap VI A 6 (JP 2: 1557) on a particular statement of Hamann's, SK remarks: it 
"occurs twice in the third and in the fifth volumes. I have marked them in my copy." The further fact that he 
has adopted a great many of Hamann's favorite citations and expressions as his own also testifies to his 
intimacy with the Magus (see Wilhelm Rodemann, Hamann und Kierkegaard [Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 
1922],34). 
25Blanke, "J. G. Hamann als Theologe," 33. 
21bid., 34. We might note in passing that Socrates' likeness to Christ extends to the prophet's fate that he 
suffered as well. Hamann is of the opinion that God's messengers will be persecuted: "Wie man den Baum an 
den Friichten erkennt, so weiB ich, daB ich ein Prophet bin, aus dem Schicksal, das ich mit allen Zeugen teile, 
geUistert, verfolgt und verachtet zu werden" (R I 441). Metzke writes that "das eben gehort zum Wesen des 
Publikums, des 'Man' einer Zeit, daB es das, was schlechthin anders ist als es selbst, nicht hOren und verstehen 
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How does Hamann conceive this relationship between ignorance and faith? In the Socratic 
Memorabilia he contends that we can only regain a true relationship to reality through a 
complete renunciation of reason's claims to knowing. In place of reason Hamann establishes 
faith as our point of contact with reality, and an immediate one at that. Owing to its 
immediacy, faith's certainty is unsurpassed; it has no need of reasons, since it does not have 
its basis in reason.27 While Hamann stresses Socrates' ignorance in order to illustrate that 
kann und will, dal3 es den, der die 'Wahrheit, die im Verborgenen liegt', verkundet, ablehnen mul3. Kampf und 
Martyrium, das ist deshalb notwendig das 'Schicksal' des aus der Welt der Wahrheit Gesandten (R I 441 !)" 
(Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie 157-58). From this derives Hamann's contempt for "the public. " Playing 
upon the Bible's designation of John the Baptist as "a voice crying out in the wilderness," he speaks of "eine 
Stille und eine Stimme; die Stimme eines Predigers, dem das Publikum eine Wuste ist, in der mehr Herden als 
Menschen wohnen. Wer Ohren hat zu bOren, der bOre" (R II 100). Metzke observes: "bei Hamann finden wir 
die Grundmotive fUr Kierkegaards Kampf wider die Anschauungen der Zeit (ebenso wie Hamann rennt er ja 
an gegen das 'Publikum', die 'Menge', das'Man'" (Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 158 n. 1). 
27Metzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 191. "Unser eigen Dasein und die Existenz aller Dinge 
aul3er uns mul3 geglaubt und kann auf keine andere Art ausgemacht werden" (R II 35). "Was man glaubt, hat 
daher nieht notig, bewiesen zu werden, und ein Satz kann noch so unumstol3lich bewiesen sein, ohne deswegen 
geglaubt zu werden .... Der Glaube ist kein Werk der Vernunft und kann daher auch keinem Angriff derselben 
unterliegen, weil Glauben so wenig durch Griinde geschieht, als Schmecken und Sehen" (R II 36, cf. R 1478). 
Elsewhere in describing the immediate certainty that faith confers, Hamann can quote Luther directly: Faith 
is a "lebendig, geschaftig, tatig, machtig Ding ... ganz anderes, das weit unmittelbarer, weit inniger, weit 
dunkler und weit gewisser als Regeln uns fuhren und erleuchten mul3" (R II 430). Metzke writes that "in der 
einfachsten Wahmehmung steckt ein Glauben. 'Das Dasein der kleinsten Ursache beruht auf unmittelbarem 
Eindruck, nicht aufSchliissen' (R VII 419) .... Glaube und Wirklichkeit gebOren in unmittelbarer Korrelation 
zusammen. Dieser urspriingliche narurliche 'Zusammenhang' 'zwischen Sein und Glauben' fehlt nur dann, 'wenn 
ich das Band der Natur entzweigeschnitten habe' (G 577). Deshalb ist der 'Unglaube' das 'erste Element un serer 
verkehrten Denkungsart' (G 370)" (Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 192-93). Faith, for Hamann, is a ~ 
~ element that is as necessary to cognition as are perception and inference. One perceives an evident 
parallel to Hume, who finds it necessary to establish belief as that upon which our knowledge of causation rests. 
Indeed, Hamann writes: "lch habe ihn [Hume] studiert, ehe ich noch die Sokratischen Denkwilrdigkeiten 
schrieb, undmeinen Glauben eben derse1ben QueUe zuverdanken" (G492f., 506). One also perceives aparaUel 
to Hamann's younger contemporary, F. H. Jacobi (1743-1819). Jacobi's "philosophy offaith" likewise grounds 
knowledge upon "belief," by which is understood an immediate conviction of the sensory and supersensory 
things that are revealed in perception. Because "belier' delivers to us the real objects whose interrelationships 
"intellect" subsequently discerns, it is prior to, and in no need of, rational demonstration (for more on Jacobi's 
epistemology the reader is referred to B. A. Gerrish, "Faith and Existence in the Philosophy of F. H. Jacobi" 
in Witness and Existence: Essays in Honor of Schubert M. Ogden, ed. Philip E. Devenish and George L. 
Goodwin [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989], 106-39). For his part Kierkegaard acknowledges the 
primacy of bel ief over knowledge: it is upon belief that our knowledge that a thing has come into existence rests 
(Fragment's "Interlude"). In this he is probably indebted in some measure to all of the figures above, and in 
addition, to Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In Book III (entitled "BeHer') of The Vocation of Man Fiehte rejects 
skepticism, grounding knowing upon belief, declaring it to be the "organ" by which we apprehend reality 
(Fichtes Werke. 2:253 [The Vocation of Man, 99]). Related epistemological themes that occur in Fichte and 
recur in Kierkegaard include: the endlessness of reflection and the paralysis of action that it engenders (2:252-
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knowing does not have its basis in reason but that, on the contrary, reason must be gotten out 
of the way in order that real knowing can occur, he also stresses Socrates' daimon in order 
to illustrate that knowledge of "the truth that lies in concealment" can only be had via divine 
revelation.28 This latter tenet renders the conclusion inescapable that the general ontological 
and epistemological position that Hamann assigns to faith in the Socratic Memorabilia 
ultimately rests upon theological premises (specifically theologia cruCis ones) and Metzke 
is quick to point this out: 
53, [98-99]); Ernst and Interesse as basic to life, keeping us captive to our first belief (not rational grounds!); 
systems of thought as extinguishing these (2:253, 2:255 [99, 102]); a resolution ofthe will (faith) as that which 
checks reflection, allowing us to admit as knowledge the testimony of our first belief (2:253-54 [99-100]). 
While we defer in-depth discussion of SK's relation to Fichte until chapter eight, it lies beyond doubt that he 
has been significantly influenced by the latter--not only in these matters, but in a great many others. 
28Metzke quotes the following passages that illustrate both chief points: "Der Gegensatz, auf den es 
ankommt und der den Glauben als unmittelbares und fundamentales Seinsverhaltnis exponiert, ist scharf 
herausgesetzt. Gerade im Zerbrechen der ratio, im Scheitem aller Anspruche des Menschen, im Vergehen der 
'natilrlichen Weisheit', im Durchbruch durch alles, was selbstverstandlich und natUrlich ist, wird der Boden 
gewonnen fUr das neue Seinsverhaltnis und Wirklichkeitsverstandnis, das radikal anders, 'gleichgiiltig gegen 
das, was man Wahrheit hie13', ist (R II 40) und das deshalb der in sich befangenen ratio immer verschlossen und 
unverstandlich oder doch mindestens fremd und 'sonderbar' bleiben mu13: 'Wie aber das Kom aller un serer 
natUrlichen Weisheit verwesen, in Vnwissenheit vergehen muB, und wie aus dem Tode, aus diesem Nichts, 
das Leben und Wesen einer hOheren Erkenntnis neugeschaffen hervorkeime; so weit reicht die Nase eines 
Sophisten nieht' (R II 38). Aus der Tiefe des 'Nichts' entspringend, d. h. unableitbar, ist das neue Verhaltnis zur 
Wirklichkeit da. Vnd in ihm bricht die Wirklichkeit in einer Tiefe auf, die nicht mehr bedingt ist. In dieser Tiefe 
wurzelt das 'Genie', das alle Bedingtheiten, 'Gesetze', 'Kunstregeln' zerbrechen mu13 (R II 38). Aus dieser Tiefe 
sprach des Sokrates 'Genius' (R II 38), sein 'Damon' (R II 39), 'auf dessen Wissenschaft er sich verlassen 
konnte, den er Iiebte und fiirchtete als seinen Gott, an dessen Frieden ihm mehr gelegen war als an aller 
Vemunft der Agypter und Griechen, dessen Stimme er glaubte, und durch dessen Wind ... der leer Verstand 
eines Sokrates so gut, als der SchoB einer reinen Jungfrau fruchtbar werden kann' (R II 38). Hier ist die 
'Wahrheit, die im Verborgenen liegt' (R II 42)-- --wir begegnen dem 'gelov' (R II 95)" (Hamanns Stellung 
in der Philosoph ie, 191-92). 
A number oftheolo~a crucis ideas are touched upon here: fallen reason's blindness to God's presence 
about it (witness Hamann's comment in the Introduction: "Doch vielleicht ist die gan7..e Historie ... gleich der 
Natur ein versiegelt Buch, ein verdecktes Zeugnis, ein Rathsel, das sich nicht auflosen laBt, ohne mit einem 
andem Kalbe, als unserer Vernunft zu pfliigen" [N II, 65]), faith's facility in grasping "the truth that lies in 
concealment," the notion that such truth is divinely revealed, but only after the person has died to his 
understanding--all of these are explicitly present. In addition Metzke notes (p. 192, n. 1) that Hamann's 
insistence upon the slaying of "natural wisdom" and breaking through what is self-evident helps to explain the 
converse proposition that he makes elsewhere--viz., that certainty is the enemy of faith--i.e., yet another 
theologia crucis tenet ("Gewi13heit hebt den Glauben auf'--R V 277, similarly R I 425). Certainly Kierkegaard 
has learned this, too, from Hamann. In 1849 he writes: "Hamann rightly declares: Just as 'law' abrogates 'grace,' 
so does 'to comprehend' abrogate 'to have faith.' It is, in fact, my thesis. But in Hamann it is merely an 
aphorism; whereas I have fought it through or have fought it out of a whole given philosophy and culture into 
the thesis: to comprehend that faith cannot be comprehended or (the more ethical and God-fearing side) to 
comprehend that faith must not be comprehended" (Pap X2 A 225 [JP 2:1559]). 
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Faith can only be this power ... because for Hamann it is at the same time "faith in 
God" (R I 226, 219) in which God himself acts ... , which God himself "effects and 
gives" (R I 226, 219). This faith, which is obedience to God (cf. G 264 ... ), which 
seeks "the honor that is God's alone" (R II 466), which annuls all "self-righ-
teousness" and which places the person unconditionally under God (R 1394,483), 
is the "victory that has overcome the world" (R VII 460, ... ). This, however, is the 
"faith" of Paul, the "faith" of Luther--just as even already in the Socratic Memorabil-
ia Christian-Pauline convictions form the core of ... the notions concerning 
"ignorance" that provide the foundation for "faith" (R II 37, 40, 50, among 
others).29 
We have observed that Hamann's admiration of Hume owes to the epistemological 
primacy that the latter assigns to faith: "Hume is ever my man for he at least ennobles the 
29Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 193). Metzke's remarks concerning the theological basis of 
Hamann's faith concept have a further import: they indicate that Hamann's denial of epistemological 
significance to reason is likewise theologically motivated. With Luther, Hamann can contend that "der Satan 
bemachtigte sich nicht nurunserer sinn lichen Werkzeuge und Krafte, sondern auch der Vernunft selbst" (R I 
82). The effect of sin has been the corruption of human nature at its root ("das Giftder Sunde [ist] im Biut und 
Herzen"--R I 165) and reason is unable "die Bosheit un seres Heu..ens gut zu machen" (R I 66). None of our 
drives or inclinations have remained untouched: "Wieviel Schlacken sind in den besten unserernatiirlichen und 
kunstlichen Triebe! Wie verdorben muB der Boden sein, der die beste Wei7..eDsaat zu Trespe macht und 
verwandelt! Wie leicht ist es der Natur selbst auszuarten!" (R 1183). Least of all have our mind and will been 
spared: "Sind Vernunft und Freiheit nicht die ede1sten Gaben der Menschheit, und beide zugleich die Quellen 
alles moralischen Obels?" (R VII 342). Accordingly, "das Gute hangt nicht von uns ab" (R VI 229) and we are 
most deluded when we believe ourselves capable of good. Metzke writes: "Gerade in den hOchsten Kraften und 
Gaben des Geistes ist das Bose verborgen: im selbstsicheren und se1bstgerechten Vertrauen auf sie ist es 
wirksam. Gerade in diesem 'Vertrauen auf mich selbst' bestatige ieh nur, daB der Mensch 'authentisch leben 
und sein eigener Herr sein' will (R VII 342), daB er, was immer er auch tut und erstrebt, seinem 'Eigenwillen' 
(R VII 353), seiner Ichsucht verhaftet bleibt, nicht von ihr loskommt, so daB alles das, was filr mich zeugen 
solI, meine 'redlichen Absichten', meine 'guten Werke', me in 'guter Wille' mir nur zum Gericht werden (vgl. 
R I 176, 330). Hier liegen die Grundspannungen und Grundnote, die 'Klippen', an denen Hamann 'selbst 
gescheitert' ist (R I 172)" (Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 225). 
If the power of sin is so radical, so all-embracing, then a divine act of recreation is man's only hope: 
"Nicht auf eine natilrliche Entfaltung, Entwicklung des Menschen darf man sich also verlassen, sondern ein 
Umbruch, ein Umschaffen des Menschen, wie es Hamann an sich seIber erfahren hatte, ist notig. Das aber 
vermag nurGottes SchOpfertat. 'Gott schaffe in unsallen ein neues Herz' (G 57). Denn 'Gott allein' kann Neues 
hervorbringen' (R I 116, R IV 95). Gott allein kann sagen: 'Ich mache alles neu' (G 385). Nicht 'Tugend', 
'Handlungen', 'gute Werke', 'Vernunft', sondern eine 'neue Kreatur' und 'Wiedergeburt' sind die Fundamente 
des sittlichen Lebens (R III 254, R V 47, R VI 19, R VII 58, G 51 und R II 156-59)" (Metzke, Hamanns 
Stellung in der Philosophie, 226). "Un sere Wilrde," writes Hamann, "hangt nach besseren Begriffen nieht von 
Verstand, Willen, Tiitigkeit ab--sondern bleibt das Geschenk einer hOheren Wahl--nicht mehr ein angeborenes, 
sondern erworbenes--auch nicht selbsterworbenes noch selbstandiges,--sondern schlechthin abhangiges" (R 
VII 287, R IV 41). 
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principle of faith and takes it up into his system.,,30 The problem with Hume is that he fails 
to apply his own principle in that sphere where it matters most, viz., "things higher. ,,31 Yet 
as Metzke notes, a far greater difference separates the two thinkers, for their conceptions of 
faith are fundamentally different. For Hume belief is a derived relationship arising from 
perception and custom, and hence is variable in degree. It is linked to probability--when 
probability waxes, so too does belief. For Hamann, on the other hand, faith is a primitive 
relationship, an immediate (God-given) access to reality that transcends reason's poor pow-
ers.32 Probability as adjudicated by reason has nothing to do with faith, but everything to 
do with subordinating truth to human opinion. "Indeed, a certain improbability belongs 
essentially to the truth.,,33 Contra Hume, faith's ability primitively to grasp the nature of 
reality has its ground in its humble receptiveness to God's self-revelation. Hence Metzke can 
assert that 
Hamann's "realism" is rooted in the affirmation of reality as given creation, rooted 
therefore in a faith in God that is totally irrelevant to Hume's purposes, receiving 
from this the unconditionedness and absoluteness that we seek in vain in Hume--
precisely because Hume's belief is simply a psychological-theoretical concept, 
whereas Hamann's 'faith' is the Christian-Pauline 1tl0'tlt;.,,34 
30R VI 187. Hamann prizes Hume because of the rigor with which he presses his logic to its conclusion: 
either immobilizing skepticism or honest admission of one's reliance upon belief notwithstanding its 
insupportability. "Ein Geist zum niederreil3en, nicht zum bauen, darin besteht der Ruhm eines Hume" (RI 356). 
Hume falls, according to Hamann, "in das Schwert seiner eigenen Wahrheiten" (R I 405-6). 
31"Der attische Philosoph Hume hat den Glauben notig, wenn er ein Ei essen und ein Glas Wasser trinken 
soll ... wenn er den Glauben zum Essen und Trinken notig hat: wozu verleugnet er sein eigen Prinzipium, 
wenn er tiber hOhere Dinge als das sinnliche Essen und Trinken urteilt!" (R I 442). 
32Metzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosonhie. 195-96. 
"Ibid., 182. 
'ibid., 197. To what has been said concerning Hamann's subordination of reason to a religious faith that 
has the improbable, even the absurd, as its object, the caveat must be added that Hamann does not regard 
knowledge and science as utterly without purport: "Die Wissenschaft ist vielmehr eine 'edle Gabe Gottes' (R 
II 221, vgl. R I 127). 'Die Zeugnisse der menschlichen Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte dienen alle zum 
Siegel, zum menschlichen Siegel der Offenbarung, und man hat als Christ so wenig Ursache, dieselben zu 
versaumen und aufzuheben, als Paulus, seinen Oberrock in Troas im Stich zu lassen' (R I 119) .... Hamanns 
harte Kritik an Wissen und Wissenschaft will nur verstanden werden als ein dringender Ruf zur prinzipiellen 
Selbstbesinnung der Wissenschaft auf ihre Gefahren angesichts bestimmter iibertriebener Anspruche und 
bestimmter Versaumnisse der Wissenschaft seiner Zeit. Ebenso hat natiirlich auch fUr ihn und gerade fUr ihn 
die Vernunft ihre bestimmte positive Bedeutung in der Ordnung des Seins. 'Glaube hat Vemunft ebenso notig, 
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This being the case, Hamann is not at all disconcerted by the improbability that 
attaches to Christianity's articles of faith. We have already observed the glee with which he 
greets Hume's recognition of the contrarationality of Christianity and the enthusiastic 
reception that this receives in the young Kierkegaard (Pap I A 100). In another entry from 
the time of SKIs initial encounter with Hamann to which we have already referred, viz., Pap 
I A 237 (JP 2: 1540), SK writes concerning the Magus's view of reason and faith: 
It is a quite interesting parallel that Hamann makes between the law 
(Moses' law) and reason. He namely goes right at Hume's tenet: "die letzte Frucht 
aller Weltweisheit ist die Bemerkung der menschlichen Unwissenheit und 
Schwacheit" .... "Unser Vernunft," Hamann then says, "ist also eben das, was 
Paulus das Gesetz nennt--und das Gebot der Vernunft ist heilig, gerecht und gut; aber 
ist sie uns gegeben uns weise zu machen? Eben so wenig als das Gesetz der Juden, 
sie gerecht zu machen, sondern uns zu uberfuhren von dem Gegentheil, wie 
unvernunfig un sere Vernunft ist, und dass unsere Irrthumer durch sie zunehmen 
solIen, wie die Sunde durch das Gesetz zunahm." 
cfr. Hamann Schr: lste B: p. 405. 
Another place p. 425. "1st es nicht ein alter Einfall, den du oft von mir 
gehort: incredibile sed verum? Lugen und Romane mussen wahrscheinlich sein, 
Hypothesen und Fabeln; aber nicht die Wahrheiten und Grundlehren un seres 
Glauben." 
The first quotation (from a letter of Hamann's) is quite in line with the moral of the Socratic 
Memorabilia. Though a God-given good, reason is not, of itself, able to make us wise. One 
must rather speak of the "spiritual" use of fallen reason--viz., to make us aware of the limits 
of our understanding, thereby pointing the way to the revelation that is received by faith. 
Reason's ultimate goal, "by its own admission, is that which cannot be declared, cannot be 
als diese jenen hat' (G 504). 'Ohne Vernunft keine Religion' (R VI 25). Man kann also nicht von einer 
grundsatzlichen Vernunftfeindlichkeit Hamanns sprechen. Auch hier will die scharfe Kritik, die er doch an der 
Vernunft ubt, als Ruf zur radikalen Selbstkritik und Selbstbescheidung verstanden werden. Denn 'wei13 man 
erst was Vemunft ist, so hart aller Zwiespalt mit der Offenbarung aur (G 406). Vemunft ist eben ein 
Vernehmen, ein Empfangen, bleibt angewiesen auf ein Anderes. Sie mu13 'warten', 'Dienerin, nicht 
Gesetzgeberin sein wollen' (G 16)" (Metzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 186). Metzke stresses 
elsewhere that Hamann's intent is not to isolate belief from reason orthe senses. On the contrary, this is an error 
for which Hamann reproaches Jacobi--an error born of the general tendency to sunder the primitive unity of 
being into artificial distinctions. All our faculties, like all being itself, is to be affmned as an integrated whole 
(pp. 209-10). 
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put into clear concepts--and accordingly, does not belong to reason's province.,,3s The 
second Hamann-text that SK cites (concerning the improbability of faith's articles) finds its 
way at a later date into Philosophical Fragments (viz., at the conclusion of "The Absolute 
Paradox," where SK sets forth the themes of God's hiddenness and the absurdity of revela-
tion to reason). So too does Hume's unwitting affirmation (he regarded it an accusation) of 
Christian faith as "the miracle," as well as yet a third Hamann-text that Kierkegaard has 
come upon while a student.36 
Now such statements concerning the improbability of Christianity's articles of faith 
and the poverty of reason in grasping them presuppose an important principle of Hamann's 
that was previously touched upon under the rubric of the "servant form" of God's revelation--
viz., the necessary condescension [Herablassun2] whereby the transcendent deity reveals 
himself in the baseness of creation, the human word, and the son of man. Hamann calls this 
juxtaposition ofloftiness and lowliness the "principium coincidentiae oppositorum" and with 
it we come to the very heart of his ontology and epistemology: 
For the dimension of religious reality the "contradiction," the "paradox," (a concept 
that Hamann, too, knows and uses, and that sheds light upon the inner connection 
between Luther, Hamann and Kierkegaard) is virtually constitutive. "Precisely herein 
consisted the mystery of the divine wisdom, in uniting things that canceled each 
other, that contradicted each other, that seemed to annihilate each other." We stand 
here before "truths that by reason of their make-up must be a folly and an offense to 
the natural man" (R IV 331, cf. IV 259), before "symbols of contradiction" (R VI 12) 
such as the unity of God's "forgiveness" and ''judgement'' (R I 369), the "transfigu-
35G 7. Metzke (Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 187) cites other related passages: "Die Vemunft ist 
nicht dazu gegeben, dadurch weise zu werden, sondem eure Torheit und Unwissenheit zu erkennen, wie das 
mosaische Gesetz den Juden" (R 1442); "Die Vernunft ist heilig, recht und gut; durch sie kommt aber nichts 
als Erkenntnis der uberaus sundigen Unwissenheit. ... Niemand betrGge sich also selbst" (R II 100); "Ich hab 
es bis zum Ekel und Uberdru13 wiederholt, daB es den Philosophen wie den Juden geht und beide nicht wissen, 
weder was Vemunft noch was Gesetz ist, wozu sie gegeben: zur Erkenntnis der Siindeund Unwissenheit, nicht 
der Gnade und Wahrheit" (G 48). 
36 All three occur in SV IV 219 (Fragments. 52). In the third text (R I 497) Hamann asserts that he would 
rather hear the Word of God from a pharisee against his will than from an angel oflight. This text is frequently 
cited by SK (Pap II A 2 [JP 2:1542], II A 12, p. 16 [JP 1:265], II A 105 [JP 2:1693], III A 49 [JP 2:1722], and 
Pap V B 6,1 [Fragments supp., 195-96]). Frequently he conflates it with another text that involves Balaam's 
ass--see Pap II A 12, where the citation runs: "He [Hamann] would rather hear wisdom from Balaam's ass than 
from the wisest man, rather from a pharisee against his will than from an apostle or angel." The fact that this 
citation is so frequently mentioned by SK owes, in my view, to the pithiness with which it expresses Hamann's 
principium coincidentiae oppositorum, a topic to which we now tum. 
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ration of humanity in deity and deity in humanity" (R IV 330), the communicatio of 
divine and human idiomatum" (R IV 23), the "1tav't« 8ei« and aVep~1t1.v« 
1tav't« [everything divine and everything human]" (R II 95, also R IV 23) that 
signifies paradoxical unity for Hamann, not mystical coalescence! In the revelation 
of God the highest and the lowest, the mightiest and the weakest form a "unity," are 
immediately one.37 
This paradoxical coincidence of opposites (which is already prefigured in the Delphic 
oracle's choice of Socrates as its servant--see R II 26) Hamann can call the "wisdom of the 
contradiction" (R II 81 )--a wisdom that is "the death and the hell of living worldly wisdom" 
(R II 91). While the contradiction can be made to disappear, this happens "not through ratio, 
not through the person, but through God alone, and that in so paradoxical a fashion that the 
contradiction itself is affirmed as truth (R IV 330, R VI 183, R VII 125f., RN II 30). Further 
heightened the 'contradiction' qua reality-principle cannot be.,,38 Fritz Blanke describes the 
opposition of this principle to (fallen) reason in terms that are strikingly reminiscent of 
Luther: 
Wherein does the difference between faith and knowledge lie according to Hamann's 
view? The answer was already given ... where we said that the peculiarity of faith 
is that it sees through the veils of revelation. The natural man sees only the earthly 
shells and is vexed by them; the believer, however, sees in them the divine content. 
He views both together, the lowly and the exalted, the earthly and the heavenly. For 
faith, therefore, opposed things coincide. What to philosophical thinking is perverse, 
yes, nonsense and mockery, what to the unbeliever seems exaggerated--this is 
meaningful to the believer. The principle of contradiction does not apply for him. 
Rather faith's cognition is ruled by the law of the coincidentia oppositorum.39 
Hamann is clear about the fact that it is the revelation of transcendence that 
constitutes the contradiction--such self-revelation cannot but entail self-contradiction since 
37Metzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 171-72. On p. 172, n. 1, Metzke lists a wealth of Hamann-
texts that deal specifically with the incarnation's paradoxes. 
38Ibid., 173. Of the absolute centrality of the "principium coincidentiae oppositorum" to Hamann's 
understanding of reality, Metzke writes: "Dies Prinzip, das er auf Giordano Bruno zurUckfilhrt (R VII 414; R 
VI 30 1 )--den eigentlichen Ursprung bei Nic. v. Kueskennt Hamann nicht--, hat ihm ~ahrelang im Sinngelegen' 
(R VI 183). In ihm glaubt er das Grundprinzip fUr das Verstandnis der Wirklichkeit--und der WidersprUche in 
ihr wie in der Vernunft--zu haben. 'Diese Koinzidenz scheint mir immer der einzige zureichende Grund aller 
Widerspriiche undderwahre Proze!3 ihrer Auflosung und Schlichtung, aller Fehde der gesunden Vemunft und 
reinen Unvemunft ein Ende zu machen' (R VI 183)" (p. 173). 
39Blanke, "l G. Hamann als Theologe," 37. 
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it is the manifestation of the transcendent in the familiar. This just is the "servant fonn" of 
revelation: 
God is absolute transcendence. He is "supra nos" (R VI 58). He is the "hidden," 
"invisible" one, the "incomprehensible" one, "the great and unknown" "GOD" (R I 
99,502; R II 259, 283; R IV 136, 142, 145, 197; R VI 58; R VII 66; ... G 56,659). 
There is an "infinite misrelationship of man to God" (R VII 59 ... ). God is the 
"transcending" and "annihilating of all human concepts" (R 163, 124; R VIII a 5). 
Withdrawn from our every power of disposal, indeed "bringing to naught" our every 
intent to exercise disposal (R VI 30), he is "in the most real sense an individual" that 
can be understood "by no other measure than that which he himself gives" (R VII 
418). Every human measure must be shattered. Even in their ultimate, highest 
statements "philosophy" and "theology" can only be "i>1tooeiyJ.Lu'tu, 0'1<1U1 and 
ftvt'i'tU1tU" [signs, shadows and antitypes] (R VI 123).40 
Proceeding from God's transcendence and--this transcendence notwithstanding--his self-
revelation, Hamann draws the consequences that Luther before him drew, and that Kierke-
gaard subsequently does: 
The way proceeds not from humans to God, but only from God to humans, and to be 
sure, in such a way that God acts in opposition to human reckoning and expectation. 
"The will of God occurs when ours is broken" (G 531). The "Spirit of God" 
communicates itself by "pulling down the heights of our reason" (R I 88). Therefore 
God's revelation is ever at once veiling and "disguising" (R II 208) and his will ever 
"secret will" .... "It is God's honor to conceal a matter (R 1441, R VII 204, G 547; 
cf. R I 99). It is the "qualification" of revelation to be "contradiction," "offense," 
"outrage," "foolishness" (cf. R I 55,85,87,99,138,218; R II 207, 373, 476; R IV 
259,329,331; R VI 12, 14; R VII 57; K 87; G 246). God intentionally manifests 
himself so that he "demeans" himself, so that he chooses "the ridiculous--the drivel-
ling--the ignoble" (R II 207), so that he appears in "servant fonn" (R 150,450; R II 
207, 296) and so that he unveils himself the most profoundly--and incomprehen-
sibly--as "God on the cross" (R II 302; RIll 255; R IV 331; R VI 12, 14).4 
This being so, "God alone can here open the 'eyes.',,42 "Only to those who are called does 
the divine power and divine wisdom become manifest, and this call depends not upon the 
will of the flesh, nor of a man, nor of blood" (G 246, 514). Metzke writes that it is God who 
~etzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 253. 
4IIbid., 254. 
42Ibid. Metzke elaborates: '''In solcher Verkleidung die Strahl en himmlischer Herrlichkeit zu erkennen', dazu 
'gehOren freilich erleuchtete Augen' R II 207f. Solche Augen erblicken 'eine Gottheit, wo gemeine Augen den 
Stein sehen' R VII 49" (p. 254, n. 6). 
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"creates, destroys, creates anew .... 'Rebirth' and 'new creature' become (as once before with 
Luther) fundamental categories of anthropology and ethics (R III 253f.).,,43 
In view of the central role played by the coincidentia oppositorum in Hamann's 
thought, it is imperative to determine whether this principle has impressed itself upon the 
young Kierkegaard during his initial study of Hamann. It would seem that it has. In Pap II 
A 78 (dated June 3, 1837) he registers his approval of the "humorous" point of view (humor 
having to do with the ludicrousness--for the initiate!--of incongruous entities juxtaposed) 
that Hamann has so rightly discerned in Christianity. SK writes: 
The humoristic sense that in general resides in Christianity is expressed in the 
principal tenet that the truth is hidden in the mystery (€V I-L UO''tfl p1ct> UitOKPU<!>fl), 
where it is not merely taught that the truth is here found in a mystery (an assertion 
that the world, by and large, is more inclined to hear since there have often enough 
arisen mysteries while the ones initiated into them then, in tum, immediately 
regarded the rest of the world in a humoristic light); but that it is even hidden in the 
mystery, which is precisely the life-view that humorizes to the highest degree over 
the world's cleverness; generally the truth is revealed in the mystery. 
Insofar as Christianity does not separate out the Romantic from itself, 
however much Christian cognition may increase, still, it will continually always 
remember its origins and therefore know everything €V lluo'tflptCJ). 
The humoristic in Christianity also appears in the statement: my yoke is light 
and my burden not heavy; for it certainly is after all--is heavy for the world in the 
highest degree, the heaviest that can be imagined: self-denial. 
The Christian's ignorance (this purely Socratic viewpoint as, for example, in 
a Hamann) is naturally also humoristic; for wherein does it reside but in this, that by 
forcing oneself down to the lowest standpoint one looks up (i.e., down) upon the 
ordinary view, though in such a way that behind this self-deprecation there lies an 
elevation of oneself in high degree .... In this way the miracle also plays a great 
leading role in this life-view, not by reason of the mighty one who is procured by its 
means for Christianity; but because all of the most profound ideas of all the wise 
men are thereby (for this standpoint) brought to naught alongside Balaam's prophe-
sying ass. Hence the more insignificant that the miracle is, if I may say so, or the less 
its effect as regards the historical development--yes, even to the extreme that this 
viewpoint tempts God, so to speak, i.e., desiring a miracle for the sole purpose of 
causing professors of physics difficulties--the more does it rejoice over it. Yes, I 
43Ibid., 255. Hamann denies the existence of a free will that is poised between good and evil, able to choose 
either. Metzke observes that he roundly criticizes Robinet when the latter "tries to escape onto the 'rocking 
horse' of an 'equilibrium' of good and evil": "Sollte nicht das Gute mit dem BOsen in der Natur im 
Gleichgewicht stehen? Ja, sollte- -?" (R II 244, cited by Metzke, p. 226). Elsewhere Metzke remarks that the 
radicalness of Hamann's "solus Deus" is reminiscent of Luther (p. 133). 
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suppose that it will rejoice the most over the transformation of wine into water at 
Cana. Yes, when it rejoices over the miracle of Christ's resurrection, then it is not the 
true Easter joy, but much more enjoyment over the Pharisees and their soldiers and 
their enonnous stone before the tomb. Hence this viewpoint dwells ever so gladly 
upon the crib, the rags in which the child was wrapped, the crucifixion between two 
thieves.44 
A few other themes remain that Kierkegaard has demonstrably, or with high 
probability, taken over from Hamann. One is the elevation of the "passions" to a place of 
preeminence over reason.45 Another is the identification of anxiety as that which signifies 
our spiritual provenance.46 And finally there is the notion that the truth is not a finished 
44Pap II A 78 (JP 2:1682), translation mine. Another early text that refers to Hamann's principle of the 
coincidence of opposites (more specifically, that of the communicatio idiomatum) is Pap II B 20 (Concej)t of 
~, supp., 445), where Kierkegaard observes that "the dogmatic thesis around which everything turns in 
Hamann [is] 1tcXV't'lt 8ellt Kltl CtVSPOO1t1Vlt 1tcXv't'lt [everything divine and everything human]." 
Cited is either R II 95, Wolken, or R IV 23, Des Ritters von Rosencreuz letzte Willensmeynung. Metzke's 
warning is to be heeded as to how this expression is understood by Hamann: viz., as signifying "paradoxical 
unity ... not mystical coalescence!" (Hamanns Stellung in die Philosophie, 171). 
4SSee, e.g., the motto of Either/Or I, "Is reason alone then baptiz.ed, are the passions pagans?" (SV I iii 
[EitherlOr I, 1 D, which is taken from Edward Young, whom Hamann likes to cite. Of the human faculties 
Hamann gives primacy to the heart ("Das Herz schlagt fruher als unser Kopf denkt"--R VII 264f.). Bycontrast, 
reason is the "zufalligste und abstrakteste Modus un serer ganzen Existenz" (R IV 328). It sub serves the heart; 
indeed, every function, whether intellective or vital, depends upon the heart ("Denken, Empfinden und 
Verdauen hangt alles vom Herzen ab" [R III 382D. Hamann calls the heart the "primum mobile." Since it is 
the seat oftheemotions ("Ein Herzohne Leidenschaften, ohne Affekt, ist ein Kopf ohne Begriffe, ohne Mark"--
R I 494), these are the wellspring of action, the creative force of life. While it is clear that SK (like the 
romantics) has been influenced by Hamann as regards the primacy of the passions, he seems to have been not 
at all influenced by their correlate: sensuousness. Yet Hamann is at pains to affirm both, for both are intrinsic 
to "die Bejahung der vollen 1eibhaftigen Realitat des menschlichen Lebens--wider aile Einschrankungen, 
Begrenzungen, VerkGrzungen der ratio" (Metzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosoph ie, 223). This being the 
case, Met7.ke is certainly correct when observes that, despite the key role that Leidenschaft plays for SK, it is 
"completely deprived of natural qualities" (p. 219). But more on this shortly. 
~n Pap II A 235 (JP 1: 1 020 from 1842) Kierkegaard writes: "Hamann makes a remark in the sixth volume 
of his writings, p. 194, that I can use even though he has neither understood it as I wish to understand it, nor 
thought any further about it: "Diese Angst in der Welt ist aber der einzige Beweis unserer Heterogenitat. Denn 
fehlte uns nichts, so wiirden wir es nicht besser machen, als die Heiden und Transcendental-Philosophen, die 
von Gott nichts wissen, und in die liebe Natur sich wie die Narren vergaffen, keine Heimweh wiirde uns 
anwandeln. Diese impertinente Unruhe, diese heilige Hypochondrie." Kierkegaard does subsequently make use 
of this Hamann-text at the conclusion of The Concej)t of Anxiety (SV IV 427 [Concej)t of Anxiety. 162]). 
Metzke writes, concerning the sense in which Hamann intended this text, that the phenomena, "anxiety in the 
world," "homesickness," and "impertinent unrest," indicate that our being is not exhausted by "being in this 
world." Our lack of fulfillment here points to an invisible reality, another world, to which we belong (Hamanns 
Stellung in der Philosophie, 228). On Kierkegaard's use of the concept, "anxiety" is a presentiment that we are 
spirit, i.e., free beings. If we will but attend to it and allow it to do its work in us, conjuring up dread 
116 
result, but is rather a "way," a mode of existing in which the transcendent, though not visibly 
present, announces itself in concealed form as a "becoming." In contrast to this hidden 
operation of God within us, we find ourselves in a posture of "fear and trembling" because 
of the judgement that we are fleeing.47 
The preceding comparison leaves little doubt that Kierkegaard has been influenced 
by Hamann; the question that has not been resolved is precisely to what extent. Unfortu-
nately, without a far more rigorous investigation than I can undertake here, it is impossible 
to answer that question adequately.48 Torsten Bohlin was surely correct in asserting that, 
possibilities (as the hypochondriac allows his imagination to do so), anxiety will in the end educate us, by faith, 
to rest in Providence. 
47Metzke writes: "Das menschliche Dasein ist also in seinem Leben in dieser Welt noch nicht in seinem 
eigentlichen Sein, sondem istnoch 'in der Mache' (G 16), ist 'noch unterwegs' (R II 216). Unser Leben istkein 
fertiges, in sich ruhendes, sondem wesenhaft ein Noch-nicht-sein, ein 'Werden', nicht im Sinne eines sich 
auflosenden Verstromens, einer unbestimmten Lebensdynamik Uberhaupt, sondem im Sinne einer 
zielgerichteten Bewegung, ein Werden, das ein 'Weg' ist, dessen Telos--das wozu wirunterwegs sind--schon 
verborgen gegenwartig da ist" (Hamanns SteUung in der Philosophie, 229). He notes that while Hamann can 
himself urge that "Wahrheit ist freilich Weg und Leben" (R VII 147), he must hark back to Luther for his most 
powerful expression of this idea: "Dieses Leben ist nicht eine Frommkeit, sondem ein fromm werden, nicht 
eine Gesundheit, sondem ein gesund werden, nicht ein Wesen, sondem ein Werden. Wir sind's noch nicht, 
wir werden's aber. Es ist nicht das Ende, es ist aber der Weg; es glGht und glitzt noch nicht alles; es fegt sich 
aber alles" (R VI 127). Behind Hamann's "theology of the wayfarer" lies the Pauline dictum, "Your life is hid 
with Christ in God" (Col. 3:3, cited in R II 159, R IV 285, G 16, R III 185, 254). Behind it lies Luther's simul, 
wherein Christians are in the process of being conformed to what they already are in a hidden way, and what 
they one day manifestly will be: "Jenes zukiinftige dem 'Werden' seine Erfiillung bringende Sein, das noch 
'verborgen', 'noch nicht erschienen' ist, aber erscheinen wird, so gewif3 erscheinen wird (R II 159!), dal3 es 
schon die Gegenwart erfiillt und bestimmt, ist das Kommen Gottes, ist die prlisentia dei" (Metzke, Hamanns 
Stellung in der PhilosQphie, 230). But until the consummation of these things faith has "die Form eines steten 
Werdens und Kampfens" (Blanke, "I. G. Hamann als Theologe," 39). It is born of extraordinary danger and 
pursues blessedness in constant fear and trembling (§6 of Brocken: "Wenn man erwagt, wie vie! Starke, 
Gegenwart des Geistes, Geschwindigkeit, der wir sonst nicht fahig sind, uns die Furcht einer aul3erordentlichen 
Gefahr giebt: so begreift man, warum ein Christ dem natiirlichen sichern Menschen so sehriiberlegen ist, weil 
er mit bestandiger Furcht und Zittem seine Seeligkeit sucht" (R I 147). 
48Such a study would presuppose a thorough survey of Ham ann's entire authorship, and on that basis identify 
probable allusions (conscious or unconscious) to works not explicitly cited by Kierkegaard. It would also 
determine more closely the extent of indebtedness to the works that are cited. I have had to confine myself, for 
the most part, to SK's direct citations of Hamann. Additionally I have gone farther afield and presented a 
compend oftheologia crucis notions that are to be found in Hamann. The idea here is that if Kierkegaard has 
read more in Hamann than his citations indicate (as I believe one may safely assume), then he has in all 
probability encountered these notions. To demonstrate that this is so, however, one would have to possess an 
exhaustive acquaintance with Kierkegaard's sources (Le., the Roth edition and the Hamann-Jacobi correspon-
dence that SK also owned), and on that basis identify the likely allusions. 
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notwithstanding the strong presumption of a defining influence exercised by Hamann at an 
early stage of Kierkegaard's intellectual formation, 
any obvious traces of an influence from Hamann upon Kierkegaard's dogmatic view-
point cannot ... be demonstrated in Kierkegaard's own writings. A series of citations 
and allusions can, in this connection, certainly come under consideration. But it is 
striking that the places that Kierkegaard reproduces or refers to, as a rule, do not at 
all command consideration as any of Hamann's central or principal decisive 
thoughts, but rather have to do with more or less peripheral thoughts and incidental 
reflections, and that Hamann's actual chief works either did not receive any attention 
at all, or in any case only scant attention: Gol20tha und Scheblimini, iEsthetica in 
~, Apologie des Buchstabens H, Biblische Betrachtungen und Brocken are thus 
not named once. It is, in other words, far easier to demonstrate points of similarity 
and contact between Hamann's and Kierkegaard's psyches and religious views than 
to show the presence of a religious theological influence of the former upon the 
latter.49 
Bohlin is quite correct in his contention that Kierkegaard does not cite from many of 
Hamann's most important works, and that many of the things that have drawn his attention 
are peripheral thoughts that do not belong among Hamann's principal ideas. Nonetheless, it 
is clear that a number of theologia crucis themes are present among the works that SK has, 
with certainty, read (e.g., the Socratic Memorabilia and the letters from around 1759). It is 
also clear that Kierkegaard has commented upon some of these themes, even if his 
comments are far fewer in frequency than we would wish. It therefore seems to me that 
Bohlin's restraint regarding the postulation of direct influence, admirable as it may be, does 
not give sufficient weight to the evidence that does exist. 
One thing is certain. During a brief but tempestuous period of his youth Kierkegaard 
was exposed to romanticism and speculative theology, the result of which was shipwreck to 
his faith and moral anarchy. During this period he no doubt longed for a mentor who could 
show him the way out of his despair. He found him in Johann Georg Hamann. The fascinat-
ing thing about Kierkegaard's struggle with a regnant philosophy and unexpected experience 
of being reclaimed by historic Christian faith is that they largely recapitulated Hamann's 
own. Himself in need of a mentor in combatting the corrosive ideas of the Enlightenment, 
49Kierkegaards dogmatiska askiidning i dess historiska sammanhang (Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans 
Diakonistyrelses BokfOrlag, 1925),49. Bohlin's isarestatement of Wilhelm Rodemann's results andconc\usion 
(see Rodemann, Hamann und Kierkegaard. 32-33). 
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Hamann had harked back to Luther. In particular, he had fixed upon the very aspect of 
Luther's theology that Erasmus had found objectionable--the paradoxes--in order to counter 
the speculative rationalism and moralism of his own day. The clear implication is that to the 
extent that Kierkegaard's attack upon romanticism and speculative idealism was inspired by 
Hamann, its ultimate intellectual progenitor was Martin Luther. This means that while he 
was as yet quite ignorant of Luther's own writings, Kierkegaard was nevertheless already an 
unwitting intellectual descendant of the reformer. 
Be this as it may, it seems equally clear that Kierkegaard's theology of the cross 
diverges from that of Luther and Hamann on an absolutely critical point: viz., on its stance 
toward corporeality. While Kierkegaard urges the incarnation's paradoxicality as a check 
upon the grandiose pretensions of human rationality, he does not simultaneously contend for 
its sacramentality--the idea that creation is a fit vessel to bear the divine. As a consequence 
he is prone to what is, at its best, a world-denying asceticism, and at its worst, out and out 
Manichaeism--a fact that has been clearly recognized by scholars who possess acquaintance 
with both Kierkegaard and Hamann.so For Hamann the tenet of the corporeality of spirit 
~etzke observes that, in respect of his affirmation of "immediacy," Hegel is the truer disciple of Hamann: 
"Kierkegaard, der in einem prinzipiell andem Sinne als Hegel ein geistiger Erbe Hamanns ist und sich daher 
zugleich als scharfster Antipode Hegels fiihlen kann, vollzieht die bei Hamann latent gebliebene Scheidung 
zwischen einer bloB asthetischen und einer substantielleren, letztlich christiich-religiosen Unmittelbarkeit, 
verliert aber in diesem Zerlegen--Hegel und der Romantik seinen Tribut entrichtend--jene unproblematische 
und ursprlingliche Unmittelbarkeit, die Hamann im Sinne hatte" (Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 207). 
Ronald Gregor Smith ("Hamann and Kierkegaard") writes: "For Hamann the key to Christian 
existence is ... God's continuous and absolute condescension. The connexion between God and the world is 
not broken" (p. 61). For Kierkegaard matters are otherwise: "In the strength ofthe paradox he denied the world" 
(p. 64). Smith goes on to observe--rightly in my judgement--that "the deep difference between the two at this 
point might well be summarized in their respective attitudes to Luther. 'Ich lutherisiere', said Hamann once, and 
he never left the Lutheran fold. Kierkegaard on the other hand became increasingly critical of Luther" (p. 64). 
Smith notes that while the Christian's heterogeneity to the world "is undoubtedly inherent in living in an evil 
world," this "is not the la"t word .... The last word is found in the reality of the being of God for the world in 
Christ, in such a way that the world is not destroyed but affirmed, re-affirmed" (p. 67). 
Along the same lines Walter Leibrecht remarks that for Kierkegaard and Hamann alike, "Christus ist 
die Mitte des Glaubens ... und beide betonen die Niedrigkeit, die'Demut' gottlicher Offenbarung. Aber hier 
ist nun auch der entscheidende Unterschied: Kierkegaard wurde schliel3lich durch das ihm eigene Verstandnis 
des Kreuzes Christi zu einem asketischen Christen tum getrieben, in dem das Gesetz nun doch wieder das 
Evangelium zu uberwiegen scheint. Bei Hamann ist der Gekreuzigte der Triumphierende .... 1m Kommen 
Christi sieht Hamann nicht das Nein, sondern das Ja Gottes zu seiner SchOpfung. In Christus ist der 'wahre 
Mensch' offenbar geworden, d. h. durch ihn werden wir zu unserem wahren Ursprung und damit zu echter 
Ursprlinglichkeit befreit, zu wirklichem Menschsein" (Gott und Mensch bei Johann Georg Hamann. 13). The 
strong difference that exists between SK and Hamann can be illustrated by the latter's understanding of the 
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is nothing less than an Archimedean principle.51 If at times he revels in it with almost 
Bacchic exuberance, this owes not to a quasi-Romantic worship of nature on his part, but to 
his creation- and revelation-faith.52 In this respect Hamann's sense for the implications of 
the theology of the cross for a theology of nature manifest much greater fidelity to Luther 
communicatio idiomatum. For Hamann Christ is the pattern of the condescension by which God originally 
united himself with, and disclosed himself to, humans. As such our created, corporeal nature is essential to our 
communion with God: "In Christus ist die urspriingliche Gemeinschaft von Gott und Menschheit wieder 
Wirklichkeit geworden. Indem Hamann die communicatio idiomatum in Christus nie als die seiner beiden 
Naturen auffaJ3t, sondern als die communicatio Gottes und der Menschheit, ist damit schon gegeben, daB bei 
ibm die 'communicatio gottlicher und menschlicher idiomatum' zwar als eine ftiruns von Christus herriihrende, 
aber dann fiber seine Person hinausgehende, das ganze Handeln Gottes mit der Menschheit kennzeichnende 
Bewegung verstanden ist" (p. 21). To this Leibrecht adds the warning (p. 22), as we earlier saw Met:zke do, 
that Hamann does not conceive this union in a mystical or pantheistic way, but personally, as an I-Thou 
relationship in which the identities of God and the individual human being remain distinct. While this is, to be 
sure, an extension of the original teaching, for example, of Cyril regarding the hypostatic union of Christ's two 
natures, it does not admit of the mingling of characteristics that would land Hamann in pantheism or (as 
Nestorius and others thought) Cyril in monophysitism. Hamann's is a fascinating use of the incarnation in 
explaining how communion can occur between an "infinitely qualitatively distinct" Godandhiscreation, man--
one that Kierkegaard has not taken up. Instead he has been forced to volatilize the human being into "absolute 
spirit" in order that such commerce may occur. 
SlBlanke writes: "Das eine Prinzip, von dem [Hamann 1 beherrscht ist, ist das des Geistleiblichen. Hamann 
ist von der Ueberzeugung erfiillt, dass alles Geistige, ehe es fUr den Menschen fassbar wird, eine sinnlich ... 
fassbare Form, d. h. einen Leib annimmt. ... Wir haben also den Geist nie unmittelbar, sondern immer in 
konkreter geschichtlicher Form. Hamann hiitte das Nietzschewort sich aneignen konnen, dass der 'reine Geist 
eine LOge' sei" ("1. G. Hamann als Theologe," 11). This idea ofthe corporeality of spirit furnishes the primary 
theme of lEsthetica in nuce. the occasion ofwhich was contention of the Old Testament critic, Michalis, that 
the Old Testament's language was too pictorial to have been given by God. Michalis deemed only an abstract 
language that had been divested of all sensuous elements to be worthy of God (Blanke, "I. G. Hamann als 
Theologe," 13). In response, Hamann contends that because we are sensuously determined, God must make use 
of sensuous determinants when speaking to us (N II 198). Matters cannot be otherwise since "Sinne und 
Leidenschaften reden und verstehen nichts als Bilder" (N II, 197). The underlying premise of this, however, 
is that God has not considered the sensuous-corporeal to be beneath himself; he has created us as corporeal 
spirits and himself speaks to us in whatever sensuous medium he chooses, whether it be the physical sounds 
ofhuman language, or the phenomena of nature or events of history. Indeed God himself has not shied away 
from becoming a man. Accordingly, the human and the divine do not exclude each other, but belong together: 
"Menschliches und Gottliches schliessen sich ja bei Hamann nicht aus, sondern gehoren zusammen. Finitum 
capax infiniti!" (Blanke, "I. G. Hamann als Theologe," 15). 
S2See Met7J<e (Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie. 202) who acknowledges the frequency with which 
Hamann sets "Mutter Erde" in a position of seemingly equal rank with "Vater Gott," speaking ardently of its 
"Orgien und Eleusinischen Geheimnissen (R II 267ff.), even proclaiming himself to be "Pan." Met:zke, 
however, points out that "dies Eintreten ftir das elementare Leben mit seinen drnngenden uod 7..eugenden 
Kraften, seinen Instinkteo, Trieben, Begierden und Affekten, seiner ganzen vitalen und sinnlichen FOlie steht 
bei Hamann inengem inneren Zusammenhang mit seinem Christentum, mit seinem lebendigen undkraftvollen 
SchOpfungs- uod Offenbarungsglauben." Hence, though justly regarded the father of Stunn und Orang, Hamann 
himself was no romantic. 
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than does Kierkegaard's.53 The fact that Kierkegaard has not chosen to hallow corporeality 
in the manner of a Luther or a Hamann almost certainly derives from his pietistic heritage 
which, in a curious point of convergence with the Enlightenment, purges the natural drives 
from its view of man.54 Kierkegaard's own spiritualistic tendencies, combined with his 
embrace of German idealism's notion of transcendental subjectivity and its dialectical 
development, land him in a variant of idealism toward the end of his authorship that can only 
be described as Neoplatonic or quasi-gnostic. These elements of his thought, though kept in 
check by the theologia crucis elements during the first period of the authorship, themselves 
come into the ascendancy in the late period and influence his view of life under the cross in 
a decisive way. 
53 As in his Hamann-study, so too in his Luther-study does Erwin Metzke, a philosopher by vocation, prove 
to be a capable theologian. I refer to his work that explores the implications of Luther's eucharistic teaching 
for his understanding of corporeality. On that teaching the finite is regarded as being fully capable of 
comprehending the infinite (finitum capax infiniti), the eternal Word making itself present without remainder 
in incarnate form. Met:zke points out that this eucharistic doctrine is really a consequence of Luther's theology 
of the cross: liEs ist ... ein Vorurteil des Menschen, daB Gottes Wirken lediglich geistig, lediglich inncrlich 
sein musse, als wenn es Gottes Ehre widerspriiche, ja eine 'schande' ware, 'daB er sollte bei uns sein hier auf 
erden in allerlei not der sunden und des todes' (WA 26, 437). Gott selbst, dessen Art es ist, sich so zu 
offenbaren, daB die 'hochmGtigen, klugen geister' sich stof3en (W A 23, 255), bejaht und sucht vielmehr den 
Menschen in seiner leiblich-kreatiirlichen Existenz, dieals leibliche 'genlihret, gemehret underhalten' wirdzum 
'ewigen leben'. Wie kann man da meinen, 'daB der leib nicht soUte fahig sein der gabe gottes, welche ist das 
ewige leben' (WA 23, 235). Und wie kann man, da Gott selbst sich in der Fleischwerdung und in den 
Sakramenten an das Irdisch-Sichtbare und Elementhafte bindet, datiiber, wie die Spiritualisten, die 'nase 
tiimpfen' und sagen: 'es ist kein gott da' (W A 23, 73)" (Sakrarnent und Metaphysik. Eine Lutherstudie uber das 
Verhiiltnis des christlichen Denkens zum Leiblich-Materiellen. Schriftenreihe lebendige Wissenschaft, Heft 
9 [Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1948],22). 
~etzke, Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie, 203. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE APPROPRIATION OF GRACE AS ITSELF GRACE 
In view of the striking similarity that exists between Kierkegaard's and Luther's 
theological frameworks, it is highly doubtful that Kierkegaard could have entertained a 
teaching on grace at odds with Luther's. Luther embodies a "turning point in the develop-
ment of religion." With him entered the recognition that the Christian ideal is so infinitely 
sublime that all human efforts at resembling it are either "a demented nullity" (afsindi2t 
Intet) or, at best, "a reverential jest" (gudfl)'~i2 Sp(2). Hence, the teaching about Christ as 
prototype "can no longer [as in the Middle Ages] ... occupy the first place. Faith comes 
first, Christ as the gift."l 
This notwithstanding, it may be questioned whether the presentation that is given by 
Johannes Climacus in the Postscript allows for any teaching on grace whatsoever insofar as 
it characterizes Christianity's religiosity as a potentiated form of that which is already present 
within religious immanence; indeed, insofar as the latter is subsumable under what are 
essentially ethical rubrics, Christianity would seem to be--in certain crucial respects--little 
more than a special case of the ethical. Hermann Diem makes what amounts to this very 
accusation when he charges Kierkegaard with incorrectly subsuming Christian communica-
tion under general ethical communication--a methodological error that, Diem contends, 
leaves Kierkegaard no choice but to reverse the relationship between grace and imitation in 
such a way that the latter becomes the requirement for the former.2 This comes as no 
IPap X2 A 207 (JP 2:1135). 
2Hennann Diem, "Kierkegaards Hinterlas.<;enf'Chaft an die Theologie" in SOren Kierkegaard, ed. Heinz-Horst 
Schrey, Wege der Forschung, vol. 179 (Dannstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971),293-96 
("Kierkegaard's Bequest to Theology," trans. Thora Moulton, in A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. Howard A. 
Johnson and Niels Thulstrup [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962],260-63). 
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surprise for, Barthian that he was, Diem merely follows the master's lead in contending that 
Kierkegaard lays down an existential interpretation of the human condition as the necessary 
groundwork for efficaciously proclaiming the gospel.3 Is such a charge accurate? Does the 
reception of grace, for Kierkegaard, depend upon a prior level of existential or ethical at-
tainment that is achieved independently of grace? 
In order to answer this question we must first begin with the fundamental distinction 
that Climacus makes between aesthetic and ethical ideality in the Postscript. Within the aes-
thetic sphere possibility is higher than actuality. Hence, 
30fthose theologians who have gone through Kierkegaard's school and--most importantly--graduated from 
it, Barth writes: "Sie fanden den Trost der so kiimmerlichen Christen, der auch der Trost der ganzen Welt und 
so auch ihr eigener Trost ist, statt in irgend etwas, was der Mensch von sich aus fOr Gott sein und tun konnte, 
in dem, was Gott in der Majestat seiner freien Gnade fUr ihn und mit ihm getan hat, noch tut und wieder und 
endgiiltig tun wird. Sie konnten die Theologie von dort aus weder offen noch heimlich mit einer Existential-
philosophie vertauschen, sieweder direkt noch indirekt den Strukturen einer solchen anpassen" (Karl Barth, 
"Kierkegaard und die Theologen," reprinted in Hermann Diem. sine vi - sed verbo. Aufsatze -Vortrage -Voten. 
Aus AniaB der Vollendung seines 65. Leben~ahres am 2. Febr. 1965, ed. U. A. Wolf, Theologische Bucherei, 
vol. 25 [Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1965],9 ["Kierkegaard and the Theologians," Canadian Journal of 
Theology 13 (January 1967):65]). Implied in Barth's remarks is that SK's theological method--in particular, his 
assumption of an existential dialectic as integral to the process of becoming a Christian--denies the reformation 
insight into humanity's status corruptionis and thereby rejects the absolute priority of God's sovereign grace. 
Eberhard Jungel has dealt at length with the existential dialectic as Kierkegaard developed it himself, as well 
as the use to which it was put in the theologies of Brunner, Gogarten and Bultmann ("Von der Dialektik zur 
Analogie. Die Schule Kierkegaards und der Einspruch Petersons" in Barth-Studien [Zurich-Koln: Benzinger 
Verlag, 1982], 127-79). The latter theologians saw in SK's existential dialectic a necessary apology for faith, 
and hence, an indispensable prolegomenon to theology itself. For his part, Barth rejected the tenet "daB eine 
theologisch relevante vortheologische existentiale Interpretation mensch lichen Daseins moglich ist, innerhalb 
deren dann auch der Glaube a1s Moglichkeit oder gar Notwendigkeit menschlichen Existierens aufgewiesen 
wird" (p. 176; see also pp. 142-43, 160-61 and 171). Jungel points out, however, that Barth's criticism was 
aimed not so much at Kierkegaard as at the Kierkegaard-interpretation of his earlier confederates: "Barth unter-
scheidet sich ... von den anderen dialektischen Theologen und--wenn nicht sogar von Kierkegaard selbst, so 
doch--von ihrem Kierkegaardverstandnis, insofem er die Unbeweisbarkeit und Unbegrtindbarkeit des Glaubens 
an die Menschwerdung Gottes auch nicht existenz-dia1ektisch mit der These plausibel machen kann und will, 
daB die Subjektivitat die Wahrheit ist" (p. 175). For his own part, Jungel denies that Kierkegaard ever sought 
to render belief in the incarnation plausible through advance deepening in SUbjectivity: "Allerdings gilt es zu 
beach ten, daB Kierkegaards Existenzdialektik zwar die menschliche Existenz als Crt und damit als 
Verifikationshorizont gottlicher Offenbarung einschiirft, damit aber nicht einer untheologischen Begriindung 
des Glaubens das Wort reden will. Verifikation und Begriindung sindzu unterscheiden!" (p. 171). NordidSK 
conceive of such deepening as effecting any fundamental change in the human predicament independently of 
grace: "Die Bedeutung, die Climacus dem Satz 'Die Subjektivitat ist die Unwahrheit' gibt, gleicht der 
hertihmten Behauptung Luthers, Paulus habe in seinem Romerhrief die Sunde groB machen wollen, damit es 
zur Erkenntnis der Rechtfertigung des Sunders durch die fremde Gerechtigkeit GoUes komme" (p. 168). It is 
the task of this chapter, however, to confirm these claims through detailed exegesis of the relevant texts! 
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if falling in love is interpreted esthetically, it holds true that the poet's conception of 
falling in love is higher than anything actuality offers. The poet can have an ideality 
compared with which actuality is but a weak reflection; for the poet, actuality is 
merely an occasion that prompts him to abandon actuality in order to seek the 
ideality of possibility.4 
It follows that it is a misunderstanding to be concerned about actuality from the aesthetic 
point of view. "Esthetically and intellectually, it holds true that only when the ~ of an 
actuality is dissolved into its ~ is an actuality understood and thought.s The situation 
is precisely the reverse with regard to the ethical. There actuality is higher than possibility: 
"Ethically, it holds true that possibility is understood only when each ~ is actually an 
~.,,6 Hence the ethical "specifically wants to annihilate the disinterestedness of possibility 
by making existing the infinite interest.,,7 Ethics' concern is not that the ethical demand be 
thought--as one possibility among others--but that it be actualized. Because we have our 
being in the concrete medium of existence rather than abstract possibility, our task as 
existing individuals is essentially the ethical one of actualizing the possible.8 
4SV VII 336 (Postscript. 388). 
slbid., 279 (324). 
~id. 
7Ibid., 275 (320). 
8 A word is in order on SK's use of the word "ethical" to denote the actualization of possibility, for this would 
seem to include all possibilities--even manifestly evil ones. Judge William is the first pseudonym to elaborate 
this understanding ofthe ethical, and he does so with full awareness that it constitutes only its formal condition. 
Yet within the formal condition of"choosing" there is also contained the material one: the right choice. Judge 
William writes: "Rather than designating the choice between good and evil, my Either/Or designates the choice 
by which one chooses good and evil or rules them out. Here the question is, under what qualifications one will 
view all existence and personally live. That the person who chooses good and evil chooses the good is indeed 
true, but only later does this become manifest" (SV II 153 [Either/Or II, 169]). In answer to the question of how 
the bare act of choosing ultimately manifests itself as "choosing the good," Judge William observes that, in 
choosing, one chooses de facto to acknowledge oneself as free (pp. 191-93 [213-16]), but that this in tum 
inevitably means: the acknowledgement of oneself as responsible, and therefore, as guilty (pp. 222-23 [247-
48]). Implicit in Judge William's broad understanding ofthe ethical as choice orthe actualization of possibility, 
is the narrow understanding of it as duty and the failure to live up to duty. There is, of course, a missing 
premise involved: viz., that duty--and concrete duty, at that--is a thing that is posited along with freedom; that 
just as all human beings are cognizant of their freedom, so are they cognizant of their duty. Judge William takes 
this premise to be self-evident. Of the ethical subject in the narrower sense as duty-bound (and derelict in his 
duty), he writes: "He will teach himself the particular duty and will without avail seek enlightenment on it from 
anyone else, and yet here again he will be an autodidact just as he is a theodidact, and vice versa" (pp. 242-43 
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This IS why Climacus regards the ethical and the religious spheres as being 
[270-71]). It appears from this citation, as from others cited earlier (chap. 2, n. 4), that SK's is a "divine 
command" ethic (Pap IV C 72 [JP 1 :894]), the specific content of which is, or can be, known to all free subjects 
(Poul Ltibcke seems to give such an interpretation of SK's moral philosophy, though he does not explicitly 
attach the label--see "An Analytical Interpretation ofKierkegaard as Moral Philosopher," in Kierkegaardiana 
.li, ed. Joakim Garff, et al. [Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1991],93-103). The very universality of ethical 
knowledge is surely part of what Kierkegaard means when he asserts that there are no "geniuses" when it comes 
to the ethical (Pap Xl A 430 [JP 1 :975];cf. SV XII 221 [Practice in Christianity, 242]). The ethical is "the most 
certain of all" for anyone who cares to examine himself in its mirror. It "is the only certainty, to concentrate 
upon this [yields] the only knowledge that does not change into a hypothesis at the last moment, to be in it 
[yields] the only secure knowledge, where the knowledge is secured by something else" (SV VII 126, 125 
[Postscript. 153, 152, slightly amended]). 
Because Kierkegaard does not regard practical reason as self-legislating, one must distinguish his 
position from Kant's. Yet it is less easy to distinguish it from Fichte's. Notwithstanding that Fichte regards the 
individual ego as but a manifestation of the transcendental Ego, he nevertheless denies that individuals bring 
forth duty from themselves. In The Vocation of Man we read: "I assume ... a law of a spiritual world--not 
given by my will nor by the will of any finite being, nor by the will of all finite beings taken together, but to 
which my will, and the will of all finite beings, is subject" (Fichtes Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte 
[Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979],2:295; The Vocation of Man, trans. William Smith [La Salle, IL.: The Open 
Court Publishing Company, 1955], 149). This law from without is immediately present in each person's 
conscience in the form of specific duties. Because of its immediacy, they are never in doubt concerning what 
they are to do (Fichtes Werke, 2:258, 263, 284 and 309 [Vocation of Man, 105,111,135 and 165]). Though 
the practical law pertains to the supersensible realm, it is more certain than the theoretical laws governing this 
sensible realm. Because the Eternal Will has produced the latter as the field for its practical activity, and 
continues at every moment to reproduce it via our theoretical faculties, it is the certainty that grounds every 
other certainty (2 :259 [106 D. While we, as sensuous creatures, cannot divine this supersenuous order in which 
moral causes produce commensurate moral effects, we are obliged to secure such effects for the future life by 
the performance of duty here and now. Moreover, we are obliged to disregard any adverse empirical effects 
that may accrue to our acts here and now, being motivated solely by consideration of duty (2 :264, 282,284-85, 
310 [111-12,133,135-37, 166D. 
It is evident that Fichte's ethic corresponds to Kierkegaard's in terms of duty'S absolute unconditioned-
ness, the immediate certainty attaching to it, and its autodidactic, yet also theodidactic character. Still other 
similarities might be mentioned. These must await the more complete statement of Kierkegaard's relation to 
Fichte to be given in chapter eight. Of interest in the present context is the purely formal character of each 
man's ethic. For Fichte, the transcendental Ego is simply "unlimited activity" or "infinite striving" that freely 
(albeit blindly) strives for self-realization. To accomplish this it must first limit itself through the production 
of Non-Ego. From this theoretic activity emerges the system of finite egos and non-egos that we know as the 
natural world. The world is not an end in itself; it is but the field for the Ego's practical activity. In it a 
determinate moral order grows up, and through the free actions of finite beings within that order the Ego attains 
to practical self-definition. Yet the goal of such practical activity is, in the first instance, wholly undefined. 
So, too, is Judge William's initial choice of self. At the outset it is the mere exercise of abstract freedom. Only 
subsequently does the self find itself in possession of concrete freedom and specific duties, for in "choosing 
itself' the self chooses itself in all its facticity--quite analogous to the transcendental Ego's self-objectification 
via the theoretic and practical deductions of consciousness. For Kierkegaard and Fichte alike, the formal 
definition of ethics as "actualization of the possible" implicitly contains the closer, material determinants of 
the existing natural and moral orders. 
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essentially related to one another9 and, the tripartite division of the spheres notwithstanding, 
depicts life's most basic choice as a simple "either/or": either to maintain an aesthetic-
intellectual pseudo-existence by declining to choose (and take responsibility for) a life-
possibility, or to enter ethico-religious existence by choosing the life-possibility that these 
spheres present (and, as already indicated, there is only one such possibility--Judge 
William's premature closure with the ethical notwithstanding, his categories are already 
religious ones). The very medium of existence--actuality itself--dictates that the individual's 
task will be ethical in the broad sense of actualizing possibility. Accordingly, his 
actualization of the religious possibility will be an ethical task.10 
Now, the possibility that is presented by the religious sphere (religiousness A) is that 
of the relationship with God, and its actuality is the appropriation of such via resignation, 
renunciation, and repentance. It is by means of resignation (Resi~ationen) that one 
determines whether one has an absolute relationship to the absolute, and therewith to an 
eternal blessedness. Resignation, through the medium of imagination, "visits" the would-be 
religious individual in his immediacy, showing him what can happen in life. If he shrinks 
back from the eventualities that resignation conjures up, then he may be certain that he is not 
yet willing to give up everything for the sake of his relationship with God. Climacus puts it 
9SV VII 252 (Postscript. 294). 
I~is is, incidentally, the meaning ofClimacus's claim that Christianity is not a doctrine but an existence-
communication. "Understanding is the maximum with regard to a doctrine .... With regard to an existence-
communication, existing in it is the maximum and wanting to understand it is a cunning evasion that wants to 
shirk the task .... [Tlo become a Christian is the maximum, to want to understand Christianity is open to sus-
picion .... The relation of possibility is the maximum with regard to a doctrine; actuality is the maximum with 
regard to an existence-communication; wanting to understand an existence-communication is wanting to 
transform one's own relation to it into a relation of possibility (ibid., 321-22n [3 7l-72n 1; cf. SV XII 409 [~ 
for Yourself!. 131 D. 
The fact that Christianity is an existence-communication and not a doctrine does not, however, rule 
out its objective content. In SV VII 328-29n (Postscript, 379-80n) Climacus acknowledges that Christianity 
is a doctrine in the sense that it "is to be actualized in existence." Nevertheless, this is something very different 
from being a doctrine in the sense that a speculative tenet is. In the latter case the difficulty lies with 
understanding the teaching; in the former it lies with existing in it. Climacus's rejection of the term "doctrine" 
(~ as applied to Christianity is, accordingly, a rejection of the sense that this term had assumed in the 
intellectualistic nineteenth century (and, no doubt, possesses yet today). He contends that it is sheer artifice to 
interpret his denial that Christianity is a doctrine to mean that it is without content. On the contrary, "when a 
believer exists in faith, his existence has enormous content, but not in the sense of a yield in paragraphs" (pp. 
329-30 [380]). 
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ever so bluntly: "He is not relating himself to an eternal happiness.,,1l This conjuring pro-
cess does not occur once and for all at the beginning of the religious life but is an abiding 
feature of it, for it is resignation's task at all times to keep watch that an absolute relation is 
being maintained.12 
But resignation is only the "initial" expression of religious pathos for, having 
discovered the points at which one clings to immediacy, one must die to them (.!llik!) by a 
painful process of renunciation (Forsagelsen) if one is to enter into the absolute relation-
ship.13 Such suffering, as we learned in chapter two, Climacus calls the "essential" 
IISV VII 341 (Postscript. 393). Cf. pp. 342 and 352-53 (394-95 and 406-7). Insofar as one prizes relative 
relationships above one's relationship with God, one demotes the latter to relative status; any relationship to 
God for whom he truly is--the absolute One--is consequently lacking. 
The critical role played by resignation in determining where one stands in one's relationship with God, 
and hence in providing the unconditional point of departure for that relationship, is observable throughout the 
authorship. Always, the notion of seeking out "the terrible" is involved, though the term Resignationen itself 
is not always used. In Fear and Trembling, the knight of infinite resignation is said to advance to meet the 
terrible via the imagination, and to preserve the experience of this encounter in his memory (SV III 85 [Em 
and Trembling, 33-34]). In The Concevt of Anxiety. anxiety is said to wean the individual from finitude (and 
educate him unto faith) by envisaging terrible possibilities that take "away from him absolutely all that any fate 
could take away" (SV N 425 [Concept of Anxiety, 160)). And in Stages on Life's Way we are told that "the 
person who wills religiously must have receptivity precisely for the terrible; he must open himself to it." Here 
it is melancholy (Tungsind) that is serviceable (SV VII 349-50 [~ 374-75]). 
12SV VII 344 and 348 (Postscript, 397 and 401). 
13"If everything were decided on paper, one would start on the ideal task at once; but in existence the 
beginning must be made by practicing the relation to the absolute dA.o~, and taking power away from 
immediacy .... The actual individual is, after all, in immediacy, and to that extent is actually in the relative 
ends absolutely. Now the individual begins, not, please note, by simultaneously relating himself absolutely to 
the absolute "t £ AO~ and relatively to the relative ends, because by being in immediacy he is exactly reversed, 
but he begins by practicing the absolute relationship through renunciation .... In order to relate himself to the 
absolute dAO~, the individual must have practiced renunciation of relative ends, and only then can there be 
any question of the ideal task: simultaneously to relate oneself absolutely to the absolute, and relatively to the 
relative. Not prior to this, because before this has been done the individual is continually more or less 
immediate and to that extent relates himself absolutely to relative ends. And even when he has surmounted 
immediacy, with his victory he is nevertheless again in existence and thereby again hindered from absolutely 
expressing the absolute relation to the absolute "tHo~ (ibid., 374-75 [431-32]). 
The use of the expression, "to practice" (at indeye) is noteworthy here, for it occurs in a later, 
specifically Christian context: Practice in Christianity (Indeyelse in Christendom). As always, what is present 
at an earlier stage of existence is to be met with at a later stage in sublated (ophrevet = aufgehoben) form. 
Within Christianity, as within universal piety, one must acquire the relationship with God through 
practice. Yet (as we indicated in the previous chapter) already within religiousness A this process of 
acquisition is conceived as being nonmeritorious. So, too, within Christianity. There, as we shall see, 
Indmrelse means something rather more than simple renunciation or "dying to," though, to be sure, it contains 
this moment. It means also: to become practiced in the flight to grace with each new failure at "dying to." 
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expression of religious pathos since it is voluntarily, rather than accidentally, incurred. Yet 
as we also learned, the appropriation of the relationship with God does not herewith move 
forward toward a triumphant conclusion. Rather, by engaging in the struggles of resignation 
and renunciation, one only succeeds in discovering guilt, the "decisive" expression of 
religious pathos. Thus does the third moment in the actualization of the religious possibility 
enter in: repentance, the eternal recollection of guilt qua total determinant of one's being. 
The consciousness of guilt is the expression for the fact that one is related to God, 
even though it ostensibly signifies only the misrelation. Climacus writes: 
Even though the consciousness [of guilt] is ever so decisive, it still is always the 
relation that carries the misrelation, except that the existing person cannot get a firm 
hold of the relation because the misrelation continually places itself in between as 
the expression for the relation. But on the other hand, they still do not repel each 
other (the eternal happiness and the existing person) so that a break establishes itself 
as such; on the contrary, it is only by being held together that the misrelation repeats 
itself as the decisive consciousness of essential guilt, not of this or that guilt. I 
It is important to note that within religiousness A it is the misrelation that continually 
signifies the relation. Guilt is not something that applies to this or that act, so that once it has 
been repented of one's condition qua guilty is dispatched. Such thinking (which lay behind 
the invention of penance) does not get at the essential nature of guilt. No, only by eternally 
recollecting one's guilt--not seeking to atone for it--does one acknowledge its all-embracing 
magnitude.ls Thereby does one retain a negative relationship to the absolute despite one's 
continual failure to establish the positive relationship (relating absolutely to it, but relatively 
to relative ends). 
On the other hand, it is equally important to note that within religiousness A it is 
nevertheless always the relation that sustains the misrelation for, as we saw in chapter two, 
this ceases to be the case with the advent of the consciousness of sin where the breach is 
made absolute. To this we shall tum shortly. For now, however, the point to be made is this: 
within the sphere of universal piety the relationship with God constitutes an ethical task 
14SV VII 464 (Postscript 531-32). Cf. p. 467 (535-36). 
'5"Recollection's eternal storing up of guilt is the expression for existential pathos, the highest expression, 
even higher than the most inspired penance that wants to make up for the guilt" (ibid., 469-70 [538]). 
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insofar as it entails the realization of the religious possibility via resignation, renunciation, 
and repentance. In this crucial respect paradoxical religiousness is no different. It, too, 
is the realization ofthe religious possibility, even incorporating the very momentsjust 
mentioned. As such, it falls within the domain of the ethical.16 Matters cannot be other-
wise. The Christian, too, is an existing individual--his medium of existence is actuality; and 
as Climacus constantly points out, an existing individual cannot assume a standpoint outside 
existence--by existing he necessarily is actualizing this or that possibility. What applies to 
the existing individual therefore applies to the Christian mutatis mutandis: his existence qua 
Christian is an ethical realization of an existential possibility, the relationship with God, as 
this is more closely defined by Christianity.17 
16For example, the eternal recollection of guilt must be present in order to appropriate Christianity's 
paradoxical satisfaction of sin. Climacus writes: "Recall that the forgiveness of sin is the paradoxical 
satisfaction by virtue of the absurd. In order merely to become aware of how paradoxical it is, the eternal 
recollecting of guilt as the highest expression must come in between, lest the spheres be confused and the 
essentially Christian be chattered into childish categories of the forgiveness of sin, which belong where the 
ethical has not emerged, even less the religious, and still less the Christian" (ibid., 470n [538-39n, emphasis 
added]). Climacus further observes: "Religiousness A must first be present in the individual before there can 
be any consideration of becoming aware of the dialectical B. When the individual in the most decisive 
expression of existential pathos relates himself to an eternal happiness, then there can be consideration of 
becoming aware of how the dialectical in the second place (secundo loco) thrusts him down into the pathos of 
the absurd. Thus it is evident how foolish it is if a person without pathos wants to relate himself to the 
essentially Christian, because before there can be any question at all of simply being in the situation of 
becoming aware of it one must first of all exist in religiousness A" (p. 486 [556-57]). 
All of this corroborates the earlier enunciated principle that, as far as the life-spheres are concerned, 
the earlier ones are not superseded by the succeeding ones, but are "taken up" into them. Cf. p. 336 (388, 
emphasis added): "If the religious is truly the religious, has passed through the ethical and has it in itself, 
then it cannot forget that religiously the pathos is not a matter of singing praises and celebrating [the religious 
hero 1 ... but of existing oneself." 
17The added qualification of pathos that Christianity'S dialectical determination brings does not eliminate 
the strenuousness of appropriation of the religious possibility, but only intensifies it. Climacus writes: 
"Religiousness A is the dialectic of inward deepening; it is the relation to an eternal happiness that is not 
conditioned by a something but is the dialectical inward deepening of the relation, consequently conditioned 
only by the inward deepening, which is dialectical. On the other hand, Religiousness B ... or paradoxical 
religiousness ... or the religiousness that has the dialectical in the second place, makes conditions in such a 
way that the conditions are not the dialectical concentrations of inward deepening but a definite something that 
qualifies the eternal happiness more specifically ... , not by qualifying more specifically the individual's 
appropriation of it but by qualifying more specifically the eternal happiness, yet not as a task for thinking but 
as paradoxically repelling and giving rise to new pathos" (ibid., 485 [556]; cf. pp. 488 and 333-34 [559-60 and 
385-86)). 
129 
Does the fact that Christianity falls within the purview of ethics and can be 
characterized as a striving and appropriation of the relationship with God mean that the 
concept of grace is effectively excluded? It does not if we take Climacus's exposition of sin 
seriously--an exposition that so transforms the meaning of the ethical that one is forced to 
invoke a distinction such as Vigilius Haufniensis's between "first" and "second" ethics. In 
The Concept of Anxiety we read that, whereas ethics sets the individual the task of bringing 
ideality down into actuality, dogmatics, with its doctrines of sin and hereditary sin, precludes 
this possibility and proposes instead to raise man up from actuality to ideality, presumably 
through the Atonement. ls At this point ethics enters in again, but not with the renewed 
demand that the ideal be brought into actuality. "The new ethics ... sets ideality as a task, 
not by a movement from above and downward but from below and upward.,,19 That is to 
say, "This ethics does not have its ideality in making ideal demands; rather, it has its ideality 
in the penetrating consciousness of actuality, of the actuality of sin.,,20 The import of 
Haufniensis's remarks seems to be that second ethics' task is, through the consciousness of 
sin, to appropriate the grace that makes possible the person's elevation from the actuality of 
sin to the ideality of redemption and new life. 
There is nothing in Climacus's development of the sin-concept that would contradict 
this. As was mentioned in chapter two, he describes sin as a condition wherewith each and 
every individual "is suspended from the ethical in the most terrifying way, is in the 
suspension heterogeneous with the ethical. ,,21 By an act of freedom, man has forfeited the 
very freedom that was the indispensable condition for realizing the ethical. 22 Thus did 
occur a qualitative transformation of originally created human nature. Climacus defines this 
transformation in the most radical terms possible, as we have seen. Sin is an essential alter-
18SV IV 290-92 (Concept of Anxiety, 17-19). 
19Ibid., 293 (20). 
2<jbid., 292 (20). 
21Chap. 2, n. 9 (SV VII 226 [Postscript 266-67]). 
22SV IV 185-87 (Fragments. 15-17). 
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ation of the person.23 It is not merely a "a change of the subject within the subject himself," 
but "a change of the subject himself.,,24 Sin is the "loss of continuity" with oneself,25 an 
existence-determination on which "to be" means "to be another than one was.,,26 
This stands in sharp contrast to what obtained in religiousness A. There, although 
guilt was an abiding feature of the individual, he nevertheless remained the same individual, 
for it was he who discovered his own guilt.27 With the introduction of sin in religiousness 
B, however, a different state of affairs is brought about. Sin is no accidental attribute the 
predication of which leaves the subject fundamentally unchanged. The capacity for relat-
edness to God--the one truly critical defining factor of man's status inteL!1itatis--has been 
forfeited because of sin. From this SK apparently infers that the nature that was originally 
created by God has been altered in essence (this is the most radical consequence that can 
possibly be drawn from Lutheran orthodoxy's denial of any remaining point of contact with 
God). In its place, another nature (a sin-nature that has, as it were, only an accidental resem-
blance to man's original nature) has come to be. How do we know this to be the case? It is 
a consequence of the appearance of the deity in time. The fact that God must confer, in time, 
(a) the awareness of the identity change to which the sinner is not himself privy, and (b) the 
condition for relatedness to himself, therewith making of the sinner a new creation,28 means 
that the person has hitherto been alienated from this inalienable attribute without which he 
is not, properly speaking, himself.29 
23SV VII 174 (Postscript. 207, emphasis added). 
21bid., 509 (584). 
25Ibid., 502 (576). 
2~bid., 508-9, 464, 502 (583-84, 532, 576). 
27Ibid., 464 and 466 (532 and 534). 
28SV IV 188 and 190 (Fragments, 18 and 21). 
291n Fragments Climacus seems to describe the qualitative changes wrought by sin and the new birth in a 
less pointed manner than in the Postscript. He notes that "when the learner is untruth ... but is nevertheless a 
human being, and he now receives the condition and the truth, he does not, of course, become a human being 
for the first time, for he already was that; but he becomes a different person, not in the jesting sense--as if he 
became someone else of the same quality as before--but he becomes a person of a different quality or, as we 
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Accordingly, there can be no question of man, as he is, actualizing the "possibility" 
for relatedness to God. With the advent of Christianity that possibility has been shown no 
longer to exist. But if this is so, there can be no talk of the ethical--at least, not as it was 
hitherto understood. The priority of grace is so firmly established that "the ethical" qua 
actualization of ideal possibility must, if it is invoked at all, signify something other than it 
did within immanence. Yet as we have seen, the ethical is sublated, not abrogated, by 
Christianity. The appropriation of the relationship with God via resignation, renunciation, 
and repentance is preserved, indeed, rendered still more arduous by Christianity's paradox-
ical determinations.30 How is this possible? The answer to this question is of crucial 
can also call it, a new person" (SV IV 188 [Fragments. 18]). To this one must ask: does not a qualitative 
transformation, the magnitude of which is so enormous that the subject's identity is not sustainable, imply that 
the sinner has, in fact, ceased to be a human being as defined by the imago Dei? Yet clearly it is Climacus's 
contention in the Fragments. as well as in the Postscript. that a loss of continuity does in fact occur with the 
advents of sin and new birth, for he writes: "In the moment. a person becomes aware that he was born, for his 
previous state, to which he is not to appeal, was indeed one of 'not to be'" (SV IV 190 [Fragments. 21]). How, 
then, can he escape the postulate of two radically discontinuous natures, one of which is not human? This 
interpreter has not been able to resolve the difficulty. Climacus's elaboration of the change wrought by sin 
seems, in all of its essentials, to be identical to that of Matthias Flacius. The assertion that sin is an alteration 
in the person's identity appears to have the same force as the claim that original sin has become man's 
substance. If the framers of the Formula of Concord rejected Flacius's claim a~ being much too strong (and, 
in fact, heretical--Solid Declaration, art. I), it is almost certain that they would have rejected Climacus's. 
Whether they would be right in doing so, and right in believing that their teaching was closer to Luther's, is a 
matter concerning which we here forego discussion. For our purposes it suffices to say that, so far from being 
Pelagian or even semi-Pelagian, Kierkegaard's doctrine of sin and anthropology have the appearance of being 
hyper-Lutheran. 
30"Christianity has made the way the most difficult of all; and it is only an illusion, which has ensnared 
many, that Christianity has made the way easy, since, quite the contrary, it has come to the rescue of people 
only by a beginning that makes everything far more difficult than ever before. If a pagan has merely caught a 
glimpse of the absolute good, then Christianity has helped--by the absurd. If one omits this, then everything 
has indeed become much easier than in paganism; but if it is held fast, then everything is far more difficult, for 
it is easier to cling to a weak hope in one's own strength than to gain certainty by virtue of the absurd .... 
[Christianity] requires that the individual existentially venture everything (the pathetic); a pagan can also do 
this .... But then it requires that the individual also risk his thought, venture to believe against the 
understanding (the dialectical) .. , . [T]his is the absolute venture. Existentially to struggle through life on the 
strength of an immortality's 'ir might seem laborious enough, and to acquire a proof through the Resurrection, 
an enormous ease--were not the proof itself the most difficult thing of all. To gain everything by a mediator 
does seem easy enough by comparison with paganism, where the wise, by his greatest exertion, achieved but 
little; but suppose that the very fact that there is a mediator is the most difficult thing of all! To gain everything 
by a gospel is surely easy enough--were not the very fact that there is a gospel the most difficult thing of all. 
By God's strength, to be capable of doing anything is surely easy enough--were not one's incapability of doing 
anything, oneself, the most difficult thing of all, so difficult that, I dare say, there are few in any generation who 
can truthfully say that, day in and day out, they even become moderately aware that a person is capable of 
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importance for it not only provides the key to Kierkegaard's teaching on grace, but further 
exemplifies the role that the cross qua cognitive principle plays in Kierkegaard's thought. 
Here, as before, we find ourselves in a situation in which visible reality runs counter 
to the invisible reality signified by revelation. Visibly we are confronted with the existing 
individual's infinite interest in his relationship with God, and his stupendous efforts at 
actualizing it. Invisibly we are confronted with the deity's actualization of that relationship 
in complete independence of the individual's capabilities, for these are wholly lacking. 
Because we are simul aetemalis et temporalis we cannot simply prescind from the latter in 
orthodox affirmation of the former; that would be to take up the theology of glory's illicit 
standpoint sub specie aetemitatis. No, we can only affirm the former in conjunction with 
the latter, as concealed under it.3! Our experience of the relationship with God can come 
to us in no other way than via ethical appropriation of possibility over time, for grace does 
not annul the conditions of existence.32 
nothing at all" (SV VII 372-73 [Postscript, 428-30], translation mine). 
31Hennann Deuser (Dialektische Theologie: Studien zu Adornos Metaphysik und zum Spatwerk Kierke-
~[Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1980],262-67) has interpreted Kierkegaard as providing Luther's fonnula, 
simul iustus et peccator. with an ethical, social, political, and christological context apart from which it all too 
easily takes on the purely metap hysical standpoint of extra nos [outside of us], sub specie aeternitatis [under 
the aspect of eternity]. He observes that while, for Kierkegaard, it is true that we are completely righteous in 
God's sight even as we continue to be sinners in our own sight, a collision is constantly taking place between 
these two aspects. The locus of that collision is our very temporal existence that is in the process of being 
transfonned. Hence it impossible for us to prescind from our station in existcnce--one that is characterized by 
aconcrete situation and the call to decisive action in obedience to Christ--and to assume God's standpoint where 
the warfare is complete. On my own view, Kierkegaard's particular concern as regards the Lutheran simul is 
aptly expressed in the fonnula, simul aetemalis et temporalis. with the stress upon temporalis. for it is there 
that the strife to appropriate the grace that is already ours, sub Sl)ecie aeternitatis. occurs. 
32What is said of religiousness A where the principle, "Subjectivity is truth," reigns, is also true, mutatis 
mutandis, of religiousness B as regards appropriation of the relationship with God over time: "But precisely 
because the subject is existing, the 'how' that is subjectively empha<;ized is dialectical also with regard to 
time. In the moment of the decision of passion, where the road swings off from objective knowledge, it looks 
as if the infinite decision were thereby finished. But at the same moment, the existing person is in the temporal 
realm, and the subjective 'how' is transfonned into a striving that is motivated and repeatedly refreshed by the 
decisive passion of the infinite, but it is nevertheless a striving" (SVVII 170 [Postscript. 203, emphasis added]). 
In keeping with the temporal nature of sUbjectivity's striving to layholdofanobjectively uncertain relationship 
with God, Climacus offers the following definition of the truth: "An objective uncertainty, held fast through 
appropriation with the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an existing 
person." This definition, though given with a view to the appropriation of the relationship with God within 
religiousness A, applies equally well to its appropriation within religiousness B. All that is needed is to specify 
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Nevertheless, this appropriation is not of man's possibility after the fashion of first 
ethics, but God's possibility after that of second ethics. As already mentioned, second ethics 
sets actuality as a task. Yet, unlike first ethics, "it does not have its ideality in making ideal 
demands; rather, it has its ideality in the penetrating consciousness of actuality, of the 
actuality of sin.,,33 That is to say, the ethical task that Christianity sets the sinner is not that 
of overcoming sin, but rather, of deepening his own consciousness of it. The struggle with 
the anxious conscience--togetherwith faith's venture--constitutes the indispensable condition 
for the realization of God's possibility. This is what man "does" within the medium of 
existence in appropriation of the relationship with God. 
The paradox is that he does not do these things by his own powers. The ability 
to hold fast to the consciousness of one's sin (the anxious conscience qua precondition for 
forgiveness) is the work of grace; similarly the ability to pray for grace--and to receive, in 
faith, the grace thus requested!--are themselves gifts of grace. Kierkegaard writes: 
At the altar thou art able to do nothing whatever, not even to hold fast the thought of 
thine unworthiness, and by that to make thyself receptive to the blessing .... Oh, no, 
thou art able to do nothing whatever, not even to keep thy soul alert to the 
consciousness that thou art completely in need of grace and blessing. As another 
supported Moses when he prayed, so must thou at the altar be supported by the 
blessing when thou art to receive the blessing, it must support thee in its embrace 
while it is imparted to thee.34 
Kierkegaard observes that the Christian "receives everything by God's grace--even grace 
itself; he understands that he cannot do without God's grace even in praying for His grace.35 
more closely the nature of the relationship and the means of its appropriation: whereas in religiousness A an 
immanent, already present relationship with God is appropriated via recollection, in religiousness B a 
hitherto absent relationship is appropriated via grace. 
33SV IV 292-93 (Concept of Anxiety, 20). 
34SV X 316 (Christian Discourses. 308). Cf. sv V 102 (Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. 322): "When he 
goes into the house of the Lord, he knows very well ... that he himself is capable of nothing at all, not even 
of inducing a devotional mood, and consequently God must be present if he is actually moved." 
3S"Han tager Alt af Guds Naade--ogsaa Naaden; han forstaaer, at han end ikke kan undvrere Guds Naade 
for at bede ham om hans Naade" (SV X 68 [Christian Discourses. 67, the translation given being slightly 
amended]). 
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In support of this most Lutheran tenet concerning the absolute priority of grace in the 
believer's preparation for, and receipt of grace, SK cites two texts from the Psalms: 
"His grace precedes the Christian" (Ps. 59: 10) [precedes in the sense of doing for 
him first the very thing that he proposes to do], so that he may will to be satisfied 
with God's grace, and it "follows" him (Ps. 23:6), so that he may not have willed in 
vain, and blessedly, never regret that he was satisfied with God's grace.36 
In no uncertain terms, then, Kierkegaard contends that whatever the Christian has 
in mind to do in actualization of the relationship with God, it has already been done for 
him by grace. This should not surprise us for, as we have seen, "faith itself is a wonder 
[l..lrukr]" that effects the new birth. In respect of the miraculous passage from "not to be" to 
"to be" that is accomplished by faith, the believer is said to owe God everything.3? He 
cannot appeal to himself for anything, for he--properly speaking--does not exist: it is God 
who summons him forth into being from nonbeing! Referring to the related tenets that (a) 
faith is a condition conferred by God without any reference to the agency of the person 
himself, and (b) that sin and rebirth involve a loss of continuity of that person with himself, 
Johannes Climacus writes: 
The existing person must have lost continuity with himself, must have become 
another ... and now, by receiving the condition from the God, becomes a new 
creature. The contradiction is that becoming a Christian begins with creation's 
miracle [Mirakel], and that this happens to one who is [ already] created, and that this 
notwithstanding, Christianity is proclaimed to all people, whom it must regard as 
nonexistent, since the miracle by which they should come into existence must 
• 38 
mtervene. 
Clearly SKIs conception of sin and rebirth as involving a breach in the person's identity 
requires that God be the sole agent in the sinner's rebirth, for the person himself can initiate 
36"'Hans Naade kommer den Christne i Forkjebet' (Ps. 59, 11.), at han maa ville nf1lies med Guds Naade, 
og 'felger efter' (Ps. 23, 6.), at han ikke forgjeves maa have villet, og saligt aldrig fortryde, at han nf1Jiedes med 
Guds Naade" (SV X 69 [Christian Discourses. 68], translation mine). For the bracketed explanation of 
"kommer den Christne i Forkjebet" (inserted because the single word "precedes" fails to convey the entire 
meaning of the Danish expression) see C. Molbech, Dansk Ordbog indeholdende det danske SprQgs 
Stammeord. 2d ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandiing, 1859), s.v. "Forkif1Jb." 
37SV IV 230,226 and 188 (Fragments. 65-66,61 and 19). Cf. sv III 100, 116 (Fear and Trembling, 51,67), 
where faith is similarly designated "a marvel" (et Vidunder) that no one can achieve on his own strength. 
38SV VII 502 (Postscripl 576), translation mine. 
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nothing. Hence it is with unimpeachable consistency that Johannes Climacus maintains that 
God's bestowal of faith precedes all man's willing.39 
It is agreed, therefore, that Kierkegaard assigns absolute priority to grace in every 
aspect of conversion. Yet at the same time he denies that grace is something that simply 
happens to the individual independent of his subjectivity; no, the exercise of that 
subjectivity is itself integral to the operation of grace. Commenting on the parable in which 
Jesus likens the kingdom of heaven to a pearl of great price for the sake of which the 
merchant sells all that he has (Matt. 13:45-46), Kierkegaard calls attention to the 
interconnectedness of the subjective and the objective: 
The remarkable thing about the kingdom of heaven being compared to a person: one 
would, after all, suppose that the kingdom of heaven was something outside, into 
which the person was then taken up. But the kingdom of heaven is indeed also 
"within you"--hence it can be compared to the person. The unity of the subjective 
and the objective--that the most objective kingdom of heaven, that it is compared to 
a person. 
Yet Kierkegaard goes on, not to develop a synergistic understanding of human cooperation 
with grace, but rather, the absolute priority of grace's operation in the individual: 
He found a very costly pearl--and yet he went off and sold everything that he had and 
bought it. But if he found it, then he didn't need to sell anything--in order to buy it; 
it was in that case, after all, his. Here one sees the true Christian proportions. It is 
grace, you cannot buy it, acquire it through effort--it must be given (just as he had 
to find the pearl)--and only then can it be bought, only then can you sell everything 
that you have in order to buy it.40 
We see, then, that the sole efficacy of God's grace, which is present in and under our efforts 
at appropriation, does nothing to relieve us of the responsibility for such appropriation, nor 
does it diminish the strenuousness that this undertaking involves. This is a point that Kierke-
gaard is ever at pains to make. He observes that "Christianity requires everything, and then, 
39"Now if we assume that ... the teacher himself[Godl provides the leamer with the condition [forreceiving 
the truth, Le., faith], then the object of faith becomes not the teaching but the teacher, for the essence of the 
Socratic is that the leamer, because he himself is the truth and has the condition, can thrust the teacher away . 
. . . It is easy to see then ••• that faith is not an act of will. for it is always the case that all human willing 
is efficacious only within the condition" (SV N 227-28 [Fragments, 62-63, the latter holding being added 
for emphasis]). 
40Pap X2 A 50 (lP 4:3936), translation mine. Cf. Pap X3 A 165 (JP 3:2873). 
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when you have done that, it requires that you understand that you are nevertheless saved 
solely by grace. This is divine grace, different than the human conception of grace. ,,41 
Now, owing to the audience that Kierkegaard addresses--a decadent Lutheranism that 
has taken grace in vain by ignoring the subjective component of its operation--he rightly 
emphasizes the indispensability of appropriating grace. Yet his constant injunctions to 
imitate Christ, to die to oneself and world, etc., frequently give the impression that these are 
activities that Christians themselves initiate--to which the assistance of grace is conditional-
ly added. A closer examination, however, reveals that the matter is not so simple. Take the 
matter of "dying to"--an exercise that one suspects that Barth and company have construed 
as being a preparation for grace and consequently anathematized. Of it SK writes: 
Christ dies in order to save you--yet on the condition that you "die to"; "But then 
nothing at all is gained," someone will say. How so? Has nothing been gained? For 
even if you were to "die to" ever so much, it surely would not follow that, at death, 
you would enter into the eternal blessedness that Christ has acquired for you. But 
you say: "When one has entirely 'died to,' then he is also pure spirit and has 
essentially found that rest that Christianity offers, and so nothing has been gained at 
all by Christianity." Answer: let us suppose that it were so; in that case, however, one 
thing remains: that you are not able entirely to "die to" without Christ's help; indeed, 
without his help you are not even capable of beginning the task.42 
The use of the word "condition" (Betingelse) in the above entry notwithstanding, "dying to" 
is not a quid pro quo that we undertake, in exchange for which Christ saves us. Clearly it is 
conceived as something that Christ does in and through us--something that in turn 
constitutes an indispensable element in the economy of salvation along with the anxious 
conscience, repentance, and faith. Consequently--during the early and middle periods at 
least--as frequently as SK may bid us imitate Christ in dying to self and the world, he does 
so on the presupposition that it is God who ultimately accomplishes this work in us. 
41Pap X3 A 353 (JP 2:1480), translation mine. 
42Pap X3 A 352 (JP 3:3753), translation mine. In addition to illustrating the primacy of grace in all that the 
Christian does, this journal entry also illustrates the offensiveness of Christianity'S grace teaching--viz., that 
it should require so much of the human being, all the while declaring his efforts to be intrinsically worthless. 
At bottom, SK's imagined interlocutor denies that those efforts are in fact worthless, retorting instead that the 
grace that Christianity offers is. 
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Having issued this warmng against adjudging Kierkegaard guilty of works-
righteousness when he insists that human activity serve as the indispensable locus for and 
criterion of grace,43 we urge anew that this insistence be understood in terms of the 
theology of the cross. From that perspective SK's demand that human striving serve as the 
criterion of grace comes as no surprise: if our deliberations on the theologia crucis have 
taught us anything, it is that God's saving work will always be hidden, being made manifest 
only indirectly under an alien work. Human activity in the economy of salvation is just such 
a mask for God's activity. But if this be so, then human and divine agency are inseparable 
aspects of one and the same reality; the individual's visible efforts at appropriating grace 
are of one piece with the invisible operation of grace that occurs in and through them. Cer-
tainly this is how Luther sees the matter. Karl Holl writes: 
Continual humility or, as he can also say, continual repentance, is what Luther 
demands of the Christian. He thereby strongly emphasizes ... the earnest work of 
the will that belongs to true repentance. But while he is stressing the necessity of 
one's own efforts of will, he nevertheless rigorously maintains that only the divinely 
effected repentance is genuine. Just as he acknowledges only that self-knowledge as 
sincere that originates under the pressure of the divine sentence of condemnation to 
which the person accedes, so too he considers the power to tum away from oneself, 
i.e., the new will, to be a gift that the person must first, in fierce struggle, request of 
God.44 
43It is a warning that--though unfortunately all too rarely--one docs find in the Kierkegaard literature. Of 
Kierkegaard's claim that God's justifying action must find its locus in human activity (Le., suffering 
discipleship) if Christendom is not to be guilty of disingenuously appealing to the former a<; an ideological 
justification for the total absence of the latter, Hermann Deuser writes: "Wenn Kierkegaard tiber Luther hinaus 
Handlung und Situation als Kriterien des simul fordert, so darf nieht der FehlschluB folgen, diese seien--nach 
Luthers Terminologie--unter die Rubrik der guten Werke zu rechnen, oder Kierkegaard entwickele gegen 
Luther einen tertius usus legis, derdoch die Dialektik zur Autbebung briichte; sondern Situation und Handlung 
entsprechen dem simul insgesamt, gebcn ihm als 'Situation der Gleich7.eitigkeit' den christologischen, ethischen 
undgesellschaftspolitischen Rahmen, von dem abgelost ein Handeln Gottes wie die menschliche Relationsbe-
stimmung von Gott her nicht mehr auszusagen sind, ohne in Unverbindlichkeit oder christliche Ideologie zu 
verschwimmen. Das hat Kierkegaards Reaktion auf das Bestehende seiner Zeit konsequent vorgefiihrt, und 
deshalb muBte er auf der Unversohntheit, dem Leiden, dem Opfer und der Nachfolge so lange beharren, bis 
das Bestehende die Kraft gefunden hatte, sich von daher also ideologisch durchsichtig zu werden. Deshalb darf 
man nicht den SpieB umdrehen und nun Kierkegaard Werkgerechtigkeit vorwerfen wollen, sofern es ihm urn 
die Gnade ging, die in der bestehenden Christenheit falsch lokalisiert war" (Dialektische Theologie. 266). 
44Karl Holl, "Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Luthers Vorlesung tiber den Romerbrief mit besonderer Rticksicht 
auf die Frage der HeilsgewiBheit" in Luther. vol. 1 of Gesammelte Aufsat7..e zur Kirchengeschichte. 4th and 
5th printing (Tiibingen: 1. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1927), 142. The emphasis is Holl's, whose point 
regarding the paradoxical convergence of divine and human agency in conversion provides an apposite 
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There can be no doubt, in the light of the texts that we have already reviewed, that 
Kierkegaard sees the relationship between God's gift and man's appropriation of the same 
in an identical manner. Grace is necessarily a hidden reality. What is visible is religiousness 
under ethical determinants--with, N.B., the necessary Christian qualifications.4s As we 
have seen, the latter, so far from removing the pathos of appropriation that already attaches 
to religiousness A, only serve to potentiate it by demanding the most strenuous efforts, all 
the while denying any intrinsic worth or effectuating power to them. This paradoxical state 
of affairs arouses offense (the sign ofthe cross!) and in so doing validates Christianity's under-
standing of grace as the divine understanding.46 
The offensive element of this divine understanding of grace is precisely that the 
ethical component of general religiousness does not fall away with the advent of grace; on 
the contrary, it asserts itself with a vengeance. Accordingly, in those very contexts in 
description not only of Luther but of Kierkegaard. 
45"If, for the moment, I were to leave out of account all the more specific dogmatic qualifications regarding 
the Spirit's participation, etc., I could then define rebirth as follows: it is immediacy won ethically [Le., qua 
task. Opgave]. Ethics, or rather the ethical, is the axis about which it turns, and then, from there, the swing is 
into the dogmatic" (Pap Xl A 360 [JP 1 :972, translation mine]). 
46"Whatever pertains to Christianity always has areduplication within itself. When 'grace' is connected with 
my living in a carefree, merry manner, then grace is taken in vain. Grace is connected with the fact that I, too, 
shall 'die to,' which the Prototype simultaneously expressed all the while thatthe Prototype's suffering and death 
was grace's acquisition. I, too, shall 'die to'--and then, nevertheless, be saved by grace. The human concept of 
grace is: now you shall get off scot free, therefore it is grace. The Christian concept is: no, you shall suffer and 
suffer--and then be saved by grace. One can ea"ily see offense's criterion. It can already be an offense to the 
natural man to have to hear of grace inasmuch as he wants to justify himself. 'But very well,' he says, 'then let 
it be grace; I will humbly receive it, but in that case I also want to be free.' Oh no, says Christianity, you will 
come to suffer and suffer--and then you shall nevertheless humble yourself under the circumstance that it is 
by grace that you are saved" (Pap Xl A 278 [JP 3:3681], translation mine). 
SK underscores the offensiveness of the notion that it is by grace apart from works that we are saved 
by comparing the one who does much in appropriation of grace (i.e., the witness to the truth) with the one who 
does little (the rest of us): "Ah, if you are living happily in a beloved home, if your wife is devoted to you with 
all her heart and all her strength, if your children give you joy, then consider what it means to go on living day 
after day in this peace and quiet, salutary for a person's soul ... , and consider that this is your daily life--and 
then think of the witness to the truth! ... [I]f, to put it briefly and aptly, your life is a quiet daily plea"ure--ah, 
his life was a painful daily suffering--then you both die and you are equally blessed! ... Consider this, and, is 
it not true, you surely will say to yourself what I say to myself: Whether I now will not actually venture that 
far out or whether I pamper myself so that I do not venture out at all, one thing I will do, no matter how much 
I otherwise have to do: I will take the time to recall those glorious ones every single day. Oh, to me it seems 
a flagrant wrong that we two will both be equally blessed! But in any case my life is going to be a recollection 
of them!" (SV XII 312-13 [For Self-Examination. 22-23]). 
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which SK urges the absolute primacy of grace, he is careful to present the corresponding 
passivity of the human subject in the most active terms possible. To do otherwise would be 
to remove the cross from Christianity's proclamation of grace! As an example of this modus 
operandi one may look to SK's exposition of Luke 7:47, Jesus' forgiveness of the woman 
who was a notorious sinner. Kierkegaard writes: 
What, then, is it this woman did from whom we are to learn? The answer is: Nothing, 
she did nothing at all; she practiced the high, rare, exceedingly difficult, genuine 
womanly art of doing nothing at all, or of understanding that with respect to finding 
forgiveness she herself was able to do nothing. "How easy!"--yes, were it not that 
precisely the easiness is the difficulty. Verily he that subdueth himself is greater than 
he that taketh a city. Greater than he that sets everything in commotion just for the 
sake of doing something himself, is he who in relation to God and with respect to 
receiving forgiveness of his sins, can keep quite still. so as in godly fear to let God 
do all, understanding perfectly that in this respect he himself is able to do nothing at 
all, that everything a man himself is able to do, though it were the most glorious 
deed, the most astonishing, is in this respect infinitely nothing, that it is (if, indeed, 
it is something which, humanly speaking, is really good, and not the pitiful self-
deception of the cunning heart) so far from contributing even in the least degree to 
acquire for him in the remotest way the forgiveness of sins, that it far rather puts him 
in a new debt, a new debt of gratitude to the infinite grace which in addition to 
everything else permitted him to succeed in this. No--oh, pitiable aberration, or 
frightful presumption, that such a thought could occur to a man in the remotest 
way!--no, with respect to obtaining forgiveness of sins. or before God, a man has no 
power to do anything; how could this be possible, since even in relation to the least 
thing, a man, humanly speaking, has no power, except by God's help.47 
47SV XII 256-57 ("The Woman That Was a Sinner" in "Training in Christianity" and the Edifying Discourse 
Which 'Accompanied' It, trans. Walter Lowrie [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947),268-69). In all, 
SK wrote three discourses treating of Luke 7:47 --the discourse cited above, written under SK's own name and 
accompanying Anti-Climacus's Practice in Christianity (1850); another discourse (one of the cycle, "Three 
Discourses at the Communion on Fridays"), similarly written under SK's own name and appearing roughly 
contemporaneously with Anti-Climacus's other work, The Sickness unto Death (1849); and finally, a third 
discourse (included in the cycle, "Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays") appearing on the same day 
as My Activity as a Writer (1851), both written under SK's own name. The general pattern in all of these 
discourses is to emphasize the personal appropriation of grace while denying that any capability on the part of 
the person--or resultant merit--attaches thereto. While perhaps not adequately expressing the strenuousness 
of the believer's passive appropriation of grace, Martin Thust nevertheless correctly observes: "Mit seinem 
Handeln drUckt der Glaubende nur aus, dal3 er in Wahrheit nicht handelt, sondem nur auf Jesus blickt, mit dem 
ihm alles geschenkt ist (Rom. 8,32). Das ist der Klang, der in der Eingangspredigt der "Einiibung" und in den 
Abendmahlsreden immer wieder anklingt" (S(ken Kierkegaard. Der Dichter des ReligiOsen. Grundlagen eines 
Systems derSubjektivitat [Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1931),358). One wonders whether 
Thust does not have reference to all three of the discourses on Lk. 7:4 7--the one quoted above (though he refers 
to it as Older Eingangspredigt der'Einiibung"') as well as SVXI 273-80 ("'The High Priest'--'The Publican'--'The 
140 
Already in the Postscript, within the context of religious immanence, we encounter 
the notion of endeavoring to acquire what one already possesses. While such acquisition 
would appear to be the easiest of tasks, really it is the most strenuous possible, involving 
the maintenance of a passive posture toward what is already given. Operating under the 
assmnption that one is immortal yet, qua temporal being, must nevertheless become such, 
Climacus asks, "What does it mean to become immortal?" Can one (a) "do anything in order 
to become immortal," does one (b) "become immortal automatically," or is one (c) "itnmor-
tal but can become that?" Clearly the first two possibilities are raised only rhetorically; it is 
the final one that Climacus favors. If immortality is a thing that one becomes "as a matter 
of course" then 
the highest in life [immortality's acquisition] turns out to be like a ridiculous 
undertaking, so that the passion of freedom ... is assigned only the lower tasks but 
has nothing to do with the highest, not even negatively, since a negative action in 
relation to the highest would in turn certainly be the most strenuous action--
namely, after having enthusiastically willed to the utmost of one's ability to do 
everything, then to learn that the highest is to maintain oneself at every moment 
merely receptively toward precisely that which one would so infinitely gladly do 
th O t . 48 some mg 0 acqUIre. 
To regard immortality as a thing that one becomes "as a matter of course" is, within 
religiousness A's context, the equivalent of "taking grace in vain" in Christianity's context. 
One already is immortal and can, therefore, contribute nothing to its acquisition; 
nevertheless one must, in freedom, become what one already is through the most taxing 
. 'ty49 passlVl . 
Woman That Was a Sinner': Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays" in Christian Discourses. Etc .. 
trans. Walter Lowrie [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940].379-86) and SV XII 271-79 ("Two 
Discourses at the Communion on Fridays" in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves!. trans. Walter 
Lowrie [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944],9-16). 
48SV VII 145 (Postscript 175, amended and emphasis added). 
49Remember, the sphere of religious immanence is that of the soul's pre-existence (immortality). While this 
tenet is capable of definitive proof if one has recourse to the phenomenon of recollection (Plato'S Meno), 
Johannes Climacus represents Socrates as continually repUdiating this speculative temptation in recognition 
of the fact that his station is in existence--a circumstance that prevents him from distractedly assuming a status 
sub Sllecie aeternitatis. While Socrates contends as an article offaith that he is immortal, his station in existence 
nevertheless compels him to become such through appropriation of what he already is, over time. 
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In precisely the same manner, from Christianity's point of view one is, from the 
outset, the beneficiary of grace; accordingly, one does nothing at all. This notwithstanding, 
one is not relieved of the task of acquiring that of which one finds oneself already in posses-
sion. Hence, though the Christian be the patient of grace's operation, he is as well the agent 
of its acquisition. How may two such conflictive tenets be reconciled? Only by application 
of the cognitive principle of the theology of the cross: God's grace, as seen from its 
antipode--human experience--necessariIy has the appearance of the most stupendous 
striving. It is the very translation of divine grace into the terms of existence that so alters its 
visage. Nevertheless it remains grace, and as such, retains its priority over the Christian's 
appropriation of the same. Martin Thust writes: 
The appropriation of the divine gift is itself a gift, and one understands Kierkegaard 
falsely if one construes it unambiguously as a free act of the person. Instead one must 
speak of a charisma of appropriation through which God gives in advance to the 
individual what he subsequently makes his own .... When Kierkegaard everywhere 
in his religious discourses demands the forceful application of the will, he himself 
reckons in earnest with the divine grace that has already in some way grasped his 
reader and made him capable of this action. For there can be no doubt that 
Kierkegaard absolutely distinguishes the natural immanence of the human from the 
transcendence of the divine: here exists an unbridgeable abyss over which no human 
being, by his own powers, can pass. The passage between these two worlds takes 
place ... in a paradoxical, preconditioned act, an act that, in an irreconcilable way, 
ambiguously signifies an act of the person, and yet again, not his act, but the action 
of God.sO 
SOSoren Kierkegaard: Der Dichter des ReligiOsen, 367. Though it does not have conversion as its focus (the 
focus is on the already sanctified will that practices self-renunciation), SV IX 343 (Works of Love, 333) 
nonetheless addresses the issue of the convergence of grace and human activity: "Precisely this becomes the 
blessing, disturbing contradiction: to have one all-powerful as co-worker. For one all-powerful cannot be co-
worker with you, a human being, without its signifying that you are able to do nothing at all; and on the other 
side, if he is your support, you are able to do everything. The strenuousness lies in the simultaneity of the 
contradiction so that you do not experience the one to-day and the other to-morrow; the strenuousness lies in 
this that the contradiction is not something you are conscious of once in a while but something you must be 
conscious of every moment." 
Even Torsten Bohlin, who considers SK a synergist, grants that one must speak of a paradoxical 
convergence between faith qua divine operation and faith qua human activity in Kierkegaard. Bohlin maintains, 
however, that SK's well-nigh exclusive emphasis upon the indispensable role of human activity has obscured 
for him the primacy of God's activity and prevented him from attaining to "the jubilant cheerfulness of Luther's 
faith" (in the process landing him in synergism). Bohlin writes: "Forgiveness, at the same time that it is 
regarded by Kierkegaard as a gift of God, is comprehended under faith, and ••. faith, even if it is always 
regarded according to its innermost nature as a work of God, nevertheless is always overwhelmingly 
presented not from God's point of view or as a reception from the human side of God's own love life, but 
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We see, then, that the obj ectivity of grace is manifest here on earth in only one way: 
viz., as human sUbjectivity. The solely effectual operation of grace is identifiable only as 
the individual's highly extenuating efforts, amid repeated and overwhelming Anfechtum~en, 
at its appropriation. In the strong language of Luther: the Christian "cannot possess the 
heaven of community with God without repeatedly making the descent into hell which takes 
place when he doubts and even despairs of God's grace. ,,51 Intrinsic to the Christian's 
despair of God's grace is offense at that grace: i.e., at its repellant aspect. Luther and Kier-
kegaard recognize this alike. Consequently, their stress upon the strenuous efforts involved 
in appropriating grace does not constitute a tacit denial of grace's primacy, but an 
acknowledgment of its presence under a mask--their teachings on grace, alike, urge the 
necessity of penetrating that mask in order to receive the forgiveness of sins.52 One aspect 
of grace's sub contraria specie, however, is the very struggle for its appropriation. Here, 
too, faith is incumbent. Faith alone can--and must--descry in the opus alienum of appropria-
tion, and the sufferings attendant to it, the opus proprium in which God effects his saving 
purpose for us. More than this, the act of appropriation is itself faith, the hidden work of God 
in us, for faith not only victoriously transforms our strivings and sufferings so that these 
from the human point of view as an expression for human activity and the will's own striving •... [T)he 
detennination of faith from the standpoint of human activity has, inreality, come to influence the understanding 
of forgiveness' content as well, so that its character as a new creation and new orientation of the will, effected 
by God, has not received its just due. It is not the case with Kierkegaard, as it is with Luther, that faith never 
sees itself but only sees God and his work in everything; and while the jubilant cheerfulness in Luther's faith 
is conditioned by the fact that faith elevates itself so as to see with God's eyes and comprehends itself through 
and though as God's action in man, the case is the reverse with Kierkegaard--faith's inward gazing upon itself 
has stood as a hindrance in the way of the joyous confidence and cheerfulness and inevitably led to the 
circwnstance that the awareness that the person really is renewed and is privy to Christ's dominion has never 
been able to break completely through" (Kierkegaards dogmatiska askadning i dess historiska sammenhang 
[Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses BokfOrlag, 1925),484-85). As will become evident inthe latter 
part of this work, I share Bohlin's view that such a displacement occurs in the later Kierkegaard. 
slPaul Althaus, Die Theologie Martin Luthers. 1st ed. (Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 
1962),41 (The Theology of Martin Luther. trans. Robert C. Schultz [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966),33). 
s2Eduard Geismar writes: "In Luther findet Kierkegaard endlich einen Menschen, der ihm kongenial ist im 
VersUindnisse dessen, daB die 'Vergebung der Sunden' sowohl die Bekiimmemis wie das Gericht entbalt; und 
er verweilt wieder und immer wieder dabei, daB es bei der lutherischen Lehre von der Gnade immer auf den 
Kampf des geangstigten Gewissens ankommt, das zu der Aneignung dieses 'fUr dich' vordringt" ("Wie urteilte 
Kierkegaard iiber Luther?" Luther lahrbuch 10 (1928):3-4). 
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come to assume the aspect of God's solely effectual grace; faith is God's activity under the 
aspect of human freedom. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
KIERKEGAARD'S TEACHING ON THE WILL: 
LIBERUM ARBITRIUM OR SERVUM ARBITRIUM? 
If the previous chapter's account of Kierkegaard's teaching on grace is correct we are 
faced with the antinomy that man can do nothing in the economy of salvation--it is God who 
effects everything, including the human being's receptivity to the operation of grace. This 
notwithstanding, it is maintained that the person is responsible for receiving grace, and this, 
in such a way that his real--not illusory--agency is affirmed. That Kierkegaard maintains 
both elements of the antinomy is abundantly clear from a journal entry such as the 
following: 
This is the law for the relationship between God and man in the relationship 
with God. 
DIVISIO 
There is an infinite, yawning, qualitative difference between God and man. 
This means, or the expression for this is: the person is able to do absolutely 
nothing; it is God who gives everything; it is he who enables the person to believe, 
etc. 
This is grace, and this is Christianity's major premise. 
SUBDIVISIO 
Notwithstanding the fact that there could, of course, be nothing. uncondition-
ally nothing meritorious in any action whatever, any more than faith could be 
meritorious (for in that case the Diyisio or major premise is annulled, and we are, 
after all, here in a minor premise), it is nevertheless essential to dare in a childlike 
way to be involved with God. l 
While it is the case that Kierkegaard affirms both aspects of the above antinomy, I 
have chosen to highlight those texts that assert the sovereign dominion that grace exercises 
IPap Xl A 59 (JP 2:1383). Translation mine. 
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in the life of the individual. It seems only right to do so since the other element of the 
antinomy is, to use Kierkegaard's own expression, "after all, ... a minor premise." This 
notwithstanding it is easy enough, when reading Kierkegaard, to have one's attention 
directed to precisely that premise--viz., to the agency that is demanded of the individual in 
relating to God, and to the accountability and freedom that are the inevitable correlates of 
moral agency. For the texts in which Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms stress this aspect are 
legion. Indeed, the above entry itself lays the stress on the "minor premise" since exclusive 
emphasis upon the "major premise" can all too easily become an endorsement of "living 
entirely as one pleases, with a worldly view of life," or of "leading a religious sti1llife 
without duly coming out into the dangers." 
Here as elsewhere, it is imperative to remember that Kierkegaard's statements are not 
motivated so much by an interest in dogmatic definition as by a predominantly practical 
intent. His remarks about human agency and responsibility within the context of the 
relationship with God, therefore, should not be taken to be dogmatic formulations of a 
synergistic position. Just as we earlier found that Kierkegaard's emphasis upon the ethical 
aspects of Christianity did not constitute a revocation of the Lutheran teachings on sin and 
grace, so too we may here suspect that his accentuation of human agency by no means 
constitutes a revocation of the Lutheran teaching regarding the bondage of the will. Yet not 
a few notable Kierkegaard scholars have maintained just this. Eduard Geismar, the very 
scholar who, above all others, has called attention to the role that the theologia clUcis plays 
in Kierkegaard's thought, has written: "We must, however, point out a significant difference 
between Luther and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard would not have been able to write De Servo 
Arbitrio.,,2 Similarly, Emanuel Hirsch has maintained that Kierkegaard's teaching on grace 
2"Kierkegaard und Luther," Monatsschrift fUr Pastoraltheologie 25 (Oct./Nov. 1929):234. Geismar's 
statement is endorsed by Viggo Mortensen, who charges SK with having misinterpreted the doctrine of 
justification in a synergistic direction ("Luther og Kierkegaard," in Kierkegaardiana IX, ed. S0ren Kierkegaard 
Society by Niels Thulstrup [Copenhagen: Rosenkilde og Bagger, 1974),194). Heinrich Traugott Vogel, too, 
detects a clear synergistic strain in Kierkegaard's thinking. This he traces to SK's "anthropological point of 
view," in contrast to which he finds a predestinarian strain devolving from SK's "christo logical point of view." 
While these two points of view uneasily coexist for much of the authorship, Vogel finds that the latter is 
increasingly overpowered by the former so that Kierkegaard ends by predicating grace upon human initiative 
("Christus als Vorbild und Versohner. Eine kritische Studie zum Problem des Verhaltnisses von Gesetz und 
Evangelium im Werke Soren Kierkegaards," [Inaugural diss., Humboldt University, Berlin, 1968],74-76,94, 
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is Lutheran, but his teaching on the will Erasmian.3 For his part, Torsten Bohlin totally 
concurs in this judgement.4 Because Hirsch has given the most detailed schema of SK's 
"synergism," it is to it that we now tum. 
Hirsch bases his interpretation on the fact that, in the confrontation with Hegel, 
Kierkegaard was led to assert on the one hand the "yawning abyss" that separates the life of 
grace from that under the law in sin, but on the other hand, personality and freedom. "With 
the one notion he stands on the side of the Lutheran teaching on grace as over against the 
Erasmian attenuation of grace and, with the other, on the side of the Erasmian teaching on 
freedom as over against Luther's teaching on bondage.,,5 This disparity presented 
Kierkegaard with a task for thought, the solution to which he had worked out by 1840-41, 
according to Hirsch. It is during this period that we encounter a journal entry in which 
Kierkegaard declares synergism to be the principle of Christianity.6 On the basis of an 
examination of this and other texts, Hirsch develops a point by point schema of Kierke-
gaard's "synergism." The freedoms that Kierkegaard is said to accord the will are freedom 
in the act of sin,7 freedom in the act of recognition of sin,s and freedom in cooperating with 
grace;9 divine intervention is assigned to but a single point, that of regeneration through the 
conferral of faith. Hirsch summarizes this schema in the following way: 
Faith qua immediate consciousness has as its presupposition a new, original 
beginning that is sovereignly implanted by God in the person who recognizes his 
112-17,207-09). It seems to me that Vogel is essentially correct in this assessment. 
3Kierkegaard-Studien. Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Erste Studie (VadusfLiechtenstein: Topos Verlag, 1978), 
129 [575 in continuous pagination]. 
"Kierkegaards trooch andra Kierkegaardstudier (Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses BokfOrlag, 
1944), 182. 
5Hirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien. Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Erste Studie:129 [575]. 
6Pap III A 118 (JP 4:4004). 
8Pap III A 39 (JP 2:1100). 
9SV XIII 380 (Concept of Irony, 313). 
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sins--a beginning that only later, in reflection and action, opens into freedom; ... 
therefore grace, in which we receive forgiveness and conversion, is the breaking 
of the divine into our life from beyond our thinking and willing. Kierkegaard's 
synergism therefore leads thiOugh the decision for the consciousness of sin along the 
way up to the portal of grace and, through the free acceptance of the divine that 
discloses itself to us, once again along the way from the portal of grace out through 
life. He leaves in between, however, one point, the "hidden one" of "spiritual 
birth."lo 
Against such an interpretation two things can be urged. The first is that it is 
exegetically unsound. Per Lanning observes that it is based on a limited selection of texts 
in which the concept of freedom seems to be understood from a psychological perspec-
tive. ll To this may be added that they all derive from a very early date, and Hirsch himself 
makes the admission that the synergistic element in Kierkegaard's thinking thereafter 
increasingly loses its force in relation to the element of grace.12 The three youthful texts 
l'1<.ierkegaard-Studien, Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Erste Studie: 130 [576]. Hirsch's text reads as follows: 
"Die beiden Sci ten [Le., freedom and grace] finden sich so zusammen, daB der Glaube als unmittelbares 
BewuBtsein einen von Gott in dem seine SOnden Erkennenden souveriin gesetzten neuen urspriinglichen 
Anfang zur Voraussetzung hat, der erst nachtriiglich in Reflexion und Handlung zur Freiheit aufgeschlossen 
wird, daB also die Gnade, in der wir Vergebung und Umkehr empfangen, der jenseits unsers Denkens 
und Wollens stehende Hereinbruch des Gottlichen in unser Leben ist. Der Synergismus Kierkegaards fiihrt 
also durch die Entscheidung fOrs SOndenbewuBtsein auf dem Wege bis vors Torder Gnade, unddurch das freie 
Aufnehmen des sich uns erschliel3enden Gottlichen auch wieder auf dem Wege vom Tor der Gnade durchs 
Leben hindurch. Er IiiBt dazwischen aber einen Punkt, den 'verborgenen' der 'geistIichen Geburt'." 
II"Samtidighedens situation." En studie i S0ren Kierkegaards kristendQrnsforstaelse (Oslo: Forlaget Land 
og Kirke, 1954),58. 
12Certainly this holds true for the published authorship. To be sure, Vogel (supra, n. 2) contends that a 
synergistic element comes strongly to the fore in the late Kierkegaard (Le., the journals from about 1851-52 
on). Yet if one prescinds from this late development, confining one's attention to the published works (which 
conclude in 1851), it is clear that grace possesses ascendancy over human willing in SK's presentation offaith. 
Hirsch's admission that this is so is particularly noteworthy in view of the fact that he so strongly maintains 
SK's "synergism" from beginning to end: "Es bleibt ... in den ersten pseudonymen Schriften noch unklar, in 
welchem Sinne der Glaube, der als eine eigne freie leidenschaftliche Bewegung des Individuums geschildert 
wird, auf der Gnade beruht. Nur das ist schon jetzt ganz eindeutig, daB 'in Kraft des Absurden' aus der 
iisthetischen Perspektive des Pseudonyms in die christliche Obersetzt heiBt: 'in Kraft des unbegreiflichen 
schlechthinnigen Wunders der versohnenden Gnade,' daB also bei Kierkegaard Ober den Glauben die 
synergistische Aussage mit einer, die die Gnade als die mindestens die Glaubens-moglichkeit schenkend 
schaffende ehrt, zusammensteht und ihr gegenOber mehr und mehr an Kraft verliert. Ruttenbeck, S. 
Kierkegaard 1929, S. 219ff., hat diesen Tatbestand gut beobachtet, freilich nach meinem Urteil viel zu sehr in 
die Paradoxie des Priidestinatianismus, den Kierkegaard mit seiner theologischen Reflexion ablehnt, 
umgebogen. Selbst wenn man bedenkt, daB Kierkegaard die Aussagen Ober den Glauben als Willensakt je 
liinger je mehr eingegrenzt hat, das bleibt doch, daB die vor der Gnade stehende, von der Gnade vorausgesetzte 
Wahl derVerzweiflung bei Kierkegaard ein schlechthin freier Aktist ... unddasGleiche giltvom Gehorsam 
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upon which Hirsch's interpretation is built are hardly compelling. The first one (Pap III A 
118 [JP 4:4004]) declares synergism to be Christianity's principle, citing sin as an instance 
of the freedom that Christianity assigns to the individua1.13 Yet not even the most orthodox 
Lutheran would dispute that sin, in the first instance, is a free act; nor would he dispute that 
the person, having once become the slave to sin, nevertheless continues to be regarded under 
the detenninant of freedom, for otherwise his sin would no longer be construable as sin. Yet 
if these facets of Kierkegaard's "synergism" are all that can be inferred from the text cited, 
then it is utterly unserviceable as proof that Kierkegaard was synergistic in the proposed 
Erasmian sense. Hirsch's second text (Pap III A 39 [JP 2:1100]) asserts that the con-
sciousness of sin and the assurance of the forgiveness of sin are not products of prior states 
of consciousness. They do not belong to a psychological chain of cause and effect at all, but 
arise spontaneously as acts of freedom. Yet just who the agent behind these free acts might 
be is not disclosed.14 Finally, the third text (SV XIII 380 [ConctWt of Irony, 313]), despite 
its strong appearance of synergism, is not without ambiguity. There Kierkegaard speaks of 
"the synergism that assists the deity" but, as the context seems to indicate, means thereby 
that the person is not an impassive instrument of grace, but that the new will is personally 
engaged in what grace effects. "The finite is, of course, the Nichtige," Kierkegaard writes, 
des Lebens im Glauben" (Kierkegaard-Studien. Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Zweite Studie:44 [646] n. 3). 
13"Christianity has been the first to advance the concept of synergism, and in it for the first time finitude 
gains its validity, in it for the first time speculation has its true point of rest, freedom its reality. The first 
determination of synergism that Christianity has is sin. Sin is therefore not merely finitude, but in sin there is 
also a moment of freedom and free finitude" (translation mine). 
14"One sees also that faith is a more concrete determination than 'the immediate' from the fact that, whereas 
from the purely human standpoint the secret of all cognition is deliberation upon what is immediately given, 
in faith we receive something that is not 'given' and that can never be deduced from the preceding state of 
consciousness. This [preceding state] was namely the consciousness of sin, and the second is the assurance of 
the forgiveness of sin. But this assurance does not follow in the same way that knowledge follows with an inner 
consistency from doubt; and everyone would, I dare say, sense the carelessness of understanding it in that way, 
or--better put--the one who thus understood it does not have the preceding standpoint (the consciousness of 
sin); rather, it is a free act. Neither is the consciousness of sin, like doubt, an arbitrary act of man; it is an 
objective act, for the consciousness of God is precisely immanent in the consciousness of sin. Add to this that 
the consciousness of the forgiveness of sin is coupled with an external event of the entire appearance of Christ, 
which, to be sure, is not external in the sense of being alien to us, of no concern to us, but external qua 
historical" (translation mine). 
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"but there is nevertheless something in it, and something to that something. "IS Again, no 
champion of Lutheran orthodoxy would take issue with this. Still other (later) texts that 
Hirsch might have mentioned, but did not, appear to approach conversion from the "psycho-
logical perspective" referred to by Umning. As such, they too fail firmly to establish SKIs 
synergism.16 Hence it is certainly possible to conclude with Valter Lindstrom that, when 
Kierkegaard does use the word "synergism" in the early texts, he has another meaning in 
mind than the usual one.17 
The second thing that may be urged against Hirsch's interpretation is its untenability 
from a logical standpoint. Lindstrom points out that "it should be impossible to imagine a 
person who is Lutheran in his teaching on grace but Erasmian in his teaching on freedom if 
ISSV XIII 380 (Concept of Irony, 313), translation mine. The context of this passage is SK's analysis of 
Solger, for whom "moral qualifications have no validity; all finitude together with its moral and immoral 
striving vanishes in the metaphysical contemplation that sees it as nothing" (SV XIII 380 [Concept ofIrony, 
312-13 D. Against this Kierkegaard objects: "It is indeed true that moral virtues have no worth in and by 
themselves but only in the humility that allows God to evoke them in us; and it is indeed true that human vices 
can be canceled only by God and not by one's own powers; but by no means does this say that one is to lose 
oneself metaphysically and in the one case to disregard the synergism that assists the deity and in the other case 
to disregard the repentance that does not let go of God" (Hong translation, slightly amended). SK's point seems 
to be (a) that though human moral distinctions and strivings lack validity in the sight of God, man himselfmust 
accord them a certain validity, and (b) that the person is, in any case, not an impassive instrument of grace. 
16SV XII 149-50 (Practice in Christianity, 159-60) is a much later text that could be read as a declaration 
of synergism in the classical sense since it speaks of Christ's work in drawing the person as a "composite" 
[Sammensat] act in which the individual cooperates by means of a choice ret Valgl: "With regard to the iron 
when it is drawn [by the magnet], there is no question and can be none of any choice. But one self can truly 
draw another self to itself only through a choice--thus truly to draw to itself is a composite." While the notion 
of "choice" [arbitrium] goes beyond what Luther will admit as belonging to the will's powers, SK byno means 
has in mind the choice of a disinterested free will. As we shall shortly demonstrate, he has rather in mind the 
personal engagement of one who is already in the process of being drawn to Christ (something more akin to 
Luther's voluntas). A psychological perspective underlies two "synergistic" statements from the Edifying 
Discourses as well (SV V 128, 147 [Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 352,375]). In them SK refers to the 
Semi -Pelagian maxim, "Do what you can for God, and he will do for you what you cannot do," as a "beautiful 
saying." Yet this is hardly an endorsement of synergism. Indeed, it is possible to employ the language of"doing 
what lies within one," all the while assuming that prevenient grace stands behind such "preparation for grace." 
Aquinas, for example, does so. 
l7"lf we first examine the content of the word, 'synergism,' it is surely apparent thatthis word in Kierkegaard 
receives another content than the usual one, on which God's gracious will and the human will are conceived 
as complementing each other .... Kierkegaard's claim that since a moment of freedom is present along with 
sin, sin demonstrates Christianity's synergistic character, shows clearly that he does nol intend to profess 
synergism in its classical sense" (Stadiemas teologi. En Kierkegaard-studie [Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1943], 
353). 
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one is to attribute any consistency to his view."ls As we have already seen, Kierkegaard's 
teaching on grace corresponds to a teaching on sin so extreme that it ostensibly places him 
in the company of Matthias Flacius. Nor has this fact escaped Lindstrom's notice, for he 
remarks that, so far from being a synergist, "one could in fact sooner maintain that 
Kierkegaard is in the ranks of Flacius since the latter maintained that the person's will is not 
merely passive like a stick toward grace, but that it is positively hostile toward God.,,19 One 
would be very surprised indeed, then, were one to discover that SK was so inconsistent as 
to espouse Lutheran doctrines of sin and grace, but a synergistic doctrine of freedom. Yet 
just such inconsistency is what Bohlin attributes to Kierkegaard.20 Is it possible that there 
is substance to this charge? 
The only way in which it could be possible were if Kierkegaard espoused a liberum 
arbitrium conception of the will, for this is ultimately the basis upon which synergism rests. 
In its classical Lutheran fonn, synergism teaches that unregenerate man's will, though so 
enfeebled by sin as to be incapable of initiating the process of conversion, can nevertheless 
be a forthcoming factor in it. To be sure, the Holy Spirit must first have "made the beginning 
and ... called us by the Gospel." But once the offer of grace has been extended, 
the free will by its own natural powers can meet God and to some degree--though 
only to a small extent and in a weak way--help and cooperate and prepare itself for 
the grace of God, embrace and accept it, believe the Gospel, and by its own powers 
cooperate with the Holy Spirit in the continuation and preservation of this work 
within US.21 
18Ibid., 352. 
19Ibid., 353. The reference is to Flacius's thesis, made at the Weimar Disputation against Strigel in 1560. 
Robert Dollinger shares Valter Lindstrom's view regarding Kierkegaard's purported synergism. He writes: 
"Kierkegaard ist ebenso weitvom Semipelagianismus entfernt wie Luther oder Calvin." "1m Kampf gegenjede 
Art von Synergismus finden wir ihn bei den Reformatoren" ("Soren Kierkegaard und der Protestantismus," 
Luther-Jahrbuch 32 [1965]:121 and 127). 
2<Xierkegaards tro, 182-83. 
21As described in the Formula of Concord's Solid Declaration, art. II, par. 77 (Theodore G. Tappert, ed. and 
trans., The Book of Concord [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959], 536). The whole of article two is essential 
for understanding the synergists' teachings and orthodoxy'S response. So too are the texts of the dispute's 
original participants: Erasmus's On the Freedom of the Will and Luther's On the Bondage of the Will. An 
excellent discussion of the position of Erasmus, as well as that of Luther, is to be found in Brian Gerrish's 
essay, "Piety, Theology, and the Lutheran Dogma: Erasmus's Book on Free Will" (in The Old Protestantism 
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The synergists' picture of the will is really that of a pair of scales: if only enough "weight" 
is added to the deficient side (through the preaching of the Word and prompting of the 
Spirit), a balance will be struck so that man's natural volition will be in a position to throw 
its own weight to one side or the other and determine the outcome. Thereafter the natural 
volition continues to require the Spirit's assistance to make up for what it lacks. That is to 
say, grace continues to cancel out the deficit of the will's natural ability, "zeroing out" the 
scales so that it can choose the good. 
Against the tenability of such a picture of the will, we have Kierkegaard's own 
testimony at an early point. In one of his first treatments of the issue (in 1840, one year prim: 
to Hirsch's "synergism" entry) Kierkegaard likens the problem of freedom to that of 
consciousness. Just as consciousness is not an empty form such that one could commence 
one's philosophy without presuppositions (such a tabula rasa is nowhere to be found), so too 
is freedom always qualified by its content from the outset: 
The circumstance that philosophy has to begin with a presupposition must not be 
regarded as a defect but as a blessing; hence this an sich also becomes a curse of 
which philosophy can never be quit--it is this conflict between consciousness as the 
empty form, as the retained image of the fleeting object, that corresponds to the same 
problem in freedom: how the contentless arbitrium that, like the weight-scale, has 
nothing to do with the content but, as infinitely abstract elasticity, maintains itself 
victorious and indifferent to all eternity, how this becomes positive freedom--here, 
too, a presupposition is encountered because this liberum arbitrium is actually never 
to be found but, already, the very existence of the world provides it [i.e., the 
presupposition] .22 
and the New. Essays on the Refonnation Heritage [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982], 11-26). 
22Pap III A 48 (JP 2: 1240), translation mine. Kierkegaard calls attention to the weight scales analogy at a 
later point as well, again rejecting it (Pap ~ A 175 [JP 2:1268]). Concerning his early dismissal of a 
contentless--and hence, indifferent--will, see Pap III A 11 (JP 3 :3281). Relevant, too, as an indicator of SK's 
thinking at this stage is Pap III A 23 (JP I :880), where he declares: "Semi-Pelagianism is no position at all." 
Though his understanding of Semi -Pelagian ism and grounds for rejecting it are difficult to decipher, they seem 
to parallel Luther's criticism of Erasmus. Of the varying degrees of assistance that Semi-Pelagian ism postulates 
as righting the scales of the natural will in a given case (presumably, as opposed to the Augustinian-Lutheran 
wholesale renovation of the will in every case) SK writes: "[Semi -Pelagianism] says that the individual perhaps 
needs it, another individual perhaps does not need it; if we then ask, 'Why not?' it has no answer, but merely 
says, 'That's how it is.' If we ask 'Why?' it must also answer, 'Because that's just how it is.' Or if it is because 
a greater corruption demands it, then we ask, 'How great is this supposed to be?' but neither can it answer this" 
(translation mine). OfErasmus's vagueness in defining the role that the natural will plays in conversion, Luther 
writes that some parts of his definition "are plain enough, but others shun the light as though guiltily aware that 
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From this point on the material determination of freedom, on the one hand, and the 
nonexistence of liberum arbitrium, on the other, are tenets consistently maintained by 
Kierkegaard. During his reading of Leibnitz's Theodicee in 1842-43, for example, 
Kierkegaard registers the following remark: "A perfectly disinterested will (equilibrium) is 
a nothing, a chimera; Leibnitz demonstrates this superbly in many places.,,23 In EitherlOr, 
under the guise of Judge William, he characterizes "the true, positive freedom" as that which 
chooses the good and is determined by it to such an extent that the evil is utterly excluded 
from it; such freedom, he stresses, is not to be confused with liberum arbitrium.24 Likewise, 
Vigilius Haufniensis conceives freedom to be the outcome of an immediate, unhesitating 
choice ofthe good; such freedom "knows nothing of the evi1." Only with the fall into sin are 
good and evil posited as co-possibilities. But with the fall, this difference between good and 
evil comes to be experienced in cQncreto--i.e., as evil. Liberum arbitriwn, on the other hand, 
"is found nowhere.,,25 The latter, so-called freedom--which postulates "a moment to choose 
between good and evil, a moment when freedom itself is in neither the one nor the other"--is 
not freedom at all, but a "meaningless reflection.,,26 In like manner, wherever one turns in 
Kierkegaard's writings one encounters the denial that freedom is ever indifferent to the 
object that it chooses; either it immediately chooses the good and is materially determined 
by that choice, or it has chosen the evil and become irrevocably stamped thereby. 
It is therefore not at all surprising that Kierkegaard, under the guise of Haufniensis, 
endorses the dogma of original sin, the import of which just is that fallen man's will is bound 
by sin. To be sure, after the fall man continues to be characterized by freedom as wel1. It 
cannot be otherwise, since freedom constitutes the condition for sin's continued entry into 
they have everything to fear: yet nothing ought to be more plainly and unhesitatingly expressed than a 
definition, since to define obscurely is the same as giving no definition at all" (LW 33, 104). 
23Pap IV C 39 (JP 2:1241). Cf. Pap X2 A 243 (JP 2:1260) from 1849. 
24SV II 157 (Either/Or II, 173-74). 
2~ot even at the moment prior to the fall! Haufniensis writes that liberum arbitrium "no more existed in 
the world in the beginning than in a late period, because it is a nuisance for thought" (SV IV 320 [Concept of 
Anxiety, 49]). 
21bid., 380-81 (111-12). 
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the world. Yet such freedom is more accurately designated "freedom lost." Of the two 
possible formations in sin that Haufniensis identifies, the less serious one--anxiety about the 
evil--just is "the bondage of sin" wherein one finds oneself in an unfree relation to the evil, 
while the other formation--anxiety about the good--is a corresponding unfree relation to the 
good.27 The fallen individual's freedom has thus received a negative determination. It is still 
freedom, but--N. B.--freedom materially qualified by sin. Freedom is so understood in the 
other pseudonyms as well. When Climacus speaks of freedom (within religiousness A), he 
does so in connection with guilt. "Guilt ... is freedom's expression as this can be in the 
ethico-religious sphere, where the positive is recognizable by the negative, freedom by guilt, 
and not directly recognizable aesthetically: freedom recognizable by freedom.,,28 Even 
Judge William, for all his talk of choosing oneself qua free being,29 understands this in 
precisely the same sense. To be sure, freedom, for him, entails making a choice--an 
apparently positive determination. Yet the self that is chosen is guilty, and his act of 
choosing is consequently an act of repentance. The ethical expression for freedom simply 
is repentance.30 Not a word is spoken of a positive capability. Not even from the point of 
view of Judge William's "ethical optimism" is man "free" in this way.3! 
The negative characterization of freedom of course becomes still more severe as we 
move into the sphere of the paradoxical-religious. In the Fra~ments Climacus asserts that 
man has forfeited his freedom through a free, but irrevocable choice--"he uses the power of 
freedom in the service of unfreedom since he is, after all, freely in it, and in this way the 
27Ibid., 387 (119). 
28SV VII 466 (Postscript. 534), translation mine. 
29SV II 193 (Either/Or II, 215). 
3'1bid., 194 (216). 
31The sermon that Judge William encloses as an afterword to his letters reinforces this interpretation. Behind 
the Judge's civil rectitude and advocacy of responsible choice lies the recognition of man's incapability vis-a-vis 
"things higher." The sermon title expresses the thought as follows: that, "in relation to God, we are always in 
the wrong." 
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consolidated power of unfreedom grows and makes him the slave of sin. ,,32 As an explana-
tion for how such a bondage of the will could have come about, Climacus harks back to a 
time "when a man could buy freedom and unfreedom for the same price, and this price was 
the free choice of the soul and the surrender of the choice. He chose unfreedom." Any subse-
quent "exchange" of unfreedom for the original, forfeited freedom has become impossible 
for, "the curious thing about unfreedom is that once it is purchased it has no value whatso-
ever, even though one pays the same price for it.,,33 It is illuminating to note that the 
"purchase price" of freedom (or unfreedom, as the case may be) is identified as the free 
choice of the soul and the surrender of the choice (Val2ets Hen2iyelse). The latter words 
are pregnant with meaning. While full discussion must be deferred until later, we can here 
adumbrate our result by saying that freedom and unfreedom are purchased, alike, by the 
relinquishment of freedom to one of two powers--to God or to sin. Freedom exists only as 
materially determined by its object. 
A second point to be made concerning Climacus's understanding of the negative 
qualification that attaches to fallen man's freedom is that it is not mere bondage to 
unfreedom, as though the will would gladly cleave unto God if only it had the power to do 
so (that is the synergists' position). No, we read that the place wherein fallen man has taken 
his abode--the untruth--"is not merely outside the truth but is polemical against the truth.,,34 
Both factors--that man cannot, and that he will not, will the truth--must be taken together 
32SV IV 187 (Fragments. 17), translation mine. Cf. Pap ~ A 173 (JP 4:4047) as well as Pap ~ A 175 (JP 
2:1268), in which entries SK agrees with Augustine that the loss of the ability to choose the good "is sin's 
punishment--and is, again, sin. The concept of sin traps in every way. It is not something external so that the 
punishment is another thing; no, the punishment, though punishment, is nonetheless, again, sin" (translation 
mine). 
33SV IV 186 (Fragments. 16). 
34SV IV 185 (Fragments, 15). This may wel1 be the text that Lindstrom has in mind when he draws the 
earlier-mentioned comparison with Flacius. Certainly Climacus's thesis is not unreminiscent of that for which 
Flacius contended during his Weimar Disputation against Strigel in 1560. There he argued that the person, at 
conversion, is not even capable of relating to grace in the manner of a wood-block or a stone. On the contrary, 
as a sinner, he is capable only of opposition toward God. 
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in order to reveal the full depth of his bondage to sin,3s as well as the severity of the expedi-
ent that is required in order to restore his freedom. Only God can confer the condition 
wherein man's will could be effectua1.36 It almost goes without saying: not only is this condi-
tion (faith) "not an act of the will"--it is, in fact, conferred in spite of man's (perverse) willing.37 
35 Anti-Climacus, too, asserts both, referring the will's inability to its perversity--a perversity so complete 
that it cannot be known apart from revelation, and even then cannot be comprehended but must be believed (SV 
XI 205-7 [Sickness unto Death. 95-96]). Pap X2 A 437 (JP 4:4031) likewise observes both aspects of 
humanity's fallen condition, referring inability to perversity. 
36SV N 227 (Fragments. 62-63). 
371n the passage cited, Climacus draws the rather weaker conclusion: "But if I do not possess the condition 
... then all my willing is of no avail, even though, once the condition is given, that which was valid for the 
Socratic is again valid." Our stronger conclusion shows itself to be justified, however, in view ofthe previously 
cited passage, according to which the learner is not merely outside the truth, but polemical against it. That 
statement clearly renders the force of the present one hypothetical: ifthere could be talk of willing at all, such 
willing could only be effectual within the condition. But of course, there can be no such talk. 
Yet, if this is the preferred interpretation, what are we to make of religiousness A's stupendous efforts at 
"willing?" Texts such as SV III 98-99,147 (Fear and Trembling. 48-49,99) and SVVII 218 (Postscript, 258), 
in particular, create difficulties. These texts contend, on the one hand, that the person can use his own powers 
to renounce finitude, repent of guilt, and enter into despair; on the other hand, they contend that divine 
assistance is needed ifthe person is to return from this state of self-willed annihilation. In the light of such texts 
Gregor Malantschuk has observed that "the person can ... attain to a negative freedom, i.e., amidst the greatest 
exertion he can disengage himself from his boundness to finitude; but he cannot attain to the positive freedom, 
viz., to actualize the good, since he does not have further powers remaining." In order for the person to "come 
further, he must be helped by the transcendent power" ("Guds Almagt og Menneskets Frihed," in Fra Individ 
til den Enkelte [Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel, 1978],219). 
Admittedly, such texts do give the appearance of man doing first "that which lies within him," 
whereupon God intervenes, doing all the rest (again, in this connection see SV V 128 and 147 [Eighteen 
Upbuilding Discourses. 352 and 375]). They seem to indicate that the person's own efforts have a limited, but 
necessary role in preparing him for grace. The ordo salutis seems to be: first the person's resignation, etc., then 
the divinely wrought miracle of grace. Nevertheless, if one inquires more closely into whether SK really does 
construe such acts of human religiosity as having intrinsic value, the answer is clearly, 'No.' Take the act of 
resignation. The very circumstance that Fear and Trembling's knight of infinite resignation remains mired in 
melancholy (the very antithesis to faith!) means that his negative freedom is not of the good. Malantschuk 
comes close to conceding this when he denies that man, by his resignation, can actualize the good. Yet he does 
not take the crucial, further step and deny that man's resignation is ofthe good. Kierkegaard himself however 
does recognize that resignation, repentance, and so on, if not taken up and blessed by God, are of the evil: 
witness the phenomenon of "crazed repentance" that Vigilius Haufniensis designates a "sophistry of sin "--one 
that can only be disarmed by faith (SVN 384-85 [Conce.pt of Anxiety. 116-17]). If this be the nature ofpurely 
human repentance, then in order for it to be taken up into the economy of salvation, it must become the tool 
of prevenient grace. The same can be said of all of the moments of religiousness A: resignation, renunciation, 
and repentance. While Johannes Climacus, for example, ostensibly presents "dying to" as a process of dying 
to self, it must not be forgotten that he is well aware that religiousness A's watchword, "Subjectivity is truth," 
gets turned on its head with the advent of religiousness B's teaching on sin: "Subjectivity is untruth." 
Accordingly, there can be no doubt that he regards religious self-denial as hopelessly leavened by sin's leaven. 
But if this be so, then it is not independently of grace, but by virtue of grace that the religious aspirant's deeply 
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In view of the sheer number and weightiness of the texts in which the tenability of 
the liberum arbitrium is denied and the bondage of the will asserted, there can be no doubt 
that any cooperation with grace on the part of unregenerate man is excluded. Indeed this is 
what we would expect, given the fact--to which Hirsch himself has called attention--that, 
over against Hegel, Kierkegaard was compelled to stress the qualitative breach that separates 
man from God. All of man's capabilities vis-a.-vis "things higher" must be denied--above all, 
the will. Just as sin has effected a change in human intellective capability with the 
consequence that God's truth has become all-too transcendent, so too has it effected a like 
change in human volition: man cannot will that which transcends his power of willing, and 
such have the things of God come to be. Were matters otherwise--were sin's outcome not the 
complete derangement of man's will but only an attenuation of its powers in relation to the 
good--then we would be back in "the Socratic." The will would be essentially disposed 
toward the good, and its disinclination therefore explainable in terms of accidental factors, 
such as ignorance. Likewise, any factor occasioning its reorientation would be accidental. 
Man would be in immanent possession of the truth. Such a teaching on the will would be at 
complete odds with Kierkegaard's understanding of Christianity vis-a.-vis speculative 
idealism. Clearly, the broad lines of his thought are just as incompatible with synergism as 
were those of Luther's, for both are marked by sharp diastasis. 
On the other hand, as Hirsch has also noted, Kierkegaard was obliged to insist upon 
human freedom contra Hegel--again, in order to secure the qualitative distinction between 
God and man. If freedom is denied to human beings, then a monergism results that is quite 
indistinguishable from monism. In order to defend against this tendency toward monism that 
issues from the misguided attempt at securing God's omnipotence at the cost of human 
freedom, Kierkegaard was at pains to point out that true omnipotence, so far from negating 
human freedom, actually demands it. In Pap VIII A 181 we read that the ability to make 
another being free constitutes a necessary qualification of omnipotence: 
flawed efforts at salvation achieve any salvific significance. The resignation, renunciation, repentance--and, 
ultimately, despair--in which they end, because qualified by sin and unfreedom, cannot be conceived as 
cooperation with grace. Any significance that they may have must be due strictly to their "co-optation" by 
grace. But in that case, what we have is not "synergism" or "preparation for grace," but grace's self-
preparation in human subjectivity. 
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By far the greatest thing that can be done for a being, greater than all that one can 
make it to be, is to make it free. In order to be able to do just this, omnipotence is 
required. This seems strange, since it is precisely omnipotence that must make 
dependent. But if one will consider omnipotence, one will see precisely therein the 
further qualification of being able to withdraw itself again in omnipotence's 
expression in such a way that, by virtue thereof, what has come into being through 
omnipotence can thereby be independent. 38 
Not only is the ability to render a being free a necessary feature of omnipotence, Kierkegaard 
regards it as the most awesome of qualifications attaching thereto: 
This is the incomprehensible thing: that omnipotence is not only able to bring forth 
the most impressive of all--the world's visible totality--but is able to bring forth the 
most fragile of all--an independent being over against itself; hence: that omnipo-
tence, which with its prodigious hand can rest so heavily upon the world, can also 
make itself so light that what has come into existence receives independence. It is but 
a paltry and mundane conception of the dialectic of power that imagines power to be 
all the greater in relation to the degree in which it can compel and make dependent. 
No, Socrates understood it better, viz., that the art of exercising power is precisely 
to make free. 
If it were not already sufficiently clear that human freedom is less a limit upon God's 
omnipotence than a demand of it, Kierkegaard drives home the point with still more clarity 
by considering the negative consequence that the denial of freedom would hold for our 
conception of God. For this purpose he turns to the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo which, he 
contends, is an assertion not only of God's omnipotence but of man's freedom. Kierkegaard 
bids us consider the doctrine's alternative: "If man had the least self-subsistence over against 
God in advance (in respect of materia), then God could not make him free." Such self-
subsistence would, in effect, be an expression of monistic dependence upon God's 
substantia, and would render true freedom impossible. The upshot is that the prerogative of 
creating a free being belongs solely to the Creator ex nihilo, and is his definitive characteris-
tic. Conversely, the attribution to man of anything less than freedom is tantamount to the 
denial of God's ability to create ex nihilo; and this is, in effect, to deny his power really to 
create at all. 
38Pap VII' A 181 (lP 2:1251), translation mine. 
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The doctrine of man's freedom is, therefore, necessary to Christianity; it is just as 
profound an expression of God's exaltedness as is the doctrine that man can do nothing apart 
from grace. Although the two doctrines seem to deny each other, the affirmation of the one 
to the exclusion of the other results in the denial of that which each seeks, on its own 
strength, to affirm. In order to effect their common end, then, both must be affirmed 
together--however much this conflicts with human reason. An emphasis upon grace that 
would neglect man's freedom issues in a monism that denies God's power to create entities 
distinct from himself; in effect, it makes of all things an ultimately homogeneous divinity 
and therewith posits the dependency of God upon his own creation. Conversely, an emphasis 
upon freedom that would neglect God's grace issues in a monadism wherein man assumes 
the status of a demi-divinity. The former makes of him "god" and the latter "a god." In either 
case, the qualitative distinction between the human and the divine vanishes and God is 
reduced to immanence. 
The emphatic manner in which Kierkegaard insists upon man's real freedom before 
God becomes more understandable in this light (as does Luther's own insistence upon some 
kind of freedom--if only a freedom in bondage). Hence, in a journal entry that touches upon 
the already-mentioned problematic of freedom vs. fatalism, Kierkegaard lUles out the possi-
bility of an infinite regress that would refer each and every act of human subjectivity to a 
prior act of God. At some point subjectivity must be affirmed in its own right if we are to 
avoid fatalism.39 In SV X 182 (Christian Discourses, 187-88) it is asserted that there is one 
thing that God cannot take away from a person--the voluntary--and that this is precisely what 
Christianity requires. In Pap X2 A 428 (JP 2: 1261) Kierkegaard expresses his wonder "that 
God can concede to man so much that he, with regard to himself, can want to speak almost 
like a suitor ... 'Will you have me, or will you not,' and then wait one single second for the 
answer." Of man's own role in dying to immediacy until at last he feels disgust for this life, 
thereby making himself fit for eternity, Kierkegaard writes in Pap Xe A 439 (JP 6:6969) that 
this is the sole work of freedom: 
39Pap X2 A 301 (JP 4:4551). 
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Only freedom can do it, but the surprising thing is to be able to express oneself by 
thanking God for it, as if it were God who did it. And in his joy over being able to 
do this, he is so happy that he will hear absolutely nothing about his having done it, 
but he gratefully attributes all to God and prays to God that it may stay that way, that 
it is God who does it, for he has no faith in himself, but he does have faith in God.40 
Likewise SV XII 160 (Practice in Christianity, 171) and Pap XS A 25, 29 and 79 (JP 3:3769, 
3770 and 3774) all maintain that salvation is a matter of free choice to which God can force 
no one--not even if he uses the most forcible of means. Such texts emphasizing man's role 
in salvation abound. How are they to be reconciled with the "bondage" texts that emphasize 
the priority and sole efficacy of grace? 
In order to answer this question we must inquire more narrowly into the precise rela-
tionship that obtains between grace and human freedom in Kierkegaard's thought. Here, as 
before, the theology of the cross provides our clue. It will be recalled from what was earlier 
said about the theory of the stages that despair was the motive force behind the passage 
from one stage to the next. The ethicist in Either/Or, after having pointed out to his young 
friend the despair that is endemic to the aesthetic way of life, drew for him the self-evident 
conclusion: "But when one knows this, and you certainly do know it, then a higher form of 
existence is an imperative requirement. ,,41 It was the aesthete's own despair, then, that was 
to propel him on to the ethical. In like manner, the ethical way of life was shown to be 
despair in virtue of the unrealizability of its requirement. Thus was the stage set for the leap 
to the religious whereby one was at least able to relate to God negatively via resignation, 
renunciation, and repentance. The travail of the religious life, though great, was not 
unbearable for at least one could sustain a relationship to God. With the revelation of sin all 
of this changed. The way forward was barred, yet so too was the way back: one could not 
return to immediacy (except by virtue of the demonic) for reflection had deprived one of 
one's taste for life (Quidam). Only at this point of extreme necessity--and not before42 --did 
~is remarkable journal entry (the last one penned by SK before his death) does, in my estimation, reflect 
a fundamental shift toward synergism. Yet the weight of the evidence prior to the final period indicates that 
SK has not always ascribed so much to man, and so little to God. 
41SV II 174 (Either/of II, 192). 
42Here cf. Pap )f A 470 (JP 1 :534). 
160 
Christianity present itself as "the radical cure." The timing was critical, for no one would 
willingly get involved with Christianity unless so compelled by the consciousness of sin. The 
progression of the stages, therefore, resembled a kind of funnel in which one's possibilities 
became more and more limited until, at last, they had been reduced, really, to but one: either 
Christianity ... or despair. 
See, this is Christianity. If you are not conscious of being a sinner to the degree that, 
in the anxiety of the anguished conscience, you dare not do otherwise than commit 
yourself to Christ--then you never will become a Christian. Only the agony of the 
consciousness of sin can explain the fact that a person will submit to this radical 
cure. To become a Christian is the most terrifying operation of all--all. But as little 
as it could occur to a person who only felt slightly indisposed to submit to the most 
excruciating operation, just so little could it occur to a person to get involved with 
Christianity if sin did not torment him beyond measure.43 
Such is Kierkegaard's characterization of the way in which one comes to embrace 
Christianity. It is the way of the Hollenfahrt of the consciousness of sin. The relationship to 
Luther's theology of the cross is unmistakable. Yet if his reader should, notwithstanding, 
miss the implicit reference, Kierkegaard obliges him by elsewhere making the connection 
explicit. Having, in Part I of Practice in Christianity, described the enormity of the suffering 
to which Christ invites the person whose suffering seems already unbearable, Anti-Climacus 
poses the question: 
"But if the essentially Christian is something so terrifying and appalling, how in the 
world can anyone think of accepting Christianity?" Very simply and, if you wish that 
also, in quite a Lutheran way: only the consciousness of sin can force one, if I dare 
to put it that way (from the other side, grace is the force), into this horror. And at 
that very same moment the essentially Christian transforms itself into and is sheer 
leniency, grace, love, mercy. Considered in any other way Christianity is and must 
be a kind of madness or the greatest horror. Admittance is only through the 
consciousness of sin; to want to enter by any other road is high treason against Chris-
• • 44 bamty. 
4Jpap Xl A 190, p. 137 (JP 1 :496), translation mine. This theme appears at a very early point in Kierke-
gaard's thinking--Pap I A 89 and 99 (JP 1 :415 and 3:3247) already refer to Christianity as "the radical cure." 
Moreover, it continues throughout (Pap X6 B 240, p. 402). Faith, on SK's understanding, simply is despair's 
category (SV VII 167n [Postscript, 200nD. 
44SV XII 64-65 (Practice in Christianity. 67-68, slightly amended). Emphasis added. 
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"To want to enter by any other road" than that of the consciousness of sin--this, says Anti-
Climacus, is Majestrets-ForbQ'delse, it is boundless presumption that offends against God's 
majesty, in a word, it is the way of glory. Christianity bars every such essay by way of glory 
precisely by means of the humiliation of the consciousness of sin.4s The matter cannot be 
otherwise for, as we have seen, to become a Christian is to undergo "the most terrifying 
operation of all"--one that lasts an entire lifetime. But if the very process of becoming a 
Christian is itself so far from being a via gloriae that it is rather a protracted suffering that 
is to be shunned at all cost, then neither can the way that leads to Christianity--viz., the con-
sciousness of sin--be a via gloriae. In point of fact, it is the greater bane of the two. And it 
is because sin's illness is so great a bane that the consciousness of it becomes the supreme 
inducement for accepting Christianity's radical cure. The consciousness of sin is the means 
by which God forces the individual to get involved with Christianity. To recapitulate: seen 
"from the other side"--Le. from this side where only cross and suffering are visible--"grace 
is force." 
It is striking indeed to observe the frequency with which Kierkegaard attributes the 
acceptance of Christianity to this state of ultimate extremity in which the person who is 
cognizant of his sins finds himself.46 While, doubtless, few modems can sympathize with 
the distress of a Luther or a Kierkegaard in this regard (in point of fact, few of Kierkegaard's 
contemporaries could so sympathize with him 47) Kierkegaard is in deadly earnest when, 
for example, at the conclusion of each of the discourses in Part II of the Christian Dis-
courses, he asserts: "only sin is man's ruin." As far as he is concerned, sin is the only thing 
worth fearing; indeed, so fearsome is it that the consciousness of it constitutes a tentamen 
45 Again I call attention to SV X 190-91 (Christian Discourses, 197) and SV XI 278 (High Priest--Publican--
Woman Who Was a Sinner, 384) where the love of God for his own sake (his perfection, etc.) is branded as 
impertinence. Man's only real (and proper) motive for loving God is his need of him. Any presumed ~ on 
the part of man for God is, in fact, the worst kind of presumption. Yet this need for God (at bottom, the need 
for forgiveness) is the "terrifying," the "disturbing," the "disquieting," as we learn in another of Kierkegaard's 
discourses on Luke 7:47 (SV XII 278 [Two Discourses at Communion on Fridays, 16)). In short, it is the 
dreaded way of the cross that only subsequently shows itself to be salubrious. 
~n addition to the texts already cited the following could, for example, be added: Pap IXA414 (IP 1 :493), 
Pap Xl A 133 (IP 4:4018), and Pap Xl A 467 (JP 1:503). 
47See, e.g., Pap VIII l A 473 (IP 4:4012) and SV VII 37-38 (Postscript, 50-51). 
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ri20rosum the severity of which is rivaled only by that of death. Hence Kierkegaard can 
speak of the reckoning with Christianity as a thing that most people postpone until the 
moment of death.48 So painful is the recognition of one's own wretchedness that the specter 
of death itself is generally required in order to elicit it.49 
The sum of the matter, then, is that in not a few texts Christianity is presented as "the 
radical cure" to which the individual would never willingly consent did he not find himself 
in the throes of an illness still more dread. Add to these citations those which, though 
acknowledging salvation to be a free choice to which God can force no one--not even if he 
uses the most forcible of means--nevertheless describe grace as just those forcible means, so 
and the conclusion becomes unavoidable that Kierkegaard's understanding of grace is one 
of God's uncompromising severity that all but inflicts itself upon the individual. Only on the 
other side of death--for it is through a life-long process of dying that grace leads the 
believer--does grace assume its true aspect.Sl There is perhaps no stronger expression of 
this than Kierkegaard's final journal entry, wherein grace is said to be precisely those means 
by which God leads the person "to the highest degree of weariness with life." To this end, 
"in the final course of this life, God transforms himself, as it were, into sheer cruelty, with 
the most cruelly devised cruelty does everything to rob [the 'graced' one] of all zest for 
life. ,,52 When God hears praise from a person who has been brought to this extreme point 
of weariness with life--i.e. praise for having been brought to this point--he says: "Here it 
is." Here is what God had been waiting for all along. Though the self-transformation of God 
into the visage of sheer cruelty is, in this entry, particularly assigned to the final course of 
life, it is nevertheless characteristic of grace's operation all the way through, for grace's 
ultimate object is to prepare a reluctant soul for eternity. One might say that the goal of 
4BPap ~ A 459 (JP 2: 1908): "When a man becomes thoroughly unhappy, then Christianity tastes good to 
him. This is why most resort to Christianity at the time of death." 
49Pap X3 A 184 (JP 2:1137). 
soE.g., Pap. XS A 25, 29, 79 (JP 3:3769,3770,3774). 
S'sv XII 365-67 (For Self-ExaminatioQ, 81-84). 
S2Pap xn2 A 439 (JP 6:6969), translation mine. 
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grace's "alien work" is the confonnitas of a soul that is not yet in a state of complete 
confonnity with God's will. But this fact that the Christian's will is at odds with God's will 
can only mean that grace is a kind of compulsion.s3 
In view of the foregoing, then, a picture emerges of grace as a kind of necessary 
severity to which God is driven in his role as parent who must deal with a willful child.54 
Corresponding to this picture of grace there emerges one of freedom as an initial grudging 
submission on the part of the child that, as the process of upbringing continues, increasingly 
comes to be willing submission. Casting light upon this and other aspects of Kierkegaard's 
concept of freedom is a journal entry dating from 1850, Pap X2 A 428 (JP 2: 1261). There he 
speaks of the person's choice of God as the choice that isn't a choice: 
Is it not a strange but profound linguistic usage that one can say: there is 
absolutely no question here of any choice--I choose this and that. ... Further, 
S~Cf. Pap ~ A 620 (JP 4:4690). Granted, in On the Bondage of the Will Luther denies that God's operation 
upon the believer involves any kind of compUlsion (WA 18,634-39 [LW 33,64-70)). What he is talking about 
in that context, however, is God's operation through the gospel whereby he creates in the person a new heart 
that delights in God's will. The context ofSK's remarks about grace as compulsion is altogether different since 
he has in mind God's gracious operation through the law. Where the law is concerned, Luther will concur that 
it does not change the heart, making it willing to do God's will; on the contrary, either it makes it ever more 
refractory and closed toward the gospel, or ever more miserable and aware of its need of grace. More than this, 
Luther will concur that the law continues to exercise the latter office even after one has become a believer--
see, e.g., his expositions of Gal. 3:23-25 and 4:3, which contrast the "time of law" with the "time of grace." 
There Luther identifies the "time oflaw" not simply with the period prior to Christ's advent, but with the whole 
of this temporal Hfe. Likewise, he identifies the "time of grace" not simply with the period following Christ's 
advent, but with the new eon that is in the process of completion through the daily, hourly, yes, the continual 
advent of Christ (WA 401, 524-38 and 550 [LW 26, 340-51 and 360]). That is to say, the believer finds himself 
in both of these times, pressed by the law as well as emboldened by grace ("The Christian is divided in this 
way into two times. To the extent that he is flesh, he is under the Law; to the extent that he is spirit, he is under 
the Gospel" (WA 401 526 [LW 26,342]). But even the law serves a gracious function for the believer: it is the 
custodian that is given for our own good until we have reached the age of majority and been fully entrusted with 
the promise. Accordingly, the fact that SK depicts the law's constraining function as "grace" must not conceal 
the fundamental agreement that obtains between him and Luther. Luther, too, understands it as a "mask" of 
God's gracious intent toward the elect. 
S4J0rgen Bukdahl ("'Indmmmeisen'. Dens plads i SII/ren Kierkegaards kristendomsforstaaelse og 
vrekkelsesaktion," Dansk teologisk tidsskrift 26 [1963] :96-124) has drawn attention to Kierkegaard's recurrent 
use of the image of "upbringing" in describing the relationship with God (cf. the previous reference to the law's 
custodianship of the heir of grace!). Presupposed is the context offamilial reJations--grace--not that of a judge 
imposing sentence in a court of\aw. Hence, notwithstanding the severity that Kierkegaard is wont to attribute 
to his own gracious God in the latter's dealings with the Christian, this God is most certainly not the monk, 
Luther's, vengeful one. And yet, as we have maintained throughout, this God is the paradoxical deity of Luther 
the reformer, i.e., the God whose gracious will is concealed under cross and suffering. 
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Christianity can say to a person: You shall choose the one thing needful, but in such 
a way that there must be no question of any choice--i.e., if you blather on at length, 
then you are not actually choosing the one thing needful; it, just like God's kingdom, 
must be chosen first. So there is therefore something in relation to which there must 
not, and by definition cannot be,ss any choice, and yet there is a choice. Hence, 
precisely this fact--that there isn't any choice--is the expression for the prodigious 
passion or intensity with which one chooses. Can a more accurate expression be 
given for the fact that freedom of choice [VaI2friheden] is only a formal determinant 
of freedom, and that precisely the accentuation of freedom of choice as such is the 
loss of freedom? Freedom's content is decisive for freedom to such a degree that the 
truth in freedom of choice itself is: there must be no choice, even though it is a 
choice. 
Here, as before, true freedom is not principally characterized as "freedom-to-choose-
between" (choice as entailing plurality of choices, with the formal possibility of selecting 
any of them), but as freedom materially qualified by its object--here, freedom as choosing, 
indeed, as already in a state of abandonment to, its raison de'etre--God.s6 Certainly the 
reason for this lies, in part, in the nature of freedom itself. If one examines freedom, one 
readily sees that it does not inhere in neutrality toward possible objects of choice, for such 
would be the deferment of choice--a condition implying either indifference or the anxious 
bondage of freedom to its possibility. On the contrary, freedom is only found in the 
passionate exercise (and surrender!) of freedom by means of the choice. Hence Climacus 
speaks of freedom's realized possibility as, perforce, an annihilated possibility, indeed, as 
the annihilation of every other possibility.s7 Yet because the essence of freedom is to 
annihilate the possible through actualizing it, and because possibility is itself the condition 
for the possibility of freedom, it follows that the exercise of freedom necessarily entails the 
surrender of freedom--at least freedom of choice. Such is concrete freedom. It is character-
ized by content, and only incidentally so by its field of annulled possibility. But if that 
S1be translation is my own. Note that the phrase to which this footnote immediately attaches is incorrectly 
rendered in the Hong translation. 
S6Cf. Pap ~ A 177 (JP 2:1269). Also SV X 90-91 (Christian Discourses. 90). That true freedom inheres in 
the relinquishment of freedom we have already seen in SV IV 186 (Fragments. 16). The model for such 
freedom is that which the lover feels when he, in an act of utter abandon, relinquishes his freedom in his choice 
of the beloved (SV II 42 [EitherlOr II, 45]). 
S7SV IV 245 (Fragments. 81). 
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content be God--the summum bonum--then it becomes even more imperative to speak of 
freedom as being characterized by its content or material detennination. The surrender of 
freedom to Freedom-Itself can be nothing less than the true freedom. So slight a role does 
"freedom of choice" play in this choice that here there can be no question of any choice, or 
if you will, "the truth in freedom of choice is: there must be no choice, even though it is a 
choice."s8 
This is one thing to be noted from the above entry. Another is that freedom is lost by 
not immediately abandoning one's freedom of choice to the true, materially-qualified 
freedom while such is still to be found. Now this failure to abandon one's freedom of choice, 
and therewith oneself, to material freedom's object is, Kierkegaard tells us, directly related 
to a dallying flirtation with formal freedom's possibility: 
Freedom is real only insofar as it, in the same moment, in the same second 
that it (freedom of choice) is present, makes infinite haste to bind itself uncondition-
ally by abandonment's choice--the choice whose truth is that there cannot be question 
about any choice. 
It is an incomprehensible wonder of almighty love that God can actually 
concede so much to a human being that He, for his part, can will to say, almost like 
a suitor ... will you have me or not, and then wait a single second for the answer. 
Ah, but man is not so entirely spirit. He thinks: since the choice is left to me 
myself, I'll take some time and first really seriously consider this matter. Pitiful 
anticlimax! "Seriousness" consists precisely in choosing God immediately and 
"first." And so the person lies and conjures with a phantom: freedom of choice, 
whether he has it or whether he does not have it, etc.: and even scientifically? He 
does not notice that he missed freedom. Thus he perhaps amuses himself for a time 
with the notion of freedom of choice, until it again transfonns itself and he becomes 
doubtful as to whether he has freedom of choice. And now he has lost freedom of 
choice as well. It is by a sheer tactical blunder (militarily speaking) that he confuses 
everything. By staring at "freedom of choice" instead of choosing, one loses both 
freedom and freedom of choice. It can never be regained by means of reflection; if 
it is to be gotten again, it must be by an intensified fear and trembling, evoked by the 
thought of having squandered it. 
The enonnous thing that is conceded to a person is: choice, freedom. If you 
want to save and preserve it, there is only one way: by, in the same second, uncondi-
tionally and in complete abandon, giving it back to God, and yourself in it. If this 
sight of what is conceded you tempts you, if you give in to the temptation and look 
with selfish desire upon freedom of choice, then you lose freedom. And your 
58 Accordingly, SK can speak of voluntariness as containing within itself "an inner urging" (Pap XJ A 24). 
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punishment then is to go about in a kind of bewildennent, boasting that you have--
freedom of choice. Woe unto you, it is the sentence upon you: you have freedom of 
choice, you say, and you have not yet chosen God. So you become sick, freedom of 
choice becomes your idee fixe; in the end you become as the rich man who 
melancholically imagines that he is impoverished and will die of want: you sigh that 
you have lost freedom of choice--and the problem is merely that you do not grieve 
deeply enough, for then you would surely regain it.59 
In the preceding, we encounter a number of, by now, familiar themes: freedom's 
object as its principal determinant; freedom's preservation as inhering in the immediate and 
unconditional relinquishment of freedom to that object; and finally, fixation upon freedom 
of choice as the cause of man's abdication of true freedom, as the sorry remnant of his lost 
freedom. In addition to these familiar themes, however, there is something new--viz., the 
means by which freedom is restored: "intensified fear and trembling," grief that is deep 
enough. Hence Kierkegaard can say elsewhere in the present journal entry: 
There must be no choice .... However strange it may then seem, one must therefore 
say that only fear and trembling, and only coercion. can help a person to freedom. 
For fear and trembling and coercion can master him in such a way that there is not 
any question about choice--and then one in all likelihood chooses the right thing. At 
the moment of death most people choose the right thing. 
It will be seen that this "new" feature concerning the means by which lost freedom 
is restored is, in fact, the "old" picture of grace as a kind of constraining force that succes-
sively reduces the scope of man's formal freedom until he again experiences the urgency of 
S9The above account of the loss of freedom corresponds closely to that given in The Concept of Anxiety. 
There the faU is said to occur, not through the aUuring power of evil (the distinction between good and evil 
being given with the fall, not before it--SV IV 379-80, 315-16 [Concept of Anxiety, 111-12,44-46]), but 
through the ambiguity of freedom itself. Via the intermediate term of anxiety (which is awakened by the 
simultaneously alluring and repelling character of freedom's indeterminate possibility--that of being able) 
freedom is said to become "ensnared in itselr' (p. 320 [49]). The fall from freedom occurs straightway. 
Likening anxiety to a kind of vertigo that freedom experiences when it looks down into its own possibility, 
Vigilius writes: "Freedom succumbs in this dizziness .... In that very moment everything is changed, and 
freedom, when it again rises, sees that it is guilty" (p. 331 [61]). While stressing that the faU occurs in 
innocence, Haufniensis also points out that an element of selfishness is also involved: "In anxiety there is the 
selfish infinity of possibility, which does not tempt like a choice but ensnaringly disquiets with its sweet 
anxiousness" (p. 331 [61 D. Moreover, freedom has the responsibility for having, in the first place, sustained 
the dizziness to which it was to succumb--Yigilius points out that the cause of dizziness in the person who 
gazes into the abyss "is just as much in his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down" (p. 
331 [61 D. If we seek an answer to the question of how freedom could have been preserved from this fate, it 
is given in the above journal entry: "By in the same second, unconditionally and in complete abandon, giving 
it back to God." 
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the choice that isn't a choice. Through the deprivation of fonnal freedom (the elimination of 
all viable options, save one) man comes into possession of material--that is to say, real--
freedom, and finds himself able willin~ly to choose that to which he had hitherto only ~dL!­
inL!ly submitted. One kind of submission (viz., to sin) has been exchanged for another. The 
concept of the will underlying this presentation is not far removed from Luther's picture of 
the horse that is under one of two riders--the devil or God. Indeed, the previously cited 
texts--all of which asserted man's utter unwillingness to involve himself with Christianity 
were he not obliged to do so by the divinity'S gracious application of a "goad"--only serve 
to confinn such an understanding of the will.60 
These ideas--freedom qua total submission to God, and grace qua increasing 
constraint upon man's fonnal freedom in order that he may experience real freedom--are 
simultaneously present in a remarkable way in an utterance of the Quidam-figure in Stages 
on Life's Way. There, with regard to his choice of isolation and reserve, Quidam remarks: 
"Governance has made me captive .... Who would think twice about choosing a relationship 
of confidence, but my choice is not free. Here I am sensible of freedom only when in 
necessity I surrender myself and in the surrender forget it [Le., freedom].,,61 While this text 
derives from a stage in Quidam's religious development in which his choice cannot yet be 
said to be the joyous, grace-affirming "choice that isn't a choice" just discussed, it 
nevertheless accurately reflects the relationship between grace and human freedom: through 
the constraining operation of grace, man's will is transferred from the evil to the good so that 
he is able to choose the latter. To be sure, he was, in a manner of speaking, "forced" into 
choosing it (the alternative being perdition), but at some point this compulsion has 
undergone a Gestalt-switch, becoming the opportunity to choose the good. As a result of 
the wholehearted directedness of the will to this object of choice, all other such objects have 
6Oy'alter Lindstrom (Stadiernas teologi, 355-56) gives a similar account of the means by which man comes 
to choose God: whereas "Kierkegaard so often enjoins the demand of choice, decision, and inwardness, 
speaking of it as a human being's deed in sentences that sound so strongly synergistic that one gets the 
impression that it is man in his freedom who, by his own hand, makes the decisive turnabout," the fact of the 
matter is that he "does not choose to go to God without being forced, hence, without God choosing him." 
61SV VI 328 (~ 351), bracketed interpolation mine. 
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fallen away; the necessity of choosing this one thing among others has ceased to be felt, or 
rather, it has come to be felt in quite a different way: as freedom, as the choice about which 
there is no question of any choice. 
The preceding discussion of the relationship that obtains between grace and human 
freedom has now brought us full-circle to the question of Kierkegaard's purported "syn-
ergism." On the one hand, his claims concerning the will's subjection either to sin or to God 
are consistent with Luther's seryum arbitrium teaching. On the other hand, the compelling 
nature of grace does not exclude the person's own, free response: he himself says "yes" to 
God--this answer is not extracted from him against his will. While this in itself does not 
contradict Luther's teaching, it would seem that another of Kierkegaard's contentions does: 
viz., that the outcome of man's choice, at some point, rests in the mystery of human 
SUbjectivity, not merely God's predestining grace.62 Are we not therefore faced with a 
modified form of synergism after all? 
Certainly it is not a synergism on Hirsch's model, for which the operation of grace 
is limited to the narrow "portal" of regeneration. On Kierkegaard's model one would rather 
say that it is the operation of freedom that is so limited. Its "options" have been reduced to 
two: either God or despair. Its role has correspondingly been reduced to one: the choice of 
God or perdition. Upon choosing, the narrow maneuvering room of formal freedom opens 
up onto the much broader vista of Christian freedom, as Hirsch correctly indicates.63 Yet 
this new freedom is peculiarly understood as material freedom: free abandonment to the 
62Again, see Pap X2 A 301 (JP 4:4551). N. Teisen (Om S"ren Kierkegaard's Betydning som kristelig 
Trenker, [Copenhagen: J. Frimodts Forlag, 1903], 89) rightly points out that, Kierkegaard's Augustinian 
premises notwithstanding, "he left the attempt at squaring the circle to Augustine and his pupils (Luther and 
Calvin)." Kierkegaard could not subscribe to anyone-sided predestination teaching for one very compelling 
reason: he "at every point takes the field on behalf of the ethical which, for him, is synonymous with having 
responsibility before God, and apart from which there is no seriousness in life. He upholds it over against 
speculation that would tum everything, including human thought and action, into the Idea's necessary 
movements" (p. 91). Kierkegaard "has clearly seen that the question is whether man is merely a thing or is 
intended for personality; whether he is a real self that, within certain boundaries, really can act, or whether he 
is merely acted through, a point of passage for the activity of nature or the absolute, universal power" (p. 90). 
63With the proviso that the freedom of the Christian is but one aspect of his experience, for he is also simul 
peccator. That is to say, he is obliged to experience "grace's" constraining power his whole life long, repeatedly 
passing through formal freedom's narrow portal. 
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will of God--in a word, to the controlling power of grace--again conceived as a necessity, 
but one that is now felt as enlarging, rather than constraining. 
Despite Hirsch's inversion of the relationship between freedom and grace, we might 
nevertheless say with him that integral to this schema is "one point, the hidden one"--
amending his statement, however, so as to read: offreedom. God's constraining grace brings 
the individual's will to the point at which it is in repossession of the ability to surrender itself 
instantaneously to God. This capability is not to be denied if Christianity is to avoid fatalism. 
Yet this renewed condition of freedom of choice is not to be understood as liberum arbitrium 
and hence, as the possibility for man's Mitwirken alongside, and independently of, grace. It 
should, rather, be understood on the model of the freedom that man possessed while yet in 
the state of innocence. Not even in that state was his will neutralt rather, it was in the 
good, possessing the potential for real freedom if only it would relinquish its freedom of 
choice by choosing God. Hence the reconstituted wi1l65 that Kierkegaard has in mind is one 
that is in the good and whose activity is more accurately spoken of as an "Inwirken im 
Wirken Gottes.,,66 That is to say: Kierkegaard is no synergist in the sense of contending for 
the will's efficacy--however severely attenuated--independently of grace. In this he concurs 
with orthodox Lutheran doctrine;67 indeed, the agreement extends still further. On parity 
with the latter's rejection of double predestination through its referral of man's fall from 
grace to his own free choice, Kierkegaard likewise refers the destiny of the will that has been 
reconstituted by grace to its own choice. If it is possible to reject God in this condition of 
grace, then this is surely no greater a mystery than is the origin of evil in an originally good 
Will.68 In any case, the mystery is not to be resolved by assigning man's fate solely to God's 
64SV IV 320 (Concept of Anxiety. 49). 
6SI.e., the will that is in possession of "the condition" wherein it is again effectual--SV IV 227-28 
(Fragments. 63). 
~enninology taken from W. Joest's article, "Synergismus," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. 
3d ed. (TUbingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1961),6:562. 
67The Fonnula of Concord, solid declaration, art. II, par. 66, 77. 
68Kierkegaard strongly applauds Julius MUller's definition of sin's essential nature as precisely 
"incomprehensibility" (Pap X2 A 436 [JP 4:4030]). 
170 
predestining will. And if, for Kierkegaard, the decisive weight then seems to rest on man's 
decision, still this does not qualify his position as synergistic: he does not question the sole 
efficacy of grace whereby the human will is made effectual. What is at issue in the matter 
of salvation is whether man will again abdicate this condition by not immediately using it 
to choose God.69 Hence divine and human agency are, alike, operative in his salvation. 
69This, it would seem, is the import of Climacus's remark in the Fragments concerning the learner's 
indebtedness to the God for having endowed him with "the condition" (faith's autopsy). Climacus writes: "A 
teacher such as that, the learner will never be able to forget, because in that very moment he would sink down 
into himself again, just as the person did who once possessed the condition and then, by forgetting that 
God is, sank into unfreedom. If they were to meet in another life, that teacher would again be able to give the 
condition to the person who had not received it, but he would be another [viz., ajudge] to the person who had 
once received it. After all, the condition was something entrusted, and therefore the receiver was always respon-
sible for an accounting" (SV IV 187 [Fragments. 17-18, emended Hong translation with emphasis added)). 
P. A. Rosenberg (S0ren Kierkegaard, hans Liv. hans Personlighed og hans Forfatterskab: en 
Y«iledning til Studiet af hans Vrerker [Copenhagen: Karl Sch0nbergs Forlag, 1898]) seems to allude to the 
above passage when he writes: ""The condition' comes from 'the God,' and the individual receives it. But can 
the individual, then, not say 'No?' Why, yes, it is expressly stated that the individual can become 'guilty a 
second time' by rejecting the condition" (p. 95). Now, the phrase "guilty a second time" [skyldig anden Gang] 
does not occur in the above-quoted passage in the Fragments. nor in any other, for that matter. Still--
Rosenberg's imprecision in citing it notwithstanding--Climacus does in the above text speak of the theoretical 
possibility of regaining possession of the condition only to lose it again, this time irretrievably. This confirms 
our interpretation of conversion, not as God's one-sided conferral of"the condition" (faith's recognition of him 
behind his lowly servant form), but rather as a simultaneous provisional conferral of both "the condition" and 
"the condition for retaining that condition," if we may so speak. The latter must necessarily be the freedom by 
which the "autopsy" granted to man a second time is either retained or lost; otherwise, Climacus could not 
speak here of a sinking "down into himself again ... into un freedom. " 
Ajoumal entry from SK's student years dealing with the Augustinian view of conversion (Pap I A 101 
[IP 1 :29] from 1837) seems to anticipate the hypothesis of a reconstituted will that can either choose or reject 
Christianity. It seems also to attest to the young Kierkegaard's idiosyncratic use of the term "synergism" to 
designate the will's capacity to choose God subsequentto rebirth. The entry reads as follows: "There is a chief 
contrast: Augustine and Pelagius. The first wants to crush everything in order to raise it; the second addresses 
man as he is. The first system therefore acquires three stages with respect to Christianity: creation--sin's fall 
and a state of death and impotence qualified thereby--and a new creation wherewith man is placed at the 
standpoint that he can choose, and thereupon-if he chooses-Christianity. The second system addresses 
itself to man as he is (Christianity fits into the world). From this one sees the importance of the theory of 
inspiration for the first system; from this one also sees the relationship between the synergistic and the Semi-
Pelagian controversies. It is the same question except that the synergistic controversy has as its presupposition 
the Augustinian system's new creation" (translation and emphasis mine). 
The idiosyncratic understanding of synergism to which this entry seemingly attests may have its roots 
in a misunderstanding of the Fonnula of Concord (art. II, par. 77), where the synergists are said to hold that 
the Holy Spirit makes "a beginning," whereupon the free will responds by its own natural powers (N.B. A 
certain familiarity with this text may be assumed since SK's notes to Clausen's dogmatics lectures of 1833-34 
refer to it--Pap I C 19 [vol. 12, p. 121)). Clearly, such a "beginning" is not identical with Augustine's "new 
creation," and the fact that SK seems to understand it thus only reinforces the suspicion that what he 
understands by "synergism" is not what the original participants of the dispute understood. In addition to the 
apparent misunderstanding about synergism, the above entry also seems to contain a misunderstanding about 
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Kierkegaard puts the matter thus: "In heterodox fashion one must say that conversion 
precedes and conditions forgiveness of sins; in orthodox fashion one must say: the forgive-
ness of sins precedes and strengthens persons to be converted in truth." 70 Per Lenning 
observes that "in the .relationship between these two determinants Kierkegaard never 
managed to maintain any either/or. The person's full and unconditioned responsibility and 
the sole efficacy of God's love were, for him, equally indispensable aspects of Chris-
tianity. ,,71 
Having said this, one thing more must be added lest we leave the impression by our 
schema that the relationship between grace's operation and human agency is utterly unprob-
lematic. In the context of the just-cited statement, Per Lenning also notes that Kierkegaard 
"never allows the dialectic between law and grace to issue in an unambiguous determination 
of how God's and the person's activity in the work of salvation can intervene in, or condition, 
one another." That is to say, the "hidden point" to which we have regularly been alluding is 
not solely that of human freedom but its concurrence with divine grace (otherwise we 
would have the person's "Mitwirken," rather than "Inwirken im Wirken Gottes," all over 
again). This raises the question of predestination. With his emphasis upon individual 
freedom and responsibility, Kierkegaard is of course most readily interpreted as advocating 
foreordination based upon foreknowledge. As he demonstrates in the Frali!ments' "Interlude," 
knowledge of the future no more betokens necessity than does knowledge of the past.72 
Augustine. The latter does not maintain that a newly recreated will can choose God ifit so pleases. Where the 
student, Kierkegaard, could have gotten these ideas is difficult to say, for his notes on Clausen's lectures contain 
no such historical inaccuracies. 
70Pap VII' A 167 (JP 2:1206), translation mine. 
7'''Samtidighedens situation". 201. 
72SV IV 243 (Fragments. 80). In this SK is influenced by Boethius and Leibnitz--see Pap IV C 62 (JP 
2:1245) and Pap V B 15,8 (Fragments. supp., 211). Kierkegaard's own reasoning as to why no event--past, 
present, or future--happens with necessity is based upon the observation that the phenomenon of "coming into 
existence" [Tilblivelse] is a qualification of being (viz., the transition from nonbeing to being), not of essence. 
In terms of modal logic, coming into existence is the transition from possibility to actuality. Necessity, on the 
other hand, is strictly a qualification of essence: the essence of the necessary is to be. Accordingly, the 
necessary does not come to be, it simply is. Or as Kierkegaard can express it: "Precisely by coming into 
existence, everything that comes into existence demonstrates that it is not necessary, for the only thing that 
cannot come into existence is the necessary, because the necessary is" (SV IV 237 [Fragments. 74]). 
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Accordingly, predestination based on foreknowledge would give human freedom its due, 
while according a place to God's eternal counsel, as well. 
There are problems, however, with imputing such a view to Kierkegaard. In the first 
place it does not accomplish that for which it is intended: it does not make God's eternal 
purpose the efficient cause of salvation. Instead of a concurrence of divine and human 
agency, what we have here is causal, though not chronological, priority being given the 
human will--precisely the reverse of real predestinarianism. Hence it is disingenuous to 
designate foreordination based upon foreknowledge by that term; "Arminian" or "Semi-
Pelagian" are far more apt. Kierkegaard himself recognized precisely this difficulty with the 
position while yet a student. In a journal entry dating from 1834 (at which time he was 
intensely preoccupied with the issue of predestination because of his study of Schleier-
macher) he writes: 
When one explains predestination as merely being grounded in foreknowledge, then 
one comes to assume that man merits grace after all. This seems also to lie in 
Origen's words defending this theory in his commentary on Romans: the cause of 
foreordination lies in our own free will. Paul was determined for God's gospel! Why? 
Because he was worthy for this owing to his deeds, foreseen by God.73 
One must assume that SK retained the awareness that a real doctrine of grace demands a 
real--not feigned--doctrine of election. Seldom is such a position attributed to him. Yet 
despite the pervasive judgement of scholars that Kierkegaard rejects the doctrine of 
predestination,74 if one will look closely at the evidence for all but tht; final period (1852-
Kierkegaard uses this reasoning to refute Hegel's claim that the historical process proceeds with necessity; 
nevertheless, it applies with equal felicity to any other fatalistic understanding ofhistory--for example, one 
based on foreknowledge, such as Luther's (see WA 18,614-20 [LW 33,36-44]). 
73Pap I A 43 (JP 3:3546), translation mine. Use of the word "merely" is significant. A doctrine of 
predestination grounded merely in foreknowledge ends with salvation by merit. The door, however, is left open 
for predestination based on efficacious grace with foreknowledge of the person's free choice. This is the 
"convergence" of which we are speaking. 
74See Hirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien, Band 2, Heft 3,44 [646] n. 3; L0nning, "Samtidighedens Situation". 20 1; 
Malantschuk, Fra Individ til den Enkelte, 216. Clearly Kierkegaard does reject the notion of election qua 
caprice, accidental good fortune. Such an attempt to smuggle paganism's aesthetic conception of "fate" into 
Christianity is prevented by the latter's ethical qualification (Pap VII2 B 235, pp. 163-65 [On Authority and 
Revelation, 129-31 n. There are no "Pamphiliuses of Fortune," no lottery winners in the religious sphere (SV 
VII 372, 374 [Postscript, 428, 431]). Yet it is far from clear that Kierkegaard's summary dismissal of "predes-
tination aesthetically conceived" (and one would have to include the conceptions of Augustine, Luther and 
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55), one will discover that his opposition is not directed at the notion per se (i.e., its logical 
incompatibility with human freedom); rather, it is directed at a specific cast of mind that 
shows a predilection for it: desperate self-arrogation.7s Moreover, even his criticism of the 
dogma of predestination is not a criticism of the notion itself, but of its abuse qua dogma 
to minimize subjectivity and slacken (if not eliminate) striving.76 This being the case, one 
can legitimately ask whether a doctrine of election rightly conceived is not possible on the 
theological premises operative throughout the published authorship (i.e., one that humbly 
refrains from speculation and instead retains the subjectivity and striving). 
The fact is that Frater Taciturnus can speak in Stages on Life's Way of "the humble 
expression of a doctrine of predestination," juxtaposing this in a favorable way with the same 
doctrine "arrogantly expressed.,,77 In the former instance one identifies oneself with the lost 
soul who is, in all observable respects, as good a person--yea, an even better person than 
oneself. Here the humble expression of the teaching on predestination is the confession of 
Calvin in this category) is a repudiation of the notion altogether. 
75 SV VII 507 (Postscript. 582); SV VI 444 (~ 478); and Pap VIe B 235, pp. 163-64 (On Authority 
and Revelation, 130). 
76S0 Pap ~ A 180 (JP 3 :3550). The late entry, Pap XII A 260 (JP 2:2058), too, seems to take this approach. 
It traces "the misunderstood trust in an election" [den misfQrstaaede Tro paa et Naadevalg] to the unsustainable 
passion that is involved in relating to a future blessedness to which, on the NT's teaching, only a very few 
individuals attain. In order to relieve the extreme tension to which this "aristocratic" understanding of salvation 
gives rise, recourse is had to the doctrine of election. Such a doctrine of course remains aristocratic, and 
therefore in tum gives way to universalism. From this entry it is not clear whether the notion of election itself 
is attacked as a human invention whereby individuals first seek assurances for themselves, and subsequently 
for the entire human race, or whether the doctrine is regarded as sound but, owing to its misinterpretation and 
abuse (so as to diminish the passion that belongs to real faith), that trust in it is misplaced. 
It seems, however, that another entry from about the same time (XII A 297 [JP 3:2551]) resolves the 
issue by rejecting election !n....tQ!.Q. SK writes: "The notion that a person's eternal blessedness is to be decided 
by a striving in time, in this life, is so superhumanly heavy that it must kill a person more assuredly than direct 
sunstroke .... I now understand Augustine as having hit upon election precisely in order to avoid this 
difficulty" (translation and emphasis mine). The only obstacle to interpreting this as an outright rejection of the 
doctrine is that later on in this same entry SK rejects the use to which Luther put his teaching on grace (viz., 
to diminish striving) while affirming the teaching itself. The same may be true of Augustine's doctrine of 
election: Kierkegaard's opposition to it may be based on its practical effect in the life of the believer. 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming emphasis of the late journals is on man's striving, not God's gift. I believe that 
this reflects a fundamental shift in Kierkegaard's thinking on the role of divine agency in salvation--one that, 
as we shall see, corresponds to his heightened criticism of Luther. 
77SV VI 444 (~ 478). See also Pap IX A 77 (JP 2:1368). 
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an identical incapacity in oneself as was seen in him, and hence, a refusal to judge him. The 
arrogant expression of the same teaching, on the other hand, refuses to feel any sort of 
solidarity with him, consigning him instead to perdition without entertaining the possibility 
that de te narratur fabula: the tale is told of you. 
Now it may be that Kierkegaard's enjoinment of the former attitude is not an 
endorsement of the doctrine of predestination per se, but rather of the piety that would 
humbly ascribe everything to God by its means.78 Nevertheless, a paradoxical concurrence 
of God's predestining agency and human freedom is by no means to be dismissed out of 
hand.79 L0nning is correct in maintaining that SK gives no "unambiguous determination 
of how God's and the person's activity in the work of salvation can intervene in, or condition, 
one another." As we have seen, Kierkegaard repeatedly affirms both aspects: even within 
religiousness A, Climacus's incitements to "appropriation" are qualified by the sobering 
consideration that "the individual is capable of doing nothing himse1f.,,8o This is also the 
78S0, for example, Pap IX A 77 (JP 2: 1368) and Pap Xe A 439 (JP 6:6969). The latter entry, as we have 
already noted, probably does indicate a late shift to synergism. 
79S0 Walter Ruttenbeck (Soren Kierkegaard. Per christliche Denker und sein Werk [Berlin: Trowitzsch & 
Sohn, 1929],221-23), who writes: "Wir stehen mithin voreiner Zweiheit: Gott wirkt den Glauben, der Mensch 
ist passiv--der Glaube ist ein Willensakt, der Mensch ist aktiv. Gleich bei der Entstehung des Glaubens merken 
wir, daB der Glaube eine Antinomie, eine Paradoxie in sich enthiilt. Der Glaube Kierkegaards ist wesentlich 
paradox. Er stellt sich in gleicher Weise in Gegensatz sowohl zur alleinigen Betonung des Glaubenstheo-
zentrismus wie auch zur alleinigen Hervorhebung des 'Glaubensaktes'. Auf diese Weise ist die Sicherung 
hergestellt gegen die Verfliichtigung des Glaubensbegriffes iiberhaupt. Denn so bleibt einerseits der 
Gottesbegriff in seiner Absolutheit, seiner ObjektiviUit bestehen, und eben dam it wird der von dem 
Immanenzgedanken herkommenden Gefahr begegnet, andererseits wird dem Menschen doch wieder sein 
Personlichkeitswert zuerkannt, undeben damit dervon dem Trans7.endenzgedanken sich herleitenden Gefahr 
begegnet. Existenz! SubjektiviHit und Objektivitiit zugleich! Paradoxie!" (pp. 221-22). 
Though Ruttenbeck claims that Kierkegaardian faith is an intractable antinomy, his presentation in 
actuality presses SK in the direction of predestinarianism: "1st nun so fraglos der Glaube bei Kierkegaard 
paradox, enthiilt er ohne Zweifel eine Paradoxie in sieh, so ist diese doch nicht so zu verstehen, als wiirde damit 
unmittelbar auch die wesentliche Gleichberechtigung des immanenten und des transzendenten Faktors 
behauptet" (p. 222). Ruttenbeck appeals to the Fragments' clear prioriti7..ation of divine freedom over human 
freedom. There it is maintained that "'der Glaube ist kein Willensakt'; ' ... denn aller menschlicher Wille ist 
bestandig nur effektiv innerhalb der Bedingung'. Damit solI nichts anderes ausgedriickt werden als dies: der 
tragende Grund der Immanenz ist und bleibt die Transzendenz. Jene steht in Abhiingigkeit von dieser. Alle 
menschliche Freiheit ist nur re1ativ im Verhiiltnis zur gottlichen, wie iiberhaupt das Merkmal des Gottlichen 
die Absolutheit, das Kennzeichen des Menschlichen aber die Relativitiit ist" (p. 222). 
80SV VII 401 (Postscript 461). 
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case with the journal entry with which the present chapter began: neither Christianity's major 
premise ("The person is able to do absolutely nothing; it is God who gives everything"), nor 
its minor premise ("It is nevertheless essential to dare in a childlike way to be involved with 
God") brooks any compromise: Kierkegaard's theology of grace affirms both. But a doctrine 
of grace that affirms the priority of divine agency at every step of the way logically entails 
a doctrine of election by which God first determines to lavish his grace on the sinner, doing 
so efficaciously. 
The closest that Kierkegaard can come to saying how this occurs has been set forth. 
Election is not an act of predestination effected by irresistible grace (God, a divine "potato-
sorter" as it were, the Christian a "lottery winner" in the religious sphere). No, God's "draw-
ing" is a "composite" that occurs through a "choice.,,81 The capability that SK accords the 
reconstituted will so that it can choose (a) rests upon a prior and present possession of 
grace that conditions its willing, hastening it to make this choice; and (b) is tantamount to 
the ability to choose away the grace in which it stands (the latter eventuality being a 
nominal one, the will already finding itself in the good and therefore utterly averse to the 
evil). Kierkegaard therefore maintains the view that grace all but confers the habere ("all 
but," for the will has only to ratify the good in which it stands), not merely the posse habere. 
Nevertheless, the fact that sin can be found in a good will means on the other hand that grace 
also confers the posse non habere: the will can choose to dispossess itself of the grace in 
which it stands. Sin is, in fact, just the incomprehensibility that a will that has been made 
to be good can be found to have chosen the evi1.82 SK's position on free will and election 
can therefore be likened to that of the Formula of Concord: on the one hand he affirms 
God's election unto salvation but, on the other, he holds forth the possibility of the 
individual's inexplicable choice of perdition. Kierkegaard's position, however, is in my 
opinion the more satisfying of the two since it does not pay rhetorical tribute to God's 
universal saving will, all the while effectively denying this by positing a limited elect. 
Neither does he abolish free choice among the elect by ascribing an irresistible grace to them 
81Again, SV XII 149-50 (Practice in Christianity, 159-60). 
82Again, Pap X2 A 436 (JP 4:4030). 
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(and them alone). For these reasons his answer to the problem of free will and election 
breaks new ground without landing him in the ranks of the synergists, even if it does leave 
one with the intractable problem of how an elect, fully possessed of grace and in the good, 
can nevertheless fall away. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
KIERKEGAARD'S CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD LUTHER 
As was pointed out earlier, Kierkegaard's first-hand knowledge of Luther did not 
begin in earnest unti1184 7-48. If one considers the fact that he had regarded his authorship 
as complete with the publication of the Postscript in 1846, it is not difficult to imagine his 
surprise when, upon opening a book of Luther's sennons more than a year later, he finds 
many of his own most basic convictions already expressed there. This anticipation of his 
ideas in the writings of the refonner is in fact far from surprising. As we have seen, 1. G. 
Hamann may well have conveyed the essentials of Luther's theology of the cross to him 
while he was yet a student. Moreover, the overall import of his subsequent authorship was, 
after all, the manifestly Lutheran one of reinvigorating a dead orthodoxy with the vitality 
of subjective engagement--in a word, with faith. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard registers the 
surprise of his discovery in ajournal entry dating from Advent, 1847: 
Wonderful! The category "for you" (subjectivity, inwardness) with which EitherlOr 
concludes (only the truth that builds up is truth for you) is Luther's own. I have never 
really read anything by Luther. But now I open up his sennons--and right there in the 
Gospel for the First Sunday in Advent he says "for you," on this everything 
depends.! 
That Kierkegaard should have been struck by this affinity with Luther at such a late 
date is somewhat enigmatic for, as we previously noted, he had already appealed to Luther 
as the champion of subjectivity in the Postscript.2 Most likely it was the forcefulness of 
Luther's person that now captivated Kierkegaard as he began to read him for the first time, 
IPap VIlli A 465 (IP 3:2463). 
2SV VII 317 (PostscriDt. 366). On the other hand, SK's relative ignorance concerning Luther is not all that 
surprising. As was noted in the introduction, very little of Luther was actually read at the Lutheran theological 
faculties of the early nineteenth century. 
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and this in turn caused an old awareness to dawn with new power. In any case, it was 
precisely this aspect of Luther's proclamation--his stress upon the necessity of personal 
appropriation: pro me!--that Kierkegaard found compelling at the time that he began to 
occupy himself in a serious way with Luther.3 Coming on the heels of the completion of the 
first half of the authorship, his self-immersion in Luther provided him with impulses that 
would prove determinative of the direction that the latter half would take, leaving its mark 
upon it at decisive points.4 
From the time of the above-quoted journal entry until his death Kierkegaard was an 
avid reader of Luther's sermons, which he owned in Danish translation. In fact it was these 
that quickly supplanted the sermons of J. P. Mynster as his primary source of devotional 
readings. While Kierkegaard also owned other works of Luther, he seems not to have read 
in them except cursorily. By far the vast number of journal references are to the Postiller.5 
3Torsten Bohlin, Kierkegaards dogmatiska askadning i dess historiska samrnanhang (Stockholm: Svenska 
Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses BokfOrlag, 1925), 443. 
'Thid., 444. So significant was Luther's influence that Bohlin can write: "In fact, the presentation of the 
content offaith that Kierkegaard gives--above all in The Sickness unto Death. Practice in Christianity. Christian 
Discourses. and in the Discourses at Communion on Fridays published in 1849-51--cannot be understood if 
one does not attend to the fact that it is from the framework of Luther's understandings of sin and faith that he 
combats speculative philosophy's and theology's view of Christianity, as well as orthodoxy's 'custom-
Christianity'" (p. 445). 
SA good account ofKierkegaard's reading of Luther is given by Regin Prenter ("Luther and Lutheranism," 
in Kierkegaard and Great Traditions, vol. 6 of Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana. ed. Niels Thulstrup and M. 
Mikulova Thulstrup [Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Boghandel, 1981], 122-26). In all there are about 250 
references to Luther in the journals, testifying to Kierkegaard's intense preoccupation with the reformer after 
Advent of 1847 (p. 137). Only a handful refer to works other than the Postiller (p. 124). As Prenter indicates, 
the authenticity of these texts is somewhat questionable; consequently their value as a source for an adequate 
understanding of Luther is limited. Nevertheless, they were by no means unserviceable in providing 
Kierkegaard with a basis for discerning actual points of agreement and disagreement with the reformer (see 
Hayo Gerdes: Soren Kierkegaard, Gesamrnelte Werke. Die Tagebticher, trans. and ed. Hayo Gerdes,S vols. 
(DtisseldorfIKOln: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1962-74) 3:327 n. 132a; relevant, too, are Eberhard Winkler's 
remarks concerning the Postillen: "Luther als Seelsorger und Prediger" in Leben undWerk Martin Luthers von 
1526 bis 1546. Festgabe zu seinem 500. Geburtstag, ed. Helmar Junghans [Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1983],237-39). For a more thorough discussion of the authenticity of these texts the reader is 
referred to Luthers Werke in Auswahl. ed. Emanuel Hirsch (Berlin: Verlag von Walter de Gruyter, 1950), vol. 
7, Predigten. vii -ix and 39-93, and to Gerhard Ebeling, Evangelische Evangelienauslegung. Eine Untersuchung 
zu Luthers Hermeneutik (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), 11-43. Despite the obvious 
value that a study of the authenticity of individual Postiller would have in establishing the origins of any 
inaccuracies that may have existed in Kierkegaard's "Lutherbild," it would not alter the points of actual 
agreement and disagreement. Since the latter constitutes the primary concern of this investigation, consideration 
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Regularly he registers his response to the sennon that he happens to be reading at the time. 
During the first years that response is extremely positive, at times euphoric.6 Kierkegaard 
is amazed and emboldened by the difference he sees between Luther and Luther's church. 
He becomes aware that he has not said anything in his own authorship that could not have 
been said by Luther himself: 
I could be tempted to take Luther's book of sennons and extract a great many 
sentences and ideas, all of which are marked in my copy, and publish them in order 
to show how far the preaching nowadays is from Christianity, so that it shall not be 
said that I am the one who hits upon exaggerations.7 
During this initial period of involvement, SK clearly regards himself as Luther's ally. 
His task as an author has, in effect, been that of defending Luther against the false and 
unchristian use made of him by Kierkegaard's contemporaries.8 Whereas Luther established 
the highest spiritual principle--that of inwardness--present-day Protestantism has used the 
"hidden" inwardness as a pretext for license in matters external with the result that it has 
sunk to the lowest fonn of worldliness.9 This Luther would never have tolerated, for it was 
of the former must be deferred. 
~at Kierkegaard's was a planned, regular reading of the Postiller in 1848 he himself reports in the journal 
entries for March 29 (Pap VIII I A 612) and April 22 (Pap VIlli A 642 [lP 3:2465]). In these places he states 
that he is reading Luther's sermons "efter Tour"--i.e., one after the other (see Pap X3 A 391 [lP 6:6666] from 
1850 for similar testimony from a later year). While the journal entries from 1848 confIrm the fact that he did, 
in fact, read the sermons in the sequence in which they occurred in the church calendar, his reading was not 
in synchrony with it. 
Regarding Kierkegaard's enthusiasm during this initial encounter, Prenter writes ("Luther and Lutheranism," 
137): "If Kierkegaard during his regular reading of Luther's sermons comes across a thought ... which arouses 
his interest he will immediately write it down in his diary. 'A good observation by Luther.' 'This is brilliantly 
expressed by Luther .... ' 'A most correct remark by Luther ... ,'etc." It is obvious that Kierkegaard feels that 
he has found a kindred spirit. At one point he sighs, "What a relief to read Luther. There is a man who can 
really stay by a person and preach him farther out instead of backwards" (Pap VIlli A 541 [lP 3:2464]). 
Elsewhere he exclaims: "0, Luther is still the master of us all" (Pap VIlli A 642 [lP 3:2465]). 
7Pap X) A 127 (JP 3:2516).A similar entry is Pap Xl A403 (JP 3:2493) in which Kierkegaard toys with the 
idea of delivering verbatim a sermon of Luther's and, in response to the anticipated indignation of the clergy, 
asserting: "This is a sermon by Luther, word for word." 
BSV XIII 506 (My Activity as a Writer. 155). 
9Pap X6 B 233, p. 383 (JP 1:825) and Pap Xe A 305, p. 327 (JP 3:3618). 
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his constant contention that the Christian must suffer for the doctrine in this world.IO Yet 
so transmogrified has the refonner's Visage become that, in the minds of Kierkegaard's contem-
poraries, he stands for wine, women, and good times. 11 Were Luther again to stride forth 
in today's context, he would confront the decadence of the chw'ch that hails him as its 
founder, drawing the Apostle James, and the latter's emphasis upon works, into promi-
nence.
12 Yes, Luther must again be brought to bear upon Lutheranism--but with the differ-
ence that his teaching be adapted to fundamentally changed circumstances.13 For this rea-
son the true follower of Luther must now act in a manner diametrically opposed to the 
reformer, even enjoining a return to the monastery from which Luther broke OUt.14 
The sum of the matter, then, is this: while Kierkegaard's initial enthusiasm for Luther 
was due to the latter's demand that Christianity be inwardly appropriated, the two men's 
affinity did not end there. Bishop Mynster, too, "dwelt unctuously upon the virtue of 'hidden 
inwardness.",ls No, what made Luther really different was his contention that such 
inwardness cannot remain hidden: it must entail consequences for the outward conduct of 
life.16 This fact constitutes the second main point of their affinity. Pap entry VIlli A 642 
(JP 3:2465) in which Kierkegaard exclaims, "0, Luther is still the master of us all" has 
already been cited as an example of Kierkegaard's early enthusiasm for Luther. What was 
not mentioned at the time of that citation were the reasons for Kierkegaard's great 
IOSV XII 440 (Judge for Yourselves', 169). 
"Pap X3 A 234 (JP 3:2524), SV XII 307 (For Self-Examination, 16). 
12SV XII 309, 314 (For Self-Examination, 18-19,24). 
'3Ibid., 306-310, 314 (15-19, 24) and Pap Jr A 349 (JP 2:1902) describe the changed circumstances of the 
church ofKierkegaard's day. Whereas the excess that Luther had to combat was a false understanding of works 
leading to the conceit of meritoriousness, the excess of Kierkegaard's day was a false understanding of faith 
leading to quietism and worldliness. Expressed somewhat differently, Luther's contemporaries wanted to hear 
only law; Kierkegaard's contemporaries would hear of nothing but gospel (Pap X3 A 336 [IP 3:2527]). 
14Pap X3 A 153 (IP 3:2518) and Pap VIlli A 403 (IP 3:2750). 
ISSO says Walter Lowrie--S"ren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity and the Edifying Discourse Which 
'Accompanied' It, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 209 n. 1. 
16Pap Xl A 489 (IP 3:2423). Faith may be invisible, but its fruits--Iove's deeds--are not. "In this Luther is, 
again, completely correct." 
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excitement. He had just been reading Luther's sermon on the Gospel about the ten lepers. 
Eduard Geismar observes that there are two features about this sermon that could not have 
failed to arouse Kierkegaard's enthusiasm. One is its presentation of faith as a life-long 
struggle wherein the believer affirms God's graciousness even in the absence of the experi-
ence of such; the other is its emphasis upon the world's hatred and persecution of the true Chris-
tian.17 Luther dwells at length upon the latter point: 
Now we are never at ease except when we suffer. We live contrary to the way of the 
world: we are delighted by what arouses its aversion, we loathe this life, we aspire 
to our dissolution. We break out in loud speech and thus outwardly confess before 
the world what inwardly binds our hearts to God. This is nothing other than to incur 
all the world's hostility and to send for cross and death over and over again. For 
whoever will loudly give God honor and praise must just as loudly condemn all the 
world's honor and praise and declare its works and words to be nothing .... See, the 
world does not tolerate this .... You are commanded to be silent, and if you will not 
obey, they begin to gather wood for the bonfire .... See, it is in this way that all the 
prophets were killed, and Christ along with them. The world will not be regarded as 
foolish or unrighteous; but God cannot regard it in any other way; therefore, he sends 
his apostles and, through them, castigates it. And because they speak their mind, they 
must lay down their lives.1s 
The correspondence between this account of the inevitability of suffering and 
martyrdom and Kierkegaard's own presentation of the same is striking. As we noted in our 
earlier discussion of Kierkegaard's theologia crucis, from a purely human point of view 
Christianity must appear to be the ultimate misanthropy: by demanding absolute fealty to 
God it, in effect, pronounces a curse and a plague upon being human.19 Consequently, those 
l7"Wie urteilte Kierkegaard tiber Luther?" Luther-Jahrbuch 10 (1928):5. In addition to the two likely reasons 
for SK's enthusiasm that Geismar gives, two others certainly bear mentioning. First, Luther stresses that true, 
God-given faith does not doubt that it will receive good of God, but boldly asks for and expects his gifts despite 
the knowledge that it deserves nothing but his wrath. And second, Christ's gifts are lavished without any 
thought of recompense whatsoever. He demands nothing in return; what he gives, he gives out of sheer love 
and grace. As a later probable reference to this sermon seems to indicate (infra, n. 51), these aspects of it were 
just as important to SK as the ones we presently discuss. Indeed, the very date of this reference (Holy Week, 
1848) confirms this (infra, n. 53). 
l8En christelig Po stille. samrnendragen af Dr. Morten Luthers Kirke- og Huuspostiller efter Benjamin 
Lindners tydske Samling udgiven i ny dansk Oyersrettelse af krgen Thisted. 2 pts. (Copenhagen: Wahlske 
Boghandling, 1828), 1:512. Cf. SK's enthusiasm for the sermon on the gospel for the second Sunday after 
Easter which similarly teats of the true Christian's suffering (Pap Xl A 370 [JP 3:2491]). 
19Supra, chap. 2, n. 82. 
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who would submit to Christianity's demand are exposed to a double danger: not only do 
they hate themselves--they are hated by the world for it.20 The second danger ineluctably 
arises from the first. The world cannot tolerate this truck that the Christian has with the 
absolute for it is simultaneously a condemnation of its own self-indulgent absorption in the 
relative. Consequently, it will do away with the true Christian, just as it did away with Christ 
and his apostles. Although Kierkegaard is aware that this teaching must seem to be an 
incredible exaggeration to his contemporaries, he is also aware that it is he who has Luther 
on his side. The teaching of the double danger is Luther's own: Luther himself has declared 
that "to Christian life belong faith--works of love--and then persecution for the faith and 
love," maintaining furthennore that "where there is no persecution there is something wrong 
with the preaching.,,21 
It is evident, then, that the praxis-aspect of Luther's theolol:ia crucis made an 
enormous impact upon Kierkegaard at the time of his discovery of Luther during 1847-
48;22 it constituted a second element of the affinity that he felt for the reformer. Yet it is 
equally clear that the epistemological-theoretical aspect (which actually constitutes the 
ultimate basis for why it must go ill with the Christian in the world) did not escape 
Kierkegaard's notice, either. Certainly it is at least implicitly present in the characterization 
of faith that Luther gives in the just-cited sermon on the ten lepers. Twice Luther quotes 
Heb. 11: 1, commenting on the significance that God's hiddenness has for faith. The first 
citation reads as follows: 
The Epistle to the Hebrews says (11: 1): Faith is a steadfastness in what is hoped for, 
a finn conviction about what is not seen. That is to say, faith keeps to things that it 
neither sees nor feels, whether inwardly or outwardly.23 
20Supra, chap. 2, n. Ill. 
21Pap X3 A 125 (IP 3:3677). 
22Indeed, as early as 1846 Kierkegaard had been impressed by Luther's statement that "if one wishes to be 
a Christian, he must also wear the ceremonial court dress (the cross)." Not only did the statement receive notice 
in Kierkegaard's journal at the time (Pap VUI A 209 [IP 3:2462D, it found its way into the Gospel of Suffering. 
published soon thereafter (SV VIII 394 [Gospel of Suffering, 131 D. 
BEn christelig Po stille, 1 :504. 
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In what must have been a powerful confirmation of his own ideas, Kierkegaard here 
discovers that, according to Luther, the only object that can be believed is one that is 
essentially hidden. Moreover faith, so far from being weakened by the hiddenness of its 
object, is incited thereby. It is for this reason that God purposefully leaves us in uncertainty 
about himself: 
Precisely in this way does God, in general, strengthen and try the faith in us all. He 
gladly allows us to be in uncertainty as regards his intention toward us. Why? In 
order that we should commit ourselves entirely to his keeping .... This trial lasts as 
long as life itself; therefore faith, too, must be in the process of growth for just so 
long. For when God has tested us along one part of the way and caused us to know 
his gracious intent in one situation, he immediately moves on to a new trial and never 
ceases to strengthen our faith .... [T]he more God conceals his goodness ... the 
more he leaves us in uncertainty as to how matters stand between us and him, the 
stronger we should become in faith. For faith is a steadfastness in what is hoped for, 
a firm conviction about what is not seen, Heb. 11:1.24 
In yet another sermon of Luther's that made a great impression upon Kierkegaard, 
viz., that on the gospel for the first Sunday in Advent, Luther develops not only the notion 
of the diesseitiL! hiddenness of faith's object, but its absurdity. Of Christ the King's humble 
entry into Jerusalem, he writes: 
Just as what one here sees, and is to believe, is nothing at all, but is sheer nonsense 
to all reason and nature: thus do we meet in all the articles of faith the same 
backwards view. Nor would it be any kind of faith at all if what faith esteems, and 
what the words indicate, were outwardly apparent. But it just is faith because the 
state of affairs does not seem to be what faith recognizes it to be and what the words 
say that it is.25 
2ibid., 1 :509-10. 
25Ibid., 1: 17-18. Cf. Luther's sermon for the day after Easter (1 :273), which treats of faith's incomprehensi-
bility and inaccessibility to speculation; see, too, his sermon on the pharisee and tax collector (1 :467-82), which 
observes not only the contrarationality of God's judgement, but its offensiveness to human reason. Kierkegaard 
notes his particular approval of these sermons in Pap X2 A 123 (JP 3:2504) and Pap IX A 427 (JP 3:3032). 
Noteworthy, too, is his praise of the sermon on the gospel for Epiphany ("Luther'S sermon on the gospel for 
Epiphany merits being read again and again, especially its entire first part"), where Luther speak. .. of the offense 
that human expectation takes at Christ's pathetic appearance (cf. Kierkegaard, Gesamroelte Werke. Die 
TagebOcher, 3 :335 n. 282 pertaining to this entry, Pap Xl A 297 [JP 3:2485]). Finally, the allusion to Luther's 
view of reason that occurs already in Fragments should not be forgotten: it is "a clod and a dunce" (SV N 219 
[Fragments, 53]). 
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Luther's employment of the theology of the cross as a principle of cognition is most 
striking in these texts. Revelation is not apprehensible via reason; so far from being 
"reasonable," its sub contraria specie is a scandal to reason. While it cannot be doubted that 
Kierkegaard has recognized this point held in common with Luther, what can be doubted 
is whether, from Kierkegaard's viewpoint, Luther has drawn the inevitable practical 
consequence of this theory of revelation by referring suffering directly to the relationship 
with God as the necessary, negative expression of God's good-pleasure. Apropos this matter, 
Kierkegaard writes the following in a journal entry dating from 1850: 
In the sermon on the Epistle for the Fourth Sunday after Epiphany, Luther interprets 
Christianity as if in a certain sense it were the wrath of God .... He explains that ... 
God has made folly of the world and wants to be loved under the cross and amidst 
lamentation .... The category is as follows: the relationship with God is not directly 
recognizable (Judaism) but inversely. The mark of offense is also here--to love God, 
not only when things go wrong . . . but when the opposition arises from the 
relationship with God itself, originates from one's relating oneself to God.26 
This journal entry is most enlightening. Here we find confirmation of the fact 
Kierkegaard has not been unaware of the connection that Luther himself makes between the 
practical and the theoretical aspects of the cross. The fact that the Christian must suffer in 
the world follows directly from the essential character of revelation. In his transcendence, 
God is not directly knowable by human beings; if he is to reveal himself at all, it can only 
occur through an act of veiling. Indeed, because man's sinful nature inverts everything, this 
revelation appears to him sub contraria specie. From this it follows that God's love must be 
experienced by us as "wrath"--the wrath of the cross--and therefore as suffering. Kierke-
gaard's recognition of Luther's consistency on this point is important for, as we shall see, 
more often than not his subsequent accusations of Luther fasten upon an alleged inconsis-
tency. 
It may be helpful to pause at this point and to attempt to gather the aforementioned 
points into a Gestalt wherein they stand in a more apparent relationship to one another. In 
essence these three factors--the inward appropriation of Christianity in faith, outward 
suffering for the sake of the doctrine, and the negative dialectic of revelation--reflect the 
26Pap x3 A 302 (lP 3:2525). 
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convergence between the situation in which each man found himself and the theological 
response to which each was driven. This we had occasion to observe earlier when we noted 
that the situation of Kierkegaard and Luther alike was one of degenerate praxis in which the 
sacraments had come to be regarded as effectual ex opere operato. Because the praxis was, 
in both cases, closely allied to speculative frameworks that put God at the disposal of man, 
the attack upon "indulgences"--be they Catholic or Lutheran--necessarily entailed an attack 
upon the respective theologies of glory that disbursed them. For this purpose a framework 
characterized by radical diastasis was employed by Luther and Kierkegaard alike. By its 
means man's self-devised practical and theoretical approaches to God were cut off, and 
subjectivity was reinstated in their place. The latter reached a maximum within the new 
framework insofar as God's immediate unrecognizability sub contraria specie entailed not 
only the manifold internal sufferings characteristic of the indirect relationship, but also the 
undying enmity of a world thus disabused of its pretensions to divinityship and confronted 
with cross and suffering. 
While this account explains much of the felt affinity that initially awakened 
Kierkegaard's admiration for Luther, it does not explain all of it. Any full explanation must 
needs explore the basis of their shared diastatic understanding of Christianity. This basis can 
be none other their shared view of the ethical. As we noted earlier, it was Karl Holl's 
contention that Luther's understanding of the ethical was determinative of his understanding 
of religion in a fundamental way since it led Luther to deny "the feasibility at all of an 
ethical striving that is directed to the unconditioned.,,27 Holl further observed that no less 
could be said of Kierkegaard. The fact that this is so is confirmed by Kierkegaard himself, 
who gave his unqualified approval to what he called Luther's "adult religion" of conscience: 
Luther's teaching about faith really corresponds to the transformation that occurs 
when one becomes a man and is no longer a stripling; his teaching about faith is 
adult religion. When one is young, it still seems possible to achieve the ideal if one 
will only honestly, with all his abilities, strive; there is a childlike, if I dare say so--a 
peer-relationship--between myself and the prototype, if only I will it to the uttermost. 
Here lies the truth of the Middle Ages. It believed so piously that it would achieve 
27"Was verstand Luther unter Religion?" in Luther, vol. 1 of Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Kirchengeschichte 
(Tilbingen: 1. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1927),24-25. 
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the ideal by actually giving everything to the poor, by entering a monastery, etc. But 
the religion of manhood is a power higher and can be identified by the very fact that 
it feels itself a stage removed from the ideal. Just when the individual is developing 
does God become for him more and more infinite, and he feels himself farther and 
farther from God. The teaching about the prototype, then, can no longer plainly and 
simply occupy the first place. Faith comes first, Christ as the gift. The ideal becomes 
so infinitely elevated that all my striving transforms itself before my eyes into a 
demented nullity if it is directed at resembling the ideal, or into a kind of reverential 
jest even though I am honestly striving. This is expressed in saying: I rest in faith 
alone .... Thus Luther is totally correct and is a turning point in the development of 
1·· 28 re Iglon. 
The perception of the unconditionality of Christianity's ethical requirement and of 
the impossibility of fulfilling it necessarily entail the doctrines of radical sin and grace. And 
as we have seen, it is precisely the extreme nature of the Lutheran teaching on sin that issues 
in the diastatic principle of cognition of the theologia crucis. Over and over again Kierke-
gaard applauds Luther's insight into the transcendent inaccessibility of Christianity's teaching 
on sin. Not only does that inaccessibility necessitate revelation; it defines the very character 
of revelation as the authoritative proclamation of transcendent truth, the paradoxical content 
of which cannot be understood, but must be believed. 
The ultimate basis of Luther's and Kierkegaard's diastatic theology is therefore to be 
found in their ethical idealism. It is important to stress, however, that this rigorous 
understanding of the ethical is what incites their theological reflection, thereby giving rise 
to their diastatic thinking--not vice versa. Were the latter the case, their statements about the 
ethical would have the hollow ring of theoretical speculation, and in reading Luther, for 
instance, neither Kierkegaard nor anyone else would be struck by the trembling "folWard 
thrust of his whole style ... which continually seems to have behind it that thunderstorm of 
terror that killed Alexius and created Luther.,,29 That thunderstorm was none other than 
Luther's conscience, and the fact that it had its counterpart in Kierkegaard leads us to point 
out the final, and perhaps most significant, point of affinity that is to be found between the 
two men: their struggle with the anxious conscience. 
28Pap X2 A 207 (JP 2:1135), amended Hong translation. 
29SV VII 317 (Postscript. 366). 
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By Kierkegaard's own testimony, from a point early on in life he suffered from an 
unnamed "thorn in the flesh" to which the consciousness of guilt and sin was attached.30 
Although he had in his early days sought to be rid of this affliction,31 he subsequently 
accepted it in resignation, thinking that it could not be taken from him. Indeed, he did not 
even have the courage to pray to this end because of the guilt that he felt in connection with 
it.32 His lot in life therefore became that of a "penitent," a "poet of the religious," and his 
authorship--initially entered upon with "an oppressed conscience,,33 --served simultaneously 
as a diversion from melancholy and a quest for redemption. Thus did matters remain until 
August of 1847. Having just completed Works of Loye, during the writing of which he had 
himself gained a profound impression of God's love,34 Kierkegaard began to feel something 
"stirring within" that hinted at a "metamorphosis." At this point it became his fast resolve 
to find myself and ... to think through the idea of my melancholy together with God. 
In this way my melancholy may be lifted and Christianity may come closer to me. 
Up to now I have armed myself against my depression with intellectual activity that 
keeps it away--now, in the faith that God has forgotten in forgiveness whatever guilt 
I have, I must try to forget it myself, but not in any diversion, not in any distance 
from it, but in God, so that when I think of God I may think that he has forgotten it 
and in that way, myself, learn to dare to forget it in forgiveness. 3s 
30Pap XS A 89, p. 104. Eduard Geismar gives a helpful, orienting discussion on the nature of the "thorn in 
the flesh" and the changing attitudes that Kierkegaard assumed toward it during the course of his life. Inasmuch 
as Kierkegaard was ever of frail physical constitution this affliction must have had a somatic, as well as 
psychic, basis. This led him more than once to consult his physician about the possibility of a cure. But 
interwoven with the somatic was Kierkegaard's profound morbidity of which, try as he might, he could not free 
himself. Still a third factor was his haunting sense of guilt for some sin or sins that he had committed, as well 
as recurring sinful thoughts provoked, against his will, by his anxious psychological condition. Most of the 
discussion that follows concerning Kierkegaard's struggle with this affliction is heavily indebted to Geismar's 
treatment (SerenKierkegaard. Hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed. 2vols. [Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads 
Foriag, 1927-28], vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 43-52, 79-87 and vol. 2, pt. 4, pp. 52-62). 
31Pap VIllI A 156 (IP 5:6011). These "early days" were no doubt those of his engagement. 
32Pap XS A 89, p. 104. 
33Pap VIllI A 250 (IP 5:6043). 
34Pap VIllI A 219 (IP 5:6032). 
3SPap VIllI A 250 (JP 5:6043). Cf. also the somewhat earlier entry, Pap VIllI A 227 (JP 5:6035), in which 
Kierkegaard had already perceived, "a change in my nature is very clearly in process." 
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Henceforth, the Atonement and the forgiveness of sins had to be advanced.36 It was 
not enough, after the fashion of Mynster, merely to hope that one's sins would one day be 
forgiven; the forgiveness of sins must be made binding in time--this was the doctrine of the 
new creation.37 Such a temporal experience of forgiveness began to be a possibility for 
Kierkegaard with the dawning of the insight that God not only forgives sins, but forgets them 
as well. Moreover, Kierkegaard now dared for the first time to regard such an experience of 
forgiveness as entailing the redress, in this life, of that which had originally plunged him 
into despair--i.e., as overcoming his "thorn in the flesh.,,38 
It was eight months after Kierkegaard's premonition that a change was in the works 
that his break-through occurred. I refer to the Holy Week experience of 1848 in which 
Kierkegaard experienced the forgiveness of sins concretely as the lifting of his melancholy 
and extreme reserve.39 Admittedly this break-through had more the character of a foretaste 
than of a fait accompli, for five days later Kierkegaard dejectedly reported that his reserve 
could not be broken yet. As before, his belief in the forgiveness of sins extended only so far 
as a belief that, though they were forgiven, he must continue to bear the punishment of 
lifelong confinement to his prison of painful reserve. This notwithstanding, he did not 
foreclose the possibility of a higher faith--only that, "as yet, at least, I cannot come to such 
heights of faith, I cannot yet win such cheerful confidence of faith that I can believe that 
painful memory away.,,40 
So far from foreclosing the possibility of higher faith in the wake of his post-Easter 
relapse, Kierkegaard came to regard the fact that a miracle had not occurred as a renewed 
incitement to believe--against experience--that his sins were "entirely forgotten." Could he 
attain to such faith, the memory of his sins would lose their power to inspire anguish; he 
36Pap VIlli A 229 and 284 (JP 5:6037 and 4:4011). 
37Pap VIII A 78 (JP 5:5928). 
38Geismar, S0ren Kierkegaard, vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 59. 
39Pap Villi A 640-41 (lP 5:6131-32). 
40Pap VIIII A 645 (lP 5:6133). 
189 
would become "a new man," hardly recognizing himself again. Hence the resolve: "I must 
continually come closer and closer to the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins.,,41 Following 
almost upon the heels of this entry is one in which he states his conviction that belief in the 
forgiveness of sins just is the confidence that one's sin is forgotten in time, that God helps 
one in time. Anything less is resignation.42 And in the entry following he affirms that, since 
Easter, he has begun to hope--with intermissions--that it may be God's will to lift the 
elemental misery of his being. "That is, I now believe in the deepest sense." 
For God all things are possible. This thought is now in the deepest sense my 
watchword and has gained a new meaning for me which I have never envisioned. 
Just because I see no way out, I must never have the audacity to say that therefore 
there is none for God. For it is despair and blasphemy to confuse one's own little 
crumb of imagination and the like with the possibilities God has at his disposa1.43 
The above idea reappears in The Sickness unto Death.44 So too does the conviction 
that true faith expects God's help in time. In what is certainly a reference to Kierkegaard's 
earlier self, the pseudonym Anti-Climacus describes a "poet-existence verging on the 
religious" wherein an imagined poet-figure suffers secret anguish in some respect. He will 
not, in faith, humble himself under this "thorn in the flesh," taking it upon himself with the 
expectation of help, for he loves his anguish. Such an existence Anti-Climacus condemns 
as sin, "the sin of poetizing instead of being, of relating to the good and the true through the 
imagination instead of being that--that is, existentially striving to be that. ,,45 Eduard 
Geismar elaborates this new self-understanding of Kierkegaard's in the following way: 
He had suffered under "the thorn in the flesh," but had not comprehended the task 
that lay therein, namely this: by God, to hope for healing within temporality; he had 
therefore not taken suffering up as a task within temporality, but had merely hoped 
for eternity's healing. But this too, is despair; here the faith is lacking that for God 
all things are possible and hence, in the final analysis, a positive relation to finitude 
4'Pap VIII' A 646-47 (JP 2:12l3-14). 
42Pap VIII' A 649 (lP 2:1123). 
43Pap VIII' A 650 (JP 5:6135). 
44SV XI 151-53 (Sickness unto Death. 38-41). 
45Ibid., 189 (77). 
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is lacking. The despair is therefore a form of what is elsewhere designated, 
"Infinitude's Despair Is to Lack Finitude." Kierkegaard had put up with "the thorn 
in the flesh" in this way and therefore, without any foothold in reality, felt himself 
thrust away from home and out into the infinitude of phantasy-life. But since the 
decision of August 1847 he had been on the right path: he had hoped for healing 
within temporality in the faith that for God all things are possible--yet this in the 
sense that the taking up of the struggle as a life-task contains a continual humiliation 
when the healing that one believed in has not yet succeeded. In this way can the two 
expressions alternate: believingly take upon oneself, and, humble oneself under.46 
The definitive understanding at which Kierkegaard had arrived as a result of his Easter 
experience, then, was this: one must "hope for healing at every moment and, at every 
moment that it does not occur, submit to 'the thorn in the flesh.",47 
For the more profound person it is undoubtedly a kind of relief to get it settled and 
certain that help is not to be expected, that the task is to bear it in silence. But the 
task is also to hope against hope. This is precisely why day in and day out he repeats 
his suffering; every day he must hope--against the understanding--that God will 
nevertheless help him, and this he must endure year after year. This is what it is to 
be educated, to learn obedience.48 
This resolution to the deep-seated problems of melancholy and the consciousness of 
sin was not what Kierkegaard had initially hoped for. Nevertheless a resolution it was, and 
one that, moreover, left room for faith. Indeed the healing power latent in this solution was 
considerable. In the months following his Easter experience Kierkegaard began to lay plans 
for a new work that would treat of the "Christian medical art." In it he planned to develop 
the thought that "heals radically": 
Essentially this is the everlasting comforting thing about the doctrine of the 
forgiveness of sins: Thou shalt believe it. For when the anxious conscience begins 
to employ itself with heavy thoughts and it seems to one as if in all eternity it would 
be impossible to forget--then the word is, Thou shalt forget, thou shalt stop thinking 
46S0ren Kierkegaard. vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 60. 
47Ibid., vol. 2, pt. 4, p. 61. 
48Pap IX A 333, p. 191 (JP 4:4370, p. 261). In this connection an observation is in order. Quite different 
from the relief that derives from resignation to one's suffering is that which owes to the new point of view 
from which the forgiven individual regards his ongoing suffering. No longer does he look upon it as a 
punishment for sin, but rather, as a vicissitude of life (Pap Xl A 319 [JP 2: 1222]; cf. Pap VIII A 141 [JP 
2: 1205]). This changed aspect of suffering is made possible by the believer's continuing confidence in God's 
forgiveness, as is his hope in the possibility of the affliction's removal altogether. 
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about thy sin, thou hast not only a right to stop, it is not merely that thou mayest 
make bold to pray to God for permission to dare to forget it; no, thou shalt forget, for 
thou shalt believe that thy sin is forgiven.49 
Henceforth this was the thought that would carry Kierkegaard forward: experience or no, it 
was his duty to believe in the forgiveness of sins. Indeed, experience had not the slightest 
thing to do with the matter. 
Whether Kierkegaard, in fact, ever attained to a full and abiding sense of forgiveness 
as the fruit of faith's obedience is, at best, problematic indeed (see chapters seven through 
nine). Apropos this matter, however, an observation by Walter Lowrie does lend itself to 
consideration. Lowrie notes that 
for a long while after the experience of Easter 1848 the entries in the Journal are 
largely concerned with reflections about the forgiveness of sins, but the other theme 
which emerges prominently is the question of direct communication. His reflections 
upon this subject were endless, but it is a proof of radical healing that his deeds had 
not to wait upon the termination of his reflections. He began at once to plan the 
outspoken books which he was to write during the course of this year.so 
This observation is illuminating inasmuch as it suggests that the increasing directness 
of Kierkegaard's confrontation with established Christianity had as its correlate his own 
newly won, if tentative, sense of forgiveness. Indeed, we would expect no less in view of the 
integral relationship that obtained between Kierkegaard's melancholy and reserve on the one 
hand, and his consciousness of sin on the other. And in fact, this "proof of radical healing" 
that Lowrie advances is, to a degree, confirmed by the self-attestation of healing that 
Kierkegaard himself makes at the culmination of the second phase of his authorship (1853). 
There Kierkegaard retrospectively reviews the "tum" made in 1848, and the painfully won 
progress that he had made since that time vis-a.-vis the sense of forgiveness and healing of 
his "thorn in the flesh": 
The question became: was it not possible that this heterogeneity could be taken from 
me? Is not Christ a savior in this way? 
49Pap IX A 176-77 (JP 6:6210 and 2:1217). The translation is Walter Lowrie's, found in his Kierkegaard. 
2 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), 2 :402. 
s<Xierkegaard, 2:407. 
192 
So I swung in this direction. But then a new difficulty manifested itself to me. 
"Suppose that you do succeed in penetrating through in Christ's name," I said to 
myself. "Isn't it true that you will then, of course, thank him indescribably, and won't 
he then in return require of you that you follow him in the strictest sense, coming to 
suffer infinitely in this world as he suffered and died for you?" 
I have been at a standstill here. It seemed to me that I could expect salvation 
and help only on this condition--and the condition itself frightened me away, 
especially when it should be considered as "the condition," for then it seemed to me 
that here there was--if I dare say so--a quibbling that did not correspond to my 
conception of "grace" in Christ.--I have struggled for a long time at this point, 
suffering unspeakably. 
Now--God, oh God be praised!--now I understand it in a different way. No, 
Christ is not petty! We see, after all, also in the New Testament that, in relation to 
those whom he heals and the like, he does not oblige them, in return, to lay down 
their lives for him. No, no, he requires their thanks (the one Samaritan) and he does 
not even allow the one from whom he drove out the legion to follow him, even 
though that one asks to do so. No, Christ is not petty, and he does not haggle about 
price; no, it is grace, infinite grace: "Take and receive; thank me accordingly, as it 
51 
appeals to your heart, but freely and cheerfully." 
This remarkable account of Kierkegaard's experience of the gratuity of Christ's 
forgiveness and healing--written in February of 1853--is accompanied by an account of the 
"loosening of tongue" that had taken place during the years leading up to it--a period of SK's 
authorship in which he had confronted established Christianity with increasing directness, 
first under the pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, and later under his own name: 
I am now at the point where I was when I introduced the last pseudonym. But 
now, how different! Humbled by means of a horrible school, I have aLSO attained to 
cheerful candor--Oh, my God, I am not, at this moment, even equal to the task of 
writing down how, once again by your infinite love, everything has been designed 
to lead me to this blessed point. I myself wondered at that time whether I should not 
have stopped and desisted from introducing the last [pseudonym]; but I was so afraid 
that, in that case, I would later have it upon my conscience--praise God that I dared! 
Yet I stop here; I am, at this moment, much too rich to be able to write down 
what I have suffered, as well as what extraordinary things have been done for me 
during the course of these last, otherwise frightfully painful years.52 
It would seem that the increasingly polemical middle period of SK's authorship did issue 
from his Easter experience of 1848 and its tentative breaking of his reserve, but that the 
Sipap XS A 89, pp. 104-5. 
s2Ibid., p. 106. 
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struggle for forgiveness nevertheless continued to be an ongoing war of attrition, with long 
periods of time being spent in the trenches and only a few clarifying victories along the way. 
In any case, it seems difficult to dispute that some correlation is to be drawn between 
Kierkegaard's initial experience of the gospel in 1848 and his subsequent authorship. 
If we now return to our comparison of Kierkegaard and Luther on this point, the 
latter's life-long struggle with conscience and the recurring Anfechtunli!en attaching thereto 
immediately come to mind. But the relationship between the two men is almost certainly not 
one of simple elective affinity--a circumstance seldom noted. While accounts of 
Kierkegaard's Easter experience abound in the literature, almost never is attention called to 
the fact that this experience of forgiveness occurred in the midst of his reading of Luther and 
may well have been a direct outcome of it. Recall the previously-cited journal entry: "Today 
I have read Luther's sermon according to plan; it was the Gospel about the ten lepers. 0, 
Luther is still the master of us all." The entry is dated April 22, 1 848--just three days after 
the Easter experience.53 The fact that Kierkegaard had for some time been going through 
Luther's Postiller in a planned program of devotional reading, as well as that his enthusiasm 
for Luther peaked at precisely this critical juncture, indicates the enormous role that Luther 
must have played throughout the process of healing that had begun in August of the previous 
year.54 Almost incontrovertible, therefore, is Eduard Geismar's conclusion that it was 
Luther who, at this time, brought Kierkegaard forward in his struggle for spiritual health.55 
53Pap VIII' A 642 (JP 3 :2465). When one considers that SK read this sennon on the healing of the lepers 
in the glow of his own profound experience of healing, one will hardly escape the conclusion that its 
presentation offaith's boldness, and of the gratuity of God's gifts, made a deep impact upon him (supra, n. 17). 
54Recall that Kierkegaard's reading of Luther began in Advent of 1847, on which occasion he exuded similar 
enthusiasm--Pap VIII' A 465 (JP 3:2463). 
55"Wie urteilte Kierkegaard tiber Luther?" 3. Gerhard Niedenneyer ("Ostern bis Pfingsten 1848, die Wende 
in der religiosen Krise Soren Kierkegaards, zugleich seine erste und entscheidende Beriihrung mit Luther," 
Luther, Vierteliahrsschrift der Luthergesellschaft 9 [1927]:42-53) makes a similar claim: "Yes, Hamann had 
been the Moses of his life who had shown him the Promised Land. Now he finds the Joshua who leads him in, 
Le., D. Martinus Luther" (p. 45). Unfortunately one seeks in vain in Niedermeyer's article for any closer 
elaboration of Luther's direct influence upon the healing events of 1848. 
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The nature of the help that was afforded Kierkegaard is not difficult to discern. In a 
Papirer entry from 1848 he comments on Luther's sermon on the healing of the paralytic 
(Matt. 9: 1-8): 
"Your sins are forgiven"--this is what the Christians call to each other, with this call 
Christianity proceeds through the world, by these words it is known, just as a people, 
a nation is always known by the language it speaks. One person shouts these words 
to another just as a night watchman in chain-series shouts a watchword to the next 
one, etc. 56 
Kierkegaard's comment is in response to Luther's remarks, at the close of the sermon, 
regarding the priesthood of all believers in pronouncing the absolution of sins, each to the 
other. In yet another place Kierkegaard praises the sermon's emphasis upon the forgiveness 
of sins as the Christian's sole piety.57 If we look more closely at this sermon we find that 
it contains a great many thoughts that must have been a balm to SK's anxious conscience. 
Luther begins by describing his own struggles to appropriate the teaching of forgiveness: 
I myself have been an apprentice for so many years. I have preached, written, and 
read to the best of my ability. But I cannot boast of any mastery; to this very day I 
must be glad that I can go to school together with those who are beginning to learn 
for the first time.58 
This frank confession on the part of Luther regarding his own ongoing difficulty in 
appropriating the forgiveness of sins must have heartened Kierkegaard greatly. Having 
prefaced his remarks about forgiveness in this way, Luther proceeds to explain why the 
teaching of forgiveness is so difficult of appropriation. The root of the difficulty is, namely, 
that forgiveness is a category of transcendence. This characterization--one that Kierkegaard 
warmly designates "a totality qualification,,59 --is elaborated by Luther in the following 
manner: 
It [works-righteousness] is so rooted in man that even those who have faith and know 
grace or the forgiveness of sins have difficulty enough fighting it. In short, to raise 
56Pap vm 1 A 664 (JP 3:2466). 
57Pap IX A 482 (JP 2: 1218), written in late 1848. 
58En christelig Postille, 1 :552. 
59Pap IX A 482 (JP 2: 1218). Cf. SV VII 188-190 (Postscript 224-26). 
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oneself above the earthly righteousness and submit to this article transcends all 
human perception and reason, all skill and ability. And no matter how much one 
hears, no matter how much one can, oneself, say about it, nevertheless, the old vain 
conceit and innate frailty that would bring its own works before God, basing its 
blessedness upon them, ever remains in you.60 
What is to be done in order to combat experience and reason, thereby attaining to the 
assurance of forgiveness? In answer to this question, Luther marshals the category of faith. 
It alone is man's means of access to the transcendent. One must believe the word of 
forgiveness: 
But when he [the Christian] raises himself above this life and wants to have to do 
with God, then he must know that here neither his sin nor his piety apply. And even 
though he feels sins oppressing his conscience, and even though the law demands 
good works, he shall neither hear nor see anything of this, but answer undauntedly: 
"If I have sin, so too have I Christ's forgiveness; yea, I sit upon the throne where sins 
61 have no power to reach. II 
It is this text and another one that follows shortly thereafter ("our piety before God has no 
other name than: the forgiveness of sins")62 that Kierkegaard has in mind when he praises 
Luther's understanding of forgiveness as the Christian's true piety. Only the righteousness 
that comes to us by faith from above suffices to quell the attacks of conscience: 
You say: But what if I now feel sin day in and day out, what if my conscience now 
condemns me and holds before me God's wrath? Answer: Then you shall just learn 
that the Christian righteousness is nothing other than--the forgiveness of sins.63 
This piety is again and again appropriated by the Christian against his experience of God-
forsakenness: "Though I therefore feel nothing other than many and great sins, even so, they 
are not sins any longer."64 This struggle for appropriation--to return to the theme with 
which we began--is a task with which the Christian is never finished. He is ever angefochten, 
and ever, in faith, overcoming this Anfechtung. 
60En christelige Postille, 1 :552-53. 
6lIbid. 
62Ibid., 1 :553. 
6J1bid. 
~Ibid., 1:555. 
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Try and see for yourself how much you understand of this and whether it is really so 
easy and simple an art as unexperienced ones suppose. For if you understood it 
rightly, if you believed it rightly, then all calamities, death, and the devil would be 
nothing. But because you must still be bitten by sin--and bite back--must still dread 
death and hell and God's judgement, humble yourself only, give the Word the honor 
and say: ''No, I have never yet really understood it." 
In short: let each one examine his own heart; immediately he will find a false 
Christian that cherishes the vain conceit of having understood it before having 
learned the first ABC's thereof. True enough, it is soon heard and learned, it is not 
so difficult to talk about. But to appropriate it, to transfer it to one's own being so that 
it becomes life to the heart and comfort to the conscience--this is no human art.6S 
Before leaving this sermon and its significance for Kierkegaard during the crucial 
year of 1848, we should note two other things. One is that Luther, like Kierkegaard, is 
emboldened by the thought that God not only forgives sins--he forgets them: 
It is quite another matter when God forgives sin than when one person forgives 
another. To be sure, one can forgive his neighbor today, but hardly does the sun rise 
tomorrow until the neighbor's offense comes again to mind .... When, on the other 
hand, God forgives sin, it is a far higher thing for he condemns sin no more, he 
abandons all wrath, he thinks no longer upon the sin.66 
The second thing to be noted is that the gospel of forgiveness can only be appropriated by 
the anxious conscience since it is, after all, the gospel of the forgiveness of sins: 
No one belongs to this kingdom unless his sins are revealed to him by the gospel. 
Otherwise he cannot appropriate these words: "Your sins are forgiven." To be sure, 
all hear the gospel; but not all take it to heart, for not all feel their sin. But the gospel 
preaches that everything that lies within us is sin. Therefore it also offers consola-
tion--the forgiveness of sins is here. If it is to redound to my good, then the 
recognition of sins must precede it.67 
In Kierkegaard's day it was questionable whether in fact all "heard the gospel," for its 
presupposition was routinely suppressed: the proclamation of sins. With justice could 
Kierkegaard appeal to Luther in contending for the necessity of a prior preaching of law in 
order to provide the context (the anxious conscience) within which alone the proclamation 
65Ibid., 1 :555-56. 
~bid., 1 :554. 
67Ibid., 1 :554. 
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of the gospel makes sense.68 So too could he argue that the proclamation of "grace" in 
isolation from the prior preaching of law amounted to neither more nor less than indulgence-
peddling.69 
If we now return to our consideration of the path to wholeness that Kierkegaard trod 
during 1847-48, attempting to identify one notion that served as an Archimedean point in 
his struggle to find a gracious God, it seems to me that we are led to that of faith's cleaving 
unto forgiveness against experience and the understanding. If we ask the further question, 
"How is such faith possible?" the answer is not far to seek: Thou shalt believe in the 
forgiveness of sins.70 That is to say, while from its divine side faith is no "human art" but 
is the solely effectual operation of God, from its human side faith is obedience. It is such by 
virtue of the fact that it is commanded.71 We are commanded to stop trying to reason our 
way to faith: ours is simply to believe. In this way doubt is preempted by authority, the 
peculiar nature of which is that it brooks no questioning.72 Hence wherever doubt exists, 
680n Kierkegaard's contention thatthe law must be heard before the gospel's "good news" can be appreciated 
see, e.g., SV X 112 (Christian Discourses. 111-12), SV XII 426, 467-70 (Judge for Yourself!, 152,200-203), 
SV XI 213 (Sickness unto Death, 102), Pap XI2 A 305 (JP 3:3617), Pap VIII' A 473 (JP 4:4012). In his 
controversy with the Antinomians, Luther not only asserted the necessity that law be preached prior to gospel 
in order to awaken the consciousness of sin, but that apart from such preaching there can be no understanding 
of forgiveness or grace (see Mark Edwards, Luther and the False Brethren [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1975], 174). 
69Pap ~ A 340, 618 (JP 2:1901, 2:1486); SVXII 409-10 (Judge for Yourself!. 132); SVIX 190-91 (Works 
of Love, 193). SK invokes Luther in the last-mentioned text: "Take away from the forgiveness of sin the battle 
of an anguished conscience (to which, nevertheless, according to Luther's excellent explanation, this whole 
doctrine leads), and then lock the churches, the sooner the better, or tum them into places of amusement which 
stand open all day long!" Kierkegaard compares the Lutheran church ofhis day to a company hawking life 
insurance: it "offers about the lowest price, while its insurance in all respects is just as safe, yes, probably even 
more secure, than that of Catholicism and other confessions which, however, make greater demands on the 
policy-holders" (Pap X2 A 460 [JP 1:516]). 
7°Again we cite Pap IX A 176-77 (JP 6:6210 and 2:1217). 
7'N.B., that faith is commanded means that it is not a matter over which the intellect is at liberty to dispose. 
Yet the exercise of faith surely does require a specific cognitive state. Consequently, the fact that it is 
commanded indirectly attests that faith is not ultimately a matter of our doing, but is wrought by God in us--
even if, in human terms, our response to the summons to believe is obedience. This being so, one ought not 
understand SK's emphasis upon the duty to believe in an onerous, legalistic sense. But more on this shortly. 
72SV X 206-7 (Christian Discourses. 213-14); SV XII 210-11 (Practice in Christianity. 229-31); Pap VIII' 
A 331 (JP 3:3049). 
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it shows itself to be insubordination, and the inability to believe is unmasked as the refusal 
to do SO.73 As such, despair over the forgiveness of sins just is sin--indeed, it must be 
reckoned among the greatest of sins.74 
Geismar notes that this claim--along with another that SK makes in The Sickness 
unto Death, viz., that faith, not virtue, is sin's antithesis--is influenced by Luther.7s As 
regards the latter tenet, Luther's influence is unmistakable: we have already noted how SK 
applauds Luther's teaching that the forgiveness of sins is the Christian's sole piety, a piety 
that lies "far on the other side of sin--and virtue," and is grasped by faith.76 Likewise, 
Luther's influence as regards the former tenet is beyond dispute: Kierkegaard is wont to cite 
Luther as having enjoined submission to authority as the antidote to doubt and despair.77 
And certainly Luther does equate submission to divine authority with faith, referring the 
certainty of salvation to such obedience. Karl Holl writes: 
Luther enjoins the believer to arise constantly from the feeling of penitence to the 
renewed certainty of justification. And he eXPsressly declares this to be not only 
something that is permitted, but a strict duty. 8 If he has barred the believer from 
placing his hope in the righteousness that is nascent within him, then he bids him, 
instead, to build all the more firmly upon the constancy of divine mercy. In [W A 56, 
268, 21-23] he inculcates both, side by side, in the same sentence. After he has said: 
"[The truly pious ones] do not know when they are righteous, because they are 
righteous only by God's reckoning them such; but nobody knows his reckoning," he 
continues: "one shall ask and hope for it." One must not consider these last words 
as a toneless afterthought, nor overlook the fact that Luther says "shall" [~] and 
not, for instance, "may" [~]. He wishes to describe faith in the constancy of divine 
grace as duty in the full sense. For God's forgiveness is--and remains--a command 
73Pap VIlli A 7 (JP 1:778); Pap VIII2 B 27, pp. 77-78 and VIe B 235, pp. 140-150 (On Authority and 
Revelation. liii-liv and 107-118); SV X 89-91 (Christian Discourses. 88-90). 
74SV XI 224-26 (Sickness unto Death, 114-16). 
7S"Wie urteilte Kierkegaard tiber Luther?" 13. 
76Pap IX A 482 (JP 2:1218), previously cited. 
77SV XII 352 (For Self-Examination, 68); Pap Xl A 324 (JP 3:2489). 
78Cf. with Pap IX A 177 (JP 2: 1217) quoted above! 
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that man shall obey. Thus the person must believe ever anew that God regards him 
. h 79 as ng teous. 
If we examine the conclusion to Luther's sennon over the gospel for the Monday 
after Easter--a text that Kierkegaard not only read but, as already noted, commented 
upon80--we find just this teaching. There we read: 
When it comes to the Bible, the clever and contentious masters do not have one word 
to say. God has given other arts--be clever there, enter into lively discussion there, 
investigate and ask what is right and wrong there. When, on the contrary, it comes 
to Holy Scripture send all questioning and debating packing with the declaration: 
"God has said it, therefore I believe it! Here it is not a matter of debating "what" or 
"how." Here it is, "Be baptized and believe on the woman's seed, Jesus Christ, true 
God and man, believe that by his death and resurrection you have the forgiveness of 
sins and eternal life." Do not ask, "How is it possible?" Only believe--then you will 
feel how your heart bums within you. If, on the contrary, you would debate and 
question, "How does it all hang together?" then you have already removed yourself 
from the truth and from Scripture's correct understanding. These disciples do not 
debate, do not question, but bind themselves to the Word of the Lord Christ and hear 
what he says. Therefore the Word penetrates them with such might and their hearts 
become so illuminated that they no longer nourish the slightest doubt, but are as gay, 
ardent and glad as if they had passed through a fire.8) 
79"Die Rechtfertigungslehre in Luthers Vorlesung tiber den Romerbrief mit besonderer Rucksicht auf die 
Frage der Heilsgewil3heit," in ~ vol. 1 of Gesarnmelte Aufsatze zur Kirchengeschichte (Tubingen: 1. C. 
B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck), 1927), 143 -44. The translation of the Luther text is Wilhelm Pauck's (Luther: Lectures 
on Romans, The Library of Christian Classics [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961), 124). The translation 
has been slightly amended: ~ has been rendered "shall" rather than "must" in order the more sharply to 
convey Holl's point. 
Itis to be noted that while Luther does contend for the obligatory nature of belief, especially as regards 
the forgiveness of sins (we are commanded to believe that our sins are forgiven), and while Kierkegaard is 
clearly impressed by this teaching, he can nevertheless fault Luther for a lack of consistency in this regard. 
Indeed, we encounter such criticism within weeks after the Easter experience (Pap IX A 11 [JP 3:2467)). This, 
of course, only testifies to the enormous importance that precisely this notion holds for him personally, as well 
as to his great disappointment that Luther does not, in his opinion, consistently advocate it. 
80Pap X2 A 123 (JP 3:2504) and Pap Xl A 361 (JP 3:2358). 
8l En christelig Postille, I :273. It is to be observed that, although Luther is free with his use of the imperative 
in putting an end to fruitless questioning ("Be bapti7.ed and believe"), the ability to comply with this command 
comes from God. The disciples are able to "bind themselves to the Word of the Lord" only because this same 
Word has first been proclaimed to them with power. Then, by virtue oftheir faith, it "penetrates them with such 
might that their hearts become so illuminated that they no longer nourish the slightest doubt." In general it is 
characteristic of Luther that the Word (not the requirement!) works faith. This is true even of the early Luther, 
for whom the word of judgement works humility. Consequently, Holl's--and Kierkegaard's--emphasis upon the 
requirement of faith is perhaps a bit misplaced and, if not carefully qualified, can lend itself to legalistic 
distortion. Only if the requirement is understood in the light of the gospel, and therefore becomes a word of 
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In this passage Luther develops what Kierkegaard calls the "change into another 
category or kind,,82 by withdrawing Christianity's truths from the genre of the indicative 
(the province of speculation) and translating them into that of the imperative (the domain of 
authority). Moreover, Luther applies this lJ.€'tCt~aO'tt; €it; aAAo yevot; to the doctrine 
of forgiveness in particular--it shall be appropriated in faith. And finally, he proclaims the 
certainty of salvation that derives from this transferral of the doctrine of forgiveness to 
another genus wherein "doubt" has no place, and hence, where uncertainty as to the reality 
of forgiveness cannot arise. Yet it is implicitly understood that the transferral from unbelief 
to belief that accompanies this Gestalt switch of forgiveness is divinely wrought by the 
proclaimed Word. As such, the Christian's certainty of salvation is by no means simply due 
to the imperative mood's grammar of unquestioning obedience. The fact that he finds himself 
in this new domain at all is a manifestation of the Spirit's presence and power. With this 
Kierkegaard, too, will agree, even if he finds particular consolation in the fact that faith is 
commanded. 
Among the several notions in which Kierkegaard has been confirmed by his reading 
of Luther, then, there can be little doubt that these two have played the most crucial role in 
his spiritual healing: first, that the forgiveness of sins must be appropriated by faith again 
and again in the face of Anfechtun~, and second, that such faith is not a luxury that is 
permitted the Christian, but a duty that is laid upon him. It is from such nonnegotiable 
obedience that the cheerful confidence of faith derives--N.B., not tV AOy~ lJ.OVOV (the 
mere "grammar" of authority) cXAAa Kal. tV &uvCtlJ.€t Kal. tV 1tv€ulJ.an cXyi~ Kal. 
1tAfl poq>opi~ 1tOAAn (by the Spirit's activity through the Word of forgiveness).83 This 
notion that trust in God is commanded was Kierkegaard's greatest source of comfort in 
Anfechtung, even as it had been for Luther before him. Karl Holl was, of course, the first to 
observe the role that the commandment to believe played in Luther's own struggle for 
gospel, does it work faith. Yet even here it is more fitting to speak of the Word, not the requirement per se, as 
effecting faith. 
82Pap Xl A 361 (JP 3:2358). 
831 Thess. 1 :5. 
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spiritual health, and his analysis of the comfort that Luther drew from this ostensible word 
of law is instructive in helping us understand the comfort that Kierkegaard himself must 
have drawn.84 Holl observes that 
what sustained Luther in such extreme distress was something surprisingly simple. 
It was the first commandment. Again and again in his mortal anguish he clung to 
its opening words, "I am the Lord your God." ... He seized upon a commandment 
as the ultimate--precisely the commandment that judged him ... and he seized upon 
it in order, first of all, honestly to affirm it along with the judgement resulting from 
't 85 1 . 
The duty of affirming the first commandment and of ratifying God's judgement against him 
for his failure to keep it--this became the very means of Luther's deliverance, for the more 
that he affirmed the righteousness of God's verdict against him (a God whom he had not 
revered as his God) the more clearly he became aware of the life-giving implication that this 
othelWise damning commandment held for him: 
In the moment that Luther, in the feeling of his unworthiness, would like to despair 
and be swallowed up before God, there came, alongside the commandment that 
84yalter Lindstrom (EfterfOljelsens teologi hos Soren Kierkegaard [Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans 
Diakonistyrelses BokfOrlag, 1956],264-73), too, makes the connection between SK and Luther on this point, 
citing Holl's work as a basis for comparison as well (p. 265). Lindstrom rightly observes that Kierkegaard's 
emphasis upon Christianity's imperatives is intended to call attention to the fact that man's relationship to God 
must be one of absolute respect. Commands such as "You shall believe," "You shall love," are claims to God's 
unconditional sovereignty. Yet (as already mentioned) these are not the sorts of demands that can be met at 
will. One must first possess the requisite condition. Lindstrom therefore regards the fact that they are 
commanded as a tacit statement 0 f the necessity 0 f grace; to acknowledge their bi nding nature means not only 
to confess that God is due our unconditional obedience, but that we are dependent upon him for all that we do, 
including our compliance with the command. In this way the language of unconditional duty implicitly 
contains the unconditional promise that God will actualize his will in us. This promise becomes explicit in the 
command, "You shall believe in the forgiveness of sins." Accordingly, Lindstrom considers Kierkegaard's 
emphasis upon obedience to the first commandment not as evidence of his legalism, but of his evangelical faith. 
There is much to commend this position, and Lindstrom argues powerfully for it. Others disagree, for example 
Karl Barth, who sees in Kierkegaard's Works of Love a Kantian duty ethic (Die kirchliche Dogmatik [Zurich: 
EVZ-Verlag, 1932-70], vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 886-87). I am persuaded that no easy answer to the question of 
Kierkegaard's purported legalism exists. He himself seems to suffer from a certain ambiguity on this point, as 
we hope later on to show. 
8S"Was verstand Luther unter Religion?" in ~ 73-74. Holl's unfortunate tendency to read Luther in 
moralistic terms finds expression in the first ellipsis: "Nowhere does it become so clear as here that the feeling 
of a 'shall' formed the foundation of his piety, and that duty toward God appeared to him to be the first among 
all duties." While feelings evoked by the law certainly did form a foundation of Luther's piety, they were not 
the foundation. One must rather speak oflaw and gospel. As we shall see shortly, only insofar as duty'S "shall" 
was transfigured by the gospel, did it gain salvific significance for Luther. 
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judged him, the sharp awareness that it remained a commandment of God to him at 
all times. One must always obey him. Always, that is to say: even now when this 
seems totally impossible. Yes, even now. For when a commandment becomes 
difficult, then is precisely the right time to fulfil it. . . . Yet to obey the first 
commandment in such a situation and to "have God as one's God" as it demands, 
means also, as Luther now discovers, to believe that God, for his part, despite the 
judgement, keeps a firm hold on fellowship with the person; it means to recognize 
that God certainly does destroy the guilty one in judgement, but that he nevertheless 
wills to let him live before him. This includes, as a consequence, the hope of 
forgiveness. Thus does Luther see through the darkness and the stonn of the divine 
wrath into the loving will of God; he perceives, as he wonderfully;mts it, how God 
speaks to him "under and above the 'No,' the deep, secret, 'Yes."'s 
In a word: "out of the consciousness of the never-ceasing obligation toward God, the 
intimation of ajust as indissoluble affiliation with God grows. Driven into the comer by the 
commandment, Luther comes to realize that he never falls out of the relationship with God." 
Even if he had to endure the impending punishment for his sins, he would 
nevertheless not be released from the relationship of obedience to God. Even in hell 
the commandment to regard God as a--as his--God would still continue to exist for 
him. Thus does Luther fight his way in Anfechtun~ through to the highest 
rigorousness of the conception; he unwaveringly understands the relationship to God 
purely as duty and elevates this to the point of unlimited extension; but precisely the 
relationship with God that is thought out with such unmerciful rigor becomes for him 
again the solid ground upon which he can tread. The fact that God, even now, still 
commands something and commands precisely this, becomes for him the sign that 
God does not let go of him and that he therewith assumes a positive attitude 
toward him. Insofar as God--even vis-a-vis the condemned person--continues to 
enforce his commandment that he be regarded as a God, he, as it were, calls him 
into his service anew. This will of God therefore shows itself to be something new, 
unexpected, because the preceding judgement, in addition, continues to be 
preserved in its entire rigor.S7 
Holl goes on the observe that, ultimately, only that person who thinks well of God gives him 
the honor that is due him. To dispute in the midst of Anfechtung that God is love is to insult 
him--more than this, it is to deny that he is God. Thus the duty to honor God as one's own 
God ultimately provides the means for overcoming Anfechtung. "The person may overcome 
himself, may overcome his 'conscience,' may overcome the image of God that confronts him 
~id., 74-75. 
87Ibid., 76. 
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in judgement, because he shall believe on that God who has good intentions toward 
h · ,,88 1m. 
Paul Buhler rightly observes that the an~efochten Christian can only find comfort in 
the first commandment insofar as it is not law, but gospel (and therefore implicitly points 
to Christ).89 Now, it is not clear that Kierkegaard sees the liberating presence of the gospel 
in the biblical injunction to believe in precisely the same way as Luther. Nevertheless, it is 
certain that the "shalt" in "Thou shalt believe" vests the addressee with God-given authority 
for appropriating the forgiveness of sins on the basis of an already present reality: "Thy 
sin is forgiven. ,,90 The commandment is not simply a word of duty (however liberating 
such might be by virtue of its unconditioned character); rather, it is a word of gospel, tacitly 
conferring the "thing signified" (the forgiveness of sin) along with "sign" itself (the 
command to believe). It is able to do this because it is grounded in the saving intent that 
God, who is absolute love, already has toward us when he says, "Thou shalt believe.,,91 
88Ibid., 79. 
89P ie Anfechtung bei Martin Luther (Zurich: Zwingli-Veriag, 1942}, 121-22, 128. Buhler (and others} j ustly 
take Holl to task for contending that Luther finds in the first commandment some other basis for faith than 
Christ alone. As for Luther regarding this ostensible word of law not simply as law but, more importantly, as 
gospel, Buhler cites a multitude of Luther-texts (p. 122, n. 186); and clearly, even on HoU's presentation (which 
is decidedly moralistic in tone) Luther does interpret the first commandment in the manner of the Pauline 
paraenesis, i.e., as an indicative ethic based upon God's saving will. Because God continues to be my God even 
in the act of judging and condemning me, therefore I remain under obligation to honor him by trusting him. 
The "shaU" is ever there: it remains my unconditional duty to honor God as my God, no matter what. But the 
added element of divine empowerment is also there: such trust is realizable on the basis of God's ongoing, 
gracious relationship to me. It is precisely the "shall" that leads me to joyful recognition of the "is" (and 
therefore, the "can") that is given along with it. This "is" of the gospel then, in tum, puts the "shall" in an 
entirely different light. 
9O"Thou shalt stop thinking about thy sin, thou hast not only a right to stop, it is not merely that thou mayest 
make bold to pray to God for permission to dare to forget it; no thou shalt forget, for thou shalt believe that thy 
sin is forgiven" (Pap IX A 177 [JP 2:1217], Kierkegaard's emphasis). 
91Cf. Pap IX A 316, p. 178 (JP 2:2008) where, as regards the deep feelings of unworthiness and 
condemnation that overpower the Christian who is experiencing spiritual trial, Kierkegaard writes: "But one 
must not give in to this; one must strive against it, thanking God that he has commanded one that one shall 
pray to him, for otherwise one would hardly make it through the Anfregtelse. One must remember that God is 
love, the God of patience and consolation, and that he is not one to assume vain titles, but is absolute and is 
what he declares himself be in a far different manner than I am able to grasp. [One must remember] that he is 
not just as loving as the most loving person and then a little bit more, but that even the most loving person ... 
is but a kind of caricature, who still does not resemble God's love any more than a monkey resembles man. 
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The saving significance of the commandment for Kierkegaard exhibits still further 
parallels to what we find in Luther. Buhler points out that the first commandment unites in 
an inextricable way both law and gospel. As such, it embodies the comforting insight that 
God's judgement is ultimately only a mask for his grace: the very God who kills by its means 
shows himself to be gracious precisely in so doing.92 Accordingly, the first commandment 
embodies the most fundamental insight of the theology of the cross ("under and above the 
'No,' the deep, secret, 'Yes"') in a single, terse formula. Such an experience of law is, as we 
learned in chapter two, precisely Kierkegaard's own.93 
Finally, aside from the manner in which the first commandment leads to the recogni-
tion of the gospel (insofar as by its means God addresses one, irrevocably laying claim to 
him), indeed is that gospel in concealed form, there is a certain psychological comfort that 
Kierkegaard and Luther alike derive from it. Buhler notes that "Luther again and again testi-
fies that the command to believe and to hope has helped him .... Thus does Luther report 
that, already while still a monk, the remark of a brother helped him: 'God himself 
commands that we hope. Why, then, should we not trust God, who commands us to hope?'" 
Buhler observes that 
We can compare and illustrate what happens here with the invitation to the hungry 
person: Eat this fruit! Such a command can be a help to the hungry person who either 
did not see, or did not dare eat the fruit, so that he will now reach for it. To be sure, 
he cannot quell his hunger by means of the command alone, but only by means of 
the food. Yet the command has helped him to find the food. In just the same way the 
first commandment helps, not as mere demand, qua~; but it points to Christ, to the 
Then one must remember that, at every second, God has 100,000 possibilities for helping one and just as many 
explanations that, if he wanted to, would immediately show one that what he sends one's way is still, at that 
very moment, the best thing, and that the reason why he doesn't do this is just because he has one explanation 
more, viz. that not to do so is the best thing for one" (translation mine, emphasis SK's). 
92P ie Anfechtung bei Martin Luther. 125-26. 
9~See the earlier discussion, supra, chap. 2, n. 99 (SV XII 427 [Judge for Yourself!, 153 D. Cf. SV IX 357 
QYorks of Love, 346, slightly emended): "What is conscience? In the conscience it is God who looks at a 
human being so that the human being now must look at him in all things .... In this way God is the educator; 
his love is the greatest mildness and the greatest rigour. It is just as in nature, where heaviness is also lightness. 
The heavenly body swings easily in the infinite--by gravity; but if it gets out of its course, it becomes too light, 
and then the lightness becomes heaviness and it falls heavily--because of its lightness. In this same way God's 
rigour is mildness for the loving and humble, but for the hard-hearted his mildness is rigorousness." 
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gracious God, and commands the despairing one to eat this bread of life, to believe 
upon God's grace and help.94 
There can be little doubt that Kierkegaard felt the commandment to approach God 
in faith as emboldening.95 Yet as we have seen, its power lay not only in the encouragement 
that it afforded but also in its nonnegotiability and implicit promise of divine actuation. It 
is the authority with which God commands that we appropriate the forgiveness of our sins 
that lifts from us the responsibility for giving them a second thought and vouchsafes that the 
matter is his concern and his alone--we are not so much as to question our own role in 
accepting such forgiveness, we are simply to accept it. This is the all-sufficiency of grace, 
it is the power of the gospel implicit in the commandment to have God as one's own God. 
Naturally, the mere existence of this commandment is not the ultimate guarantee that 
Anfechtullf~ will be overcome. As Luther (and Kierkegaard) can attest: "I know a word that 
is the most difficult of all in the entire Scripture: namely, the 'your' in the first com-
mandment. ,,96 But this is, once again, only to affirm that the ability to lay hold of the 
commanded forgiveness lies not in the bare "shall," but in the "is" to which it points. It is 
ultimately God who effects what he has commanded--his command is predicated upon the 
new reality that he has wrought. 
This concludes our survey of the affinities that drew Kierkegaard to Luther. These 
were affinities of which he was fully conscious; affinities through the cultivation of which 
he grew in the assurance of having been "sent out" by divine commission into conflict with 
official Christianity; affinities that, moreover, emboldened him to brave being thrust inward 
into painful encounter with himself, there finding the assurance of forgiveness. Not until he 
had attained mastery in the latter task could he proceed with complete assurance in the 
former one. And in both struggles Luther served as Kierkegaard's guide. Yet as we had 
~ie Anfechtung bei Martin Luther. 127-28. 
91'0 the aforementioned texts Pap IX A 192 (JP 3:3427) can be added: "The more one prays, the more 
ccrtain it is that one's final comfort is this, that God has commanded that one shall pray; for God is so infinite 
that, at many a moment, one would otherwise hardly dare to pray, however much one would otherwise like to" 
(the translation is mine, the emphasis is Kierkegaard's). 
<xvIA TR 2, 2047, p. 303,1. 25. 
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earlier occasion to note, this initially strong feeling of spiritual kinship increasingly devolved 
into a sense of dissociation. The reasons for this falling-out, as well as its implications for 
Kierkegaard's final theological standpoint, it is now our task to explore. 
In the introduction to this work we took note of the late Kierkegaard's opposition to 
Luther's presentation of law and gospel: "The way in which even Luther speaks of law and 
gospel still is not Christ's teaching.,,97 Such criticism is characteristic of the journal entries 
dating from 1854-55 and stands in sharp contrast to the generally positive attitude that had 
predominated up to that time. As previously noted, Luther had received the highest praise 
in SK's published works, which culminated in 1852 with Jud~e for Yourself!. The change 
of heart that SK had about Luther during the last two years was due primarily to the 
recognition that the bargain struck with the world by later Lutheranism could not be 
attributed simply to its falling away from Luther--the seeds for this accommodation were 
already present in nuce in Luther himself. Kierkegaard points out three respects in which 
Luther compromised the rigor of New Testament Christianity: first, by one-sidedly empha-
sizing Christ as gift to the exclusion of Christ as example, Luther left himself open to being 
co-opted by secularity; second, by promulgating a "Jewish" piety that regards temporal 
goods as evidences of God's blessing Luther negated the message of the cross, viz., that 
Christianity is the voluntary letting go of this world and its goods, and the incurring of 
suffering for so doing; finally--and most seriously--Luther translated Christianity from God's 
interest into man's when he proclaimed its raison d'etre to be "relief for afflicted conscienc-
es" instead of discipleship in the New Testament sense. The result of this revisionism has 
been nothing less than the perpetuation of a monstrous fraud as to what New Testament 
Christianity is, and an ongoing revolt against God. In the remainder of this chapter we shall 
discuss these charges in detail. 
As regards the first point, we have seen that it was SK's earlier contention that Luther 
had been "totally correct and a turning point in the development of religion" precisely 
because he was the first to recognize that the teaching about the Model could "no longer 
97Pap XII A 572 (JP 3:2554), translation mine. 
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plainly and simply occupy the first place. Faith comes first, Christ as the gift.,,9s SK had 
applauded Luther for establishing "faith in its rights" at a time when the gospel had been 
transformed into a "new Law" wherein all had become "tortured, laborious. ,,99 When Luther 
strode upon the scene works were "everything," with the result that "hypocrisy, the conceit 
of meritoriousness, and futility" were rife. loo Luther's subordination of imitation to faith 
justly acknowledged the singularity of Christ--a singularity so far removed from ordinary 
humans that his example can never be directly regulative. In recognizing this Luther showed 
himself to be, "next to the N.T., the truest figure."I01 His attack upon monasticism was an 
attack upon the reversal of this priority--an attack that was more than justified in view of the 
abuses that issued from that institution, chief among them meritmongering. lo2 
98Pap X2 A 207 (JP 2:1135). 
99SV XII 306-7 (For Self-Examination, 15-16). 
I()()Pap X6 B 2, p. 6 (For Self-Examination. supp., 227), translation mine. 
10lpap X5 A 96, p. 112 (IP 3:2898). 
102 Among the abuses of monasticism, SK numbers its "fantastically exaggerated asceticism" (Pap Xl A 213, 
X3 A 153 [JP 3 :2484, 3:2518]) which included such practices as "scourging oneself, crawling on one's knees, 
standing on one leg, etc."--as if these were "true imitation" (SV XII 460 [Iudge for Y ourselfl. 192]). Medieval 
asceticism tended in the direction of the sophistical and the legalistic, elevating trivial matters to the status of 
absolute significance (Pap X5 A 94 [JP 1: 1 77]). As such, ascetic practices became ends in themselves, 
displacing their intended ~ obedience to God {Pap XJ A 776 [JP 2: 1893)). Accordingly, Kierkegaard relates 
the rise of medieval asceticism to the transfonnation of Christianity into an objective doctrine {Pap X5 A 99 
[IP 1: 178 D. "Outwardness" rather than "inwardness" had become the criterion of piety (SV VII 351 [Postscript. 
405)). The further tendencies to which such exaggerated asceticism led were, on the one hand, anxious self-
torture and, on the other, arrogant presumption (Pap )f A 419 [IP 2: 1485)). The tendency to attach an imagined 
meritoriousness to one's ascetic exploits was great (Pap X2 A 558, X3 A 217, SVVII 351, XII 460 [JP 3:2513, 
3 :2521, Postscript. 405, For Self-Examination. 192)). This, in tum, led to the ultimate presumption that one 
person's presumed merits could be hawked to another (SV XII 460 [Judge for Yourself!. 192)). 
Kierkegaard, while specifically acknowledging the dangers attaching to asceticism (particularly that 
it can so easily become either a temptation to the conceit of meritoriousness or the cause of insanity! --Pap X3 
A 342, X5 A 94, p. 108 [IP I: 14, I: 177)), nevertheless recogni7..es a true, Christian asceticism. It is self-denial 
(Pap X3 A 326, p. 238 [IP 3:3728]), perseverance in a situation in which one could "sell out" ever so slightly 
and gain everything thereby (Pap ~ A 405, p. 245 [IP 3:2965)), it is suffering that has its ground in relating 
to the unconditioned--suffering that is, moreover, voluntarily incurred (Pap Xe A 161, p. 174, XII A 181, p. 
140 [IP 4:4057,4:3881]). 
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So Luther reinstated faith in its rights and was justified in doing so on account of the 
misplaced emphasis that had come to be placed upon "imitation." Nevertheless, Kierkegaard 
hastens to add: 
But let us not forget, Luther did not therefore abolish imitation, nor did he do away 
with the voluntary, as pampered sentimentality would like to have us think about 
Luther. He affirmed imitation in the direction of witnessing to the truth and 
voluntarily exposed himself there to dangers enough (yet without deluding himself 
that this was meritorious).I03 
While Luther's teaching, like that of Paul before him, laid the infinite accent upon Christ's 
atoning death, nevertheless his life expressed imitation in the most rigorous sense--yet in 
such a way as to divert all attention from himself. Accordingly, the crucial thing about 
Luther was that he "once again gave the relationship its correct turn .... Imitation has to be 
there, but not in such a way that one becomes self-important because of it, or wants to earn 
blessedness because of it. No, grace is the decisive thing."I04 
The problem is that later Lutheranism "misused Luther, completely left out imitation 
and took 'grace' in vain."lo5 This is, for a long time, a frequent refrain of Kierkegaard's. 
"Established Christianity has taken Luther in vain. . . . Luther rescued 'imitation, the 
imitation of Christ,' from a fantastic misunderstanding--but present-day Christendom has 
103 SV XII 461 (Judge for Yourself!, 193). 
IMPap X3 A 409 (JP 2: 1877), translation mine. 
l05Ibid. 
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completely secularized Luther, as if this were what Luther meant."l06 Thus Kierkegaard 
can characterize the progressive distortion that has been foisted upon Luther as follows: 
Those who were contemporaries of Luther, especially those who were closest 
to him, received at that time the powerful impression that he was a hero of faith, first 
of all, melancholy beyond all measure, then too, terribly tried by the most frightful 
Anfregtelser, that he was the pious, God-fearing man who is essentially a stranger to 
the world. 
Soon, however, the impression of Luther changed; he came actually to be 
perceived as a political hero and the catch-phrase under which he was remembered 
became: "Hear me, you Pope, I will be, etc." 
Yet again the impression changed since the Pope had now been broken once 
and for all and Luther was perceived as a man of the world, full of gusto, and the life 
of the party; the catch-phrase under which he was remembered by clergy and laity 
alike became: wer nicht liebt Weiber, Wein, Gesang, etc. In quite common terms one 
could nowadays say that the perception is: the significance of the Reformation is that 
Luther instituted girls and wine and card-playing in their rightful place in the 
Christian church, as something essential to it, yes, as that which is truly perfect in 
opposition to the imperfect: poverty, prayer and fasting. lo7 
For his own part, SK admits that he has steered in the direction of Christ as example 
(as evidenced by his rallying cry, "Back to the monastery from which Luther broke 
I06Pap X' A 510 (JP 3:2528), translation mine. Pap X' A 576 (lP 2:1792) similarly contends that 
Lutheranism has taken Luther's determination of the relation between faith and works in vain. Pap Xl A 213 
and X2 A 558 (JP 3:2484 and 3:2513) assert that Luther acted in response to "a fantastically overdrawn 
asceticism," to "asceticism's misunderstood, puffed up conceit." In order to combat these errors Luther piously 
set forth the simple secular walk oflife. Present day Lutheranism has not only removed Luther from the context 
in which his actions made sense, but removed the dialectical element of "imitation" so as to use him as a cover 
for its own worldliness and epicurism. As late ali 1853 (Pap XS A 139 [lP 2:1923]) Kierkegaard can still 
exclaim: "Oh Luther, who has been exploited in such a way by his adherents for a purpose the exact opposite 
of what he wanted, as you!" (translation mine). It is likely that at lealit some ofSK's antipathy to Hegel stems 
from the fact that the latter extols Luther for having done away with monasticism's vows of poverty, chastity, 
and obedience, installing kulrumrotestantische equivalents in their stead: work and commerce, marriage and 
family, and participation in the ethical life of the state. With Luther the Christian religion passed completely 
over into a Christian culture, thus fulfilling a necessary precondition for Spirit's elevation to Absolute Spirit 
(see Steven Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom. Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History [Chambers-
burg, Penn.: American Academy of Religion, 1972],53-55). Kierkegaard does not deny that Luther has had 
a certain dubious "world-historical" significance--Hegel's interpretation is a strikingly accurate account of his 
fate in history. What Kierkegaard denies is that history--and Hegel--have treated him justly. 
107Pap XJ A 234 (JP 3:2524), translation mine. 
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out,,).108 He defends this modus operandi on the ground that Luther himself when 
confronted with the exaggerated abuse of Christ as example, accentuated the countervailing 
moment. Now that Christ qua example has fallen into oblivion and Lutheran piety has been 
reduced to "shadowboxing in the hidden inwardness," SK is convinced that this exemplum 
side of Christ must be brought to the fore once again, though--N.B. --in a different way than 
had occurred to Luther or the Middle Ages: viz., so as "to jack the price up so frightfully that 
the Model himself teaches people to flee to grace."l09 This employment of Christ's 
example in order to drive people to grace is, of course, the spiritual use of the law; accord-
ingly, SK believes that he has captured the spirit of Luther's theology in spite of all 
objections to the contrary: "I see very well how one could, precisely from Luther's stand-
point, mount an attack against me; but truly, I dare say that I, too, have understood Luther--
and so I have, in addition, guarded against fooling about in a fog, as if everything were still 
as it was in Luther's day."llo 
IOSPap XII A 134, 198 (IP 3:2762,3:2763). SK writes: "There is no doubt that our age, that Protestantism 
in general, could use the monastery again .... The monastery' isan essential dialectical moment in Christianity; 
hence we must also have it out as a sea marker in order to tell where we are" (Pap VIlli A 403 [IP 3:2750), 
translation mine). 
I09Pap X2 A 30 (JP 3:2503), translation mine. This, in its own way, Lutheran understanding of the 
significance of imitation in the life of the believer (viz., to prompt the flight to grace, not to inculcate moral 
virtue) is consistently maintained by SK --see, e.g., Pap IX A 153 (JP 1 :692), JC A 349 (JP 2: 1902) and XS A 
88 (IP 2: 1922). 
IIOPap X2 A 30 (JP 3:2503), translation mine. Cf. Pap X2 A 47 (JP 2:1857) where SK explicitly equates his 
own ModellRedeemer distinction with Luther's law/gospel one. It is to be noted that SK was quite correct in 
supposing that he would not have to await posterity's allegation that he had reinstated works-righteousness: that 
allegation was to come from the pen of his contemporary adversary, Hans Lassen Martensen who, in his 
Christian Ethics, writes: "Though Kierkegaard opposes the Middle Ages' monastic movement and its self-
wrought penance, he nevertheless fails to recognize that his own direction, which I dare say sharpens guilt 
consciousness without Christ's atonement becoming a decisive factor in salvation's work, is none other than 
a repetition of the same thing in the midst of the nineteenth century Protestant world. A life that is to be ordered 
according to the Kierkegaardian view, where the consciousness of sin and guilt are fundamental detenninations 
in which the believer exists without this believer having found the faith that justifies, can only remain the life 
of a penitent; and when the consciousness of guilt demands atonement, but Christ's atonement is lacking, we 
come once again into the system of self-wrought atonement inasmuch as eternal blessedness must be earned 
by a continuous cultivation of suffering and renunciation. To be sure, we are also told that eternal blessedness 
is granted by God's free grace and compassionate love. But this grace comes only afterward, in the future life, 
in heaven, once the person has, on earth, by his own exertion, accomplished the requisite preparations. 
Christianity, on the other hand, teaches us not of a grace that comes afterward, but a grace that comes long in 
advance of the person, a preceding, forthcoming grace that, already at the person's birth, takes him up into its 
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Expressed somewhat differently, Kierkegaard believes that he can preserve Luther's 
unalloyed gospel message while countering the contemporary indifference to works if only 
he may modify Luther's ordo salutis somewhat. Whereas "Luther orders it correctly as 
follows: Christ is gift--to which corresponds faith. Next he is model--to which corresponds 
imitation," Kierkegaard believes that "more accurately one may say: (1) Imitation in the 
direction of a decisive action by which the situation for becoming a Christian comes about. 
(2) Christ as gift--faith. (3) Imitation as faith's fruit." I II That is to say: Christ the lawgiver 
must first be brought to the fore so as to provide the occasion for SK's contemporaries to try 
to keep the law. Then in the wake of their failure to do so Luther's ordo salutis will make 
some sense. Seen in this light, "the teaching about the Model, rightly understood, 
comprehends everything"--Le., both law and gospel.I1 2 
One might sum up Kierkegaard's position during the period of his positive estimate 
of Luther (1848-53) by saying that a dialectical tension must be reestablished within 
Protestantism between law and gospel. Luther himself had been constrained to emphasize 
the latter in order to correct a dangerous abuse attaching to the former. While Luther's 
theological position on the absolute primacy of faith in Christ's atonement was quite correct 
(and therefore remains nonnegotiable), nevertheless his emphasis can, and must, be reversed 
in the light of the changed circumstances. It is in terms of pedagogy (not doctrine!) that law 
must now take precedence over gospel.\13 Because the absolute primacy of faith has been 
anns in baptism (which Kierkegaard ended by rejecting), a grace that, step by step, follows the person to the 
grave and which, for the one who surrenders to it in faith, becomes the bearing grace that alone makes it 
possible forman to strive for likeness" (Den christelige Ethik [Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1871], 
vol. 1, Den almindelige DeL 385-86). 
IIIPap ~ A 459 (JP 2:1908), translation mine. 
112Pap X2 A 47 (JP 2:1857). The correctness of SK's belief that his ModellRedeemer distinction is 
equivalent to Luther's law/gospel one has been roundly disputed by Regin Prenter (infra, chap. 9, n. 61). For 
the time being we defer discussion of Prenter's criticism. 
llJsv XII 461 (Judge for Yourself!, 193), Pap Xl A 132 (JP 1 :693), Pap ~ A 491 (JP 2:1909). In SV XII 
314 (For Self-Examination. 24) SK strongly affinns the doctrinal priority that Luther gives to faith: "Lutheran 
doctrine is excellent, is the truth. With regard to this excellent Lutheran doctrine, I have but one misgiving. It 
does not concern Lutheran doctrine--no, it concerns myself: I have become convinced that I am not an honest 
soul but a cunning fellow. Thus it certainly becomes most proper to pay a little more attention to the minor 
premise (works, existence, to witness to and suffer for the truth, works of love, etc.), the minor premise in 
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proclaimed in such a way as to foster a dangerous abuse in its own right, the other dialectical 
moment must be brought to light, while not forgetting what has been learned from the 
past. 114 SK can even call that other moment "the Catholic"--in relation to which "the 
Lutheran" must be viewed as a corrective. liS 
Lutheran doctrine. Not that the minor premise should now be made the major premise, not that faith and grace 
should be abolished or disparaged--God forbid--no, it is precisely for the sake of the major premise, and 
because I am the kind of fellow I am, [that] it certainly becomes most proper to pay more attention to the minor 
premise in Lutheran doctrine." 
1140n the errors of Catholicism not being repeated along with the reintroduction of Christ as Model, see, e.g., 
SV XII 464, 465 (Judge for Yourself!. 196, 197-98), Pap Xl A 154 (JP 3 :2481), ~ A 349 (JP 2: 1902) and ,r 
A 491 (lP 2: 1909). The errors that are to be avoided include not only meritmongering, but "laying a yoke upon 
consciences" and "ascetic self-torture" (Pap ~ A 349). 
IISRegarding the matter of Lutheranism and Catholicism being dialectical counterparts to one another, and 
hence in need of one another, we cite Pap XI2 A 303 and 305 (JP 3:2544 and 3:3617--but cf. SV XIV 47; Pap 
XII A 28, 76 and 198 [Attack upon Christendom. 34; IP 1:711,6:6863 and 3:2763]). In Pap Xe A 305 Protes-
tantism is said to need the presupposition that Catholicism provides: viz., "that we humans are a bunch of 
scoundrels" (p. 328). Luther knew that he was one; he knew it because the preaching of the law had come to 
rest like "a heavy yoke upon the people's shoulders," they having been threatened "from one generation to the 
next by death and judgement and hell" (p. 324). Such preaching, together with the anxiety that it provoked, 
provided the necessary presupposition for the Lutheran proclamation: "relief for the anxious conscience" (p. 
325). This leads SK to speCUlate whether "Protestantism, or Lutheranism, is not actually a corrective," and 
whether "a great confusion has not come about by Protestantism having been made into the norm" (p. 324). 
Apart from the (Catholic) preaching of law, the Lutheran principle, "relief for the anxious conscience," is 
meaningless and ends in the deformation that SK calls "spiritless worldliness" (p. 325). By contrast, the worst 
that can happen when the Catholic principle degenerates into its respective deformation is hypocrisy (p. 325). 
This analysis is reproduced in the prior journal entry, as well (Pap Xe A 303). SK writes of Luther 
that, "after twenty years of fear and trembling and Anfregtelse so ghastly that--mark it well!--there is scarcely 
one individual in any generation who has this experience: human nature, if one wishes to put it that way, reacts 
in him, and this fear and trembling becomes transfigured into the most blissful, the most blessed good cheer 
and joy: marvelous! But what happens now? This principle is now made universal in Protestantism: in this way, 
only in this way ... is Christianity to be preached. The enormously potent medicine--the effect of which is 
relief--that Luther, fighting in fear and trembling and Anfregtelse to the point of death, discovered in his 
extreme anxiety--this is to be proclaimed as the only thing and foreveryone--and yet there is not one individual 
in any generation who is thus tried" (pp. 321-22). Whereas in Luther there was truth, SK asks whether his 
experience should be regarded as normative for the rest of us, and if not, then whether reassurance should really 
be the aim of most preaching. "Is it not enormously dangerous," he asks, "to universalize the Lutheran 
[concern], to give this knave within us the affirmation that what he needs is to be reassured, aha!" (p. 322). 
"Would society really be served," SK asks, "by a man who was as honest as honesty itself, so honest that it 
could not occur to him than anyone could want to steal--would society (or only just the thieves?) be served by 
him writing the laws, which naturally would bear the stamp of his assumption that theft does not occur?" (p. 
323). Injust the same way it is clear that Luther's prescription for the anxious conscience is not, without further 
ado, to be applied to the rest of us who enjoy all too easy a conscience. As Kierkegaard puts it in another 
journal entry: "He [Luther] is, for Christianity, a patient of the most extreme importance, but he is not the 
doctor; he has the patient's passion to express and to describe his suffering, and what he feels he needs as an 
assuagement. But he does not have the doctor's larger perspective" (Pap XII A 193, p. 153 [lP 3:2550]). That 
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While this turn that Kierkegaard has given the matter has the appearance of 
increasing hostility to Luther's theological position, it is to be stressed that the real object of 
SKIs critique is not Luther's position per se, but the manner in which he carried it through. 
Luther, on Kierkegaard's view, shares some of the responsibility for having been co-opted 
by secularity inasmuch as he incorrectly assumed that his own experience of the anxious 
conscience was normative and that every generation labored under the same burden of 
works-righteousness as did his own. This led him, in tum, to suppose that works could 
straightway be replaced by faith as the highest: 
Oh, but Luther was no dialectician. He did not see the enormous danger connected 
with introducing something else as the highest, something else related to and 
presupposing a prior thing, [something else] for which absolutely no mechanism for 
accountability exists. He did not understand that he had furnished the corrective, that 
the tap should be turned off with the most extreme caution so that he not be made the 
paradigm without further ado. This is exactly what happened.116 
is to say: Luther did not have an historical perspective and therefore did not reali7..e that what he had advanced 
was a corrective--one that, if made into the norm in a different situation, would have disastrous consequences. 
For since all development is dialectical, the "next" generation will be in constant need of "the contrast" as a 
corrective (Pap XS A 106 [JP 1 :71 0]). Christianity is just such a dialectical development (viz., mildness within 
strictness, or gospel under law), and is therefore subject to the danger that the dialectical moment that is to be 
resolved at a given point in time will be resolved all too easily, thus causing "the dialectical" to vanish from 
it (Pap X~ A 165 [JP 3:2873]). This being the case, Luther should have paid closer attention to his mode of 
presentation, matching his heightened conception of grace with an intensified enjoinment o flaw (Pap )(' A 230 
[JP 2:1484)). 
Clearly, if we momentarily abstract from SK's criticism of Luther--viz., that he incorrectly assumed 
that everyone was as honest and afflicted in conscience as he was (SV XII 314 [Judge for Yourself!. 24)), etc.--
Kierkegaard is typologizing when he characteri7..es Catholicism as the preaching of law and Lutheranism as 
the preaching of reassurance (cf. Pap)(' A 230 [JP 2:1484]. Per L,mning, too, makes this observation: cf. 
"Samtidighedens situation." En studie i Saren Kierkegaards kristendomsforstaelse [Oslo: Forlaget Land og 
Kirke, 1954],236). Insofar as it is historical types that he has constructed, they do need each other. The 
historically conditional truth of the Lutheran type, however, is not necessarily at odds with the universally 
normative truth of the Lutheran teaching: the absolute primacy of faith over works, the priority of Christ as 
sacramentum over Christ as exemplum, the ~ character of grace. Hence while SK urges a return of 
Protestantism to its "Catholic" presupposition, he denies that this implies a return to Catholicism proper: "Back 
to the monastery from which Luther ... broke out; the case must be taken back. Yet it is not said thereby that 
the pope is to triumph--it is, after all, not the papal police who are to take the case back" (Pap XII A 134 [JP 
3:2762]). Or, Pap)(' A 371-72 (JP 4:2539-40): "The Pope was, at bottom, a man who exactly understood what 
was popular .... True Lutheranism, with its closer understanding, is infinitely much too high, [it is] far, far too 
much intended for 'spirit,' to ever actually be able to become popular." The translations given are my own. 
116Pap X~ A 217 (JP 3 :2521), translation mine. Similar in tenor is Pap Xe A 301 (JP 3 :2543) in which SK 
asserts that we cannot, without further ado, begin where Luther left off--with the faith-principle--but must begin 
where he began (if not much further back!), with the principle of works. Only after having been tried by the 
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Kierkegaard goes on to say that "in general Luther struck too hard. He should have 
done everything to rid ... works of the notion of merit and, for the rest, let them stand. ,,117 
Here he is not simply criticizing Luther's false projection of his own spiritual condition onto 
everyone else and his consequent failure to attend to the prior preaching of law.lls Here 
he is criticizing the extreme mistrust that Luther has of works in general such that they come 
to assume a kind of second-rate status beneath faith. ll9 Also at work may be the conviction 
that, by allowing works to be absorbed into faith as its inevitable outcome, Luther gives too 
idealized a view of the Christian life--one that easily issues in too realized an ethic (viz., 
the antinomian one according to which, if only the faith is there, then the works are incipi-
ently present as well, even if not observably and demonstrably so). In any case, one thing 
is certain: the strong suspicion that Luther casts over works of any kind leads him to omit 
something that is essentially Christian: the voluntary incurring of suffering through imita-
t · 120 Ion. 
This, in tum, brings us to the second element of SKIs Luther-critique: viz., the charge 
that Luther undermines his own theology of the cross by entertaining a Jewish piety. This 
Kierkegaard defines in the following way: "Every existence where life's tension is resolved 
preaching of the law does Luther's result--justification apart from the works of the law--have validity for us. 
117Pap X~ A 218 (JP 3:2522), translation mine. 
1181n levelling this charge it isof course manifest that either SK isnot aware of, ordoes not adequately attend 
to, Luther's position vis-a-vis the antinomians. 
1191n this regard even Torsten Bohlin can concede that "Christian love toward one's neighbor has not always 
been able to stand forth in Luther as something that isequa1Jy as divine as faith, but has received the appearance 
of possessing lesser worth than faith; and however strongly Luther may stress that love toward one's neighbor 
proceeds from faith, it has nevertheless not come to clear expression that love amounts to faith itself and 
belongs to the center of the relationship with God since love, to no less degree than faith, is ultimately a work 
of God in man." Bohlin goes on to say that "Kierkegaard--above all in Works of Love's presentation--clearly 
maintains that love cannot be disjoined from faith as something 'human' in contrast to faith, which is something 
divine, but that just as faith itself is love, so does love belong to the heart of the personal relationship with 
God and is most deeply seen as an outflow of God's own eternal love" (Kierkegaards dogmatiska askadning, 
476-77). 
I20Pap X2 A 263 (JP 3:2509); Pap X3 A 43 (JP 4:4950). 
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in this life is: Judaism. Christianity is: This life sheer suffering--[then] eternity."m 
Whence comes this charge? At a very early point SK becomes aware that however much 
Luther may stress the world's opposition to the Christian and the suffering that results there-
from, he nevertheless is not entirely clear that persecution must occur without intermission 
or abatement so long as one persists in expressing absolute allegiance to God. Accordingly 
it is impossible that one should enjoy good days in this life. Yet it is Luther's naive belief 
that the very felicitous relationships that must needs be absent from Christian experience 
may be there after all, and that when they are, they are evidences of God's favor. 122 Luther 
lacks dialectical clarity about the Christian's relationship to temporality: on the one hand he 
warns of the double danger (lido good and then suffer for it") and on the other he speaks as 
though the world will reward the Christian's conduct of life.123 
The verity that it must go ill with Christians in this life, however, is deducible not 
only from their relationship to the world but from the very nature of the relationship to God. 
Here again Luther lacked dialectical clarity. On the one hand, there is the Luther of the theo-
102ia crucis for whom the mark of divine sonship is negative: God's seeming wrath upon 
those whom he loves;124 yet alongside this Luther is that other Luther for whom temporal 
blessing stands as the positive sign of God's favor. The source of this confusion SK finds in 
Luther's inadequate conception of God's majesty. By assigning to the devil all evil that 
befalls the Christian, Luther has treated suffering as an accidental feature of the relationship 
with God--it may be present or not, depending upon how much latitude God gives the devil 
in plaguing the Christian. Yet in point of fact, it is God's majesty that plagues the Christian--
a majesty so exalted that it cannot be experienced in any other way than as suffering by 
121Pap XII A 572(lP 3:2554), translation mine. cr. PapXJ A 157 (JP2:2219) and Pap X5 A 39(JP2:1433). 
122Pap IX A 11 (lP 3:2467) and especially Pap X3 A 605 (JP 3:2531). 
12Jpap Xl A 172 and 651 (JP 3:2482 and 3:2502), XJ A 138 (lP 3:2517). 
124Again, Pap X3 A 302 (JP 3:2525). 
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"relative" being. Consequently it is impossible that the one who has to do with God will 
"enjoy" this life.12s 
The aforementioned factors, however, are not the only ones that contribute to 
Luther's optimistic assessment of the Christian's relationship to temporality. A further factor 
is his failure to go back beyond Paul to Christ, viz., to contemporaneity with Christ whence 
suffering--and offense! --necessarily proceed.126 Then, too, Luther's rejection of voluntary 
suffering points to yet another source of his "Jewish" piety.!27 In denying the validity of 
such suffering, it is clear that Luther believes that Christ's kingdom can coexist with the 
kingdom of this world in such a way as to obviate the need for it; and in fact, Luther fre-
quently enjoins obedience to temporal authorities as if no fundamental incompatibility 
existed between this and obedience to Christ. Here Luther's life was better than his preach-
ing, for he voluntarily exposed himself to certain danger by attacking the Pope. 128 So, too, 
must all Christians, whatever their walk of life. In ajoumal entry entitled, "Luther's Swing 
from the Monastery," Kierkegaard writes: 
"Away," Luther cries, "away with all these presumed godly deeds such as fasting and 
the like: Let everyone remain in his calling--that is the true worship of God." But 
wait just a minute, dear Luther. So everyone is to remain in his position. But first of 
all, can every civil position be reconciled with Christianity?--e.g., take that of an 
actor. Great collisions lie dormant here. And next, how shall he live in his civil 
position--is civil righteousness per se, is it sufficient for a Christian? If not, then he 
must express the Christian ethic within his civil post: then he is--ein, zwei, drei--
reduced to poverty and persecution. Seen from [Luther's] angle (in contrast to the 
monastic error) this swing looks so easy, but on closer inspection what enormous 
l2SPap IX A 292 (JP 1 :486), xt A 487 (JP 4:4949), XS A 39 (JP 2: 1433) and, above all, Xe A 130-31 (JP 
2: 1447 -48). On the other hand, Luther is occa')ionally capable of pointing up (if imperfectly) both the necessity 
of suffering that issues from the world, and suffering the source of which lies in the relationship with God--Pap 
X~ A 579 (JP 4:4336). 
l26Pap IX A 95 (JP 1 :691), Xl A 595 (JP 3:2500). 
l27Again, Pap X2 A 263 (JP 3:2509); Pap Xl A 43 (JP 4:4950). In these journal entries SK takes exception 
to Luther's warning against seeking out sufferings of one's own choosing, his admonishment to await those 
sufferings that God will bring in the course of one's worldly ca\ling. It is Kierkcgaard's contention that the 
Christian is never simply passive in his encounter with the world. On the contrary, he evokes (if not provokes!) 
its opposition with full awareness of what he is doing. 
l28Pap X2 A 263 (JP 3:2509). 
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collisions lie dormant here since the characteristic state of affairs is, precisely, for 
that which is truly Christian not to fit in with this world. But Luther was no dialecti-
. . b ·d f h 129 clan, ever seemg ut one Sl eo t e matter. 
Kierkegaard's complaint has to do with the fact that on the one hand Luther speaks 
of the necessity of conflict with the established order, and on the other he enjoins peaceful 
coexistence with it. Given so marked a disparity one is tempted to speculate whether the 
former stance does not reflect Luther's experience with the Pope, and the latter one his 
experience with the peasant and sectarian revolts against the reforms that he--in concert with 
the Lutheran princes--had instituted. The theologia crucis, it would seem, belongs to the 
former context; the two kingdom teaching to the latter one. And there may well be a clash 
between these two theological views concerning the Christian's relation to society. Kierke-
gaard clearly opts for the fonner, first, because of the SpieBbfugertum that the two kingdom 
theory engenders,130 and second, because of the utter impossibility that the Christian could 
exercise his secular office in a Christian way without suffering the world's reprisal. No, 
Christ's kingdom will ever be at variance with the world's kingdom; accordingly one must 
choose in which one will participate. Should one choose to participate wholeheartedly in 
Christ's kingdom, one's participation in the worldly order will be short-lived, indeed.l3l 
Luther's very pact with secular authority affords yet another example of his "Jewish" 
piety. Again and again SK reproaches him for having politicized the Reformation. Luther 
was no true reformer inasmuch as true reform is a process of becoming inward, not railing 
129Pap ~ A 394 (JP 3:2541), translation mine. 
13°SK writes: "Actually it is there that we come to begin again: with Luther. It went a bit too fast with 
collapsing secularity and piety together" (Pap X' A 153 [JP 3:2518], translation mine). 
131Granted that Kierkegaard's two kingdom teaching has far more in common with Augustine's two city 
doctrine than with Luther's two government (Regimente) one: Kierkegaard views activity in one's civil calling 
(whether it be marriage or work), not as participation in God's Reich mit der linken Hand, but as complicity 
with a thoroughly corrupted civitas terrena. Nevertheless, he does proceed to this conclusion by way of 
theologia crucis premises (at least in part!), and therefore--it seems to me--rightly questions Luther's 
consistency in advocating both the cross- and two kingdom frameworks. But more on this later! 
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against the pope.132 He got too mixed up in worldliness, and as a result, the fruit of the 
Reformation was politics and political development.133 Luther occasioned enormous 
confusion because, though himself an individual extraordinaire (as every true Christian is 
obliged to be), he did not decline to found a party, but instead assembled others about him 
en masse.
134 Impatient that his reform-idea strike root, he accepted the princes' help and 
in effect became himself a politician. In so doing he violated the cardinal doctrine of 
religious communication: viz., that how a religious truth is introduced is every bit as 
important as what that truth is. The mode of a communication must reduplicate its content 
if it is not to end by negating it. Accordingly, the political is, and will forever remain, the 
archfoe of Christianity. Of this Luther exhibited but limited awareness.135 
Finally--and this is not unrelated to the preceding--Luther failed utterly as a reformer 
by not having become a martyr.136 One can express one's allegiance to the unconditioned 
in but a single way: by being sacrificed for it. To form a party is to cease to express an 
m"This stanza of Luther's is, alone, almost sickeningly worldly to me: 'Hear me, you Pope,' etc. Is this a 
reformer's holy earnestness, who, concerned about his own responsibility, knows that all true reform consists 
in engendering inwardness? Such a stanza is completely reminiscent of a journalistic battle-cry or the like. And 
this unblessed political business oftoppling the pope--this is and remains Luther's confusion" (Pap Xl A 154 
[JP 5:2481], translation mine). Cr., too, Pap XS A 121, p. 133 (JP 2:2046): "His task was to engender 
inwardness ... engendering inwardness was what was needed." 
I33Pap IX A 96 (JP 3:2469) and Pap XII A 442 (IP 3:2553). 
IJ4Pap XS A 121, p. 133 (JP 2:2046). As SK can also, in this same entry, put it: "The numerical is precisely 
what tramples down the unconditioned." 
IJSPap XJ A 696 (IP 3:3686) and Pap IX A 96 (JP 3:2469). 
1J6Pap XII A 61 (JP 3 :2546). SK excoriates Luther for having accepted help from the politicians, claiming 
that he did "incalculable harm by not becoming a martyr." At the very least Luther should have made it known 
that his way of bringing about reform lay at a qualitative remove from that of the true reformer, who gets 
himself killed. By failing to make this admission Luther placed his imprimatur upon mediocrity and the 
category "reformer" was debased so as to denote someone who "gets himself out of a jam." Because the nerve 
center of Christianity--the reality of martyrdom--was severed, it henceforward became almost impossible to 
get a true reformer. Luther'S legacy has been that "it is a nice world in which we live; therefore, to reform is 
to come away unscathed, for the world (which lies in the evil as Christianity teaches--and hence martyrdom) 
... wills the good, and therefore the reformer triumphs--yes, therefore Satan triumphs!" Similarly, Pap XS A 
115 (JP 4:4220) asserts that Christianity became mired in politics' mud thanks to Luther's decision to accept 
human help rather than be martyred. He was the Christian hero "who blinked, certainly not from lack of 
courage; no, but prey to the conception that it is precisely godliness to rejoice over this life, faith in the 
unconditional worth of martyrdom went out" (both translations mine). 
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unconditional relationship to the unconditioned.137 By making this swing into worldliness 
instead of martyrdom (for which Luther, at life's end, reproached himself) he brought about 
a confusion between triumphing in a worldly and in a divine sense.138 For as we earlier 
saw, the quintessentially Christian way of triumphing is to triumph in such a way that one 
"goes under.,,!39 
In concluding our remarks on Luther's "Jewish piety," it must be observed that 
Kierkegaard by no means wishes to deny (at least earlier on) that God is well-pleased with 
temporal life. 140 Nevertheless, he recognizes that Christianity promises eternal, rather than 
temporal, blessedness. Whereas Judaism is a holding onto temporality in the expectation 
of God's reward in this life, Christianity is the voluntary letting go of temporal blessing for 
the sake of the gospe1.141 In all of the aforementioned ways Luther exhibited a lack of 
clarity about this. 
The third respect in which Luther must bear responsibility for what has become of 
the reformation that he inaugurated is the most serious of them all. It has to do, not merely 
with his lack of historical perspective or his confusion regarding the Christian's relationship 
to temporality; no, it has to do with nothing less than his redefinition of Christianity into 
terms that make it a watered down version of the New Testament. SK expresses this 
variously: Luther "knocked off' from Christian ideality, he lifted burdens instead of 
imposing them, he translated Christianity into man's interest rather than God's by making it 
a religion of comfort, and so on. In certain crucial respects the Lutheran doctrine is not 
I37Again, Pap XS A 121, pp. 132-33 (JP 2:2046). 
DBPap XS A 38 (JP 4:4699). 
139Pap X A 509 (JP 5:4899). This is, after all, the only way in which the unconditioned can be served. Its 
victory is ultimately accomplished by my being sacrificed. 
140Pap VIlli A 369 (JP 2:2599). 
141p I 2 • h ap X A 426, p. 273 (JP 1 :843), X A 75 and 364 (JP 6:6503,3 :2511). In these texts SK praises Lut er's 
(apparently momentary) grasp of the difference between Judaism's and Christianity's respective pieties. Note 
that in the latter entry SK connects Christianity's recommendation of the single estate with its view that God's 
reward is given in eternity, not in this life. 
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"excellent," is not "the truth"--contrary to SK's earlier representation.142 The development 
to which we now turn is Kierkegaard's final one. 
We begin with the formulation which has it that Luther "knocked off with respect to 
the New Testament's, particularly the Gospels', requirement for being a Christian. ,,143 Kierke-
gaard makes this claim on numerous occasions in the late joumals,l44 and means various 
things by it. In Pap X5 A 88 and 96 (JP 2:1922 and 3:2898) it is made in the context of a 
discussion of the singularity of Christ. Whereas medieval piety--indeed, the Gospels--pre-
sented Christ as a paradigm according to which the Christian was to pattern his life, it was 
Luther's recognition that Christ's heterogeneity was so absolute that any imitation with the 
thought of resembling him was out of the question--hence the necessity of grace. In this 
regard Luther showed himself to be, "next to the N. T., the truest figure." Kierkegaard goes 
on to say that 
there is therefore, in one sense, in Luther a reduction with regard to what it means 
to be a Christian by comparison with the oldest Christians, in another sense there is 
an advance regarding the naIvete that an ordinary person, however sincerely he 
might desire it, can without further ado have the God-Man as his Model. Luther 
knocked off. What I blame him for is that he did not make this more strongly 
. bl 145 recognlza e. 
The "reduction" or "knocking off,146 that Luther effected was a necessary one--
indeed, it occurs already with Paul, for whom Christianity is not principally a matter of 
imitation of Christ the Model, but the receipt of grace from Christ the Redeemer. According-
ly, the "reduction" itself is not the problem (it is simply the form that Christianity must 
assume for us human beings). No, the problem is that Luther failed make it known that his 
142SV XII 314 (For Self-Examination. 24). 
143Pap XS A 88 (JP 2:1922), translation mine. 
l44p XS 8 XS I I I ap A 8 ,p. 101; A 96, p. 112; XI A l34, p. 93-94; XI A 297, p. 238; XI A 572, p. 435 (lP 
2:1922; 3:2898; 3:2762; 3:2551; 3:2554). 
14SPap XS A 96, p. 112 (JP 3:2898). Pap XS A 88 (JP 2:1922) reads very much the same. SK writes: "I don't 
direct my objection against the reduction--this can be the case inasmuch as every step toward the ideal is a step 
backward--but then it must be noted and 'grace' be applied all the more strongly, that is to say, not in empty 
platitudes, but that there be a careful settling of accounts" (both translations mine). 
I46At slaa af paa means to reduce one's asking price or one's demands. 
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presentation of Christianity was Christianity in man's interest, whereas Christianity in God's 
interest is set forth in Christ's life.147 The result of this failure, however, is that Christian 
proclamation (which should consist both of God's unconditional demand upon the Christian 
and the atonement) has been essentially altered. SK observes: "It is easy to see that Luther's 
proclamation of Christianity alters Christianity's life- and world view.,,148 
Precisely how does Luther accomplish this? The answer is: he accomplishes it by 
means of his ordo salutis: 
The way in which even Luther speaks of law and gospel still is not Christ's 
teaching .... Luther distinguishes two parts: law and gospel. First the law, and then 
147In Pap JC A 499 (JP 2: 1911) we read: "Christ's life is Christianity in God's interest. In the very moment 
that he dies, Christianity is translated into man's interest. "The apostle' changes the Model essentially into the 
Redeemer. Herein, too, lies the fact that 'the apostle' posits heterogeneity between the God-Man and every other 
human being. The atonement, or the fact that Christ's life and death are the atonement, is the expression forthe 
heterogeneity between him and every human being. 'Imitation' is in the direction of likeness. "The apostle' 
follows him and is crucified--but he brings the atonement to bear as the essential thing, for otherwise the apostle 
would, after all, become a kind of Christ. And quite properly it is precisely that apostle who has not been 
witness to Christ's life, not lived with him, that later apostle, Paul, who most strongly emphasizes the atonement 
and almost overlooks imitation. In this way Christianity is translated more and more egoistically into man's 
interest in the church from generation to generation: the atonement reduces imitation to nothing or one dodges 
imitation entirely. In this way Christendom increasingly gets a bad conscience, and the notion that being related 
to God should mean suffering becomes completely foreign--[no, it is] the exact opposite, the sign of being 
related to God becomes good fortune and success--and so, Christianity is actually done away with" (translation 
mine). 
In this entry, dating from 1852, we are apprised of the trend that SK's theology increasingly follows 
during the late period--a trend on which God's uncompromising standard comes to assume full parity--and then 
some!--alongside his grace. Indeed, already in a journal entry from 1850 (Pap X3 A 409 [JP 2:1877]) we 
encounter the above mentioned two-fold conception of Christianity--Paul's emphasis upon the atonement is 
called "Christianity for us human beings," whereas Christ's life on earth is "Christianity as no human being can 
endure it." In none of the entries cited, however, does SK deny the necessity of Christianity being translated 
"into man's interest" (here, cf. especially the last-mentioned citation where it is affirmed that "grace is the 
decisive thing"). Kierkegaard's grievance is not with that "reduction" on which Christianity is presented as 
God's forbearance and grace, but with the all too one-sided and duplicitous use that has subsequently been 
made of it. As we have seen in the previously cited journal entries, however, Luther bears some of the 
responsibility for this abuse insofar as he did not more clearly note that what he had effected was a reduction 
(albeit a necessary one). Indeed, as Pap XI' A 572 (JP 3:2554) has it--and Pap X2 A 244 (JP 3:2507), dating 
from 1849!--Luther himself takes a wrong tum as a result of his one-sided enlistment of Paul as his standard 
for interpreting the gospels. He has not seen that Paul's theology was itself a reduction--hence when he fails 
to find the apostle's teaching in the gospels, he concludes: "Ergo, this is no gospel." Subsequently Luther, too, 
was made "into the absolute, and when one found the apostle to be stricter than Luther (which he, in fact, is) 
then one concluded: the apostle is wrong here, this is no true gospel. And in this way they have systematically, 
step for step, tricked (Le., tried to trick) God out of the gospel, reversing the entire relationship" (translation 
mine). 
148Pap XII A 572, p. 435 (JP 3:2554), translation mine. 
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the gospel, which is sheer mildness, etc. But this way it ends with Christianity 
becoming optimism, the goal of which is that it should ~o well with us in this world. 
That is to say, Christianity thereby becomes Judaism.1 9 
Kierkegaard reproaches Luther for having altered Christianity, making of it a source of 
tranquility when, in fact, it is the ultimate of cause of unrest. The raison d'etre that Luther 
has assigned to Christianity--that it exists in order to provide comfort to afflicted con-
sciences--is purely an invention, as may be readily seen when it is compared with Christ's 
teaching.lso Luther's interpretation, as it turns out, is not just a return to primitive Chris-
149Ibid., p. 434, translation mine. 
lSOPap XII A 193 (JP 3:2550). Connected with Luther's revision of Christianity's trueordo salutis (suffering 
for the duration of this life, then eternal rest), is his revision of the way in which Christianity regards 
martyrdom and virginity: "In the New Testament being a Christian is expressed by the apostles; to be a 
Christian is--as spirit--spirit's highest disquietude, impatience for eternity, sheer fear and trembling that is 
intensified by being, as it were, crucified love in this evil world, intensified by trembling before the day of 
reckoning when the Lord and Master shall come again and judge whether they have been faithful. When 
matters are thus--then to have to become a martyr, which Christ foretells of the Christian, is so far from being 
an intensification that it is rather an assuagement; for one might say that only such outward sufferings and, in 
the end, a martyr's death, can assuage, can soothe the agony of soul that the exertion of being a Christian in the 
New Testament's sense is. Hence martyrdom is not a cruelty, it is, on the contrary, what bodily sufferings are 
in relation to agonies of soul. On the other hand, it would have been cruel if Christ had said to the disciples: 
'After my time you will have nothing further to do. See that you get married and that each and every one of you 
gets a respectable little occupation and scrapes some money together, be a nice person and go to church once 
a week and take communion three times a year.' In the New Testament, therefore, the one corresponds to the 
other: disquietude in the Christian demands martyrdom as a kind of assuagement--and martyrdom is what is 
demanded .... But soon disquietude was absentfrom 'Christendom,' this dead, spiritless mass .... [Olne found 
more and more that Christianity caused one trouble when one wac; to live peacefully and enjoy life-- --and so, 
this finally finds its expression in Luther (who, for that matter, no doubt can have been in the right in contrast 
to the Catholic abuse). Luther comes up with the invention that Christianity exists in order to reassure. 
I have more than once remarked that Luther has altered Christianity. As I now see, Schopenhauer contends that, 
by altering virginity, Luther altered Christianity. I have also been of this opinion inasmuch as I have thought 
that Luther should have taken the utmost care that it became known that his marriage was an exception, a 
corrective. But that at which I have particularly aimed was that Luther has altered Christianity by altering 
martyrdom. So Luther turns Christianity right on its head. Christianity is to reassure, Christ came to the world 
in order to reassure, to which is then added, anxious consciences. This is as opposite to the New Testament as 
can be. Christ comes to the world in order to save a sinful world, a world that lies in the evil. But a sinful world 
truly does not suffer from an anxious conscience. Here what is needed is precisely to awaken disquietude" 
(translation and emphasis mine). 
True Christianity, then, is not--at leac;t not principally!--a matter of having a relieved conscience. It 
is rather following Christ's teaching (Pap XII A 199 [IP 3 :3620]). And "his teaching is essentially this, his life. 
What he therefore says, is essentially this: Follow me; hate yourself; forsake all things; crucify the flesh; take 
up your cross; hate father and mother, etc. Furthermore: Ye shall be hated by all for my name's sake, etc. And 
finally: There is a day of reckoning in the next world where I am the judge" (translation mine). 
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tianity--no, it is a modification of it. ISI And it is a modification that has its source in the 
fact that Luther--quite apart from his one-sided use of Paul--continually reasons on the basis 
of human considerations. 
The tum that Luther gave the matter--Christianity must first and foremost reassure--
is really in actuality the language of revolution even if couched in the greatest 
possible language of submission. The Christian demand drives human nature to its 
greatest extremity, then it reacts: we cannot, it is sheer mortal dread--Christianity 
must first and foremost work reassuringly. But actually a consideration is deceitfully 
added to the unconditioned in this kind of talk. And as soon as the unconditioned has 
a consideration added to it, or as soon as anything is assumed to be capable of 
interposing itself in the relation to the unconditioned such that the latter pays regard 
to a consideration, then it is no longer the unconditioned. Yet at the basis of 
Lutheranism actually lies this: that whether human beings can feel well off with it 
or not is ultimately decisive for determining what Christianity is; but then Christian-
ity is not the unconditioned, God is then, after all, only a relative majesty. The law 
for what is revolutionary is given in Lutheranism. ls2 
Similarly, in Pap XII A 297 (JP 3:2551) we read: 
Luther understood the matter as follows: no human being can endure the 
anxiety that his striving is to be decisive for an eternal blessedness or eternal 
damnation. "No, no," says Luther, "this can only lead to despair or presumption. And 
therefore (mark this well!) therefore (for Luther clearly alters New Testament 
Christianity by virtue of this 'otherwise humanity must despair1 therefore, neither is 
it so. You are saved by grace; calm down, you are saved by grace--and then see to 
it to strive as best you can." 
This is the tum that Luther gave the matter. I will not speak here of the 
wicked deception that this has become in later Protestantism. No, I will stick to 
Luther. My objection is: Luther ought to have made it apparent that he reduced 
Christianity. Furthermore, he ought to have made it apparent that that by virtue of 
which he continually argues is actually the human: otherwise we must despair. But 
strictly speaking, this argument is neither here nor there when the question is what 
the New Testament understands by Christianity; and strictly speaking, the fact that 
it could occur to Luther to argue by virtue of it shows that Christianity was not the 
unconditional sovereign for him after all, but that on the assumption that "otherwise 
a human being must despair" this sovereign must also give in. But I continually come 
back to this, that Luther should have made the true context apparent. According to 
ISl pap X2 A 244 (JP 3:2507). 
IS2Pap XI2 A 194 (JP 3 :2555), translation mine. The entry criticizing Luther's ordo salutis. too, attributes this 
revisionism of Christianity's true purpose to Luther's reasoning by virtue of human considerations (Pap XII A 
572 [IP 3:2554]). 
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my concepts, those subjects are by no means rebellious who, when they honestly 
cannot pay the taxes, say straight out to the monarch, "We cannot pay the taxes." 
What they are not permitted to do, on the other hand, is to falsif~ the amount of the 
tax, quietly making it less than it is--and then honorably pay it. S3 
This entry is valuable inasmuch as it levels two charges against Luther: (a) that he 
reduced Christianity without making it known that this was what he was doing and (b) that 
he reasons by virtue of "the human," thereby showing contempt for the unconditioned. As 
is evident from the illustration of the honest subjects who admit that they cannot pay the 
taxes, a "reduction" is, in one sense, entirely in order (viz., when mandated by God). Yet in 
another sense it is not in order--viz., when we humans, reasoning on the basis of our own 
interest, arrive at the conclusions that (a) Christianity must be sheer comfort and reassurance 
because we say so, and (b) God's standard for discipleship cannot be what the New 
Testament in fact says it is because it is entirely too difficult for us. In both respects Luther 
has unwarrantably reduced Christianity, giving rise to the pretense that our comfortable, 
bourgeois lifestyle meets God's standard without further ado. In a word: Luther has (a) 
proclaimed grace improperly, out of a purely human interest and (b) failed to proclaim 
authentic discipleship, the standard for which has been laid down by Christ and the apostles 
in the New Testament.1S4 
IS~Pap XII A 297 (JP 3:2551), translation mine. 
154In Pap Xe A 266 (JP 3 :2556) we are told that the apostle expresses Christianity in God's interest whereas 
Luther expresses it in man's interest. This is enlightening, for certainly the apostle, too, has need of grace--he 
does not satisfy God's unconditional standard however much hemay more closely approximate it. Accordingly, 
when SK uses the term "Christianity in man's interest," he does not generally have in mind the necessary 
reduction that grace implies. Rather, he has in mind human effeminacy/insubordination that redefines God's 
standard in such a way that it comes offlooking quite good by comparison. This type of reduction is what SK 
finds indefensible, for not only is it not effected by God (but by man and in the interest of man), it is effected 
in all cunning as if God had mandated it. It is the latter feature, viz., that the reduction has been hushed up, that 
galls Kierkegaard. Such, for example, is Luther's rehabilitation of marriage so as to assume the status of Chris-
tianity's preferred estate (cf. Pap Xe A 243 [JP 3:3009)). Luther achieves this result, not on the basis of the 
New Testament's teaching, but on the basis of "the numerical" (viz., that because only a few individuals can 
livecha~tely outside of marriage, ergo marriage must be the preferred state). Ofthetrueconnection (viz., that 
this is a reduction effected in man's interest owing to his lack of self-control), Luther and the symbolical books 
make but the barest mention (Pap XS A 96 [JP 3:2898] and XII A 129 [JP 3:2616], referring to the Augsburg 
Confession's defense of marriage, art. 23, par. 14-16. Cf. also Pap Xe A 238, 243 [JP 3:2629,3:3009]). While 
Paul by no means sanctions marriage in the manner of Luther, it is to be noted that he nevertheless comes in 
for like criticism. He, too, made a concession to the masses, "knocking off' from Christ's requirement of 
celibacy; paying regard to human considerations, he made the unconditioned into something else--Pap Xe B 
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By Luther's redefinition of Christian discipleship as a happy marriage and bourgeois 
walk of life "devoid of the dangers of martyrdom; by his recasting of Christianity's raison 
d'etre as, first and foremost, relief for anxious consciences: by these means Luther has essen-
tially altered Christianity, reducing its demands upon the believer and, instead, placing 
human demands upon it. In short: Luther has translated Christianity into man's interest by 
continually reasoning on the basis that interest. As a result, he has thrown off yokes instead 
of imposing them as the true reformer ought. ISS This is (again!) not to say that grace is not 
an intrinsic element of Christianity. Nor is it to say that Christianity, along with the infinite 
standard that it sets for discipleship, does not also offer comfort for afflicted conscienc-
es.
IS6 It is merely to say that God is the one in whose interest Christianity has been 
established. As human beings we are unconditionally obliged to accept Christianity on 
God's terms, placing ourselves under his standard of discipleship while relying upon his un-
merited grace. This is not, as Kierkegaard sees it, a matter of reinstating thralldom to the 
law. It is merely a matter of putting an end to our insurrection against Christianity and 
honestly admitting how matters really stand between us and it. 
Seen in one light, the Luther-critique of the final years really is a critique of Luther 
and the ethos to which he gave rise. Yet seen in another light, it is not a departure from the 
reformer inasmuch as Kierkegaard continues steadfastly to maintain the cross as the decisive 
criterion of discipleship as well as unconditional respect for the unconditioned as the 
nonnegotiable watchword of the relationship with God. It is really Luther's own theology of 
175 [JP 3:3213]). 
15Sp I 5 2 I • ap X Al 4 (lP 3:2481), X A 559 (JP 3:2514) and XI A 134 (JP 3:2762). See espeCially the second 
mentioned citation where SK does not dispute the freedom from the law that Luther championed--his dispute 
with Luther lies in the fact that "he ought to have made it obvious that the freedom for which he fought (and 
in this fight he was in the right) leads to making life, the spiritual life, infinitely much more strenuous than it 
was before" (translation mine). 
IS6Even in the entry in which Kierkegaard condemns Luther's "invention" (Christianity exists in order to 
comfort afflicted consciences--Pap XII A 193 [JP 3:2550]) he adds: "Luther has suffered from an anxious 
conscience to a high degree, has needed healing: well and good. But is Christianity therefore to be transformed 
in....!Q!Q. into this: to reassure anxious consciences?" Cf. also Pap XI2 A 303, p. 322 (JP 3:2544): "In Luther it 
[reassurance] was the truth; but was it therefore also correct that it was made into the universal principle?" 
(translations mine). 
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the cross and ethical idealism--to which Kierkegaard adheres without the slightest com-
promise--that provide the basis for his final Luther-critique. Yet it is also the case that other 
factors enter in as well--factors that give his final theological stance a rather less Lutheran 
character. Already, the interpretation of grace itself as a kind "reduction" or "knocking off' 
from God's absolute demand apprises us that a foreign point of view has insinuated itself into 
Kierkegaard's thinking somewhere along the line. 
It cannot be doubted that a deep-seated disagreement does obtain between 
Kierkegaard and Luther: SK refers it to their divergent attitudes about the Christian's 
relationship to the world, as we have seen. Yet if one seeks a complete accounting of 
sources that contribute to his doctrine of the necessity of suffering in this life, then one must 
look to other factors than the sheer rigor with which he develops Luther's theolo~a crucis. 
At issue is not only the inevitability of the world's persecution of Christ and the Christian; 
at issue is an altogether different understanding of corporeal-temporal existence than one 
finds in Luther. For Luther, temporality and corporeality are not cast-away remnants of 
God's creative will, irrevocably despoiled by the Fall; rather, they participate in theredemp-
tion effected by God's assumption of flesh and are fit vessels for his presence, here and now. 
By contrast, the present world does not enjoy the proleptic fruits of redemption in the same 
way for Kierkegaard. In part this is due to his well-nigh exclusive emphasis upon the cross--
an emphasis that is rightly prompted by his fear of landing in a too-realized theology of the 
resurrection. And in part it is due to his conception of humans as being called to absolute 
subjectivity--a conception that issues in a soteriology wherein spirit sloughs off flesh, and 
eternity lays aside temporality. Both elements affect SKIs view of life under the cross, and 
with it, his understanding of grace. The product of their influence is a way of conceiving 
grace that is at odds with the theologia crucis conception already discussed. While that con-
ception is too fundamental to be abandoned by Kierkegaard, it does nevertheless undergo 
modification in a legalistic direction during the final period. It is to this latter development 
that we now tum. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CROSS WITHOUT RESURRECTION 
We indicated at the close of the previous chapter that the present world does not 
already enjoy the fruits of redemption in the same way for Kierkegaard as for Luther, 
adumbrating two reasons why this is so. One of them is SKIs fear of landing in a too-realized 
theology of the resurrection. His presentation of Christianity, after all, seeks to dispel the 
illusion that Christ's cause has triumphed in history in such a way that the church can now 
take its ease as the ecclesia triumphans. The fear that he could contribute to the illusion 
rather than offer a countervailing influence leads Kierkegaard consistently to look away from 
the resurrection and to enjoin contemporaneity with Christ's cross and suffering. Not sur-
prisingly, this "remaining standing" at the cross (as though its true import were not to be 
found in the resurrection) lies at the heart of many a theological critique of Kierkegaard--not 
least among them, Karl Barth's.l Nearly all such critiques agree that SKIs portrayal of 
'Cf. Die kirchliche Dogmatik (Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1932-70), vol. 4, pt. 1, pp. 379-81; vol. 4, pt. 2, pp. 30-
31 and 396-97. Barth warns in the latter two texts of "getting stuck" in an abstract theology of the cross and 
falling prey to a "false earnestness and profundity" that misguidedly conceals the fact that Christ's enigmatic 
existence has another side than that to which the theologia crucis points: viz., the theologia resurrection is, 
which is a theologia gloriae. Kierkegaard is tacitly accused in vol. 4, pt. 1, pp. 379-81 of having instituted a 
mythical interpretation of Christianity by his contention that Christ's experience upon the cross must be 
endlessly repeated in the lives of his disciples: Christ "lebt und regiert in Ewigkeit und stirbt nicht wieder. Und 
in und mit ihm haben auch wir das Leben und nicht den Tod vor uns. Es ist der Weg Gottes des Vaters, des 
Sohnes und des Heiligen Geistes, der Weg des wahren Gottes nun einmal kein Cyklus, kein Weg der ewigen 
Wiederkehr, auf weIchem das Ziel immer wieder Anfang werden muBte. Cyklisch, in ewiger Wiederkehr und 
auch den Menschen zu ewigen Wiederholungen, zu einem ewigen Hin und Her zwischen Ja und Nein, Gnade 
und Gericht, Leben und Tod auffordernd, ist der Weg des My thus. Man sollte das Evangelium vom Weg des 
wahren Gottes nieht mythologisieren (auch nicht im Namen Kierkegaards oder Luthers selbst!) und also nieht 
im Sinn eines soIchen Cyklus interpretieren und also das christliche Leben, den theologischen Gedanken, die 
kirchliche Predigt, Unterweisung und Seelsorge nieht jenem Ochsen gleich machen, der, an seine Stange 
gebunden, die Peitsche seines Herro hinter sich, rundum trottend seine Muhle zu treiben hat." Barth seems 
specifically to have in mind SK's presentation of Christ's alternately recurring aspect qua model, and hence, 
the Christian's repeated subjection to the law's usus elenchticus in Christ's own person. 
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Christianity as unremitting suffering and Kp (01. ~ effectively transforms it into a dour legal-
ism.2 Not only this, Kierkegaard's exclusive preoccupation with the cross is said to land him 
in a veritable thicket of other doctrinal difficulties. Perhaps the most convincing 
demonstration that SK does consistently look away from the resurrection in his presentation 
of Christianity has been given by Siegfried Hansen. Because Hansen not only demonstrates 
this feature of Kierkegaard's thought with admirable persuasive force but systematically 
draws the relevant theological conclusions from it, we take his presentation as the basis for 
this chapter's initial discussion of the doctrinal integrity of SKIS theology. 
Hansen's work explores the role played by suffering in Kierkegaard's christology.3 
Analyzing SKIS picture of Christ, he finds that it is dominated by suffering--N.B., suffering 
of a singular sort. Hansen notes how, again and again, Christ is said by Kierkegaard to have 
come into the world in order to suffer, so that this becomes the content and meaning of his 
life.4 The reason why it could not be otherwise, as we have seen, is that Christ in his 
capacity as model willed to relate absolutely to God--a course of action that put him on a 
collision course with the world (Pap X2 A 317 [JP 2: 1859]). As a result he expressed what 
it means to die to the world, living out his life in poverty, contempt and persecution (Pap X3 
A 171 [JP 2:1864]), and he did so altogether voluntarily (Pap VIlli A 259 [JP 4:4602]). The 
same will be true of every Christian who enters into contemporaneity with him (Pap X3 A 
171 [JP 2:1864] and XS A 19 [lP 3:3768]). Accordingly, for Kierkegaard the imitation of 
2 Again, Barth stands out.In addition to the text just cited we call attention to his 1963 Sonning prize address, 
quoted at the beginning of the introduction. 
3Siegfried Hansen, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens fUr das Christusbild Soren Kierkegaards," Kerygma und 
~ 2 (1956):1-28. The article is a condensation of Hansen's unpublished 1954 Inaugural Dissertation 
accepted by the University of Kiel. 
ibid., I. Hansen cites Pap VII2 B235, p. 159 (On Authority and Revelation, 126), VIlli A 273 (JP 3:3090), 
X2 A 257 (JP 4:4645) and X A 123 (JP 3:2967), but notes that the citations could be multiplied almost at will. 
He further observes that wherever the phrase occurs in Kierkegaard's manuscripts it is almost always under-
scored (Christus kom til Verden for at lide). Particularly instructive is SK's interpretation of Christ's final words 
from the cross: "'It is finished!' 'What?' The suffering'" (Pap IX B 11). Hansen asks: "Did Jesus have in mind 
his life's suffering when he, at the end, cried out: 'It is finished?' Is the suffering really the meaning of his life?" 
("Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 10). Viggo Mortensen, following Hansen, raises the identical question (see "En 
redegerelse for, hvad der ligger i det Kierkegaardske pseudonym Anticlimacus's pastand, at kristendommen 
er og skal vrere det absolutte, og en undersegelse af den i pastanden forudsatte kristendomsopfattelses forhold 
til Luther" [Aarhus Universitets prisopgave, 1971], 78). 
229 
Christ is virtually synonymous with voluntary suffering. Hansen rightly acknowledges that 
such imitation is not an exercise in works-righteousness since SK makes it clear that the one 
lesson to be learned from imitation is precisely that we cannot attain to God on our own 
powers. Sin-consciousness is the end-result of our every essay at imitation--which is as it 
should be since the purpose of imitation is none other than to lead us to Christ the Redeemer 
(Pap IX A 153 [JP 1 :692]). It is then he who, in tum, lifts us up so that we can follow Christ 
the model anew (SV XII 423 [Judge for Yourself!, 147]).5 
Despite the fact that imitation has nothing to do with self-justification, an oppressive, 
if not legalistic, tenor can be detected in the above schema in view of its stipulation of 
sorrow as the sole locus for the encounter with Christ.6 The rule that Christ is to be found 
only in sorrow establishes, at the very least, the psychological predisposition to legalism 
insofar as such descriptive analysis easily takes on prescriptive force: suffering as not only 
the specific locus of the God-relationship, but the conditio. sine qua non for it. Yet as con-
straining as this elevation of suffering to the essential feature of Christian existence may be 
(one must suffer in order to be contemporaneous with Christ, and hence, to know him), it 
is still not as constraining as the specific manner in which Kierkegaard conceives that 
suffering--a manner that displaces the emphasis onto self more radically still. On 
Kierkegaard's presentation Christ's suffering stems principally from his voluntary renuncia-
tion of self: he is the model of what it means to "die to" [~] every selfish attachment to 
the world. By contrast, the New Testament portrays Christ as the model of compassion. 
Christ's is 
a suffering, the cause of which is not, as with Kierkegaard, the collision with the 
world, but the other person's need. The point of departure is not Christ, but the other 
person, the neighbor. Christ is portrayed as the one who sees the need (io~v 
£cmJ..«yxv106T), takes it upon himself, and thereby removes it. Kierkegaard's 
concept of suffering is anthropocentric; the synoptics' concept of suffering proceeds 
from the neighbor. Kierkegaard's concept of suffering is passive--that of the 
synoptics is active. With Kierkegaard, the final result is the suffering; by contrast, 
sne preceding is a precis of part I, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens" (pp. 1-9). 
6"Kierkegaard erlebt Christus nur hier, nur im Leid. Er erfahrt ihn an dieser einen Stelle ganz--und darum 
ist Kierkegaard immer ganzer Christ und nichts anderes--, aber er erfahrt damit nicht den ganzen Christus ... " 
(ibid., 9). 
230 
according to the synoptics with Christ it is the help, the overcoming of the suffering. 
The Kierkegaardian concept of suffering is ultimately the expression for the evil of 
human beings; that of the synoptics, on the other hand, is ultimately the expression 
for the love of God in Christ that is moved to compassion.7 
Hansen's claim is that while Christ is presented as "model" in the New Testament, this is not 
in the incipiently legalistic sense in which Kierkegaard conceives it. Christ is not the model 
of the Christian who bids farewell to the world, he is not (at least not principally) the para-
gon of misunderstood and persecuted love. His life does not represent the operation of a 
natural law of suffering that is intrinsic to the relationship to God--a law that transmutes ever 
so subtly into selfish preoccupation with such suffering. No, Christ is model in the sense of 
displaying to us the image of God, which is an image of sheer compassion. It is in this sense, 
insists Hansen, that Christ is the model for the Christian. Kierkegaard, he contends, has filled 
the New Testament conception, "model," with new extrabiblical content--content fetched 
from his own experience.8 
7Ibid., 11. Other scholars concur that, for Kierkegaard, Christian suffering lacks the liberating directedness 
away from oneself, being undertaken with the selrs salvation (via Afd!!!en) in mind. Among them are Viggo 
Mortensen ("En redeg!!!relse," 88-90) and K. E. L!!!gstrup, who makes the bald assertion that in Kierkegaard 
"Christianity is made into law" (Qpg!!!rmed Kierkegaard. [Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1967],46). Knud Hansen 
calls attention to the overwhelming significance that "dying to" assumes during the final decade of 
Kierkegaard's life ("Der andere Kierkegaard. Zu S!!!ren Kierkegaards ChristentumsversUindnis," in furum. 
Kierkegaard. ed. Heinz-Horst Schrey, Wege der Forschung, vol. 179 [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1971], 128). Like Siegfried Hansen and the others, he observes its irreconcilability with 
suffering in the evangelical sense. 
8"Kierkegaard nimmt zwar einen urspriinglich neutestamentlichen Begriff--eben den des Vorbildes--, er fUllt 
ihn aber mit neuem Inhalt. Vnd er nimmt diesen neuen Inhalt aus seinem personlichen Leben und Erleben. 
Gerade weil das Leiden ein so starker Faktor in seinem person lichen Leben war, darum hat er den Wunsch, 
diesen Tatbestand in das Neue Testament hineinzuprojizieren, urn nun aus dem Neuen Testament gewisser-
maBen die BesUitigung und die Rechtfertigung seines eigenen Lebens zu erhalten. Kierkegaards Christologie 
ist in vielem ein Reflexphanomen, eine Ruckspiegelung seines eigenen Lebens" (S. Hansen, "Die Bedeutung 
des Leidens," 12). 
While Hansen's speculation about the biographical origins of SK's concept of suffering may be true 
enough, he is surely wrong when he insists that suffering in the New Testament has its meaning only insofar 
as it is directed to others. Kierkegaard is notthe only one who is guilty of a certain one-sidedness; Hansen, too, 
is guilty, and of a characteristically Lutheran one-sidedness at that. In the Synoptic gospels and Paul's letters 
it is clear that suffering is the hallmark of the present age--an age in which the eschaton has already been 
entered upon. It is the age of messianic woes. Hence in I Cor. 7 :26 Paul can speak of "the present distress," in 
Rom. 8:18 of "the sufferings of this present time," in 2 Thess. 2:7 of the fact that the mystery oflawlessness 
is "already at work." And when, in Colossians 1 :24 he speaks of completing, in his own flesh, what is lacking 
in the afflictions of Christ, the intent seems to be that a certain measure of suffering must be completed by 
Christ's church before the end of the age arrives (for further discussion, see Dale Allison, The End of the Ages 
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If Kierkegaard's understanding of "model" is qualified in the quasi-legalistic manner 
described above, we should not be surprised to learn that his view of "imitation" is similarly 
qualified. As we have seen, the imitation of Christ has to do with vOluntary suffering. K. 
E. L0gStrup cautions that such suffering is Christian only when it is "caused to flow outward 
to the neighbor." When this is not our motive we are, by default, attempting "to bring God's 
good pleasure down to ourselves." L0gStrup asserts: "We cannot make suffering and death 
into required works without making them into works by which we would earn salvation," 
further adding: "We see this with all the clarity that one might desire in Kierkegaard. ,,9 That 
is to say: L0gStrup finds in the a priori necessity that SK assigns to suffering the very same 
consequence that Hansen does--a tendency to legalism. This means that, in the end, the 
Christian who would imitate Christ assumes suffering not out of concern for his neighbor's 
Has Come. An Early Intemretation of the Passion and Resurrection of Jesus [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1985],62-65). Suffering in the New Testament, then, largely has an eschatological significance. And a certain 
ineluctable necessity is attributed to it--just as in Kierkegaard! 
In the same way Hansen is also guilty of a one-sidedness ac; regards Christ's role as "model." Christ 
is not simply a model of the divine compassion that spontaneously issues from the hearts of those who have 
been liberated by the gospel and now know the "freedom of a Christian." Such a model would require no 
imitation. Yet as Allison points out, the early church surely understood Christ as the moral exemplar whom 
Christians are actively to imitate. lrenaeus refers to Christ as an "example of piety, righteousness, and 
submission" (Adv. haer. 2,22,4). Ignatius enjoins: "Be imitators of Jesus Christ, as he was ofhis Father" (Phil. 
7,2). Paul writes: "Become imitators of me as I am of Christ" (I Cor. 11: 1). Frequently in the New Testament 
Christ is held up as model to be imitated (John 13:15 and 34; 15:12; 17:16; Heb. 11:1-4; 13:12-3; I Pet. 2:21; 
3: 17-8; I John 2:6). Allison notes that in Matthew's gospel Christ is presented--unlike the pharisees--as the one 
whose life perfectly embodied his teachings. In the Sermon on the Mount Christ pronounces a blessing upon 
the meek, the merciful, those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake. He teaches non reprisal when one is 
the target of evil, and so on. And throughout the narrative of the gospel Christ embodies all of these teachings. 
This leads Allison to regard Matthew's gospel as, in some sense, a hortatory biography--i.e., a biography 
intended to inspire early Christians to moral endeavor. Hence what was true of biography of a not so distant 
past is true of Matthew's gospel: "Biography is a type of literature which, more than any other, touches close 
upon morality" (quoting Andre Maurois. For this and the other references cited, as well as fuller argumentation, 
see Dale Allison, "Matthew: Structure, Biographical Impulse and the Imitatio Christi" in The Four Gospels 
1992: Festschrift Frans Nehynck. ed. G. Van Segbroeck [Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992], 1208-21). 
We see, then, that the Christ of the New Testament is model in the sense that he is to be actively 
imitated, not simply one to whom we are to be passively conformed. This of course does not necessarily 
absolve Kierkegaard of the charge oflegalism. It may well be that he does, as charged, portray the imitation 
of Christ in a manner that neglects the enabling presence of grace. And it may well be that his understanding 
of suffering is motivated by certain biographical--and as we shall see, metaphysical--factors. Nevertheless, 
his emphasis upon the inexorable necessity of suffering as well as upon the task of imitatio Christi are biblical, 
and provide a necessary corrective to Luther's one-sided exegesis. 
9Legstrup, Opger med Kierkegaard. 51. Emphasis added. 
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well-being, but out of the priority (and hence, merit) that the suffering enjoys in its own 
right. And the facts, indeed, bear this supposition out. Kierkegaard's operative axiom is ever 
that God is to be found only in suffering. But if this is so, then specifically Christian love 
should be identifiable by the suffering that attends it. For Kierkegaard this is indeed the case: 
Christian love is distinguishable from every other kind of love by the misunderstanding and 
hatred that it occasions in the person one seeks to help. The curious corollary of this is that 
love is demonstrably Christian precisely when it does not redound in any straightforward 
sense to the neighbor's good.!O Naturally the suffering is not the only criterion that a deed 
is Christian. Kierkegaard is well aware it must also be done for the neighbor's sake if it is 
to deserve that name. Yet the malice by which my deed is repaid is precisely the indicator 
that it has been performed for my neighbor'S sake. It is none other than an angry refusal on 
his part to enter into the suffering that I set before him when I offer him the relationship to 
God as his possibility.!! 
From the foregoing it is apparent that when suffering itself is made into the criterion 
of the relationship to God and Christian love, then it has a clear tendency to displace the 
love that alone makes a good deed truly good. Once this has happened the suffering assumes 
complete priority and the accent falls away from the outward directedness of one's acts. 
From here we are but a short step away from regarding our suffering as its own end, 
imagining as it were: "All the better that I am misunderstood and maligned by the one to 
IOSK's rationale is this: were it clear from the outset that a deed of mine would redound in human terms 
to my neighbor's good. then I could count upon his gratitude and in that case my motive could be impugned. 
Hence only when I am certain to be reviled for my deed is it demonstrably good. Legstrup caricatures SK's 
position wildly when he contends that actual misunderstanding and revilement are what constitute a deed as 
Christian for Kierkegaard (ibid., 54-55: "If Christian love is received, then it is immediately no longer 
Christian, just as surely as the one who receives it no longer repays it with hatred and persecution .... With 
Kierkegaard love, if it is to be Christian, becomes contingent upon whether the other person, be he a stranger 
ora loved one, becomes one's enemy"). This isa patent misrepresentation ofKierkegaard, formisunderstanding 
and malignancy are but "results," and results are ever morally indifferent to SK --he would never regard them 
as constitutive of a good act, let alone a Christian one. 
II"When the person who is the object of Christian love misunderstands it as hate, then this is due to the fact 
that ... it makes him unhappy. Since the unhappiness that attaches to being a Christian consists, from first to 
last, in coming to be hated and persecuted, then Christian love consists in helping the other person to come to 
be hated and persecuted. By whom? By the one whom he, in tum, loves, and who will, in tum, repay his love 
with hate and persecution since it consists of a love that would help him come to be hated and persecuted" 
(ibid., 54; see also pp. 46 and 168-69). 
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whom I show love. Their revilement not only demonstrates that my efforts at dying to self 
are sincere, it is my means of imitating Christ, my mode1.,,12 As he did with the concept, 
"model," Siegfried Hansen contrasts the inward focus of SK's understanding of "imitation" 
with the outward focus that this concept has in the New Testament: 
The follower has received a new Lord and therewith a new center, a new meaning 
and content for his life. Bonhoeffer justly emphasizes that imitation frees the person 
from all human rules, from the hard yoke of man's own laws, concerns and miseries. 
Hence he can further say that imitation is joy: the way of imitation with Christ is a 
way that is merciful beyond measure. The call to imitation is grace: I may follow! 
The liberation of which Bonhoeffer speaks is not simply a being set free from the 
world, but a new condition of being free for the world. The follower has been set 
170rsten Bohlin, too, draws the conclusion that the neighbor in the end serves as a means to the end of 
achieving one's own salvation. He can even document this from the Works of Love, ostensibly that work of 
Kierkegaard's that deals with the Christian's deportment toward others most intimately of all. Bohlin writes: 
"In the final analysis love to one's neighbor seems to be subordinated to self-denial, to the notion of the person's 
individual purification and perfection. The neighbor, we read, is this something by which selfishness is to be 
tested. 'As far as thought is concerned the neighbour or other need not even exist. If a man living on a desert 
island formed his mind according to the command, he could by forsaking self-love be said to love his 
neighbour'" (SV IX 25 [Works of Love. 37]). Think of it: a man could be said to love his neighbor even if 
he lived on a deserted isle! In this work "where Kierkegaard goes to the greatest length that he possibly can 
in the direction of the 'social' ... fellowship is legitimated, foremost, as a means of realizing what belongs to 
the ego, be it ever the highest spiritual goal" (Bohlin, Kierkegaards tro och andra Kierkegaardstudier 
[Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyreises BokfOrlag, 1944), 126-27). 
Knud Hansen detects in Kierkegaard this same subordination of the neighbor's good to one's goal of 
personal salvation through virtuosity in suffering: "Far Kierkegaard ist es der Verzicht, der das Zentrum seiner 
Aufmerksamkeit bildet. ... Etwas anderes als diese selbstbewu!3te Selbstverneinung kennt Kierkegaard nicht. 
Spricht ervon derSelbstverneinung, so hat das niemals eine Beziehung zu dem Mitmenschen im evangelischen 
Sinn, ist es niemals etwas, das mit einem Sich-offnen fUr einen anderen umschrieben werden kann; es ist nicht 
urn eines anderen wilJen, daB man sich selbst verneinen soll, sondern urn seiner se1bst willen; denn nur durch 
die Selbstverneinung kommt das Selbst dazu, sich selbst in seiner hOchsten Potenz zu ergreifen. Die 
Selbstverneinung ist so gar keine wirkliche Selbstverneinung, sie ist nur der Verzicht auf alles, was das Selbst 
an die Welt bindet, aber ein Verzicht durch den das Selbst frei gemacht wird zu einem mit Hilfe der 
Selbstverneinung versHirkten Selbstgefiihl. Gott lieben ist fUr Kierkegaard auch identisch mit derSelbst liebe" 
("Der andere Kierkegaard," 138-39). 
While Hansen's judgement may seem harsh, it is nevertheless borne out by the evidence. Exemplary 
is Pap XII A 148 (JP 2:2053): "Does not Christianity make me into an enormous egoist, or does it not develop 
my egoism altogether abnormally inasmuch as it terrifies a human being by the greatest nightmare, bringing 
him to be concerned solely with his own salvation, completely without regard for the possible weakness, 
imperfection of all the others? ... [I)s it not as though Christianity were to make him into an enormous egoist 
when it forbids him to delay himself by wanting to help them, and on the contrary, continually orders him 
farther and farther out, by which he surely will even throw those contemporaries into confusion, perhaps even 
cause them to kill him so that they even incur the greatest guilt? To this the answer must be: 'The truth' cannot 
comport itself in any other way .... [I)fwhat motivates [the person) is concern for his soul's salvation, then 
he bears no responsibility, then the responsibility rests upon Christianity, upon Governance, who then will also 
lead everything to the best outcome" (translation mine). 
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free by Christ for new tasks. The outward turn into the world, toward one's neighbor, 
can now be made on the basis of closeness to Christ. On the other hand, Kierke-
gaard's'imitation is never outward, but ever inward, i.e., turned toward itself. This 
form of imitation circles tortuously about itself all the time, killing and annihilating 
itself ever anew since it, after all, knows of nothing else than "dying to" and having 
to suffer. The positive meaning of imitation, the liberating outward turn is lacking 
. K' k d 13 In ler egaar . 
Siegfried Hansen observes the same inwardly directed, self-annihilating tendency in 
Kierkegaard's contemporaneity concept as well. This is not surprising since, "for Kierke-
gaard, it is but another expression for imitation.,,14 Because the attempt to imitate Christ's 
I3"Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 12. Anticipating what Hansen has to say about Kierkegaard's contemporan-
eity concept somewhat, we read: "Weder der Kierkegaardsche Gleichzeitigkeits- noch auch der Nachfolge-
begriff sind in der Lage, das neutestamentlich Verhaltnis zwischen dem Christen und Christus voll 
auszuschOpfen. Das befreiende Tun Christi am Nachfolger, das Hineingestelltsein in eine Aufgabe am 
Mitmenschen--es wird von Kierkegaard nicht gesehen, wei! er nur auf sich und auf sein Leiden schauen 
kann .... " This, it seems to me, is true. Nonetheless Hansen's portrayal of the New Testament understanding 
of the disciple's relationship to Christ is again presented in a one-sidedly Lutheran fashion. Christ is not simply 
"gospel" to his followers. In I Cor. 9:21, for example, Paul speaks of being "subject to the law of Christ" 
[hvOIlOC; XptG'tou] and in Gal. 6:2 of "fulfil[ling] the law of Christ" [livl11tJ..11PWG€'t€ 'tOV 
vOIlOV 'tou XptG'touJ. In the former text "the law of Christ" is, to be sure, distinguished from Mosaic 
law; and in the latter text "fulfilling the law of Christ" means "bearing one another's burdens"--that is to say, 
it is outwardly directed. The question to be raised, however, is whether "the law of Christ" is equivalent to 
"gospel" in Luther's sense. And once again it must be pointed out that Christ is the pattern that the Christian 
is to emulate in his conduct. W. D. Davies writes: "When Paul calls himself a 11 tll11 't" C; 'tou XptG'tou 
[I Cor. 11: 1] and urges others to follow him in so far as he follows Christ we cannot fail to reali7..e that for him 
every Christian is pledged to an attempted ethical conformity to Christ; the imitation of Christ is part and parcel 
of Paul's ethic." Davies goes on to say that "to be a Christian is to re-live, as it were, in one's own experience 
the life of Jesus, to die and to rise with Him, and also at the same time to stand under the moral imperative of 
His words; and it is possible to infer from this the important consequence that not only did the words of Jesus 
form a Torah for Paul, but so also did the person of Jesus. In a real sense conformity to Christ. His teaching 
and His life. has taken the place for Paul of conformity to the Jewish Torah. Jesus Himself-in word and 
deed or fact is a New Torah." This being said, Davies notes that the rendering of Torah in the LXX by the 
Greek vOIl0C; is unfortunate since this overemphasizes its legal connotation. "The legal is only one aspect of 
Torah--it is Torah as mitzwah only. By Torah Judaism meant a'i Moore has written: 'all that God has made 
known of his nature, character and purpose and of what he would have man be and do'. It is not merely to be 
understood in the restricted sense oflegislation. It is clear, then, that this may be taken to mean that Paul would 
think of Jesus as the Torah of God not only in the sense that His words were a vOIl0C; but that He Himself 
in.!Q1Q was a full revelation of God and of His will for man" (Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, Some Rabbinic 
Elements in Pauline Theology [London: SPCK, 1955], 148-49), Christ, then, isa pattern, a standard of conduct 
for the Christian, True, he a gracious pattern, But a pattern nonetheless, Kierkegaard's understanding of 
"imitation"--whatever its flaws--does at least capture something of New Testament ethics that Luther is 
prevented from grasping by virtue of his steadfast eschewal of imitatio piety, 
14"Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 12, "Gleichzeitig sein heiBt: gleich7..eitig mit dem Leiden Jesu werden, 
genauso lei den, wie er es getan hat, sich also nicht gleichgijltig oderunbeteiligt, nur bewundernd an seinen Weg 
stellen als blol3er Betrachter, sondem sein Leid auf sich nehmen," 
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perfect self-renunciation cannot but fail, "Kierkegaard's contemporaneity crushes the person 
but does not help him along."ls By contrast, the New Testament understanding of contem-
poraneity entails much more than the imaginative transferral of oneself back into Jesus' time; 
it involves the experience of his saving presence here and now in our time (I Cor. 6: 17).16 
It is with the risen and exalted Lord that the believer is united. Any number of New 
Testament texts support this--for example, Rom. 5: 1 0: "For if while we were enemies we 
were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, now that we are reconciled, 
shall we be saved by his life." To which life does Paul here refer--that of the lowly Jesus, 
or the exalted Lord? The answer is clear from the next chapter: "The death he died he died 
to sin, once for all, but the life he lives he lives to God" (Rom. 6: 10). In the following verse 
we encounter the formula, ev Xpto'tci> [in Christ], which, along with ev 1tve:6~an [in 
the Spirit], is characteristic of Pauline thought. Hansen, however, observes that "the 
circumstance of having been determined by the 1tve:u~a is completely missing from the 
Kierkegaardian concept of contemporaneity. Yet thereby it is led by itself ad absurdum, for 
a genuine contemporaneity with Christ is not thinkable without the 1tve:u~a.,,17 
Defending Kierkegaard on this point, Heinrich Traugott Vogel charges Hansen with 
having construed the phrase, ev XPto'tci>, in a manner that imputes to the New Testament 
'SIbid., 13. 
17Ibid. To be sure, Kierkegaard does have a doctrine of the Holy Spirit, whose office it is to testify to the 
believer that it is blessed to suffer--Pap )( A 593 (JP 4:4688); XS A 37, A 72, p. 79, A 79, pp. 89-90, A 81, p. 
92, A 82, p. 95 (JP 4:4346,6:6837,3:3774,4:4700,4:4478). In this way the Spirit comforts the Christian, 
further assisting his efforts at "dying to." This means, however, that SK's pneumatology is taken up into the 
schema of suffering discipleship outlined above; it is enlisted in the attempt positively to characteri7..e suffering 
that otherwise lacks positive attributes, in the process itself receiving a negative characterization (the suffering, 
for all its "blessedness," nevertheless retains its passive character, egocentric focus, and negative occasion in 
the mob's hostility). Moreover to the extent that the Spirit represents or effects contemporaneity with Christ, 
it is with the pre-Easter Christ, the model of such suffering; any association with the exalted Christ is--as we 
shall see--conspicuously lacking. Accordingly, SK's understanding of the category, ev 1tveu j.LIX n, like his 
understanding of £v XP10'rcf>, is not simply synonymous with the New Testament's. SK's pneumatology, 
like his christo logy, is controlled by his conception of suffering. 
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too realized an eschatology.ls Kierkegaard, he says, is correct in contending that contem-
poraneity with the exalted Lord can come only through the abased Christ, and hence, is 
contemporaneity with both. Vogel's problem with Kierkegaard lies elsewhere, viz., in the 
latter's strict division of Christ's earthly history into two parts: his life during which he was 
solely model, and his death in which he effected humankind's redemption. 19 Although 
contemporaneity with the abased Christ embraces both parts of Christ's earthly history--and 
hence signifies contemporaneity with model and redeemer alike--such contemporaneity does 
not, in Vogel's view, adequately overcome the split between these two highly differentiated 
aspects of Christ that SK has introduced. Vogel writes: 
IS"Christus als Vorbild und VersOhner. Eine kritische Studie zum Problem des Verhaltnisses von Gesetz und 
Evangelium im Werke Soren Kierkegaards" (Inaugural diss.,Humboldt University, Berlin, 1968),198-99: "Wir 
wollen ... ein--in verschiedenen Variationen--ofter zu horendes Mif3verstandnis dieser Dialektik [der 
Gleichzeitigkeit] abweisen. So hat S. HANSEN zuletzt eingewendet, Kierkegaard lehne eine Gleichzeitigkeit 
mit dem ErhOhten Christus ab und eine solche miisse zur Abwehr von Einseitigkeiten postuliert werden. 
Hansen beruft sich dafUr auf das paulinische EINAI EN CHRISTO, ihm entgeht aber, daB Paulus das Sein-in-
Christus auslegt durch das Mit-Christus-Sterben und Mit-Christus-Auferstehen und darin gerade die 
eschatologische Differenz festhalt, wenn er von dem ersten im Pmsens, von dem zweiten im Futur spricht (Rm. 
6,5). Die gleiche anti-enthusiastische Unterscheidung behalten sachlich die Deuteropaulinen bei, wenn die Rede 
vom Mit-auferstanden-Sein und Mit-in-das-himmlische-Wesen-eingesetzt-Sein umschlossen bleibt von dem 
Satz 'Euer Leben ist verborgen mit Christus in GoU' (Eph. 2,6; Kol. 3,3). Ebenso stehen die Evangelien, die als 
nachOsterliche Zeugnisse die Nachfolge des Erniedrigten verkiindigen, in der Abwehr einer theologia gloriae. 
Sie dGrfen nicht in dem Sinne historisierend gelesen werden, daB man von der Ablosung der Nachfolge durch 
das EINAI EN CHRISTO spricht, wenn damit eine grundsatzlich andere Weise der Jilngerschaft gemeint sein 
soil, wie Hansen zu verstehen gibt." 
19Vogel writes: Kierkegaard's "profilierte These lautet: Christus ist in seinem Leben nuroder doch vor aHem 
Forderung und erst in seinem Tode Gnade. Diese Eigentiimlichkeit bietet den Ansatz, das Leben des 
Emiedrigten zum allgemeinen Ideal zu machen, weil sie die Forderung von der Verheif3ung trennt. Wir halten 
diese These darilber hinaus fUr einen der entscheidenden Schlilssel zur Erkliirung der Spatentwicklung von 
Kierkegaards Theologie" (ibid., 179). As proof of this sharp identification of Christ's life with a demand that 
is virtually devoid of grace, Vogel cites, among others, the following journal entries: "Christ as model is still 
a form of the law, yes the potentiated law, which is also why Christ's suffering is the strictest judgement upon 
the world and the race, for there was not a single person who would bear with him .... To be contemporaneous 
with Christ is the strictest examination possible; should it be our perpetual state, then the Jews were under a 
milder judgement under the law. Butthen Christ dies--and his death is the atonement: here is grace .... As long 
as Christ is visibly present as model, he cannot prevent himself from becoming judgement. His life, therefore, 
has a double side: he is mode1--then he dies, and now he is transformed, he becomes forever 'grace,' also in 
relation to our imperfect striving to resemble the 'model''' (Pap X2 A 451 [JP 2: 1654 D. And again: "With regard 
to contemporaneity with Christ qua standard, one must however remember ... that Christ's death is, after all, 
the atonement, and that grace actually dates from it in one sense; as long as Christ lived grace did not exist in 
this way--his own life is, after all, for him, too, a trial; he himself was tried. --In another sense the whole of his 
life is grace; as the Scriptures say, grace and truth were revealed in Christ" (Pap X2 A 361 [JP 2:1862], 
translations mine). 
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As regards content, the question is whether Kierkegaard understands imitation first 
of all as grace, the fellowship of sufferings in the power of the resurrection, whether 
he sees the walk in the newness of life (Rom. 6:4) as grounded entirely in the 
resurrection of Christ even if it also bears the form ofthe cross in imitation. Because 
of the combination of both aspects, the question is identical to whether imitation is 
understood entirely as "fruit of faith and of gratitude." And this is precisely what 
cannot be said with such unequivocalness. Herein too, no doubt, lies the uneasy 
feeling that has prompted Hansen's critique.20 
Vogel locates the problematic element of Kierkegaard's understanding of 
contemporaneity in his failure to regard the earthly life with which we are to be contempo-
rary in the context of the atonement, not (as with Hansen) in his failure to move beyond that 
life directly to participation in Christ's exalted state. The Pauline notion of "being in Christ" 
must involve that of "dying with Christ." In this Kierkegaard is right. Yet it also involves the 
reality of the atonement--a reality qualifies our "dying" as gracious. Any interpretation of 
contemporaneity such as Kierkegaard's that periodizes the life of Christ--construing him as 
the suffering and dying one but neglecting the resurrection wherewith his death is attested 
as atoning--Iacks the present reality of redemption by which a truly empowering experience 
of contemporaneity is possible. This seems to be the thrust of Vogel's critique of Kierke-
gaard. And notwithstanding his difficulty with Hansen--viz., that the latter, in his view, 
unwarrantably regards the moment of "dying with Christ" as having been altogether 
superseded by "being in Christ"--Vogel does share the opinion that SKIS failure to regard 
Christ's life as gracious owes to its having been disjoined from the resurrection. SK consis-
tently "looks away" from the resurrection in which the atoning significance of Christ's death 
first comes to light, leaving the follower in an impossible situation of contemporaneity with 
an ever accusing ideal. 
To sum up: from the foregoing it becomes evident that Kierkegaard is not to be re-
proached for having accentuated Christ qua exemplwn--the age's exclusive emphasis upon 
Christ as sacramentwn doubtless warranted such a corrective measure. No, the problem is 
that on SKIS presentation the believer's contemporaneous imitation of Christ the model is 
unqualified by the Christ the redeemer's enabling presence. Christ qua exemplwn lacks the 
2°"Christus als Vorbild und Versohner," 199. 
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necessary qualifying determinant of sacramentum; imitation is enjoined absent redemption. 
Siegfried Hansen seeks further to demonstrate the presence of such a distortion in Kierke-
gaard's christology by documenting his failure to assign any redemptive role to the risen and 
exalted Lord in the believer's present life. To anticipate: any such role is consistently 
consigned to the future. 
He begins with the risen Lord. Most suggestively, he observes that throughout the 
entire corpus of SK's published writings the Easter fact is not extensively treated a single 
time. For example, in none of his seventy-eight discourses does Kierkegaard take an Easter 
pericope as his text. Indeed, the very word, "Easter," occurs but five times in the entire 
Samlede Vrerker, the word, "resurrection," but twenty, and in all of the places that the terms 
do occur the Easter event is not the principal theme of discussion but is touched upon only 
in relation to another thought that is of greater significance to Kierkegaard.21 
Secondly, Hansen observes that Kierkegaard omits mention of the resurrection and 
ascension in virtually every enumeration of the principal events of Christ's life. Ever is the 
cross depicted as its terminus ad quem and Pilate's "Ecce homo" pronounced anew so as to 
reinforce the image of Christ as the prototype of suffering.22 This astonishing truncation 
of the gospel narrative is enacted so that Christ's passion might find its real sequel in the 
sufferings of his followers. Consistent with this intent, neither Easter nor Pentecost fall 
within Kierkegaard's purview as being the terminus a QUO of the church. The fact that suffer-
ing constitutes the only legitimate continuation of Good Friday means that the disciples' re-
birth and renewed purpose to suffer must follow directly from that unparalleled event. And 
so it does on Kierkegaard's revised narrative. Hansen cites two texts in confirmation of this--
first, Pap Xl A 417 (JP 4:4326): 
But what is it, really, that explains that transformation whereby the apostles, 
who, forsaken and despondent only a few days prior, now suddenly gained faith and 
courage and resolve to venture their lives and their all for Christ's sake? One 
21S. Hansen, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 14. 
22Ibid., 14-15. Hansen cites SV XI 197 (Sickness unto Death. 85), SV XIV 28 (Attack upon Christendom. 
20), Pap Xl A 12 (JP2:1220) and ~ A 135 (lP 4:4667), but adds thatthe references could be multiplied almost 
at will. 
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answers: the communication of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, and seeks precisely by 
this transfonnation to demonstrate that a miracle must intervene. 
Meanwhile, though, another side of the matter must be brought to light. As 
long as Christ was with them they could not really give up the earthly expectations 
(as Christ says--he had to depart in order for the Spirit to be able to come). When he 
then died the death on the cross and was buried: then it became real for them; every 
earthly hope was now lost--and here lies their rebirth. Christ's most solemn 
assurances about his suffering and death, they do not help; the fact that it is he who 
says it, that he stands there in person, precisely this causes them not really to be able 
to believe it. It must become real. ... 
That is to say: spirit can only be communicated indirectly. As long as he was 
personally with them, however clearly he might say it, they would nevertheless 
misunderstand it--only when he was dead, ot:ly then did they themselves become 
spirit and understand him. The situation must be present. 
And so it goes with every person. It is the difference between understanding 
according to possibility (an understanding is always a misunderstanding) and under-
standing in actuality .... It is impossible to become spirit in "possibility." Only when 
it becomes actuality and every earthly hope really is lost: then is [ one] reborn so as 
truly to understand what he, to be sure, from the beginning had understood 
somewhat, and yet in such a way that a misunderstanding was latent therein. 
Thus does spirit coalesce qua spirit, and now comes into possession of the 
pure powers of spirit. It perhaps looked easier in possibility, but really it became 
easier in actuality, because spirit now is essentially in pure unity with itself.23 
On this account, the disciples' spiritual quickening seems to be essentially a result of the 
crucifixion, not the resurrection: 
In truth, therefore, not Easter--Iet alone Pentecost--is the hour of birth of the 
Christian Church, but already the cross, and in fact this time not as forgiveness of the 
sins of the world, but as the seal upon Christ's word concerning his own suffering. 
Because the disciples saw the consistency of the sufferer, because they had been 
made to experience that he was, to the very end, the abased and suffering one, 
therefore they believed upon him and were now able to proclaim him to the world.24 
One sees a remarkable shift of emphasis in the explanation that Kierkegaard gives 
for the disciples' bold proclamation at Pentecost--a shift that transfers the accent from the 
victorious resurrection of Christ (which he ill£Q predicted to his disciples) to the proven 
veracity of his warnings concerning the approaching cross (warnings that, upon their 
materialization, became meaningful for the disciples, emboldening them to take upon 
23Pap Xl A 417 (JP 4:4326), translation mine. 
24S. Hansen, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 14. 
240 
themselves the same fate). A similar account is to be found in Pap )( A 498, where SK 
attributes the intrepidity of the apostles and first Christians to the "momentum" that was 
imparted them by Christ's suffering: 
What now helped the apostles and the first Christians cheerfully to suffer for the 
truth was that they were propelled forward, so to speak, by Christ's life. Christ was, 
after all, the Holy One--that stood eternally certain for them; and his suffering was 
so present to them that so, too, was the realization that suffering is the mark of the 
relationship with God. See, from this came good cheer .... 
But, as mentioned, what helped the apostles and the first Christians was 
Christ's life, suffering and death. He, the Holy One, he could unconditionally render 
this truth certain for them: viz., that suffering signifies absolutely none other than the 
inwardness of the relationship with God; ergo it is not repulsive, but attractive.2s 
This explanation attributes the apostles' boldness to their realization that suffering 
is the mark of the relationship with God; this knowledge having been vouchsafed them by 
Christ's own experience, they could advance to meet their fate with good cheer. In refuting 
it Hansen appeals to the New Testament's testimony concerning the disciples' state of mind 
following the crucifixion: John 20: 19 tells us that they hid themselves behind locked doors 
"for fear of the Jews." Such anxiety, Hansen notes, was "precisely the opposite of good 
cheer. Without the Easter event, there would never have come to be apostles from the 
disciples on Easter eve!,,26 He adds that to entertain any other notion is not merely an 
exegetical, but a psychological impossibility. Yet Kierkegaard involves himself in just this 
when he sets forth suffering, rather than the resurrected Christ, as the foundation of the 
apostolic office. 
From Kierkegaard's tortured account of the disciples' transformation it becomes 
apparent he remains standing at the cross, either unable or unwilling to find the way forward 
to the resurrection. Hansen likens his situation to that of the disciples on Easter eve: 
completely transfixed by the cross, Kierkegaard seems not to have an inkling of the resurrec-
2SPap :xt A 498, translation mine. 
26S. Hansen, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 16. 
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tion to come.27 Yet his demonstrable neglect of the risen Lord is not the only index of his 
failure to assign a truly redemptive role to Christ in this life; it is complemented by his 
equally striking neglect of the exalted Lord: 
When Kierkegaard remains standing beneath the cross of Christ, not finding the way 
to the resurrected One, then it is clear from the start that the exalted Lord can hold 
no significance for him. And in fact: if one gathers together everything from the 
writings and journals that Kierkegaard has said about the ascension and the exalted 
Lord, then one comes to a quite similar result as with Easter: to be sure, Kierkegaard, 
in a purely intellectual way, stands by the traditional dogma of the church fathers as 
regards the ascension and the "sedet ad dexteram Patris"--but it means nothing to 
him, has not become existential for him.28 
Of the "vanishing few" references that Kierkegaard does make to Christ's exaltation, 
his discourse for the festival of the Ascension stands out precisely by reason of its refusal 
to address this subject. Kierkegaard uses the greater part of the discourse to recount the 
sorrowful events of Christ's life and death so as to show that he was, and remains, the 
narrow way to the Father. When at last Kierkegaard arrives at the Ascension--which is 
treated with the greatest dispatch--he imagines the objection of a disgruntled listener: 
"Perhaps you are saying, 'Yes, and this is what you should have talked about today instead 
of talking almost as if it were Good Friday.' Ah, my friend, are you the kind of person who 
precisely on the hour and day can fall into a particular mood ... ? Precisely on Ascension 
Day it ought to be brought to mind that he is the narrow way, for otherwise we could easily 
271n particular Hansen is struck by the special affinity that Kierkegaard seems to have felt for Peter. On 
several occasions Kierkegaard speculates what it must have been like for Peter following his denial of Christ 
(Pap Xl A 173, X3 A 149 and VIII I A 130 [JP 3:3232, 3:3234, and 1 :462]). On one of them he marvels at the 
grace that was shown the fallen disciple, exclaiming, "0 infinite mildness, of which I am almost afraid lest it 
deceive me into taking it in vain. It is almost this that disquiets me most about Christianity--its mildness; I 
become so afraid that I might take it in vain" (Pap X3 A 149 [JP 3:32341, translation mine). To this Hansen 
emphatically replies: Kierkegaard was not one to take grace lightly. The extreme caution that he exercised with 
grace was not simply a deliberate measure, prompted by the fear of taking grace in vain. Rather, SK's anxiety 
was of a different sort, what he elsewhere describes as anxiety about the good (SV N 386-420 [Conct;J,lt of 
Anxit;ty, 118-54]). That is to say, his reluctance to lay hold of grace was grounded in the fear of giving up his 
melancholy self-absorption. Hence in contrast to Peter, who "found the way out" of his inner prison of guilt 
and remorse and "was able to proclaim the resurrection of his Lord at Pentecost, Kierkegaard does not find 
this way" ("Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 17, emphasis added). 
28S. Hansen, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 17. 
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take Ascension Day in vain. ,,29 Thereupon Kierkegaard launches--for the remainder of the 
discourse--into an inquiry into why present day Christians hanker after the glorified Christ, 
whereas the earliest Christians felt no such need: 
Those whose lives are marked by imitation have not doubted the Ascension. And 
why not? In the first place, because their lives were too strenuous, too much 
expended in daily sufferings to be able to sit in idleness keeping company with 
reasons and doubt, playing evens or odds. For them the Ascension stood firm, but 
because their lives were so active and on the narrow way they perhaps seldom 
thought about it or dwelt upon it. The situation was like that of a soldier who owns 
a splendid uniform; he is aware that he has it, but he almost never looks at it, because 
his whole life is spent in daily battle and risks, and therefore he has a plain everyday 
uniform in order to move about properly. In the same way, those whose lives were 
marked by imitation were convinced that their Lord and Master ascended into 
heaven.3o 
The sum of the matter is that Kierkegaard takes the festival of the Ascension as an occasion, 
first, to remind his audience that Christ's earthly existence was nothing but one extended, 
uninterrupted Passion, and second, to censure his audience's effete preoccupation with the 
Christ of glory. To the at best infelicitous analogy whereby Kierkegaard relegates Christ's 
Ascension and glorification to an unnecessary appurtenance to the Christian life, Hansen 
can only exclaim: 
The knowledge of the exalted Lord as "extra uniform" of the follower that hangs 
unused in the closet because one cannot use it in daily battle! This word characterizes 
Kierkegaard's relationship to the exalted Lord, characterizes as no other his 
eschatology, too .... Eternity, the exalted Lord, are, for Kierkegaard, things purely 
future in a chronological sense. Apart from occasional comfort (cf. the occasional 
anticipation at eternity's "extra uniform") they have no effect on the suffering-filled 
present. Aside from the hope of one day being permitted to be with him, Kierkegaard 
has no personal relationship to the exalted one. He has simply a--certainly very 
personal--relationship to the crucified one, the abased one. With him he is contempo-
rary--but the contemporaneity does not extend to the exalted Lord; on the contrary, 
this is rejected: the exalted one keeps silence; the abased one, alone, makes the de-
mands.3l 
29SV XII 349 (For Self-Examination. 65). 
3ou,id., 352 (68-69). 
liS. Hansen, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 22. 
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This striking avoidance of Christ in his glorified state is typical of Kierkegaard.32 
In discounting its relevance for the Christian life here and now SK believes that he follows 
Christ's own lead. While he walked the earth Jesus repeatedly called attention to his lowly 
estate, deliberately forcing his future exaltation into a position of secondary importance.33 
Suppression of Christ's glorified state remains expedient so as to prevent the relationship of 
the "follower" from degenerating into that of the "admirer." Because imitation is everything, 
"everything that might become a danger to it must--in one way or another--be left out of 
account. Even the exalted Lord. ,,34 
The problem with this proceeding--however well intended it might be--is that it does 
violence to the New Testament, which teaches that "the future, paradoxically, is already 
there, the ai&v OU"tOI; [present age] is, in curious fashion, already pervaded by the aic;,v 
~e).).(j)v [coming age]. Thus, for the New Testament, the exalted Christ is simultaneously 
32In addition to the Ascension day address, S. Hansen adduces two others that amply illustrate this. In 
Practice in Christianity SK sharply dichotomizes the abased and exalted Christ, for all practical purposes 
dispensing with the latter. Striking is his discussion of Christ's invitation: "Come here to me, all you who labor 
and are burdened, I will give you rest." Though it is true that Christ "is the same today and yesterday," 
nevertheless these words of invitation were uttered by the one who "lived eighteen hundred years ago in his 
abasement and is not changed until his coming again. He has not yet come again; therefore he still continues 
to be the abased one who, it is believed, will come again in glory. What he has said and taught, every word he 
has spoken, becomes eo ipso untrue if we make it appear as if it is Christ in glory who says it. No, he is silent; 
the abased one is speaking" (SV XII 22-23 [Practice in Christianity. 24)). As if to offset this strict 
dichotomization, Kierkegaard also stresses the unity of Christ (p. 150 [160)). Yet Hansen observes that he 
immediately "tears this unity asunder" (see p. 151 [161)), thus leaving "the impression that he attaches such 
great importance to it because he himself senses that he destroys it" ("Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 20). 
Yet another example of Kierkegaard's suppression of the exalted Lord is his rendering of Christ's 
triumphal entry into Jerusalem: this, SK observes, cannot really have been an event having the character of a 
coronation--Christ was much too despised for that (was he not, after all, compelled to seek out his friends 
among tax collectors and sinners since no one else would have anything to do with him?). "No, when he makes 
his entry this cannot be understood along the lines of esteem, but more as a commotion" (Pap Xl A 163 [JP 
6:6368)). Hansen observes that this resort to false exegesis (Christ went "out of compassion, not because he 
would otherwise have had no social contacts") is calculated "to allow this text to show nothing of the splendor 
of the Lord" ("Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 21). 
33Kierkegaard observes: "As soon as [Christ] speaks of his glory ... he also immediately adds as an antidote 
[Modgift] that he will suffer, and then to this he adds: blessed is he who is not offended" (Pap VIlli A 381 [JP 
3:3025], translation and emphasis mine). 
MS. Hansen, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 19. 
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future and present. ,,35 This is of course the fundamental import of the Pauline concepts, e v 
Xp 1. (J't <l> and e v 'ltV trUll U 'tl., previously mentioned. Citing Gerhard Kittel, Hansen contends 
that "the CtKOAov8eiv [following after] ofthe disciples before Easter is superseded by the 
condition, ev Kvpi~ [in the Lord], after Easter,,36: 
On this basis it is no accident that the word CtKOAov8eiv is used only in the 
Gospels, that there is agreement as to its use in all four Gospels, and that they restrict 
the relationship signified by it to the historical Jesus. In the Epistles other expres-
sions are used in which the emphasis falls on the relationship to the exalted KUP1.0t; 
d H· - 37 an Is'ltvevllu. 
As regards Kierkegaard's fear of noncommittal admiration issuing from the 
Christian's relationship to the exalted one, S. Hansen contends that the very title, KUP1.0t;, 
prevents this. On the basis of the New Testament one can and must speak of a Lord 
triumphant in history. Because the church is his servant, the very possibility of freedom 
from obligation is foreclosed. The triumph that the church, by virtue of her relationship to 
Christ, enjoys here and now inevitably turns into the confession of her Lord.38 
A final doctrine in which SK's "remaining standing" at the cross makes itself felt is 
that of the church. Hansen observes that the risen Christ is the presupposition for the church; 
hence the absence of any relationship to him should entail the absence of any relationship 
3Slbid., 22. 
31bid. This is the claim that provokes Vogel's charge that Hansen entertains too realized an eschatology. 
37I.12NI, s.v. "thOAou8eCa>." The import of Kittel's statement is that rtKOAou8eCa> is so strongly 
connected with a literal following after Jesus in the manner of rabbi and disciple that the concept is restricted 
to the Gospel accounts and in an active form (Le., following after). No substantive form of the word develops 
during the time of the composition of the New Testament such as we have in German [Nachfolgel or Danish 
[Efterf0lgelseJ. It is on this basis that Kittel observes that "it is no accident that the word rtKOAou8eCa> is 
used only in the Gospels." This however is not to say that what "following after" entails--participation in Jesus' 
salvation and his fate--is dropped from early church piety as Hansen seems to indicate when he says that 
rtKOAou8eCa> is superseded by the concept, tv KUp{ct>. While the emphasis outside the Gospels may fall 
upon the relationship to the exalted Lord, this in no way negates the necessity of dying and suffering with 
Christ, as we earlier pointed out. Hence the notion of being in fellowship with the exalted Lord does not 
invalidate that of following after him in a figurative sense. Nevertheless Hansen's point holds true that 
relationship to the exalted Lord is absent in Kierkegaard and as such he conceives eschatology altogether 
futuristically rather than proleptically. 
38"Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 23. 
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to his body.39 Conversely, the Christ with whom Kierkegaard seems best acquainted is 
Christ the model. The only possible relationship with him is imitation through suffering. But 
as Kierkegaard makes clear, concentration on "the collective" is inimical to the category of 
imitation, which relates to the individual.40 Isolation is the element in which discipleship 
breathes, and suffering is the instrument by which people are individualized and driven into 
isolation.41 The primary such suffering is sin, which isolates as no other category can, leav-
ing each person--qua individual--to tum personally to God.42 Moreover the unavoidability 
of collision with the world--even with one's own flesh and blood--also isolates absolutely.43 
39Ibid. 
40Pap Jr A 369 (JP 2: 1906): "One fastens all the attention on the race, congregation, church--in short, on 
a collective; thus does the category, 'the individual,' go by the board; Christ relates to this collective, but not 
in such a way to the individual, and with 'the individual,' which goes by the board, so too does 'imitation' go 
by the board, for imitation relates categorically to the individual" (translation mine). 
41S. Hansen, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 24; K. Hansen, "Der andere Kierkegaard," 132. 
42Pap Xe A 14 (JP 4:4050): "That Christianity relates unconditionally to isolation (the individual) can also 
be seen from the fact that Christianity'S presupposition constantly is: the consciousness of sin, that it begins by 
proclaiming the forgiveness of sin. But the consciousness of sin is what isolates unconditionally .... Even the 
most exceptional human misfortune and suffering is not so isolating--by being human beings the others, too, 
participate in it, and it ends, after all, with death which does not really [i dybeste Grund] concern personality's 
essence. Only sin is what isolates unconditionally. My sin does not concern a single person but me, and 
concerns my personality at its deepest root [i dybeste Grund]." Kierkegaard ends the entry by stipulating that 
"Christianity's condition, sine qua non, [is] isolation, the individual" (translation mine). 
From this journal entry it is clear that while the consciousness of sin isolates the sinner before God, 
thus leading to forgiveness, he is not thereby freed from further isolation. On the contrary, he is driven into 
the ever deepening isolation that is the signature of spiritual existence. It cannot be otherwise if isolation 
is to be Christianity'S conditio. sine qua non. 
43"Das Christsein ist eine Isolationsbestimmung zweiten Grades. Die unmittelbare Isolation: Das in seinem 
eigenen Inneren, vor anderen verborgene Leben, das ist nur die erste Potenz der Isolierung. Ein hOherer Grad 
wird erreicht, wenn man sich nicht nurvor anderen verbirgt, sondern sich in leidenschaftlichem Gegensatz zu 
ihnen befindet. Eine solche verdoppelte Isolierung kann nur ein Geistesmensch aushalten. Der Geistesmensch 
unterscheidet sich von uns Menschen durch seine Fahigkeit zur Isolation,ja seine Kapazitat als Geistesmensch 
entscheidet sich geradezu an dieser Fahigkeit. Je mehr Isolation einer vertragen kann, desto hOher rangiert er 
als Geistesmensch. Dies ist der Grund fUr die Rede des NT, dal3 man Gott nur im Hal3 gegen den Menschen 
lieben kann, im Hal3 gegen sich selbst und gegen andere, gegen Vater und Mutter, Hausfrau und die 
Geschwister, ja sogar gegen sein eigenes Kind (SV XIV 196 [Attack UDon Christendom. 163])" (K. Hansen, 
"Der andere Kierkegaard," 133). 
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The net result of SKis extreme emphasis upon imitation in suffering is a strong doctrine of 
the individual, but not of the church.44 
In the end, the concept of the individual in imitation shows itself to be "absolutely 
foreign to community, dismissive of community.,,4s To be sure, passages do exist in which 
~is is one oftheprincipal reasons that Karl Barth's initial ardor for Kierkegaard slackened, leaving behind 
hardly a trace. In a retrospective account he writes: "Wie war das nun eigentlich mit jenem Einzelnen, urn 
dessen Existenz sich bei Kierkegaard so ziemlich alles zu drehen scheint? Wo bleibt in seiner Lehre das Yolk 
Gottes, die Gemeinde, die Kirche--wo deren diakonischer und missionarischer Auftrag--, wo ihre politische 
und soziale Aufgabe? Was bedeutet es, daB Kierkegaard in der Auslegung des Gebotes: 'Ou sollst Deinen 
Nachsten lieben wie dich selbst!' mit Augustin undder Scholastik (gegen Luther und Calvin!) darln einig war, 
daB es eine der Nachstenliebe vorgeordnete Liebe des Menschen zu sich selbst geben miisse? Wie seltsam, daB 
wir, die wir doch eben von einer intensiven Beschiiftigung mit dem Christentum in seinem Verhaltnis zur 
sozialen Frage herkamen, gerade in diesem Punkt--daB wir gegeniiber Kierkegaards so ausgesprochenem 
Heilsindividualismus--nicht sofort bedenklich wurden!" ("Dank und Reverenz," Evangelische Theologie 23 
[1963]:340-41 ["A Thank You and a Bow: Kierkegaard's Reveille," Canadian Journal of Theology 11, no. 1 
(1965):6]). 
One theologian who never suffered any illusions on this point was Ernst Troeltsch: "Mit seiner 
Theologie des absoluten Moments gibt es keinen Pfarrer, keine Gemeindeverwaltung, keine Mission und keine 
Predigt der Erziehung und Seelenleitung" ("Ein Apfel vom Baume Kierkegaards," in Anfange derdialektischen 
Theologie. ed. Jurgen Moltmann, Theologische Bucherei, vol. 17 [Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963],2: 139). 
Troeltsch, however, saw merit in Kierkegaard's radicalism, regarding him as the preeminent exemplar of a 
specific religious type: "Das Beispiel Kierkegaards kann zeigen, wie ein rein von religiosen Interessen aus 
entworfenes Programm aussehen wilrde: kirchenfeindlich, kulturfeindlich, ungeheuer einseitig und 
leidenschaftlich, eine vollige Beiseitesetzung aller ausserreligiosen Lebensinhalte" (Gesamroelte Schriften 
[Tiibingen: 1. C. B. Mohr, 1912-25],2:105). 
45S. Hansen, "Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 24. Torsten Bohlin traces the tension that existed between the 
notions of "the individual" and "the universal" from the outset of the authorship. At that point the extraordinary 
individual who, for whatever reason, could not realize "the universal" (viz., self-disclosure in marriage) was 
considered the exception to the rule and, as such, ostensibly lower than "the universal." In time, however, the 
exception was made into the rule, religiously speaking. Hence by the time of the Postscript SK regards the 
modem eremite's existence as the religious ideal, even though that same eremite is conceived as participating 
fully in family and society (relating relatively to the relative, etc.). Bohlin points out that even while SK 
continues to pay lip service to "the universal," and hence to community, his notion of the religious individual 
is prohibitive of true community. He writes: "The person--even ifhe is supposed to get to the point of devoting 
himself to the earthly--seems to be cut off from all inner fellowship according to the Postscript's presentation. 
The only true religiosity is, you see, said to be 'incognito'; the God-relationship is supposed to be a 'hidden 
inwardness,' and the knight of the hidden inwardness is not supposed to be distinguishable from any other 
person (SV VII 434f.). The person who exists under ethical categories herewith becomes exclusively 
concentrated upon his own inner actions, 'his soul's development' (p. 110); only by faith's indirect means can 
'a reconciling fellowship' be won with others who are engaged in ethico-religious striving (p. 125). But the 
more consistently that the demand for the hidden inwardness is carried out, the greater is the degree to which 
the person is condemned to spiritual isolation. The empha~is rests decisively upon the person's own 'dialectical 
inward deepening' (p. 498). This program is the only one that can be consistently carried out according to the 
Postscript's fundamental ethico-religious view, and therewith has Kierkegaard, in reality, made the religious 
exception into the ethical paradigm" (Kierkegaards tro. 120-21). 
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Kierkegaard ostensibly defends the notion of the "congregation. ,,46 Yet it is revealing that 
such passages define the congregation as a collection of individuals qualitatively under-
stood (Le., individuals who, in their service of "the idea," have broken with their contempo-
raries, bidding farewell to the world, thereby becoming individuals in the true sense). By 
contrast, "the mob" or "public" is a collection of "individuals" in the purely quantitative 
sense--persons with no identity distinct from "the others." What binds the congregation (or 
any true society) together is the shared situation of being qualitative individuals, passionate-
ly related to the same idea.47 Such individuals find themselves joined in opposition to every 
other bond that would disturb their qualitative individuality, and this polemical stance 
toward the greater society of humans, too, is a defining feature of the congregation.48 To 
this definition of the Christian community Siegfried Hansen objects: "But this is no 
We see, then, that the late "gemeinschaftsfremd, gemeinschaftsabweisend" notion of the individual 
in imitation is but a further development of what is already present at a much earlier stage of the authorship. 
With an ineluctable logic Kierkegaard proceeds from a position in the Postscript that advocates a fundamental 
pretense of self-disclosure (a manifestly unethical position that SK nevertheless seeks to justify and 
universalize on religious grounds) to the conclusion that the company of others and "diversion" are, at best, 
concessions made to human weakness--concessions that one is gradually supposed to "work his way out or' 
(Pap IX A 315-16 [JP 2:1377 and 2:2008]). The measure of the person is, in the final analysis, "how long,and 
how far out can he endure being alone, without [entering into] an understanding with others" (Pap XII A 415 
[JP 2:2067]). 
46Siegfried Hansen cites Pap X2 A 390 and 478 (JP 3: 2952 and JP 4:4175). Yet he also points out that the 
position of Anti-Climacus is an outright rejection of the very idea of a congregation (SV XII 204-5 [Practice 
in Christianity. 223]). Though Kierkegaard himself, at the time of writing Practice in Christianity and these 
other "positive" entries on the congregation, considered Anti-Climacus's position an "intensification" calculated 
to awaken the church from its torpor (Pap X2 A 366 [Practice in Christianity. supp., p. 345]), there is no 
mistaking its import: the church militant recognizes no congregation whatever--it is composed only of individu-
als engaged in individual strife. Here--as we shall see--one is best served by the assumption that Anti-Climacus 
speaks the true mind of Kierkegaard, for it is Anti-Qimacus who has gone on in advance, developing a still 
nascent line of thought with a consistency that Kierkegaard himself has not yet been prepared to accept. 
47SV VIII 59 and Pap X2 A 390 (JP 3:2952). 
48Pap X2 A 478 (JP4:4175). SVXIV 153 (Attack \Won Christendom. 127)--a much latertext--also apprises 
us that "the concept, 'Christian,' is a polemical concept, one can only be a Christian in con~rast or by way of 
contrast" (slightly amended). Here the ground of contrast is not referred to qualitative individuality per se, but 
to absolute love of God, which absolutely devalues every other love: "So it is also in the New Testament: to 
God's desire to be loved, which essentially is a relationship of contrast or opposition in order to raise love to 
a higher power, corresponds the fact that the Christian who loves God in contrast and opposition to other men 
has to suffer from their hate and persecution." It will be noted that this text does not relate conflict to the 
concept of "congregation, " but rather to that of " Christian. " The tacit message is that "the polemical" ultimately 
serves not to define "congregation," but to dissolve it--along with every other human relationship! 
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community at all, for there is nothing here that binds; on the contrary, one is polemically 
disposed against everything that is connected with bonds. Imitation binds to Christ, to be 
49 
sure, but not to others." 
It seems to me that he is right. Though the members of such a communion share the 
common idea of the imitation of Christ as individuals, we have seen that the very nature of 
imitation is to exclude the collective. Hence only the shared polemical stance toward the 
world remains to provide a basis for communion. Such a communion can be nothing more 
than an adventitious association of individuals brought together by the world's animus. But 
more than this, this outwardly polemical posture must in the end rebound onto the 
congregation itself, dissolving even its accidental union, for this just is the inexorable logic 
of "the polemical." And indeed, this is what happens.so "The polemical" is allowed to 
disband what little cohesion does obtain among fellow Christians--even among Christian 
husband, wife and child--since even a limited cohesion is debilitative of qualitative indi-
viduality and unconditional love for God.sl 
The attempt has been made to interpret Kierkegaard's statements about the church 
as a purely corrective measure without dogmatic intent.52 While this may have been 
49"Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 25. 
SOPap Xl2 A 396 (JP 4:4730) reiterates that God wishes to be loved "by way of contrast" and that "the 
collision with the others" is Christianity's specific suffering. Yet this time Kierkegaard adds that, even if the 
world consisted of nothing but Christians--real Christians!--if one really loved God, one would "nevertheless 
come into collision with 'the others.''' 
SIOf SK's ambivalence toward marriage and friendship--even when praising them!--Torsten Bohlin 
(Kierkegaards tro, 126) writes: "The idea that 'the social,' communal life as such, should be placed in 
connection with a final goal, the kingdom of God, is utterly foreign to Kierkegaard. Here, too, he expressly 
defends the civil arrangement of marriage. But however 7..ealous he may seem in this defense, he goes on to 
acknowledge that Christianity "has misgivings about romantic love and friendship and he falls back upon Paul's 
words that it is better to get married than to burn (SV IX 54-55 [Works of Loye, 65])." For Kierkegaard, 
romantic love is fundamentally irreconcilable with being a Christian. So too, is friendship. A range of texts 
indicating the former includes: Pap II A 244 (JP 3:2578), VIlli A 663, p. 315 (JP 2:1215), X5 A 158 (JP 
6:6306), SV VII 149-51 (Postscript. 179-81); SV XII III (Practice in Christianity, 117). Pap X2 A 508 points 
up the irrelevance of friendship to the one who would save his own soul; it also calls attention to the 
inevitability of collision with one's own flesh and blood. 
52Hermann Diem, Die Existenzdia1ektik von S. Kierkegaard (Zurich, 1950), 103-105 (Kierkegaard's 
Dialectic of Existence. trans. Harold Knight [Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957], 108-110). 
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Kierkegaard's original aim, Hansen contends that we must ask quite another question: 
whether he has not, in fact, effected a dogmatic shift, saying "a clear 'No' to any church at 
all."s3 Kierkegaard's point of departure is widely divergent from the New Testament, where 
"the exalted one is present in his C1(;)~«, the church. The correlate to the KUptOt; XptC1'tOt; 
isnottheindividual, butthecongregation, the eKKAllC1i«, the C1(;)~« 'tou XptC1'tOU. There 
are no individual Christians outside of the C1(;)~«-community founded by Christ. The 
individual members of this body signify, individually seen, absolutely nothing."s4 Hansen 
goes on to say that though Kierkegaard regarded the individual as the corrective to a 
"church" become quantitative, such a church "is not reformed by ranging a qualitative 
concept of the individual against it, but only by going back to the New Testament's 
qualitative concept of the congregation."ss Yet Kierkegaard has rejected any such 
concept. This becomes abundantly clear in those texts in which he expresses misgivings 
about the New Testament church itself. In an entry entitled, "A Nota Bene That Prompts 
Misgivings," (Pap XII A 189-90 [JP 2:2056-57]), he writes: 
Those 3000 who, at Pentecost, were added to the congregation en masse--is 
there not here, precisely at the very beginning, a questionable state of affairs? 
Shouldn't the apostles have had misgivings as to how it could be that these thousands 
became Christians all at once? Hasn't something human happened to the apostles 
who, still keenly aware of their despairing condition at Christ's death when all was 
as if lost, now, overwhelmed by joy at the effect that they produced, forgot what 
Christianity really is, forgot that if true imitation is to be Christianity, then such enor-
mous conquests as 3000 at one time will not wash? 
It is so enormously difficult, for there is a curious meeting of two notions, 
almost as when two people meet one another in a narrow passage where they cannot 
get by each other. In Christ Christianity is in the direction of intensity, that is to say, 
it is pure intensity; the apostles' task seems to be in the direction of propagation, the 
greater the propagation, the better. But to the same degree that I accentuate the inten-
sity I halt the propagation--and yet it was, I should think, true Christianity that the 
apostles were to propagate. 
In Christ Christianity is the individual, here the single individual. In the 
apostles it is straightway--congregation. But by this means Christianity is transferred 
SJ"Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 25. 
S;bid., 26. 
S5Ibid. 
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into quite another concept-sphere. It is also this concept that has become Christiani-
ty's ruin. To this concept owes the confusion of states, lands, peoples, kingdoms that 
are Christian. 
And it is a question as to whether the principle that one should hate oneself, 
which is after all Christianity's, is not so anti-social that it cannot constitute 
congregation. In any case, one will from this standpoint gain a true view of what 
nonsense state churches, people's churches and Christian lands are.56 
It is of course a precipitate act to lay to the apostles' charge the entire history of 
Christianity's decline, contending that the mass conversions of Pentecost and genesis of the 
56Cf. SV XIV 193-94 and 351 (Attack upon Christendom. 159-61 and 282-83), the fonner being a close 
rendition of the passage quoted above, and the latter being a defense of its scathing criticism of the apostles' 
modus operandi in disseminating Christianity. In similar fashion Pap Xe B 175 (JP 3:3213) charges the 
apostles with having been far too eager to aid Christianity's cause by gaining adherents (SK cites Paul's 
concession as regards marriage, an institution that Christ had strictly forbidden). Because of their deference 
to "numbers" the apostles alIowed themselves to be taken hostage by the mob, and in so doing alIowed 
Christianity to go out of the world almost before it had even come in. Pap XII A 482 (JP 3:3042) charges the 
apostles with having introduced an optimistic world view that was at odds with Christ's "absolute pessimism." 
Because they entertained the possibility of remaining in this evil world without being martyred, they fonned 
congregations. Pap Xe Al 0 (lP 4:3836) expresses the same sentimcnt concerning the apostles, asserting that 
Christianity's notion of voluntary martyrdom is so anti-social that it is necessarily prohibitive of association. 
Insofar as the apostles themselves constituted a society this cannot have been based upon the shared notion of 
the necessity of martyrdom; rather, "they were a society as regards the willingness to be sacrificed if it could 
not be otherwise, but in addition, a society to prevent the need of this, if possible." SK goes on to charge them 
with having banded together out of a continuing attachment to finitude. 
In still other entries that do not specifically single out the apostles as the culprits behind Christianity's 
defonnation qua church, the notion of the congregation is scorned and the possibility of association among 
Christians dismissed out of hand. Pap ~ A 226 (JP 4:4341) declares the concepts of society, church and 
congregation to be nondeducib1e from the concept, "spirit." In fact the church is said to exist "precisely because 
we are neither in truth, nor are pure spirit. 'Congregation' is an accommodation, an indulgence that pays regard 
to how little we are, or can endure being, spirit." So, too, entries such as Pap XII A 489 and Xe A 47 (JP 
3 :2732 and 1 :559) assert that Christianity is diametricalIy opposed to "propagation," having solely to do with 
the "intensive" (the individual). The "extensive" (churches) are, by contrast, destructive of this. Or continuing 
this spatial metaphor, in Pap Xe A 51-52 (lP 3:3099-3100) we read that God must have his abode in the 
phenomenon that is of the least possible compass--"the wretched, single, poor, forsaken individual"--and even 
this locus is, so to speak, too spacious for him; it must be negated in order to accommodate his presence. 
Consequently, he is all the less to be found in the "greater" phenomena (Le., churches) that men have construct-
ed. 
In alI of the above entries we catch a glimpse, not only of the late Kierkegaard's hostility to the NT 
teaching of the Church, but of his theory of Christianity's continuous decline beginning with the apostolic 
proclamation (the Pauline translation of Christianity "into man's interest"--an example ofthis--was discussed 
in the previous chapter). Other texts in which Kierkegaard enunciates this interpretation of Christian history 
include: Pap Xl A 415 (JP 2:1644), a relatively early (1849) statement of it; Pap ~ A 340 (JP 2:1901) which 
designates the history of the Church a history of peddling indulgences; Pap XII A 388 and 446 (JP 2:1647 and 
1648) and SV XIV 233 (Attack upon Christendom. 194-95) which define the history of Christianity as the 
process of the degradation of its idea and its eventual conversion into total nonsense. The sum of the matter is 
that "throughout Christianity's many centuries there is not to be found a single proclamation like Christ's" (Pap 
XI2 A 434, pp. 429-30 [JP 2:1940], translations mine). 
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church had their foundation, not in the exalted Lord's spiritual presence as the Scriptures 
affinn, but in the apostles' all too human impatience for "results." Yet this is what Kierke-
gaard does, and the only thing that can have prompted him to venture upon so dangerous a 
course was what he perceived to be a greater danger still: that the individual and imitation 
would go by the board if any quarter were given to community.57 Hansen concludes his 
piece with the observation that the seeds of Kierkegaard's final dismissal of community lay 
all the way back in his earliest conception of suffering: 
Here the consequences of denying the significance of the exalted Lord for this tem-
porality, and wanting to know and acknowledge Christ solely as the one who lived 
in suffering, become manifest in a remarkable way. For consistent with this, one falls 
into the isolation of one's suffering, one's sins, from which one cannot emerge by 
oneself. Only Christ as the exalted one is able properly to convey to the person 
fellowship with his neighbor; only he can make a member of the body out of the 
individual. This possibility: that a member of the body should come to be out of the 
individual, has not been seen, still less actualized, by Kierkegaard.58 
In my judgement Hansen has admirably made his case. The ultimate reason for 
Kierkegaard's rejection of Christian community is not didactic (the need for an "intensifi-
cation" to rouse the church from its lethargy). Nor is it historical-sociological (the 
observation that, once introduced into Christianity, the collective tends to supplant the 
individual, thus causing imitation to fall away). Yet neither is it simply personal-psychologi-
cal (to wit, SKIS melancholic predisposition to an "Easter eve" mentality). No, as befits a 
thinker there is an ideational component as well, viz., the necessary connection between 
temporal existence and suffering. While Kierkegaard's proclivity to this view may have its 
roots in his personal suffering, the idea itself comes to assume foundational importance for 
his thought. So powerful is it that it causes him publicly to discountenance the apostles' mis-
sionary methods and church planting activities. So powerful is it that it results in his 
condemnation of not only of the church, but of marriage and family as divinely ordained 
institutions. In addition, then, to the sundry factors that have been named as contributive to 
Kierkegaard's preoccupation with the cross and consequent failure to attend to redemption 
S7Again, Pap X4 A 369 (JP 2:1906). 
SS"Die Bedeutung des Leidens," 27. 
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as a present reality that confers a new dimension upon existence, there is an ideational factor 
that must be considered. It is none other than SK's metaphysically detennined view of exis-
tence in general, and Christian existence in particular, as suffering. 
TIlis means that Kierkegaard's "remaining standing" at the cross is no mere accident 
of his personality that just happens to color his thought. Neither is it simply a calculated 
"shock tactic." To be sure, for compelling personal and didactic reasons Kierkegaard has 
felt himself moved to accentuate the suffering Prototype's cross at the expense of the 
triumphant Redeemer's resurrection. These factors contribute to the theological outcome that 
the grace of which SK speaks must needs remain so deeply concealed beneath the cross that 
it can only with difficulty emerge. Were they the only factors at work in the later Kierke-
gaard's thought, then the charge of heterodoxy that Hansen levels at him would largely miss 
the point. But because there is coupled to SK's personal and practical concerns an ideational 
component that leads him flatly to reject church, family, and apostolic authority, Hansen's 
charge cannot be dismissed. A substantive redirection of dogma does occur in the later 
Kierkegaard, and it is to the underlying cause of that redirection that we now tum: Kierkeg-
aard's fundamentally gnostic anthropological premises. It is these that ultimately provide the 
explanation for the view that all existence is isolation and suffering; it is these that dictate 
that the believer's station must ever be beneath the cross; it is these that account for the 
absence of redemption's fruits in this life. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE ROMANTIC-IDEALIST ROOTS OF KIERKEGAARD'S 
EXISTENTIAL DIALECTIC 
Kierkegaard is ever regarded as a lonely voice crying out in the wilderness against 
nineteenth century humanity's pretensions to divinity. The suggestion that he himself might 
have been a child of his age, imbued with its heady intoxication, seems quite implausible. 
Yet this is precisely what the work of certain scholars--above all Wilhelm Anz--has shown. 
To be sure, Anz concedes that "Kierkegaard has seen through transcendental subjectivity's 
presumptuous phoniness. Our cognitive faculties do not possess the comprehensive horizon 
of the world Spirit within which the world--the 'other' of ourselves--is rich in content and 
like us." Nevertheless Anz observes that 
for Kierkegaard there is no other thought schema than that of absolute subjectivity. 
Here he moves in a completely naive manner in the intellectual climate of romantic-
idealist philosophy. What Hegel would attain by means of the transcendental 
subjectivity of Spirit--the identity of I and not-l--Kierkegaard expects of existing, 
absolute subjectivity, the self. Only now the not-I is restricted to the natural condi-
tions of empirical subjectivity.! 
IWilhelm Anz, "Fragen der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," Theologische Rundschau. Neue Folge., 20 
(1952):49. Cf. Anz, Kierkegaard undderdeutsche Idealismus (Tiibingen: 1. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1956), 
10: "Bei Kierkegaard [ist] im Grunde tiberaU der Bezug auf den Idealismus gegenwartig. Der deutsche 
Idealismus ist die GroBe, in Auseinandersetzung mit der Kierkegaard seine Kategorien gewonnen hat. Der 
Idealismus ist und bleibt die selbstversHindliche Atmosphare, innerhalb deren Kierkegaard denkt. Dennoch ist 
Kierkegaard--soweit ich ihn verstehe--von Anfang an kein idealistischer Denker gewesen. In der ihm so 
selbstverstandlichen geistigen Atmosphare des Idealismus zu bleiben, hindert ihn die MachI:, der er noch 
innerlicher verbunden ist: der christliche Glaube." Similarly, Steven Dunning writes: "I have come to the 
conclusion that Kierkegaard was quite unconscious of the extent to which he continued, even after breaking 
with Hegelianism, to think in tenns that pennit--and often seem to demand--a Hegelian structural analysis" 
(Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages [Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985],5). Dunning notes that many scholars have detected Hegelian elements in SK's thought 
Yet he observes: "Much less common ... is the argument that Kierkegaard remained an ambivalent disciple 
of Hegel despite his efforts to reject Hegelianism," and names Wilhelm Anz as the chief exponent ofthis view 
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The pervasive influence of idealism has far-reaching consequences for Kierkegaard's anthro-
pology, soteriology, and other Christian doctrines. While these consequences are present in 
latent fonn at the very beginning of the authorship, they do not become fully manifest until 
the end, at which time SK's idealist premises gain the upper hand over the restraining influ-
ence previously exercised by his Lutheran tenets. It is the intent of this chapter to 
demonstrate the indebtedness of SK's existential dialectic to Gennan idealism; to elucidate 
its consequences for a range of theological issues (most of which were treated in anticipatory 
fashion in the preceding chapter); and lastly to set the stage for the final account of Kierke-
gaard's teaching on grace that is to be given in the concluding chapter. 
Fundamental to the romantic and idealist philosophies of early nineteenth century 
Gennany was the Cartesian self-consciousness. In Descartes, the "subjective turn" of modern 
philosophy was decisively taken. Whereas from the time of Plato the world had provided the 
focal point of epistemology (its order being fixed and discernible by mind), by the time of 
Descartes autonomous human reason had assumed priority. The existence of the self and the 
world are mediated by subjectivity (Descartes' second and sixth Meditations). The laws 
governing the world, though metaphysically grounded in God's nature, are secondarily 
grounded in the innate ideas and a priori laws implanted by God in the thinking subject. 
Hence, while the Cartesian ego is not the creator of reality, it does reproduce it in its own 
experience. At every tum subjectivity is conceived as the crucial factor that not only medi-
ates, but in some sense produces, experience. 
The Cartesian point of departure in subjectivity or consciousness and its attendant 
dichotomization of the world into subject and object are the legacy to all who follow. This 
dichotomization that Descartes bequeaths to his successors is again and again overcome by 
the productive function that is accorded to subjectivity. While Locke, for example, rejects 
Descartes' notion of innate ideas, he nevertheless retains his representative theory of percep-
tion: ideas and impressions are immediately cognized, not the things themselves. And like 
Descartes, Locke finds that certain "secondary qualities" are productions of the observer's 
mind that do not inhere in the objects themselves. This productive activity of consciousness 
(p. 258, n. 15). 
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is, in turn, expanded by Berkeley to embrace "primary" as well as "secondary" qualities. 
Objects have no existence independent of perception. There are no material substances 
possessed of properties, for such are the property of the soul. Accordingly, the external 
world is a production that exists only in the mind of the perceiver (and God). Burne, of 
course, takes this skepticism as regards substance or being a step further, denying that 
soulish substance is anything but a fabrication wrought by customary associations of 
thought. In Burne's phenomenalism we are deprived of anything but the contents of con-
sciousness. And while Immanuel Kant will not indulge in skepticism as to the existence of 
the transcendental ego behind subjectivity, he is constrained to admit that this being behind 
thought is inaccessible to perception. Demonstrating instead its a priori necessity, he goes 
on to develop a full-blown account of the constructive activity of its faculties of intuition and 
understanding. And once again, the phenomena that result therefrom are the products of 
consciousness, not the actual things-in-themselves. 
Yet none of the above solutions to the Cartesian dichotomy of subject and object, 
thought and being, proved satisfying. Behind the constructed "phenomenon" there remained 
(except in Burne's epistemology) an occult "noumenon" that was inaccessible to thought, 
unless as a postulate. Moreover, Kant's postulation of such an entity seemed to violate his 
own tenet about the inapplicability of the categories of the understanding to what lies beyond 
possible experience. Consequently the idealists rejected the postulate as invalid and instead 
regarded reality as the product of thought alone. In so doing they made the tum from the 
merely constructive activity of thought to its creative activity, in effect transforming Kant's 
critical philosophy into a thoroughgoing idealism. Because the individual finite ego could 
not ascribe to itself this creative function, it had to be referred to a supra-individual, absolute 
ego. The entire order of being was accordingly regarded as a production of transcendental 
subjectivity writ large. Bow had the idealist philosopher arrived at this metaphysical 
standpoint? Answer: by strict application of the Kantian conception of philosophy. 
For Kant the metaphysics of the future is a transcendental critique of human 
experience and knowledge .... [I]t is the human mind's reflective awareness of its 
own spontaneous formative activity. In metaphysical idealism. however, the 
activity in question is productive in the fullest sense ... and this activity is attributed, 
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not to the finite human mind as such, but to absolute thought or reason .... That is 
to say the Kantian theory of knowledge is inflated into a metaphysics of reality.2 
Frederick Copleston notes that the transformation of Kant's epistemology into a full-
blown metaphysic entailed changes of great moment. One such change was the conferral of 
objective reality upon abstract notions of logic. Another was the ascription of objective 
status to the principle of teleology: 
If with the elimination of the thing-in-itself the world becomes the self-manifestation 
of thought or reason, the Kantian distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori 
loses its absolute character. And the categories, instead of being subjective forms or 
conceptual moulds of the human understanding, become categories of reality; they 
regain an objective status. Again, the teleological judgment is no longer subjective, 
as with Kant. For in metaphysical idealism the idea of purposiveness in Nature 
cannot be simply a heuristic or regulative principle of the human mind, a principle 
which performs a useful function but the objectivity of which cannot be theoretically 
proved. If Nature is the expression and manifestation of thought or reason in its 
movement towards a goal, the process of Nature must be teleological in character.3 
Now, the purpose that is present in nature is discernible to the idealist philosopher 
since he, too, is a production of transcendental subjectivity and, as such, a participant in its 
unfolding teleology. What is remarkable, however, is that infinite subjectivity attains to the 
awareness of its own teleology through the finite mind of the human observer. This is again 
a consequence of the strict application of the Kantian conception of philosophy: 
Though it is a paradoxical statement, ... the closer idealism kept to Kant's idea of 
the only possible form of scientific metaphysics, the greater was its confidence in the 
power and scope of philosophy. For if we assume that philosophy is thought's 
reflective awareness of its own spontaneous activity, and if we substitute a context 
of idealist metaphysics for the context of Kant's theory of human knowledge and 
experience, we then have the idea ofthe rational process, which is reality, becoming 
aware of itself in and through man's philosophical reflection.4 
2Frederick Copleston, Modem Philosophy: Fichte to Hegel. vol. 7, pt. 1 of A Histo!.)' of Philosophy (New 
York: Image Books, 1965), 21-22, emphasis added. 
3Ibid., 22. As regards a priori categories and relations, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all employ a logical 
apparatus whose elements are vested with ontological--not merely noological--significance. In particular, the 
empirical relation of cause and effect is assimilated to the logical one of antecedent and consequent (ibid., 23-
24). This gives rise to the systematic, deductive character of their thought. Hegel takes this to its extreme in 
the deVelopment of his logic. 
4Ibid., 25. 
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Such are the broad lines of the idealist completion of modem philosophy's 
"subjective tum." This tum received penultimate form in the critical philosophy of Kant; 
Fichte was the first of Kant's successors to undertake its further development. His relation-
ship to Kant is particularly close inasmuch as he seeks to uphold the primacy of practical 
reason and is convinced that a consistent idealism is the only means of doing so (the ego 
acting freely, rather than being acted upon by things-in-themselves). Fichte's point of depar-
ture is, accordingly, the transcendental ego that Kant had posited as the condition for the 
unity of experience in the first Critique. In agreement with Kant, Fichte denies that we 
possess an intellectual intuition of an entity behind consciousness. Nonetheless he contends 
that we do intuit an activity within consciousness and that Kant's transcendental ego is just 
such pure activity or doing. As the ground of consciousness the transcendental ego is not 
itself conscious; it can only come to exist for itself "by an activity directed at an activity,"s 
viz., the aforementioned intuition. Thus does it "posit itself' in an original, absolute way.6 
Such self-positing presupposes consciousness, which in tum assumes the subject-object rela-
tion. Consequently, in order to posit itself pure ego must first posit non-ego. Expressed 
somewhat differently, the unlimited activity that constitutes absolute ego must limit itself 
by positing "a divisible ego as over against a divisible non-ego."? From this arises a 
multiplicity of finite egos and non-egos that mutually limit and qualify each other. 
Fichte's theoretical and practical deductions of consciousness detail the emergence 
of this reciprocal limiting activity. The theoretical deduction attempts to explain the finite 
ego's consciousness of limitation from without (i.e., its sense of being acted upon, and hence 
unfree). Because such limitation cannot ultimately derive from non-egos (the thing-in-itself 
having been eliminated) it must stem from the productive power of imagination that is 
operative at the infra-conscious level of pure ego. It is this which generates "non-ego" in the 
first place, as well as the forms of intuition (space and time) wherein a field of distinct egos 
SJohann Gottlieb Fichte, Fichtes Werke. ed. Immanuel Hennann Fichte, II vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1971),1:459. 
~bid., 1:98. 
7Ibid., 1: 11 O. 
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and non-egos can arise. The powers of understanding and judgement in tum establish the 
concepts and universal judgements by which objects can come to exist for consciousness. 
Lastly, the power of reason enables the finite ego to exist for itself qua subject. By such self-
reflection the infinite ego itself begins to achieve self-transparency.8 
The practical deduction of consciousness, on the other hand, attempts to explain the 
finite ego's consciousness of itself as free and acting upon non-egos. It, too, proceeds from 
the intuition of pure ego as unlimited activity, in particular, qualifying it as an infinite striv-
ing. Copleston observes that this conception of the ego's activity 
implies overcoming, and overcoming requires an obstacle to overcome. Hence the 
ego must posit the non-ego, Nature, as an obstacle to be overcome, as a check to be 
transcended. In other words, Nature is a necessary means or instrument to the moral 
self-realization of the ego. It is a field for action. Fichte does not, however, proceed 
directly from the idea of the ego as striving to the positing of the non-ego. He argues 
first that striving takes the determinate form of infra-conscious impulse or drive 
(Trieb).9 
This conception of the transcendental ego as a bare "force" or "drive" is consistent with 
Fichte's original characterization of it as unlimited activity. Nevertheless the moral 
overtones that are so apparent in the further determination, "infinite striving," are latent at 
this initial stage, for this force "exists 'for the ego' in the form of feeling" and "the feeling 
of force and the feeling of hindrance go together.,,10 That is to say, non-ego is already 
present to ego at the rudimentary stage of feeling, present in such a way that it is experienced 
as a constraint that is to be overcome. From this derives the primacy of the practical deduc-
tion of consciousness over the theoretical one: 
It is clear enough that for [Fichte] the ego is from the start the morally active ego. 
That is to say, it is potentially this. And it is the actualization of the ego's potential 
nature which demands the positing of the non-ego and the whole work of the 
productive imagination. Behind, as it were, the theoretical activity of the ego lies its 
nature as striving, as impulse or drive .... Thus the two deductions are complemen-
tary, though the theoretical deduction finds its ultimate explanation in the practical. 
8Copleston, Modern Philosophy; Fichte to Hegel. 72-75. 
9Ibid., 75. 
I~bid., 75-76. 
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In this sense Fichte endeavours to satisfy in his own way the demands of Kant's 
doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason. I I 
The upshot of the practical deduction of consciousness, is the moral determination 
of the ego as infinite striving. "The essential nature of the ego," Fichte writes, "consists in 
a tendency to self-activity for the sake of self-activity.,,12 If this be its nature, the ego must 
be free, or conversely, subject to the law of self-determination. From this convergence of 
freedom and duty derives the fundamental principle of morality: "The free being ought to 
bring its freedom under a law, namely the law of complete self-determination or absolute 
independence.,,13 This definition of duty is purely formal; yet by the operation of the 
productive imagination it takes on material content, the world presenting itself as the "instru-
ment for the fulfilment of our duty, sensible things appearing as so many occasions for speci-
fying the pure ought. ,,14 Hence it is through the positing of the world and the moral voca-
tions of finite egos that the infinite Will comes to realize its nature as infinite striving. The 
only proviso to be added is that this infinite striving "is unable to rest in any particular satis-
faction or group of satisfactions .... [The] goal always recedes. Indeed, it must do so, if the 
ego is infinite or endless striving."ls 
The early Schelling, and Hegel after him, adopt Fichte's notion of a transcendental 
Ego that posits alien realities as part of its self-positing activity and quest for self-transparen-
cy. They also adopt his view that such self-transparency occurs in and through the human 
spirit (in particular, through the transcendental philosopher). Given this basic outlook, "it 
would be natural [for Fichte] to conceive the infinite Life as expressing itself immediately 
in objective Nature as a necessary condition for the life of the human spirit. In other words, 
IIIbid.,77. 
12Fichtes Werke, 4:29. 
I3Copleston, Modem Philosophy: Fichte to Hegel, 87 (citing Fichtes Werke, 4:59). 
14Copleston, Modem Philosophy: Fichte to Hegel, 88. 
lsu,id., 76. 
260 
it would be natural to proceed in the direction of Hegel's absolute idealism. ,,16 Fichte 
declines to take this step, steadfastly asserting that the world has reality only for conscious-
ness (even as, for Kant, the phenomenal world exists only in and for consciousness). This 
Schelling denies. Yet his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) regards the philosophy 
of nature not as a denial of transcendental idealism, but a complement to it.17 One may 
begin with nature and show how it develops into self-comprehending Ego, or one may begin 
with Ego and show how it comes to represent itself in nature. Either approach presupposes 
the Absolute, that identity of Subject and Object that differentiates itself into objective 
Subject-Object and subjective Subject-Object. These ostensibly distinct activities are in 
reality identical since each represents the activity of the distinctionless Absolute, considered 
under different aspects. Consequently, though the progression is from nature to spirit, or 
increasing consciousness, no priority can be assigned to the philosophy of nature or transcen-
dental philosophy.18 
In addition to the correlation that is drawn between the history of consciousness on 
the one hand, and the philosophy of nature on the other, Schelling's transcendental idealism 
differs significantly from Fichte's in another respect--one that is likewise rooted in the 
conception of Ego as Subject-Object. This difference is reflected in the architectonic of the 
System of Transcendental Idealism. The work begins by following the pattern established 
16Copleston, Modem Philosophy: Fichte to Hegel. 116. 
17 A word on the tenn "transcendental idealism" is in order since it can mean different things depending on 
which transcendental philosopher one has in mind. In the case of Kant the designation refers to the imposition 
of fonns and categories upon the contents of experience, and the imposition of unity upon this ordered manifold 
by the "I" of apperception. While the idealists after Kant ascribe powers to subjectivity of which he had not 
dreamt, their point of departure remains the "pure I" concealed behind consciousness, and productive of it. In 
this sense they are all transcendental idealists. 
ISSee Walter Schulz's introduction to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, System des transzendentalen 
Idealismus. ed. Horst D. Brandt and Peter MUller, Philosophische Bibliothek, Band 448 (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner Verlag, 1992), xxiii-xxv. Schulz summarizes the thrust of this work as follows: "Das Allumfassende 
entwickelt sich als objektives Subjekt-Objekt, d. h. als Natur, biszum Geist, dem subjektiven Subjekt-Objekt, 
so daB dieser nun die Natur in sich selbst zu konstruieren vennag. Schelling hat in der Zeit des 'IdentiUits-
systems', also in den Jahren von 1801 bis 1806, diesen Ansatz naher ausgefilhrt, und zwar unter der 
Fragestellung, wie das Absolute sich zu dieser Bewegung verhalte, und das Ergebnis dieser Besinnung ist die 
Einsicht, daB das Absolute an ihm selbst as 'Identitiit' oder 'InditTerenz' von Subjektivem und Objektivem Uber 
jede Entwicklung erhaben ist" (p. xxv). 
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by Fichte--a theoretical deduction of consciousness followed by a practical one, with 
primacy being assigned to the latter.19 Yet the primacy enjoyed by practical consciousness 
cannot be ultimate, for the goal of transcendental idealism is the Ego's grasp of itself as 
absolute Identity. Therefore Schelling's idealist interpretation of practical philosophy is 
followed by treatments of teleology and artistic production. The Ego objectifies itself in 
nature and the work of art. Yet because the latter production bears the impress of both 
freedom and necessity, it yields the most complete impression of the Ego, one transcending 
the distinctions, conscious/unconscious, free/determined. Hence the goal of transcendental 
idealism has been reached. The intellectual intuition with which it began (the transcendental 
apperception of Ego as self-positing activity, Subject productive of itself as Object) has led 
it through the stages of Ego's self-objectification to the point where the initially contentless 
intellectual intuition has been fleshed out in an aesthetic intuition. Both forms of intuition 
deliver to us the Ego as absolute Identity: 
"But how is this absolutely non-objective entity to be evoked before consciousness 
and understood--which is necessary if it is the condition of understanding of all 
philosophy?" The answer that Schelling gives is: this absolutely Identical can be 
grasped in intellectual intuition, yet it is not objective in this immediate vision. The 
unity is rendered objective, first and only, in the work of art. Hence--so Schelling 
continues--the aesthetic intuition is the intellectual intuition become objective, and 
art is "at once the only uue and eternal organon and document of philosophy .... 
Precisely for this reason is art the highest thing to the philosopher, for it opens up to 
him the Holy of Holies, as it were, where in eternal and primordial union there bums 
in one flame, as it were, that which is separate in nature and history, and must 
eternally shun itself in life and action, just as in thought.,,20 
19Like Fichte, Schelling regards the Ego ac; "activity directed toward pure self-detennination," i.e., self-
actualizing will that becomes conscious of itself as such through a demand (see Schellings Werke. MUnchner 
Jubilaumsdruck, edt Manfred Schroter, 6 vols. and 6 supp. vols. [Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuch-
handlung, 1927-28 and 1954-59],2:573-74). Hence he contrasts the Ego's initial theoretical determination qua 
nature or "slumbering Spirit" with its subsequent, practical detennination qua self-determining activity, or 
conscious Spirit. He regards the unfolding of this practical determination as a process of creation of "second 
nature." Though the Absolute is pure identity, its unfolding in history is an endless striving toward the 
establishment of a perfect moral order. Herein one sees a parallel to Fichte. Then too, as with Fichte, the 
spiritual reality guiding this historical process ("Providence") ishidden, concealed under--and at the same time 
manifest in--increasingly rationalized fonns of political society. 
2°Schulz, introduction to System des transzendentalen Idealismus. xliv (quoting from Schellings Werke. 
2:627-28). 
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Hegel further elaborates this general approach in his absolute idealism--even as 
Schelling is having second thoughts about it. By the latter's report, Hegel takes credit for 
ideas that he, Schelling, had been the first to discover.21 The most crucial of these is that 
the Ego is both Subject and Object--a fundamental contradiction that works itself out in a 
process that is "completely immanent, in which the Ego [is] occupied only with itself, with 
its own contradiction, posited within itself, simultaneously to be Subject and Object, finite 
and infinite.,,22 This contradiction provides the impetus for the dialectical development of 
Spirit--the "Zu-sich-kommen des Ich"--that occurs in two stages: a "transcendental past" 
prior to the emergence of consciousness, and a "transcendental history" after it.23 The 
specific epochs within these stages are a function of the limits imposed by the Ego upon 
itself at a given time. The late Schelling contends that this method "was peculiar to me, 
indeed, so natural that I almost cannot pride myself on it as an invention, but precisely 
therefore can I least of all let myself be robbed of it, or permit another person to pride 
himself on having invented it.,,24 With this assessment Walter Schulz agrees: 
Schelling considered the conception of a dialectical development of Spirit as his, not 
Hegel's, contribution, and when one surveys Schelling's early history, one will have 
to admit that he is right, since already in the Abhandlun2en zur Erlauterun2 des 
Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre [1796-97] Schelling had placed the idea of a 
"history of self-consciousness" at the center, in order then to extend it in the 
philosophy of nature to the idea of an objective development from the unconscious 
to the conscious.2s 
21What follows is to be found in Schelling's Vorlesungen zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie from 1827 
(Schellings Werke. 5:71-270). Schulz discusses the text in his introduction to the System des transzendentalen 
Idealismus. pp. xxvi-xxviii. 
22Schellings Werke. 5:167. The System of Transcendental Idealism also describes the fundamental 
contradiction that grounds the Ego in terms of a conflict between two activities--one infinitely self-producing 
("centrifugal") and the other self-limiting ("centripetal"). Cf. Kierkegaard, SV XI 143 (Sickness unto Death. 
29-30). 
23Schellings Werke. 5: 163-64. 
2"Ibid., 5: 166. 
25Introduction to System des transzendentalen Idealismus. xxviii. 
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Certainly, significant differences do distinguish Hegel's absolute idealism from 
Schelling's philosophy of identity. The truly salient one consists in Hegel's elevation of the 
Ego from its quasi-mystical abyss of unknowability in Schelling's philosophy to the stature 
of an entity fully transparent to Reason: der Be~ff.26 Hegel's Absolute is not "pure identi-
ty" or "simply indifference." Rather it is identity in difference. What is taken up into a higher 
unity is retained, not abrogated. Accordingly, the dialectical development of the Notion is 
a process of attainment to ever greater conceptual specificity. Hegel's is a patently 
rationalized fonn of idealism. Whereas Fichte began and ended with a practical conception 
of the Ego (viz., its self-realization in action), and whereas Schelling made but a tentative 
foray into the theoretical (its self-representation in art) only to lose his way in indetenninacy, 
Hegel plants his feet finnly in the theoretical sphere, supplanting mere representation with 
full-blown ratiocination. The Absolute is "self-thinking Thought" that has its point of 
departure in the Notion and comes to ever fuller manifestation in Nature and Spirit. Because 
the Absolute is theoretical--indeed logical--in character, it is "essentially a result.,,27 The 
enonnous divergence of idealism's ending from its beginning thus announces itself. One key 
element of that divergence is the loss of the ethical, a "result" for which Kierkegaard and the 
later Schelling alike roundly condemn Hege1.28 Another is the complete elimination of 
transcendence from the idea of God.29 
2~n the Preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel roundlycritici7..es Schelling's view of the Absolute. 
To maintain that the Absolute is the annulment of all difference is effectively to consign it to "the abyss of 
vacuity," passing it off as "the night in which, as they say, all cows are black" (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
Siimmtliche Werke. Jubitaumsausgabe. ed. Hermann G. Glockner, 26 vols. [Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927-40], 
2:21 and 22). 
27Ibid., 2:24. This occasions the later Schelling's charge that Hegel's philosophy amounts to a Logifizierung 
des Dogmatischen and a Dogmatisierung des Logischen (see Michael Theunissen, "Die Dialektik der 
Offenbarung. Zur Auseinandersetzung Schellings und Kierkegaards mit der Religionsphilosophie Hegels," 
Philosophisches Jahrbuch 72 [1964]:150, citing ScheUings Werke. vol. 6 supp.: 82). 
2'1beunissen, "Die Dialektik der Offenbarung," 143. 
2~is, too, becomes a focus of critique for Kierkegaard and the later Schelling. In his system of identity 
Schelling already expresses high regard for the Absolute's transcendence. After exchanging it for his positive 
philosophy he insists all the more on the essential hidden ness of God, typically speaking of God's "reserve" and 
"retirement," even in the act of revelation. (In part this has to do with the later Schelling's conviction that it is 
man, not God, who has been subject to a fall that has concealed God; it is therefore man who needs God in 
order to achieve self-understanding, not vice versa. And in part it has to do with the transcendence that has, in 
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In shifting consideration from the idealists to Kierkegaard, it must be noted that, 
whatever the similarities, SK does not ascribe to human sUbjectivity the grandiose power of 
positing itself and its world in an original way.30 Nonetheless, he does ascribe to it a great 
many features reminiscent of transcendental subjectivity. One may take as an example the 
Socratic paradox that subjectivity is truth. This paradox has to do with ethico-religious truth 
and is a corollary of its peculiar nature. Because ethico-religious truth makes a claim upon 
our very being, the condition of being in the truth entails more than mere cognition--it 
involves actualization or appropriation of the life-possibility that is set before us. Hence 
there is a sense in which we become the producers of truth and reality, for the demand that 
is ever put to us by ethico-reIigious truth is that we introduce it into existence, making it our 
truth, our reality. SK appeals to Socrates as the originator of this epistemology insofar as 
Socrates understood that the truth of personal immortality was tantamount to the demand 
that it be lived out and appropriated here, in existence, where the flux of becoming renders 
even so certain a thing as eternity eminently uncertain. Acknowledging the claim that 
immortality had upon his life, Socrates allowed it to transform his inner being into an 
incessant, passionate striving that was itselftruth.31 He deliberately refused to avail himself 
of the theoretical possibility that was his--viz., that of inferring immortality from the doctrine 
of recollection. Consequently Socrates became the father of a new way of knowing and a 
some measure, been characteristic of his thought all along, but particularly so ashe approaches Christianity--see 
Theunissen, "Die Dialektik der Offenbarung," 144-48.) By contrast, for Hegel God is the very opposite of 
conceptual unknowability: he just is self-manifestation. This means that nothing of his nature can, at least in 
principle, be withheld from the philosopher's knowing gaze. Theunissen writes: "Das dem Denken Offenbare 
... mu!3 ein vollkommcn Offen bares sein. Ware noch etwas Dunkles an ihm, so lieBe es sich nicht wirklich 
denken. So kann auch die Offenbarung Gottes nur eine totale sein. 'Gott ist schlechthin offenbar', es ist dank 
seiner Offenbarung 'nichts Verborgenes', 'nichts Geheimes mehr an Gott' (p. 137). 
30SV XI 128 (Sickness unto Death. 13) and SV II 242 (Either/Or II, 270). SK's conception of the self as a 
"derived relation" echoes Schelling's notion of "derived absoluteness." 
310ne notes a debt to Fichte, for whom infinite striving is the ground of truth--inchoate truth, as it were. 
Fichte's influence is particularly evident in SV VII 72-73 (Postscript. 91-93), where it is asserted that the 
Socratic thinker "is continually striving ... striving infinitely." It cannot be otherwise since existence itself "is 
a striving ... directed toward the infinite, is a process of infinitizing, which is the highest pathos." Yet 
Kierkegaard modifies this Fichtean conception along Christian lines when he denies that it is "a continued and 
perpetually continued striving toward a goal without reaching it." 
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new kind of truth: knowing achieved by an inward turn, and inner truth produced by self-
activity. 
Notwithstanding the difference that separates the ways of theoretical speculation and 
existential praxis, Wilhelm Anz points up the far greater similarity that unites the two. He 
notes that Kierkegaard has completely reinterpreted Plato's Socrates, setting him within the 
modem philosophical context. For Plato it is the KOOI'OC; that gives meaning and criteria 
for our moral activity. Because the KOO'JlOC; is present to vouC; (the faculty of intellectual 
intuition), human beings are able to apprehend the nature of things. Truth resides in "the 
perceptibility and ... the presence of the An-sich-Seienden. ,,32 Because man is able to dis-
cern the eternal order of the KOO'JlOC;, he is able to imitate it in his conduct, and in so doing 
attain to what is right and true.33 By contrast, for Kierkegaard truth resides in "the trans-
parency of the self that is responsible for its behavior. ,,34 It is seif-awareness that mediates 
truth, subjectivity that brings forth its own true reality.3S 
The debt to the Cartesian self-consciousness is evident, and the proximity to the 
idealist thinkers--in particular, the ethical idealist, Fichte--is close indeed. Yet the character-
ization of truth as subjectively produced applies to them all: 
There is no fixed, lasting truth. There is no An-sich-Sein (the eternally true, just, 
etc.). The true is now no longer simply to be found, to be brought forth from its 
concealment to manifestation, rather, it is first to be produced by us. It is therefore 
our creation. However we conceive of it--whether as scientific knowledge, as 
objective Spirit, or as our self-understanding: ever does the truth originate from our 
rational or comprehending freedom and is therefore subjected to a constant change . 
. . . For [Hegel and Kierkegaard] it is a foregone conclusion that there is truth only 
n"Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard. Uberdie Bedeutung der Existenzdialektik fUrdie Theologie," 
Zeitschrift fUr Theologie und Kirche 51 (1954):86. 
33Anz, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus. 70-71. 
34Anz, "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," 85. 
3SSV VII 207 (Postscript 242): "Truth is the self-activity of appropriation." SV IV 404-5 (Concept of 
Anxiety, 138): "Truth is the work of freedom, and in such a way that freedom constantly brings forth truth." 
And again: "What I am speaking about is very plain and simple, namely, that truth is for the particular 
individual only as he himself produces it in action." 
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through human beings, that man, his freedom and his reason, is the one reality that 
is accessible to us and that we therefore have to proceed from it in our knowing.36 
36 Anz, Kierkegaard undderdeutsche Idealismus, 71. Friedrich Hauschildt, following Emanuel Hirsch, more 
aptly refers SK's idea of the self-production of truth to Fichte: "Kierkegaard flihrt Zllstimmend den 'Hauptsatz 
der Philosophie Joh. Gottlieb Fichtes' an, daB die Freiheit 'fort und fort die Wahrheit erzeugt'" (Die Ethik Sm-en 
Kierkegaards [Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshus Gerd Mohn, 19821, 78). The parallels between Kierkegaard 
and idealism--to be developed throughout this chapter--include themes common to all three idealists. 
Nevertheless, the manner in which SKemploys them seems most reminiscent ofFichte--so much so that Hirsch 
can contend that SK reinterprets Fichte romantically, ascribing to the individual what Fichte attributes to the 
transcendental ego (Kierkegaard-Studien, Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Erste Studie [Vadus-Liechtenstein: Topos 
Verlag, 19781,29-30 [475-76 in continuous pagination]). Hirsch points out that Kierkegaard has encountered 
Hchte prior to the other idealists (p. 25 [471]), mentioning him as early as September 29, 1834 (Pap I A22 [JP 
3:3545]), March 16,1835 (Pap I C 50 [JP 2:1186]) and July 29,1835 (Pap I A 68 [JP 5:5099]). Both of the 
latter citations reveal acquaintance with Die Bestimmung des Menschen, and Hirsch makes much of the impact 
that this work has had upon the young Kierkegaard. That impact is quite evident from the several allusions that 
one finds to it in the notable "Gilleleje entry" of August I, 1835 (Pap I A 75 [IP 5:5100]). One is struck by that 
entry's ethical fervor: "What I am really lacking is honestly to come to terms with myself concerning what I 
am to do, not what I am to know, except insofar as a knowing must precede every acting. It is a matter of 
understanding my vocation [Bestemmelsel, seeing what the divinity actually wills that I shall do; the essential 
thing is to find a truth that is true for me, to find that idea for which I will live and die. And what would it 
profit me if I devised a so-called objective truth, if I worked my way through the philosophers' systems ... if 
it did not have any deeper significance for me and for my life" (translation mine). One finds similar motifs, 
even similar sounding phrases, in Die Bestimmung des Menschen. For example: "Es giebt nur Einen Punct, 
auf welchen ich unabliissig alles mein Nachdenken zu richten habe: was ich thun solIe, und wie ich dieses 
Gebotene am zweckmassigsten ausfiihren konne. Aufmein Thun mussalles mein Denken sich beziehen, muss 
sich als, wenn auch entferntes, Mittel fUr diesen Zweck betrachten lassen; ausserdem ist es ein leeres 
zweckloses Spiel, ist es Kraft- und Zeitverschwendung und Verbildung eines edlen Vermogens, das mir zu 
einerganzanderen Absicht gegeben ist" (Fichtes Werke. 2:257-58 [The Vocation of Man, trans. William Smith 
(La Salle, IL.: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1955), 104]). The likeness of ethical temper, even of 
specific turn of phrase, can hardly be an accident: "Es ist klar, [Kierkegaard1 hat Fichtes Lehre von der 
ichhaften, allein im tathaften Gehorsam zu greifenden Wahrheit ergriffen" (Hirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien. 
Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Erste Studie, 29 [475]). 
As striking as the correspondence between this passage and the Gilleleje entry is, many other equally 
striking correspondences exist. We have elsewhere noted the parallels that obtain between Kierkegaard's and 
Fichte's ethical theories (chap. 4, n. 8), and their respective depictions of faith as a sui generis element of 
knowing (chap. 3, n. 27). We shall have occac;ion to point out still other correspondences during the course of 
this chapter. For the time being, however, we confine ourselves to the issue of truth, and to the observation 
that Kierkegaard seems to owe two of his central tenets concerning it to Fichte--first, that it is a product of 
SUbjectivity, and second, that how one relates to what one knows is infinitely more important than what one 
knows. The reader is referred to Fichtes Werke, 2:257 and 2:254 (The Vocation of Man, 104 and 100). And 
lastly, one other observation is in order: viz., that the correspondences between Kierkegaard and Fichte are 
perhaps all traceable to SK's early perusal of this single, slim volume. Hirsch writes: "Man hat sich oft 
gewundert iiberdie innere Verwandtschaft Kierkegaards und Fichtes, die durch allen Gegensatz immer wieder 
durchbricht in Kierkegaards Denken und Geschichte: noch im ietzten Streit erinnert seine ethische Herbigkeit 
an Fichtes leidenschaftliche Unerbittlichkeit mehr als an die sokratische Ironie. Man hat diese Beriihrung urn 
so seltsamer gefunden, als Kierkegaard aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach von Fichte aul3er der "Bestimmung des 
Menschen" keine Zeile gelesen hat" (Kierkegaard-Studien, Zweiter Band, Drittes Heft, Erste Studie, 30 [476]). 
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The critical role played by human consciousness in producing one's world, and 
thereby grounding one's knowledge of it, is the common property of Kierkegaard and the 
idealists as modem thinkers. Yet it is not so much the awareness that the world, truth, etc. 
are mediated or in some sense produced by subjectivity that constitutes their commonality; 
rather, it is the absoluteness, the sovereignty that they all unabashedly ascribe to subjec-
tivity on the basis of that awareness. All draw the conclusion that ultimately is to be drawn 
from modem philosophy's "subjective tum," viz., that SUbjectivity is the ontological prius 
of everything else, it is the quantity that merits philosophy's undivided attention. 
Modem self-consciousness's demand that we accept only that truth which is 
self-developed, that reality which is self-posited, is just as alive in the existential 
dialectic as in Hegel's speculative idealism .... Both [Kierkegaard and Hegel] are 
able to make their most basic experience understandable only within the horizon of, 
and by means of, the Cartesian self-consciousness. There is truth only in and through 
human self-consciousness; "being" is only mediated through consciousness. Even the 
infinite life of the world Spirit is tied to its being experienced in and through man, 
to its being expressly posited through his thinking and doing. Without subjectivity 
as the sphere of its truth and its actualization, the Absolute would not be Spirit, i.e., 
power that wills and comprehends itself. All "being" manifests and reveals itself in 
man, and something corresponding to this applies to Kierkegaard's existing person 
or existential spirit as well: that, alone, is true which has entered into the understand-
ing and decision of the person, becoming a moment of his self-understanding. 
"Being" is tied to the understanding and deciding person. 
Quite certainly there remains, within these same basic categories, the contrast 
between Kierkegaard and Hegel: the metaphysical presupposition that bears Hegel's 
speculative dialectic is the infinite life of the world Spirit that brings forth all reality 
but first becomes self-comprehending subjectivity in man. The dialectic of existence, 
on the other hand, is devised in order to preserve the independence of the person 
before God in the midst of this infinite life. Yet Kierkegaard does not shy away from 
ascribing to the existing spirit a comparable metaphysical power that formally 
(naturally, not materially) corresponds to the power that Hegel had ascribed to the 
world Spirit. The existing spirit has the power to create its own reality. It is eternal 
or infinite insofar as it is capable of power over itself and insofar as it also actually 
exercises it. But when being, truth, and meaning are tied to the existing person, then 
man has a truly metaphysical significance. And such is, indeed, also the case. Not 
in the scientific Enlightenment, not in cultivated humanity, not even in specula-
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tive idealism, but first in the existential dialectic has rational self-conscious-
ness's tendency to absoluteness and sovereignty reached its extreme.37 
The absolute sovereignty of subjectivity is also at work in romanticism's creative 
genius who, in Gefiihl, discovers and actively gives birth to the infinity of the inner life. In 
this regard the romantic is no different than the idealist.38 By means of the imagination 
subjectivity heightens and idealizes mundane experience, and in the process discovers that 
37Anz, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus. 73-74. Emphasis added. Cf. the following text of 
Kierkegaard's that designates finite subjectivity the absolute, referring the power of positing itself to it: "I 
myself am the absolute; I posit the absolute, and I myself am the absolute. But in other words with exactly the 
same meaning I may say: I choose the absolute that chooses me; I posit the absolute that posits me--for if! do 
not keep in mind that this second expression is just as absolute, then my category of choosing is untrue, because 
it is precisely the identity of both. What I choose, I do not posit, for if it were not posited I could not choose 
it, and yet if I did not posit it by choosing it, then I would not choose it. It is, for if it were not I could not 
choose it; it is not, for it first comes into existence through my choosing it, and otherwise my choice would be 
an illusion. But what is it, then, that I choose? ... I choose the absolute, and what is the absolute? It is myself 
in my eternal validity" (SVII 191-92 [EitherlOr 11,213-14]). The "absolute selP' of which Judge William here 
speaks is the concrete historical self, but with the added qualification: that it is free (pp. 192-93 [214-15]). "It 
is the total aesthetic self that is chosen ethically." The one who chooses himself in this manner "remains 
himself, exactly the same that he was before, down to the most insignificant feature, and yet he becomes 
another, for the choice penetrates everything and changes it. Thus his finite personality is made infinite in the 
choice in which he infinitely chooses himselP' (pp. 199-200 [222-23]). 
While the term, "the absolute," is reminiscent of Schelling or Hegel, Kierkegaard's use of it is closer 
to Fichte: Judge William is working with a model of the self as unqualified freedom whose task is the ethical 
one of bringing itself completely under the law of self-determination, converting everything that belongs to its 
facticity ("non-ego," as it were) into its own act and thereby producing itself. One's natural capabilities are 
part of that facticity. So, too, is the social matrix into which one is born (one's family, nation, and the specific 
moral vocations attaching thereto). On Judge William's ethic, all of these provide the instrument for the selPs 
fulfillment of duty qua absolute self--they are the occasions for further specification of unqualified freedom's 
"pure ought." Exactly the same applies for Fichte. He, too, has the individual produce by an act of freedom 
what has already been given by nature (though nature is already--unbeknown to the finite ego--his own 
production insofar as he is a manifestation of infinite Ego): "Die Urquelle alles meines tibrigen Denkens und 
meines Lebens, dasjenige, aus dem alles, was in mir, und fOr mich und durch mich seyn kann, herfliesst, der 
innerste Geist meines Geistes, ist nieht ein fremder Geist, sondern ist schlechthin dureh mich selbst im 
eigentlichsten Sinne hervorgebracht. Ich bin durchaus mein eigenes GeschOpf. Ich hatte blind dem Zuge 
meiner geistigen Natur folgen konnen. Ich wollte nicht Natur, sondern mein eigenes Werk seyn; und ich 
bin es geworden, dadurch dass ich es wollte" (Fichtes Werke, 2:256 [The Vocation of Man, 102-103], 
emphasis added). This astonishing similarity of ethical outlook has not only led Emanuel Hirsch, but other 
scholars as well, to maintain that it is Fichte, not Hegel, who has exercised the greatest influence on 
Kierkegaard (e.g., Hauschildt, Die Ethik Seren Kierkegaards. 242, and Helmut Fahrenbach, Kierkegaards 
existenzdialektische Ethik [Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1968], 165). 
38"Der Gegensatz Geftihl-Verstand tritt zuruck hinter der Gemeinsarnkeit des Anspruchs aufSouveranitat. 
Romantisches Geftihl ist nach Kierkegaard souveranes Geftihl. Der romantischen Subjektivitat gilt--nicht 
anders als dem cartesianischen Bewu/3tsein--nur die durch ihre produktive Tatigkeit zustande gebrachte 
Wahrheit: das All des Geftihles, das Universum der erlebten und getraumten Machte. Sie selbst ist es, die allen 
wahren Inhalt schafft, und sie weil3 darum" (Anz, "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," 69). 
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it is "absolutely superior to all the world, even its own experiences; for the shifting experi-
ences are but the occasion for engendering ever anew the one experience of one's own infini-
ty.,,39 Yet in order to transcend mundane experience and become cognizant of its 
superiority to it, the romantic consciousness must first detach itself from that experience. 
This it does through irony, which denotes "a particular relationship of the subject to reality 
as given: he liberates himself from it, destroying it as far as he is concerned so as to be in the 
free suspension of possibility, positing a new beginning out of his inwardness.,,4o The 
romantic mindset 
believed that the ego, qualified by irony, possessed the power to bind and loose 
everything. It allowed it critically to destroy the whole of existence, even its own 
given individuality; it made it into a nothing, without past, without task, and along 
with all this, it believed itself capable of bringing into life the highest divine poetry: 
our life as our creation, as our poem, in relation to which we create and poeticize 
with ever unfettered freedom.41 
This sense of inner infinity and ironic detachment from factual reality "served the aesthetic 
and intellectual culture of romanticism. Kierkegaard, in his youth, felt himself to belong to 
't ,,42 1 . 
This notwithstanding, SK was also aware that such unfettered inwardness "falls prey 
to boredom since feeling loses every content, without, however, coming free from itself and 
its unsatisfied yearnings. A true person must let himself be limited by finitude, and hence, 
39 Anz, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus. 16. Kierkegaard shares Fichte's view--upon which the 
romantics draw--that imagination is "infinitizing reflection," and that as such it possesses primacy overall other 
cognitive capacities (SV XI 144 [Sickness unto Death. 30-31]). 
'"liirsch, Kierkegaard-Studien. Erster Band, Zweites Heft, 102 (230). 
41Ibid., 103 (231). Cf. Kierkegaard's own description of romantic irony, SV XIII 348 (ConceQt of Irony, 275-
76). 
42 Anz, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus. 16. As we noted in the introduction, Hirsch is of the 
opinion that romanticism, not Hegelianism, was what most attracted Kierkegaard in his student days. 
Consequently SK's doctoral dissertation, The Concept of Irony, is more aptly regarded as a critical 
confrontation with romanticism than as a statement of youthful Hegelianism (Kierkegaard-Studien. Erster 
Band, Zweites Heft, 100-102 [228-30]). With this Anz concurs: "Kierkegaard ... ist ... nie so HegelanMnger 
gewesen, wie er unter dem Einfluf3 der Romantik stand" (Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus, 30). And 
again: "Kierkegaard weif3 sich den Romantikern naher als Hegel; denn sie haben Sinn ftir die unendliche 
Innerlichkeit und fUr die Unersetzlichkeit der Individualitat" (p. 33). 
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by the definite relations of life, otherwise nothing will matter to him any longer. And when 
nothing is serious for him any longer, then neither is anything true for him. ,,43 Consequently 
Kierkegaard recognized that he was confederate with Hegel in criticizing romanticism's 
latent nihilism. What separated them was the manner in which Hegel proceeded against the 
romantics. 
As we learn from SKIs appraisal in The Concept of Irony, Hegel's notion of irony was 
forged in response to that of Friedrich Schlege1.44 Hegel reproaches the latter for having 
"wrenched the Fichtean thesis on the constitutive validity of the ego out of its metaphysical 
context. ,,45 In attributing to the individual that which belongs to the Absolute, Schlegel 
and the romantics had subverted every positive determination of society--custom, religion, 
morals, polity--and in so doing attempted the reversal of the gains made by Objective Spirit. 
In contrast to irony thus conceived, Hegel sets forth irony as practiced by Socrates. 
Socrates used irony in order to expose the relativity of cultural norms;46 as such, irony 
afforded the culture critic a vantage point superior to that possessed by his contemporaries. 
Yet were this all that the Socratic irony afforded, then there would be nothing to prevent the 
enlightened critic's freedom vis-a.-vis conventional authority from turning into sheer arbi-
trariness.47 But Socrates's position, according to Hegel, was not all negativity; it contained 
an element of positivity (at least formally) insofar as Socrates "moralizes." That is to say, 
from the standpoint of subjective morality48 to which Socrates has attained via irony, he 
43 Anz, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus, 16. Cf. SV XIII 356 (Concept of Irony, 285) which 
presages Either/Or in identifying the boredom that besets romantic irony. 
44SV xm 339 (Concej;)t of Irony, 265). 
4Slbid., 341 (268). In this connection Kierkegaard quotes Hegel, Sammtliche Werke, 20: 184. Anz quotes 
a similar passage from Hegel's V orlesungen iiber die Aesthetik: " ... der Standpunkt der Ironie ... ist aus der 
Fichteschen Philosophie hervorgegangen ... Alles im leh wird betrachtet als ein durch leh, ein von mir 
Gesetztes ... Alles ist mein Produkt und gilt nur, insofern ich es gesetzt sein lassen will, und ich kann es 
ebensogut aufbeben. Alles Moralische, Wahrhafte, Sittliche, Gottliche ist blo/3 ein Schein, kein Sein, ist nur 
von mir hervorgebracht" (Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus. 17 n. 21). 
46Sittlichkeit. or unreflective virtue based upon custom and natural observance. 
47SV XIII 305-6 (Concept of Irony, 228). 
48I.e., Moralitat. an ethical posture based not upon custom, but upon individual reflection or conscience. 
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seeks to confer upon his actions the form of universality.49 Hegel sees in Socrates's 
conception of "the universal" a formal principle of positivity, as well as negativity50--one 
that allows Socrates once again to arrive at specific duties: 
In the 'universal' lies, for Hegel, the transition from moralizing subjectivity to the 
existing orders of Objective Spirit. Subjectivity is truly 'universalized' only when the 
'universal' consists not only in the form of the cultivated consciousness, but in the 
content as such. This is the case when subjectivity qua this particular individual 
conceives and freely acknowledges Objective Spirit as the truth of all things. Then 
it understands that Objective Spirit, which corresponds to the thinking of all things, 
also expresses the nature of all things. True morality [Sittlichkeit] is 'substantial' 
morality. The merit of the 'moralizing' Socratic subjectivity is that it has embarked 
upon the way to this fundamental experience.51 
Kierkegaard of course rejects Hegel's interpretation of the Socratic irony. It does not 
contain an incipient element of positivity that affords access to incontrovertible duties within 
a "total system of reality." Socrates' moral posture is ever one of striving toward the idea 
of the Good.52 It is not a provisional stage on the way to full consciousness of human 
institutions as embodiments of Objective Spirit. In endorsing the existing forms of the state, 
jurisprudence, and so on, Hegel has in fact negated human freedom; he has robbed indi-
viduals of the very independence needed to attain to Socratic self-understanding. 
The sum of the matter is that while Kierkegaard rejects the romantics' excessive 
emphasis upon the infinity of the human spirit as experienced in imagination and irony, he 
also rej ects Hegel's unimaginati~e, unironic boundness to finitude. The task of the individual 
49SV XIII 305-6 (Concept ofIrony. 227-28). Universality is, after all, the essence of the ethical as far as 
Hegel is concerned. Hegel recognizes that "Wille als mein Wille ist eo ipso ein besonderer Wille, und als 
soIeher hat er ... die Tendenz, eben die eigene Besonderheit zum Prinzip zu erheben, das heil3t nach Hegel, 
bose zu sein. Der allgemeine Wille, oder, wie Hegel sagt, der Begriff des Willens ist dagegen die 
Verniinftigkeit, wie sie in der Sittlichkeit erscheint. Dieser allgemeine Wille ist nichts anderes als die Ordnung 
und als solche das Gute" (Walter Schulz, PhiloSQphie in der yeranderten Welt [Pfullingen: Verlag Gunther 
Neske, 1984], 730). 
sosv XIII 308-9 (Conctfl)t ofIrony, 231-33). 
SI Anz, Kierkegaard und die deutsche Idealismus. 18. 
S2"[Socrates'] life was a continual arriving at the good and having others arrive .... But precisely because 
he only arrived at it, had being-in-and-for-itself only as the infinitely abstract, he had the absolute in the form 
of nothing. Byway of the absolute, reality became nothing, but in turn the absolute was nothing .... Hegel has 
ignored this" (SV XIII 311-12 [Conctfl)t of Irony, 235-36]). 
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is to reconcile both aspects of his nature. The young Kierkegaard regards Goethe as the 
contemporary figure who has best achieved this synthesis, for he has learned the use of irony 
qua mastered moment.53 A review of Goethe's production reveals that the tragedies befall-
ing the Goethean hero are the result of his failure to attain to the desired synthesis.54 
Werther, for example, is so driven by his longing for the "eternal moment" of harmony with 
"the whole" that he is led to renounce human society (including his beloved) with its prosaic 
concerns, and instead choose death in solitude. Werther shows that unity with the divine is 
not to be sustained on the basis of the exaltation of feeling alone; on the contrary, as Goethe 
demonstrates in the ode, das Gottliche, nature must needs appear "unfeeling" and societal 
life "accidenta1." In both das Gottliche and Wilhelm Meisters Wanderiahren, the eternal is 
. 
made present in ethical activity: 
In it the person is capable of the impossible, capable of conferring duration upon the 
"moment" and thereby holding fast to the unity of the infinite and the finite. When 
the noble person who is aware of his own infinite life enters helpfully into the life 
of another, then he preserves within himself that same eternity by whose formative 
powers Nature proceeds: he creates living order itself, unites. preserves, promotes, 
and is, in such activity, the "model" both for himself and for others--i.e .• the visible 
guarantee of that felt uni~. Whoever acts thus remains within his origins and can 
complete himself therein. 5 
The perfecting of the personality occurs in the renunciation of "the continual exaltation of 
feeling"; it occurs in the entry into "the given relationships of life, adapting to them, bearing 
this life circle along with oneself and, as much as lies within one, promoting it." 
Goethe's humane morality is not grounded in a revealed divine command or a 
definite moral law. It has, rather, to do with the completion of the personality. The 
soul, by its natural essence, swings between two poles. In this movement lives, as it 
5J1bid., 389 (325). 
541 am indebted to Anz (Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus. 20-22) for the review and analysis that 
follows. 
55Ibid., 22. 
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were, the breath of the soul, which without infinite liberation would be narrow and 
dead, and without limitation in the finite would be empty.S6 
On the Lebensweisheit Goethes the person for his own sake acts ethically, limiting 
himself and binding himself in freely assumed service so as not to fall victim to romantic 
irony.s7 Anz observes that this repeatedly effected synthesis of the infinite and the finite 
within the individual is what Kierkegaard has in mind when he speaks of "the Idea."s8 This 
synthesis is--provisionally--the product of irony qua mastered moment, as we have seen.S9 
It is noteworthy that on Goethe's conception of the integrated personality it is sovereignly 
acting subjectivity that posits the synthesis that makes up its own reality.60 Whatever the 
~id., 22 and 23. The assumption of one's specific life conditions and duties accruing thereto is, of course, 
characteristic of Either/Or's Assessor Wilhelm. Only in so doing does one escape A's aesthetic nihilism and 
assert the self "in its eternal validity." One sees in Assessor Wilhelm's life-view precisely this movement 
between two poles, the "infinite" and the "finite," that is constitutive of Goethean selfhood. 
57Ibid., 25. 
58Ibid., 23. Anz further notes that this result of The ConceDt of Irony has entered into subsequent writings 
as "a settled formula" (pp. 57-58). See, e.g., SV II 279 (EitherlOr II, 311) and SV VII 63,72-73,264,267-68, 
339,364 (Postscript, 82,91-92,308,312-13,391,420). 
59With precisely Goethe in mind, SK writes: "To be controlled in this way, to be halted in the wild infinity 
into which it rushes ravenously, by no means indicates that irony should now lose its meaning or be totally 
discarded. On the contrary, when the individual is properly situated--and this he is through the curtailment of 
irony--only then does irony have its proper meaning, its true validity .... [NJo genuinely human life is possible 
without irony. As soon as irony is controlled, it makes a movement opposite to that in which uncontrolled irony 
declares its life. Irony limits, finitizes, and circumscribes and thereby yields truth, actuality, content; it 
disciplines and punishes and thereby yields balance and consistency. " On the other hand irony directs itself with 
equal disciplining force against finitude: it "rescues the soul from having its life in finitude even though it is 
living energetically and robustly in it" (SV XIII 390 [Concept of Irony, 326]). 
The significance of mastered irony notwithstanding, even in The Concept of Irony Kierkegaard is clear 
as to its ultimate inability to effect the desired synthesis of the personality. In the end (SV XIII 393 [ConcCl1t 
ofIrony, 329]) SKappeals to humor, whose assaults are more devalitating than irony's, tending in the direction 
of sin-consciousness. In removing every last pretension to self-sufficiency, humor clears the way for 
Christianity's reconciliation. 
6O"Bei Goethe gleichen sich Endliches und Unendliehes aus. Das ein7~lne Tun ist sinnvoll und erftillt nur 
als Gestalt der unendlichen Lebensflille der Seele; die aIle Endliehkeit Gbersteigende Tiefe und Weite des 
LebensgefGhles 'ist' nur, wenn sie in einzelnes Tun als gestaltende, bildende Kraft eingeht. Darin zeigt sieh, 
daB es keinen feststehenden 'objektiven' Ma13stab gibt, demgemaB sich die Ausgleiehung volIziehen konnte; 
sie selbst ist der Mal3stab, oder was Mal3 ist, das bildet sich je neu im individuellen Handeln .... Die humane 
Wirkliehkeit ist insoweit schliel3lich doch unsere Tat, durch die wir 'dem Augenbliek Dauer verleihen'. Dieses 
Tun enthalt eine verborgene Souveranitat und darin die Freiheit, von der einen zur anderen Erfahrung 
hinuberzugehen" (Anz, Kierkegaard unddie deutsche Idealismus. 26-27). Naturally Kierkegaard rej eets certain 
aspects of Goethe's Lebensweisheit, Though Goethe makes use of the category, "subjectivity," he ignores its 
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differences between the romantic and idealist understandings of the ego, this basic theme is 
a shared one and has been largely retained by Kierkegaard (with, N.B., the necessary 
Christian modifications--viz., the added confinium of humor as well as the religious stages). 
The parallels between Kierkegaard and romanticism and idealism, however, are by 
no means exhausted once the broadly shared theme of self-constituting subjectivity has been 
pointed out. Just as in all of the above versions subjectivity constitutes itself as a synthesis 
of the finite and the infinite, so too does it constitute itself as a synthesis of temporality and 
eternity. There is a parity of concepts here. "Infinity," as we have seen, designates for 
Kierkegaard and the romantics alike existing subj ectivity's ability to enter the realm of ideal 
possibility, transcending its mundane experiences and life conditions via the imagination 
and irony; finitude, on the other hand, is the vessel that bears this idealizing subjectivity--it 
is the arena for its self- and world-forming powers.61 Similarly, "eternity" and "the mo-
ment" ("an atom of eternity") designate subjectivity's power to take up what belongs to itself 
potentially--i.e., what it ideally can be under the conditions circumscribed by existence--and 
to transform such potential into its own reality. In a word, eternity is self-presence. 
Kierkegaard describes ... the moment as an "atom of eternity." The meaning of this 
formula seems to me to be: God, as the eternal one, is in absolute command of his 
nature. His potentia is completely realized. Therefore he is pure present. As the one 
who is absolutely in command of himself, God is Spirit. The existing subjectivity 
emulates the absolute personality of God. It, too, is spirit, and as such, strives to be 
in command of itself, to transform whatever is already at hand into its own deed or 
its own responsibility. However, it is never continually in command of itself, but 
only now and then, from moment to moment; and in that respect the moment, as the 
point of this power over oneself, is an "atom of eternity.,,62 
definitiveness. Intoxicated with his own genius, Goethe considers it a manifestation of the divine, in effect 
succumbing to the very bane of uncontrolled irony that he seeks to redress. 
6lHauschildt, in accordance with his Fichtean interpretation ofKierkegaard, designates infinity"das Faktum, 
da!3 der Mensch sich als permanente Selbsttatigkeit vollziehen soll,die nieht bei ihren Produkten stehenbleiben 
darP' (Die Ethik S0ren Kierkegaards, 74). This is entirely correct since "self-activity" and "infinite striving" 
are synonymous expressions of the Ego's most fundamental character. 
62 Anz, "Fragen der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 41. Cf. Anz, "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," 
92-93, where the finite person is said to emulate the infinite Person in virtue of the sovereignty that subjectivity 
possesses vis-a-vis the reali7.ation of its potential: "Gott wird hier als unendliche Person das Vorbild des 
mensch lichen Personseins. Hierin besteht die Gleiehheit von Gott und Mensch .... Gott ist Geist; das hei!3t bei 
Kierkegaard: Gott ist sich mit seinem ganzen Vermogen stets gegenwartig. Diese vollkommene Selbst-
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When Kierkegaard speaks of the self as absolute, it is this capacity sovereignly to dispose 
over itself, to enact within itself these syntheses that he has in mind, not some lesser 
• 63 
capacIty. 
Beyond the notion of a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the 
eternal, that SK shares with the philosophy of absolute subjectivity in its various fonns, we 
may elaborate upon yet another notion held in common--that of "spirit," a tenn that desig-
nates not only subjectivity's freely self-constituting activity, but the self-consciousness 
deriving therefrom.64 To constitute oneself--as is evident in what has been said heretofore--
means to become fully present to oneself (as opposed to absent qua unenacted possibility). 
gegenwart wird durch das Prndikat der Ewigkeit ausgedriickt. A ber auch der Mensch ist Geist und ... darf man 
auch im Hinblick auf ihn von Ewigkeit sprechen." As regard" the notion of "the moment," Anz calls attention 
to its occurrence in Goethe as a designation of the person's momentary unity with "the eternal life of the All" 
(pp. 83-84). 
6.'Alastair Hannay, for example, writes: "The individual's decision to believe ... that its relation to 
something in time is a relation to the etemal-in-time, is what Kierkegaard means by the individual's 'becoming' 
infinite (or eternal). In the interests of consistency this cannot, of course, mean that by this decision the 
individual in fact acquires an 'eternal determinant'; the break with immanence is definite and the practical 
solution has to be found within the framework established by that break" (Kierkegaard [London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1982],39-40). Hannay's contention that Kierkegaard cannot possibly intend an eternal determinant 
by "becoming eternal" surely attenuates the force of the two realms paradox (Luther'S simul teaching or the 
Pauline £V XP1(J't<l> conception) that SK wants to affirm. But leaving aside this specifically Christian 
paradox, it seems clear that SK's schema of absolute subjectivity commits him to understandings of eternity 
and infinity that amount to rather more than "a relation to" the eternal or the infinite. The individual is these 
things according to potential inasmuch as he is a derived absolute with the (ostensible) power to dispose freely 
over his own being. 
64"Wir sind ontologisch souveran •... Nur indem wir actu, d.h. von Augenblick zu Augenblick uns frei 
entscheiden, uns frei verantworten und auch unser Verstehen verantworten, nur als diese punktuelle Unruhe 
der Existenz sind wir Person. Diese sich selbst denkende und wollende Einheit der Person heil3t Geist" (Anz, 
Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus, 62). Other scholars give related understandings of what SK means 
by "spirit." Mark C. Taylor observes that for Kierkegaard and Hegel alike spirit is "the activity of self-relation 
in which opposites join "(Journeys to Seltbood: Hegel & Kierkegaard [Berkeley, CA.: University of Cali fomi a 
Press, 1980],168). The difference between the respective conceptions--as Taylor also pointsout--is that Hegel 
mediates the opposites, whereas Kierkegaard leaves them standing in open contradiction. Taylor also calls 
attention to the element of increasing self-consciousness that attaches to becoming spirit. In his own way SK 
has charted a "phenomenology of spirit" with his theory ofthe stages (p. 103). This is, in fact, a rather frequent 
refrain among Kierkegaard scholars--see Steven Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom. Hegel vs. Kierkegaard 
on Faith and History (Chambersburg, Penn.: American Academy of Religion, 1972), 74; Dunning, 
Kierkegaard's Dialectic ofInwardness, 255-56 n. II; Bruce Kirmmse, "Psychology and Society: The Social 
Falsification of the Self in The Sickness unto Death," in Kierkegaard's Truth: The Disclosure of the Self, ed. 
Joseph H. Smith, Psychiatry and the Humanities, vo\. 5 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 177 n. 10; 
Hannay, Kierkegaard, 16). 
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This in turn means to become "transparent" to oneself--to come into possession of full self-
consciousness.65 But in this conception of human subjectivity the fingerprint of idealism 
is palpably present. What SK imputes to human sUbjectivity is precisely what Hegel and the 
other idealists ascribe to absolute subjectivity: the attainment of total self-presence through 
external, self-positing activity: 
Here ... we encounter the ... common element in the thought of Kierkegaard and 
Hegel. What Hegel says about absolute Spirit--that it is the ground of all temporal 
events, which must be understood as its emergence into actuality--Kierkegaard says 
of individual persons: the individual person is, in principle, absolute spirit; as such, 
he is the ground of temporal action. In and with it, the individual steps into existence. 
Indeed, if we may understand by "eternity" the ever identical, continuous ground that 
determines the course of temporal events, then the human, absolute spirit is 
eternal. It is the power that, in all action, is now present. ... Therefore Kierkegaard 
speaks as a matter of course of human existence as the eternity that enters into exis-
tence, or that "becomes." And he speaks here not in a derivative sense of God, who 
as the eternal is present in conscience, but in an entirely original sense of eternity as 
the self-presence in which the existing person--at least according to the emphatic 
demand--possesses himself and is absolute spirit because he is, in himself, the unity 
of the temporal and eternal. Eternity is self-presence.66 
Kierkegaard, of course, couches all this in a Christian form. The self is explicitly said 
not to posit itself all by itself, but to have been posited by another: the demand that we 
comport ourselves as absolute subjectivity is understood in the sense that we are to be like 
God, imitating him by freely becoming in actuality that which we already are according to 
potential--not that we are God. Nevertheless this understanding of the human being owes 
far less to Christianity than to transcendental idealism. Certainly the language is idealism's 
("spirit," "synthesis," "eternity," "infinity"). So, too, is the fundamental ontological point of 
departure in subjectivity. The ~ of its development is the same: complete self-actualiza-
tion and self-awareness. Even the dialectic shares significant points of commonality--a point 
that is of sufficient interest that it bears attention in its own right.67 
65See SV XI 128, 142 (Sickness unto Death, 14,29). 
66Anz, "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," 83. 
67The tenn "dialectic" is particularly troublesome since it can mean many things and is often used without 
much precision. In his study of the dialectical structures in SK's authorship, Steven Dunning offers the basic 
clarification that "Kierkegaard's primary dialectical concern is with the relation ofthe subject to the object, not 
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For Hegel, the general movement of the Idea (i.e., transcendental subjectivity's 
potential self-actualization and self-presence) involves first of all its self-estrangement--one 
might say exitus--into that which is other than itself. This occurs in its positing of external 
Nature, a state of immediacy that at every level expresses the Idea's self-differentiating 
unity. At the conclusion of natural development (i.e., organics) Spirit emerges. Emergent 
Spirit or Soul is, to begin with, immersed in Nature and not yet in possession of conscious-
ness. Once, however, it has awakened and the subject-object distinction has become explicit 
(consciousness), there occur successive attempts to incorporate objects into the self, as 
belonging to the self (self-consciousness). These ultimately end in the acknowledgement of 
the independence of other finite, free selves, i.e., in universal self-consciousness. Hence the 
end-result of the development of Subjective Spirit is a subjectivity that is intersubjective, 
and therefore objective. With the appearance of such intersubjectivity, the stage is set for 
Objective Spirit, i.e., Spirit that has yet again externalized itself in a new ~, fonning 
a world of human institutions such as morality and the State. With the advent of the State, 
or Second Nature as Hegel calls it, Spirit finally possesses the requisite condition for full 
self-consciousness; no longer confined to individual SUbjectivity alone, it becomes 
with the essential nature of the object as such." Hence Kierkegaard's is a "dialectic of inwardness--of concepts 
developing within consciousness" (Kierkegaard's Dialectic ofInwardness. 7). Dunning identifies four ways in 
which opposed concepts can relate: (1) through a dialectic of contradiction in which "relief from the negative 
relation is denied"; (2) through a dialectic of reciprocity in which a third moment affirms "a reciprocal relation 
between the opposite poles ... but in such a way as to preclude further development"; (3) through a dialectic 
of paradox in which "a genuine unity is achieved, but one that accentuates rather than supersedes the 
contradiction between the two poles"; and (4) through a dialectic of mediation, where the third moment is 
conceived as "more than a reciprocal stalemate or a paradoxical unity of two contradictory poles. Mediation 
is a union in which a third step takes the opposites up into itself as aspects or moments within a new reality. 
In this process, each pole loses its negative character in relation to the other and is thereby fulfilled in its true 
nature as positively related to the other. Most important, the new third can now embark upon its own course" 
(pp. 6-7). Though Kierkegaard isjustlyrenowned for the dialectic of paradox, and Hegel forthat of mediation, 
Dunning contends that Kierkegaard possesses an extraordinary talent for Hegelian dialectics (p. 263, n. 9). 
Others point out the same. Michael Theunissen observes that the analysis of the self given in The Sickness unto 
Death. pp. 13-14 (SV XI 127-28) cannot be understood apart from Hegelian negation theory ("Kierkegaard's 
Negativistic Method," in Kierkegaard's Truth: The Disclosure of the Self, ed. Joseph H. Smith, Psychiatry and 
the Humanities, vol. 5 [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981],399). The issue of dialectics in Kierkegaard 
and Hegel is extraordinarily complex. In what follows I simply want to call attention to the correspondence that 
exists between their respective "phenomenologies of spirit." Each traces a progression in consciousness, 
identifying similar stages along the way, even if the mechanism for transition ("leap" vs. "mediation") is 
different. By "existential dialectic" I have in mind this odyssey of the existing individual spirit. 
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increasingly aware of itself as universal and infinite. Such "Second Nature" marks the final 
externalization of transcendental subjectivity. From this state of objectification, Spirit 
completes its reditus as Absolute Spirit. This occurs in three stages, each of which is 
marked by increasing self-awareness. The first is the stage wherein Absolute Spirit is present 
to itself in the form of immediacy or pure sensuousness--Art. Thereupon follows the 
representational form of consciousness (pictorial or metaphorical thought) that is 
characteristic of Religion. And lastly, there is the fully reflective form of thought--
Philosophy. In the Philosophy of Spirit transcendental SUbjectivity attains to the full self-
actualization and self-understanding that was incipiently present in the Idea. 
This pattern is strikingly similar to what we find in the existential dialectic. In The 
Concept of Anxiety we are told that man's initial state (innocence) is one of "immediate 
unity with his natural condition." Consequently, he "is not qualified as spirit"--rather, "the 
spirit in man is dreaming." "Spirit is present, but as immediate.,,68 Spirit's first dim presenti-
ment of itself comes as the bare "possibility of being able" (the as yet undeveloped "Idea") 
and this is experienced as objectless anxiety. As yet there is no reflection upon experience, 
no distinction between self and world. With the fall into sin, however, all of this changes. 
Sexual differentiation, and with it the distinction between soul and body that had hitherto 
been latent, now become manifest.69 Spirit is said to "posit the synthesis, but in order to 
posit the synthesis it must first pervade it differentiatingly.,,70 At this point the synthesis 
exists in the fonn of a contradiction that is to be overcome.7) That is to say: spirit, hitherto 
an unconscious unity, has undergone differentiation and self-estrangement qua body. It is 
6IISV IV 313, 315 (Conc~pt of Anxiety, 41,43). The analogy to Hegel's "emergent Spirit," or "Spirit sunk 
in Nature" is transparent. It is to be noted, however, that Hegel has drawn upon Schelling, whose designation 
for Nature is "slumbering Spirit." SK's terminology is almost identical to the latter's. 
69S0, too, does temporality for the first time become manifest, and with it, the time/eternity distinction. 
7~bid., 319 (49). 
71Ibid., 320 (49). The "contradiction" is all the greater inasmuch as sin's entry into the world results in 
sensuousness' degradation into sinfulness (p. 329 [58)). 
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ostensibly the task of spirit to reconcile this contradiction, taking its elements up into a 
higher unity as occurs in the Hegelian contrast of Spirit and World.72 
The history of the human spirit after its fall into sin (and out of unqualified 
immediacy) is a history of the mounting reflectedness of its anxiety. Whereas Adam's 
anxiety was absolutely without determinate object, the congenital anxiety afflicting his 
descendants is more and more a "something." In part this is due to the greater sensuousness 
that is theirs owing to their origination in the sex act. It is at the moment of conception that 
spirit feels most estranged from itself.73 A second reason for the greater reflectedness of 
anxiety is due to the cumulative sinfulness of the race.74 Because sinfulness ever qualifies 
the sensuous as sinful too, the cumulative yield of the race's sinfulness is an ever stronger 
presentiment of sensuousness's sinful taint.7s The result is that after Adam every person, 
from the point of conception onward, experiences anxiety in an increasingly reflected form. 
Thus the history of the race is a history of the progressive consciousness of its state 
qua anxious, and hence, of itself as emergent spirit. SK illustrates this by an analysis of the 
Hellenistic, Hebrew, and Christian eras. For the Greeks the indeterminacy of anxiety's object 
(freedom'S as yet undeclared possibility) was epitomized by Fate, an obscure power that was 
none other than spirit conceived as external to itself.76 That is to say, for the Hellenes spirit 
was as yet in a state of self-estrangement and had not, in the deepest sense, posited itself as 
spirit. For the Hebrews, on the other hand, the object of anxiety was more determinate: it 
was the possibility of guilt. This remained an ambiguous deterrnination--the fact that the 
Jewish sacrifices had to be constantly repeated testified to their lack of clarity about their 
nThe similarities hitherto detailed corroborate Walter Schulz's claim that SK'sanalysis of the fall (the event 
by which one becomes a person) is guided by Hegelian categories (Philosophie in der veranderten Welt. 390). 
Yet Schulz observes a key difference between SK and Hegel: the proposed synthesis never actually occurs. 
73SV N 334, 341 (Concept of Anxiety, 64, 72). 
74Ibid., 323 (52). 
7~e same may be said of temporality, mutatis mutandis. It, too, becomes qualified as sinfulness at the 
moment of the fall. And like the moment of procreation, the moment of death marks the point at which spirit 
feels itself to be the farthest from completing the synthesis, and hence, the most anxious (ibid., 362 -63 [92-93 D. 
71bid., 366 (96). This is a precise analog of Hegel's unhappy consciousness. 
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relationship to guilt.77 There was a gain in self-consciousness on the part of the Jews, and 
hence of spirit; nevertheless anxiety's objectlessness was only somewhat abated insofar as 
spirit was aware of itself only according to its possibility.78 With Christianity this changed. 
Freedom discovered its determinateness in the actuality of the totality of guilt. As such, 
spirit's self-estrangement was removed but at a terrible price. Kierkegaard applies this 
schema of the race's progressive self-awareness to the individual on the ground that each and 
every individual is an embodiment of the race. Accordingly the entire race's development 
is recapitulated by the individuae9 --if he progresses that far. Modem "spiritlessness" SK 
likens to Greek naiVete, except that it is moving in a direction away from becoming spirit. 
The movementtoward increasing consciousness that Hegel attributes to the Absolute 
is, as we see from the foregoing, transferred to the race and the individual by Kierke-
gaard.80 The resemblance of the existential dialectic to that of Hegelian idealism, however, 
does not end here. The notion of subjectivity "going forth" into objectivity and "returning" 
as enhanced subjectivity (with the various stages of development along the way "taken up" 
into the succeeding ones) is very much in evidence in Judge William's portrait of the 
development of the ethical personality. The Judge tells us that the person who has chosen 
himself ethically has not only chosen to be an "objective self" in the sense of taking up and 
ratifying his specific concretion by an act of freedom--this is merely to be a "personal self." 
77Ibid., 373 (103-4). 
78Ibid., 377 (108-9). 
79Ibid., 373-78 (104-10). The notion of the individual as "concrete universal," too, is Hegel's. 
8<Mark Taylor calls attention to Kierkegaard's periodization of individual and world history according to 
stages of consciousness. Yet he is mistaken when he claims that no other commentator, save Gregor 
Malantschuk, has recognized this Hegelian tendency (Journeys to Selfhood. 79 n. 30). Wilhelm Anz's 
recognition antedates them both: "Trotzaller Polemik gegen Hegel behiilt Kierkegaard in seinen Schriften doch 
Hegelsche Horizonte beL Er entkleidet die Hegelsche Philosophie ihrer metaphysischen Motive, bewahrt aber 
in existentialisierter Form ihre Fragen. Wie Hegel periodisiert erdieGeschichte nach dem Ma13stabe derSelbst-
reflexion, d. h. der Selbsterfassung der Freiheit. Das Sein der Geschichtsepochen hiingt ab vom Bewul3tsein. 
V gl. z. B. die im 'Begriff der Angst" vorausgesetzte Periodisierung der Geschichte in Griechentum, Judentum, 
Christentum .... Hier wird jedesmal die Selbsterfassung der Freiheit zum Prinzip, nach dem die einzelnen 
Epochen der Geschichte ausgelegt und der Gang der Geschichte geordnet wird" (Anz, "Fragen der 
Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 46). 
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The ethical self has also become obj ective in the much larger sense of entering into "the 
universal": 
The self that is the objective is not only a personal self but a social, a civic self. He 
then possesses himself as a task in an activity whereby he engages in the affairs of 
life as this specific personality. Here his task is not to form himself but to act, and 
yet he forms himself at the same time, because, as I noted above, the ethical 
individual lives in such a way that he is continually transferring himself from one 
stage to another .... He transfers himself from personal life to civic life, from this 
to personal life. Personal life as such was an isolation and therefore imperfect, but 
when he turns back into his personality through the civic life, the personal life 
appears in a higher form. The personality appears as the absolute that has its teleolo-
gy in itself.S! 
SISV II 235-36 (Either/Or II, 262-63). Judge William speaks of the "identity" that obtains between the 
isolated and the public self. Intended is the identity of "subjectivity" (the individual ego as freely self-positing 
activity) and "objectivity" (its externally manifest form in a moral vocation)--one is tempted to say, of "inner" 
and "outer" (p. 232 [258-59]). The judge also speaks of the ethical personality as taking "the form of the unity 
of the universal and the particular" (p. 236 [264]). Here we have something akin to Hegel's conception of the 
individual as the concrete universal. Yet in the case of Hegel the emphasis is upon the universal, Le., upon the 
finite ego's subjection to the universalizing tendency of Objective Spirit. Bycontrast. in the case ofKierkegaard 
the emphasis is upon the particular. This may be seen from the fact that the so-called universalizing tendency 
is not grounded in broad human institutions such as Sittlichkeit or the State (see Hauschildt, Die Ethik S0ren 
Kierkegaards. 32 and 36-37), but in individual duty: "As a particular individual, I am not the universal, and 
to require it of me is unreasonable; consequently, if I am to be capable of performing the universal, I must be 
the universal at the same time as I am the particular, but then the dialectic of duty resides within me" (SV II 
237 [Either/Or II 264], emphasis added). Notwithstanding the contrasts of subjective/objective, inner/outer, 
particular/universal, and their ongoing dialectical process of sublation into ever higher syntheses (which has 
led Taylor and others to claim that the Judge's ethic is Hegelian--see, e.g., Journeys to Selfhood, 243), one 
senses in this definition of duty a Kantian-Fichtean understanding of the ethical autonomy of the individual 
ego--autonomy that in turn entails participation in existing moral vocations whose common goal is a universal 
moral order. The difference from Fichte is, of course, that the individual's moral activity is not subsumed under 
transcendental Ego's self-positing activity: Christianity's God has no need to "posit" himself. Accordingly, 
Kierkegaard transfers the task of self-positing directly to the individual, whose self-forming deeds are then 
assimilated to a divinely pre-ordained moral order. Despite the assumed convergence of the individual's self-
positing activity with that of other individuals in a universal moral order, the referral of the moral imperative 
of Fichte's transcendental Ego to the individual ego (viz., bringing itself under the law of complete self-
determination or "choosing itselP') gives the Judge's ethic a formal character that ultimately allows "the 
universal" qua material determinant of duty's "pure ought" to fall by the wayside, elevating the individual qua 
"exception" to a position of ethical legitimacy, even pre-eminence. That is to say, Kierkegaard, like Kant and 
Fichte before him, has difficulty maintaining concrete duties in the face of his purely formal principle of 
morality--the realization of absolute subjectivity (cf. Hauschildt, Die Ethik S0ren Kierkegaards, 32,38-39,41-
42). But of course some material content must fill the void, and that content is ultimately--as we shall see--the 
imitation of God in his absolute subjectivity. But because Christianity'S God, unlike Hegel's Absolute, is by 
definition nontemporal, noncorporeal and nonfinite, a schema of transcendental subjectivity based upon 
Christian theism will perforce move in the direction of world-denial. Indeed, this is already true of Fichte's 
system inasmuch as the present spatiotemporal realm and its institutions is but a staging ground for entry into 
the future moral order. Consequently our task in this life is to renounce this life. But more on this later. 
282 
The elements of Judge William's dialectic are familiar: the subjective self is "the 
absolute," possessed of a teleology that only comes to full realization through a provisional 
~ into objectivity. The subsequent reappearance of subjectivity via the reditus of 
enhanced self-understanding is in a "higher" form, with the intervening stages having been 
preserved notwithstanding their supersedure. This has led Wilhelm Anz to conclude that 
"Kierkegaard has Hegel's Spirit-concept in the schema. The absolute 'I' sublates the negation 
of itself, the 'not-I' and thereby becomes identical with itself. Spirit is the negation of 
negation.,,82 To this assessment Anz adds the ominous warning: "With the existentializing 
of absolute subjectivity there arises a situation that, in its consequence, is no less 
questionable than is the 'transcendental idealism' of the Hegelian philosophy of history." It 
is to this consequence that we now tum. 
One of the greatest difficulties that Anz sees in the use of absolute subjectivity as 
point of departure for a Christian anthropology is the transferral to human beings of attrib-
utes that have traditionally been reserved to God. This results in the blurring of the 
capabilities proper to each. The self-positing freedom of which SK speaks is a case in point, 
for it is at times difficult to distinguish whether he is speaking of God or man.83 The same 
may be said of the predicates "eternity,,84 and "infinity.,,8s The imputation of such 
attributes to humans has serious theological consequences, for by their use Kierkegaard is 
"precisely not in the position of being able to bring to clear expression the qualitative dif-
ference between God and man vis-a.-vis idealism, however much he might want to. ,,86 Anz 
82Anz, "Fragen der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 50. 
8lAnz, "Fragen der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 36. Louis Mackey arrives at the identical conclusion by 
an independent analysis. Speaking of the absolutizing of human freedom that occurs in Kierkegaard, Mackey 
writes: "But human freedom, thus absolutized, becomes indistinguishable from the omnipotence of God .... 
If it is not itself God, at least it has a handy purchac;e on the divine omnipotence" ("The Loss of the World in 
Kierkegaard's Ethics," Review of Metaphysics 15 (1961-62):616-17). 
84Anz, "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," 102. 
85 Anz, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus. 31-32. 
86ybid., 32. Cf. pp. 32-33: "Fur Kierkegaard ist es keine Frage, daB hinter der Unendlichkeit der Existenz 
Gott als ihr Urheber und Richter steht. Aber da er nur das idealistische Schema der Subjektivitat als der 
Synthese von Endlichem undUnendlichem besitzt, urn seine Erfahrungen auszusprechen, ergibt sich nunmehr 
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raises the disturbing question as to whether SKIS employment of these concepts is at all 
theologically correct: "In the self-evident manner in which Kierkegaard uses [them] does he 
not fall victim to precisely the age against which he contends? Does he not act against his 
own theological intention?"s7 
Of course the attribution to human beings of traits belonging to God is indispensable 
if one views as their purpose the imitation of God in his self-positing subjectivity. And as 
far as Kierkegaard is concerned the ultimate ethical demand is that all human beings imitate 
God by freely bringing forth into being what they are according to potential. This however, 
as Anz notes, is medieval scholasticism's analo~a entis out-done--"out-done" because 
whereas the scholastics' analo~a entis assumed a similarity within a still greater dissimilari-
ty, Kierkegaard assumes "a direct imitation of the infinite person by the finite one."ss He 
does so by claiming for human SUbjectivity sovereignty over what can count as truth. And 
he does so by claiming for human subjectivity sovereignty over the world (making whatever 
is "given" into my own act). Kierkegaard's conception of the two-fold sovereignty that 
inheres in subjectivity in turn leads him into a two-fold dogmatic distortion. 
The most basic--and serious--distortion arises out of the notion that autonomous 
SUbjectivity in some sense produces truth. The classical understanding, as we have seen, is 
that voi>~ merely discovers the truth that is already given in the K6(JllO~. For Kierkegaard, 
by contrast, ethico-religious truth is what I cause to be true for me. As such its object must 
lend itself to existential appropriation, for otherwise it could never become true in this 
pregnant sense. Accordingly, the proper object of ethico-religious truth is identifiable by its 
ability to engender inwardness. Such an object sets itself apart from objects of purely 
die beunruhigende Zweideutigkeit, daB derselbe Kierkegaard, der so klar urn den Unterschied zwischen 
Goethescher Humanitat und Existenz vor Gott weil3, innerhalb der Dialektik der Existenz den Unterschied 
zwischen der Freiheit als dem Ewigen oderdem Unendiichen und Gott alsdem Ewigen oderdem Unendlichen 
nicht unmiBverstandlich aussprechen kann. Faktisch ist in dem einen das andere mitgemeint. Dann aber liegt 
es nur an der Weise, wie wir in uns un sere Unendlichkeit sein lassen, ob wir von Gott oder nur von uns selbst 
und un serer kosmischen Herkunft sprechen." 
87Ibid., 31. Schulz makes a similar point when he observes the theological questionability of portraying the 
Fall as something positive--the coming to be of the person (PhilosQDhie in der veranderten Welt, 389-90). 
88 Anz, "Fragen der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 41 and "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," 92-
93,95. 
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scientific or historical interest inasmuch as the latter engender the very opposite disposition: 
objective detachment. But if the ability to incite inwardness is the criterion of the proper 
object of ethico-religious truth, this means that the inwardness itself is the criterion of what 
is to count as the appropriate object of such truth. Subjectivity contains within itself the 
condition for the possibility of truth, it contains within itself a criterion of truth that is not 
to be gotten from its object. Certainly, to this subjective index of truth there corresponds an 
objective one--viz., the paradox, since the paradox alone is able to incite the inwardness. 
Nevertheless the bare paradox is but the incitement to inwardness (one might call it its 
necessary condition). It does not guarantee the actual presence of inwardness, and as such 
cannot serve as the index of truth in the pregnant sense (appropriation).89 Pure subjectivity 
alone is the index for such truth. And ultimately only that which is capable of subjective 
appropriation can count as a candidate for ethico-religious truth. It is the subjective criterion, 
the inwardness, that validates the objective one, the paradox --not vice versa. 
Anz notes that Luther, like Kierkegaard, made appropriation into a theological 
category. Indeed, we have previously noted SK's equation of his own subjectivity principle 
("Only the truth that builds up [Le., has been appropriated to one's edification] is true for 
you") with Luther's pro me.90 But Anz further observes that SK's use of subjectivity as an 
epistemological principle (the criterion of what can count as true in any religiously relevant 
sense) makes of it something very different than Luther's pro me, for it ends by accepting 
or rejecting traditional dogmas on the basis of their value in inciting subjectivity. 
Has Kierkegaard simply repeated this Lutheran understanding [that Christ is 
only truly understood when understood as Christus pro me]? As far as I can tell: No, 
even though he desires nothing more than the appropriation of what is known in the 
"objective" statements of Scripture .... The matter does not stop at the simple 
obedience of faith in relation to the Word, but goes so far as the dialectical consider-
89"Die Offenbarung ist ... nicht wahr als objektiver Vorgang, vielmehr der Akt des Glaubens gibt dem 
Gegenstande des Glaubens die Moglichkeit, sich als wahr zu erweisen" (Anz, "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. 
Kierkegaard," 102). "Glaube ist Reproduktion, Rekonstruktion. Glaubenssubjektivitiit erschafft nicht willkiirlich 
ihren Gegenstand aus dem Nichts, sie ist aber auch keine bloB passive Hinnahme des Paradoxes, sondem sie 
'nacherzeugt', sie ist Tiitigkeit" (Hauschildt, Die Ethik Seren Kierkegaards. 67, referring to SV IV 250 
[Fragments. 86]). 
90See the beginning of chapter 6, which refers to Pap VIIII A 465 (JP 3:2463). 
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ation as to what in the Word can be the object of faith and what cannot. Appro-
priation therefore contains within itself a critical reflection foreign to Luther. It re-
flects not only upon the content of the dogma, but also upon the fact that only the 
dogma's existential intent can be the object of faith. Here we encounter a faith that 
keeps only to the existential intent of the dogma, thereby in fact abandoning to the 
critique of objectifying reason the statements about creation, miracles, and the salva-
tion history at work in the church. Here faith is made into a miracle in a new way. 
A tradition that has been made entirely profane and exposed to reflection is, in the 
object of faith, transformed into the act of faith .... In and with [the individual's] 
faith, the truth of faith first constitutes itself. 
Does it not tum out here that the act of faith (fides qua creditur) becomes lord 
over the content of faith (fides quae creditur)? The "what" of faith is posited by the 
"how" of existence. Does not the ontological sovereignty of faith come to predomi-
nate vis-a.-vis the content of faith? So far as I understand Kierkegaard: Yes!91 
The claim that subjectivity produces the truth of what is believed (even if it be false!) 
might seem to be gainsaid by the Postscript's revocation ofthe thesis, "Subjectivity is truth," 
by the counterthesis, "Subjectivity is untruth." Yet the thrust of the counterthesis is that, 
since we are sinners, we are not capable of willing the kind of subjective relationship to the 
paradox that is requisite to the production of truth. This, however, does nothing to alter the 
fact that such a relationship, were it possible, would be productive of truth. And indeed, 
once the miracle of faith has transpired subjectivity again comes into possession of this 
9lAnz, Kierkegaard und derdeutsche Idealismus, 68-69. Cf. "Fragen der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 56: 
"Bedenklicher ist die aus dem Gegensatz zur Spekulation versUindliche Dberbetonung des Glaubens, der nicht 
nurals die legitime Zugangsart erscheint, sondem eine Art kritischer Funktion gegeniiber seinem Inhalt erhiilt. 
Der Glaube stellt nicht nurdie existierende SubjektiviHit in die Entscheidung, sondem erentscheidet auch iiber 
seinen Inhalt, ob dieser seiner Art nach qualifiziert ist, Glaubensinhalt, d. h. AnlaJ3 eines wahren Existenz-
vollzuges zu sein." In "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," too, Anz discusses the issue of whether 
SK has merely recapitulated Luther's ~ or equipped it with a modem critical function that ends by 
rejecting certain traditional dogmas (pp. 97-1 OS). He sees this prefigured already in the Postscript. where the 
content of faith "erscheint in polemisch einseitigen Formulierungen sogar als etwas dem Glaubensakt 
gegeniiber Indifferentes. Kierkegaard begniigt sich nicht mit derunbestreitbaren Wahrheit, daBdas Wissen von 
Gott kein objektiver Besitz ist, der als soIcher das christliche Leben verbiirgt, sondem er riskiert die 
Umkehrung, daB das irrende falsche Wissen urn Gott, mit innerlicher Leidenschaft ergriffen, in die wahre 
Existenz hineinfUhre. Das besagt: es gibt in soIchen Aussagen kein Dogma mehr, sondem nur noch 
Glaubensvorstellungen. Diese sind nicht mehr der Grund des Glaubens. Die eigentliche Realitat kommt allein 
der Glaubensentscheidung zu. Kierkegaard griff das spekulative Denken Hegels an, weil in ihm das Denken 
entscheidende Bedeutung fUr die Wahrheit habe, insofem die Identitiit von gottlicher und menschlicher 
Vemunft sich erst im Denken des Philosophen vollendet. Kierkegaard griff die Mittlerstellung an, die der 
Philosoph sich damit gibt. Aber fUhrt die dialektische Aneignung des Paradox nicht in dieselbe Vcrlegenheit? 
Bringt die glaubende Subjektivitiit ... nicht auch in gewisser Weise die Wahrheit des Geglaubten hervor? Und 
gewinnt nicht der 'Christ erster Hand' in der ietzten Konsequenz auch eine gewisse Mittlerstellung?" (pp. 102-
3). 
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truth-making quality. And once again, only a faith-object that is suitable to the incitement 
of subjectivity is suited to become true in the pregnant sense. Whatever is not paradoxical 
does not pass muster (subjectivity's critical function) and is, in turn, consigned to the acids 
of modem reflection (autonomous reason's critical function). It may fall away from the core 
of Christian dogma or not--its fate is a matter of indifference. We see, then, that subjectivi-
ty's critical function makes possible the ultimate rejection (observed in the previous chapter) 
of the dogmas pertaining to apostolic authority and the church. Indeed, insofar as individual 
subjectivity is vested with the aforementioned critical function we are not surprised to see 
these two traditional bearers of doctrinal authority--apostolic office and episcopate--
relegated to a status well-nigh of insignificance. More than this: in the absence of these 
"objective" authorities we are not surprised to see other dogmas fall by the wayside as 
well.92 
Among them are all of those doctrines dealing in some fashion with creation. Not 
surprisingly, the significance that SK assigns to creation is only such as is possible within 
his schema of absolute subjectivity. As previously explained, because absolute subjectivity 
is spirit like God, it strives to be in command of itself, transforming whatever is "given" into 
its own deed. As such the deed of the person takes the place of VOUI;, or intellectus, as 
regards the attainment of truth. Anz contrasts the place that is assigned to the world on such 
a scheme with the place that it occupies in classical thought: 
As intellectus man looks upon the whole of the world that possesses its order within 
itself and understands himself within it. He cannot become aware of its QIdQ without 
seeing himself with his orderedness and security and, at the same time, his limitation 
and need. Because he as man is exposed to change, corruption and error, he remains 
92This bears upon Barth's charge of anthropocentrism raised at the beginning of chapter four. There the 
charge was deflected through a consideration of Kierkegaard's deeply held Lutheran premises. But we have 
since become aware ofthe just as deeply held idealist ones, and these give credence to the Barthian charge. The 
mature Barth, as we know, came to Emanuel Hirsch's conclusion that Kierkegaard was the nineteenth century's 
most consistent representative ofSchleiermacher and "the most thoroughly reflective completion of Pietism" 
(Barth, "Dank und Reverenz," Evangelische Theologie 23 [1963):341 ["A Thank You and a Bow: 
Kierkegaard's Reveille," Canadian Journal of Theology 11, no. 1 (1965):6). Cf. Emanuel Hirsch, "Soren 
Kierkegaard," in Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie im Zusammenhang mit den allgemeinen 
Bcwcgungen des europiiischen Denkens [Giltersloh: C. Berte1smann Verlag, 1951) 5:453-54). In respect of 
subjectivity being the arbiter of dogma Kierkegaard is akin to Schleiermacher, yet with the notable difference 
that for latter it is the piety of the community that serves this function. 
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directed to a truth that preserves and guides him and lets him see. The acceptance of 
this truth excludes from the outset reflection upon one's own absoluteness. If we 
visualize the opposition of both points of view we can perhaps gain a clearer 
awareness of the consequences of the "deworldization" [Entweltlichun,,] to which 
the existential dialectic attains. The deworldization of absolute subjectivity releases 
subjectivity not only from its "accidental finitude," but simultaneously takes from 
it reference to the world's grounding and ordering truth. Finitude therefore only 
becomes accidental since it can no longer be understood within such a truth.93 
It is contended that, because SK gives absolute subjectivity priority over being-in-the-world, 
an Entweltlichun" occurs in his thought. No longer does a divinely instituted world order 
provide the horizon for the interpretation of Being. Rather, self-reflection does this. And 
because subjectivity ceases to be grounded in a world-ordering truth, it loses its essential 
relationship to the world. Ultimately, the finitude in which subjectivity finds itself becomes 
entirely expendable. Let us trace this chain of consequences. 
That the fonner consequence really does occur is evident from the late Kierkegaard's 
proscriptions against marriage, family, and congregation. These institutions constitute the 
very bedrock of social order. From the conventional Judeo-Christian point of view, the 
second table of the law divinely sanctions them and provides for their continuance. Yet the 
law is not the highest instance for Kierkegaard, but in reality only a superseded Sittlichkeit 
since the subjective individual is commanded directly to imitate God: 
Since subjectivity is sovereign in relation to the world it can have no other measure 
than its own absoluteness. Kierkegaard knows of the divine "Thou shalt," to be sure. 
This "Thou shalt," however, is neither the order of Being of the Platonic philosophy 
nor the law of the Old and New Testaments that situate the person in intraworldly 
93Anz, "Fragen der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 48-49. On finitude becoming "accidental" on the schema 
of absolute subjectivity, see SV II 233 (EitherlOr II, 260). Louis Mackey finds the same tendency to acosmism, 
and the same source: Kierkegaard's absolutization of freedom. "The world is only a cluster of possibilities for 
[Kierkegaard], and as such does not offer him matter, content, locus, opportunity, orexigence foraction--these 
he must generate out of his own freedom. Kierkegaard was rightly apprehensive about the kind of objectivism 
that threatened to dissolve human individuality in the non-human world, the race, the state, or some other 
collectivity. But his fear of coalescence and his will to preserve freedom untrammeled led him to sweep away 
all order, participation, and community. His insistence that the question of the reality of the world is ethically 
irrelevant, and that only an indirect possibility-relation holds between the ethical subject and other realities, 
implies a sort of freedom that is separative only and is not supported by the cosmos" ("The Loss of the World 
in Kierkegaard's Ethics," 613). And again: "The Kierkegaardian individual is existentially--in his ethical 
reality--a-cosmic if not a-theistic. He is infinitely free. But because it is without limitation--by the relative 
objectivity of the world or the absolute objectivity of God--his freedom is empty of everything but 
indeterminate possibilities" (p. 617). 
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relationships before the will of God. It says to the worldless I nothing more than 
"Thou shalt be like God. Thou shalt be absolute subjectivity.,,94 
This "ought" of absolute subjectivity, "Thou shalt be like God," prompts the question 
as to what this means in the human context. If for the late Kierkegaard it does not involve 
marriage, family and community relationships guided by the principle of the love of 
neighbor (Christ's summation of the second table of the law), then it probably has never 
really meant this, even in those earlier texts that speak of ethical duty as the obligation to 
realize det Almene [the universal]. But if not this, what does it mean? It is clear that for 
Kierkegaard, for whom den reli~ieuse Undta~else [the religious exception] gains an 
increasing normativity, it involves Afdoen, "dying to" every attachment to this life. And 
with this we arrive at the second consequence that the deworldization of absolute subjec-
tivity entails: the willed negation, as opposed to sublation, of finitude. Ultimately Kierke-
gaard's "characteristic superhumanity" derives from his demand of absolute subjectivity.95 
94 Anz, "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," 92-93. Cf. SV XI 143 (Sickness unto Death, 29-30) 
where we are told that the self according to potentiality "does not actually exist, is simply that which ought to 
come into existence. Insofar, then, as the self does not become itself, it is not itself; but not to be itself is 
precisely despair" (emphasis added). This text clearly presents the primary task of existing subjectivity as that 
of positing itself realiter, and so becoming absolute SUbjectivity. This is the exceedingly abstract task offinite 
SUbjectivity attaining to moment by moment self-presence on the pattern of God's self-presence. In theory this 
involves the free assumption of concretion, and hence, of the ethical relationships in which one finds oneself. 
Nevertheless, these are entered into not for their own sake, but for the sake of meeting absolute subjectivity's 
demand. As such, ordinary Sittlichkeit stands in a precarious relationship to the higher calling of "spirit" and 
is in the end lost. Accordingly, Anz attributes to SK's existential dialectic as great an ethical confusion as that 
attributed by SK to Hegel ("Fragen der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 50-51)! Interestingly, Mackey does the 
same: "Kierkegaard's ethical thought, even in its religious dimension, rests on an acosmism as pretentious as 
the idealism of Hegel" ("The Loss ofthe World in Kierkegaard's Ethics," 618). Moreover, Mackey assigns the 
source of this pretentiousness to the same overdrawn similitudo Dei that Anz has identi tied as the CUlprit: "Now 
I do not wish to deny that there is a moment of absoluteness in human freedom: the capacity of man, recognized 
by Augustine and most other theologians, to utter a radical and final Yes or a radical and final No to the claim 
and the grace of God. Nor would I deny that Kierkegaard is the connoisseur without peer of this religious crisis, 
with its terrible testimony to the reality of God--and its equally terrible temptation: eritis sicut Deus. It seems 
to me that his understanding of subjectivity often succumbs to the temptation, and confuc;es the potentia 
absoluta divina with human freedom in a way that is close to demonic" (p. 617). 
9S"Der platonische £ p cu t; erreicht sein Ziel nur auf dem Wege Uber weltliche Inhaite, die von sich her auf 
den bewahrenden uns maf3setzenden gottlichen Grund ihrer selbst hinweisen. Der intellectus Augustins ist 
seines Hinblicks auf die gottliche Weisheit und den in ihr gegebenen ordo gewif3. FUr Platon und Augustinus 
ist der lebende Mensch von vornherein bestimmt von einer Wahrheit, die sein Denken und Handeln 
durchdringt. Aberdiese Bestimmtheit ist fUrKierkegaard inder Entweltlichung derabsoluten Subjektivitat ver-
loren gegangen, und so fUhrt paradoxerweise die Begriindung des zeitlichen Seins im Ewigen zur 
auBersten Ubersteigerung und Uberforderung des existierenden SelbstbewuBtseins. Vielleicht liegt hier 
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Now, the charge that dying to finitude has been SK's true ideal of "spirit existence" . 
all along might seem difficult to sustain in view of those texts already cited in which its free 
acceptance is enjoined. In the early formulations of the existential dialectic does not Judge 
William insist (contra romantic nihilism) that it is freedom's task to assume the whole of 
one's concretion? Nature, or immediacy, is to be taken up and preserved on the way toward 
becoming spirit. So, too, is community and its ordered relationships. Mastery over one's 
accidental finitude by no means designates liberation from it in the early writings. Neverthe-
less, for all Kierkegaard's talk about the "equilibrium" ofthe erotic and the ethical or about 
a dynamic "synthesis" between soul and body, eternity and temporality, finitude and infinity, 
there are hints that what is intended is the revocation, not the sublation, of the counter-
moment. One may cite, for example, Judge William's assertions at the end of EitherlOr II 
that "every person is an exception" and that such exceptionality can lead to one's becoming 
"an extraordinary human being in a nobler sense" since what is lost by way of extensiveness 
can be won "in intensive inwardness. ,,96 The hidden agenda as early as Either/Or II seems 
to be that of not realizing the universal, but rather, achieving an "intensive inwardness" in 
isolation from the others. The "married man" of Stages (presumably, Judge William met 
with again) confirms this, for by now all coyness is gone as regards the real path to 
becoming "spirit": 
I do not say that marriage is the highest, I know a higher; but woe to him who would 
[leap] over marriage without justification .... It is easy to see in what direction that 
feigned sally away from life must occur. It must occur in the direction of the reli-
gious, in the direction of spirit, in such a way that being spirit makes one forget that 
one is also man, not spirit alone like God.97 
eine der Ursachen fUr das eigentiimliche Ubermenschentum, in dem Kierkegaard endet" (Anz, "Fragen 
der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 42, emphasis added). 
96SV II 297-98 (EitherlOr II, 331-32). 
97SV VI 161 (~ 169). From SVVII 151 (Postscripl 181)we learn that the~'s "married man" is, 
in fact, Judge William and that he has been aware of the problems involved in realizing det Almene in marriage 
all along. SV VII 149-51 (Postscrim. 179-81), as a matter offact, raises serious reservations about whether the 
erotic component of marriage can be reconciled with "the true religious infinitizing" that spirit must undertake. 
Johannes Climacus speaks of it, not as an aid, but as an impediment, and a serious one at that. 
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If we ask why the attainment of "spirit" might require the annihilation of finitude 
("forgetting that one is also man"), this too is made clear in texts dating from the early part 
of the authorship. We are told in The Concept of Anxiety that sin made its entrance into the 
world in the first place when subjectivity, in attempting to posit the synthesis and thereby 
attain to spirit, became "dizzy," and laid "hold of finiteness to support itself.,,98 From that 
point on sensuousness and temporality came to signify sinfulness.99 Although they are not 
themselves sinfulness, "sin makes [them] sinfulness."lOo The qualitative distinction of sin, 
as it were, occasioned a rift between time and eternity, between animal-being and spirit-
being.lol The (at this point unstated) implication is that these came to be irrevocably 
despoiled by the fall and that dying to sin now perforce means: dying to sensuousness and 
temporality. But more than this, there is evidence in The Concept of Anxiety that crea-
turliness in its pre-fallen state was never good in the sense contended by Judeo-Christian 
theology .102 It was there for the sole purpose of revocation, not incorporation, by spirit, for 
Vigilius Haufniensis writes: "Had Adam not sinned, he would in the same moment have 
98SV IV 331 (Concept of Anxiety, 61). 
99Ibid., 363 (93). 
loolbid., 342-43 (73). 
1000f this bifurcate ontology Walter Schulz writes: "Die menschliche Struktur ist grundslitzlich widersinning. 
Ich bin als Leib ein Teil der Welt, genauer der Naturwelt ... und ich bin als Geist zugleich welttranszendent. 
Ich kann diesen Widerspruch nicht aufheben, und dies besagt: ich muB an ihm leiden. Der Mensch ist zur Angst 
nicht nur verdammt, sondern auch verpflichtet, denn nur in der Angst erfahrt er und bestatigt er seine 
widersinnige Seinsstruktur. Die Wunde der Negativitat ist daher offen Z\l halten" (Philosophie in der 
veranderten Welt. 397-98). From the later period cf. Pap XII A 592 (JP 1 :88): "The human being is a synthesis; 
but ac; 'spirit' is being introduced, it splits the compound of the synthesis and puts [it] together like a vertical 
angle. From this derives the circumstance that the more spirit, the stronger the reaction of flesh and blood, and 
from this derives actually what the apostle talks about, what cannot enter into the harmonious synthesis." (The 
translation is mine. The reference is most likely to I Cor. 15 :50, "I tell you this brethren; flesh and blood cannot 
enter into the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable. ") One may state the matter as 
follows: where Hegel is able to mediate the elements that have faIlen into self-estrangement in the self-positing 
of spirit, Kierkegaard is obliged to let them stand. Having consigned temporality and corporeality to 
"sinfulness" (rather than treating them as casualties of sinfulness) reconciliation is out of the question (even 
via the paradox) and the dialectical unity of the person destroyed. 
I02Schulz in fact intimates as much when he describes man's ontological structure as "absurd" (widersinnig)--
quite apart from its qualification by sin! 
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passed over into eternity."lo3 If the revocation of finitude was intended for subjectivity in 
the state of innocence, how much more so now that it has come to signify sin! 
Given this evidence from the early part of the authorship, there can be little doubt 
that finitude is an accidental accoutrement that is to be sloughed off in the process of 
becoming spirit.104 It is, at the very best, a provisional stage in spirit's career that is to be 
entirely superseded. The consequences of the imposition of the schema of absolute 
subjectivity in its Kierkegaardian variant upon Christian theology should by now be clear. 
For one thing, the doctrine of the goodness of creation is irreparably compromised. This 
becomes evident when SK couches the Christian's duty in terms of dying to temporality 
I03SV IV 363 (Concept of Anxiety, 93). Adam's sin consisted in using his freedom to "lay hold of finitude" 
rather than renounce it. God created and preserved the world for justthis purpose (Pap X2 A 241 [JP 2: 1399]). 
Legstrup writes: "Man has received earthly existence only in order to die to it. ... Because eternity is 
everything, temporality is nothing" (Opger med Kierkegaard [Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1967],57). 
I04Earlier we observed that existence is a striving "directed toward the infinite," "a process ofinfinitizing" 
(SV VII 72 [Postscript. 92], emphasis added). While existence is a child begotten by both "the infinite and the 
finite, the eternal and the temporal," it is not a friendly synthesis of the two. On the contrary, it is a process of 
"becoming" through "struggle" (p. 73 [92-93]). And this means: becoming more infinite. Kierkegaard is 
explicit about this: "As an existing person ... composed of the finite and the infinite, he ... is supposed to 
become one of the parts, and one does not become both parts simultaneously, because one is that by being an 
existing person" (p. 364 [420]). Of course the question arises, "How is it possible to divest oneself of finitude 
so long as one is situated in existence?" The answer is, that though nominally one remains in the finite and the 
temporal, one's goal is to have these only as a veneer, an accident, an incognito, all the while that one is 
becoming infinitized and assuming ever more of the eternal. This is the "hidden inwardness." 
It is to be noted that we find in Fichte the same tendency to forsake the temporal and finite in favor 
of the eternal and infinite. Like Kierkegaard, he enjoins asceticism and renunciation of the world: "Den Sinn, 
mit welch em man das ewige Leben ergreift, erhiilt man nur dadurch, dass man das Sinnliche und die Zwecke 
desselben wirklich aufgiebt undaufopfert flirdas Gesetz, das lediglich unseren Willen in Anspruch nimmt, und 
nicht unsere Thaten .... Erst durch diese Verzichtleistung auf das Irdische tritt der Glaube an das Ewige hervor 
in unserer Seele, und wird isolirt hingestellt, als die einige Stiitze, an die wir uns noch halten konnen, nachdem 
wir alles Andere aufgegeben, -- als daseinige belebende Princip, das unseren Busen noch hebt und unser Leben 
noch begeistert. Wohl muss man, nach den Bildern einer heiligen Lehre, der Welt erst absterben und 
wiedergeboren werden, urn in das Reich Gottes eingehen zu konnen" (Fichtes Werke, 2:292 [The Vocation of 
Man, 145]). Fichte calls those persons who, for ethico-religiouc; reasons, forsake this life "practical 
transcendental idealists": "Diejenigen, die da sagen durften: Unser BGrgerrecht ist im Himmel, wir haben hier 
keine bleibende Statte, sondern die zukUnftige suchen wir; diejenigen, deren Hauptgrundsatz es war, der Welt 
abzusterben, von neuem geboren zu werden, und schon hier in ein anderes Leben einzugehen, -- setzten ohne 
Zweifel in alles Sinnliche nicht den mindesten Werth, und waren, urn des Ausdruckes der Schule mich zu 
bedienen, praktisch transcendentale Idealisten" (2:308 [164]). 
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rather than to sin. lo5 This implication of his anthropology he does not find at all disturbing 
since Christianity itself forbids the enjoyment of creation.I06 Indeed, the view that cre-
ation is something to be enjoyed by man is a Jewish teaching. lo7 This distinction between 
Christian and Jewish attitudes toward creation of course has a Marcionite ring to it; 
accordingly, it comes as no surprise that some have observed a gnostic bias on the part of 
105 Because Kierkegaard's anthropology opposes pairs of a synthesis: body/soul, finitude/infinity, and 
temporality/eternity, and identifies one element of each pair with sinfulness, the cancellation of that element 
becomes imperative. Striking is the absence of a category such as "flesh" to denote the orientation of the whole 
person away from God. In its stead corporeality, temporality, and finitude assume that function. As such 
Kierkegaard shows himself to have far more in common with ancient idealism than with Pauline and Lutheran 
thought. His anthropology has been influenced by idealist ontology and, as a consequence, so too have his 
hamartiology and soteriology. "Dying to" is necessary to salvation, butthis is not conceived in the first instance 
as dying to sin, but to temporality, to that which is earthly (Pap XS A 19,25, 142 [JP 3:3768, 3:3769, 
3 :3097]). As such the denial of self becomes tantamount to the denial of life (Legstrup, Opger med Kierke-
~ 43). "That Christianity is paradoxical can easily be seen from this one thing alone, that to the question, 
'What is life's purpose, what is the task?' it answers: 'To die to. To die to.' That is to say, God created this world 
of living things and put man in it and deposited in man this enormous zest for life, and life's significance and 
task is: to die to, to die to!" (Pap XS A 142 [JP 3:3097], translation mine). Cf. SV XIV 265 (Attack upon 
Christendom. 224): "This is what God wills ... ,He would have the life out of everyone that is born, have him 
transformed into a deceased person, one who lives as though dead." Why so? Because of the intractable gulf 
that SK's ontology assumes between time and eternity at the outset. 
106"Perhaps you are saying, 'But it is after all God himself who has created this world with all its loveliness 
and joy, so it is really a self-contradiction on his part that Christianity then comes along and transforms 
everything into sin and makes the demand that of "dying to.''' To this I have, in a certain sense, nothing to 
answer--such does not concern me. If only it stands fast that it is Christianity'S teaching, then I have nothing 
to do with such objections. But beyond this, is it not a self-contradiction on your part that you accept a holy 
scripture that is God's Word, accept Christianity as divine teaching--and when you happen upon something that 
cannot be reconciled with your head or your feeling, that you say, 'It is a self-contradiction on God's part,' 
instead of it being a self-contradiction on your part since either you must entirely reject this divine teaching, 
or entirely get used to it as it is?"--Pap ~ A 260 (JP 3:2888). cr. Pap ~ A 482 (JP 3:2437): "'But,' I hear 
someone say, 'Is not the God whom I am to love ... the same God who has created all of this splendid world? 
How, then, could it be contrary to his will that I love it, rejoice in it, in his gifts? Do not the sparrow and the 
lily so rejoice, and all of nature with them?' To this Christianity must answer, 'Nonsense.' In the first place, do 
you know whether the lily and the sparrow also rejoice? In the second place, if you can rejoice in the same way 
as the lily and the sparrow, then please, do so. But you cannot. For the sparrow and the lily and all of 
nature's life are simply compounded-the sparrow is no two-fold nature, no synthesis, for it there is no 
either-or .... Only man is a two-fold nature. And further [as regards] this entire world of which you speak--it 
is questionable whether God can be said to have created it, all of this culture-world which is a human work. 
'But then is not man the most miserable of creatures, destined from God's hand to be unhappy, or to be obliged 
to make himself unhappy?' To this I must answer: this is not at all what is at issue. What is at issue is: what is 
Christianity'S view" (translations and emphasis mine). Finally, Pap Xe A 199 (JP 1 :729): "Listen to the 
newborn infant's cry in thehourofbirth--see the death struggle in the final hour--and then declare whether what 
begins and ends in this way can be intended to be enjoyment." 
107Pap Xl A 426 (JP 1 :843), ~ A 572 (JP 2:2222) and XII A 565 (JP 1 :728). 
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Kierkegaard against corporeality. lOS In the late Papirer such a bias becomes particularly 
apparent. In reading the following entry, for example~ one could be forgiven if one thought 
that one were reading a paraphrase of Plato's myth of the cave. 
This is Christianity's view. Man is a fallen spirit. And as, for example, in 
Russia a nobleman who has committed an offense is put among the troops as a 
simple man as his punishment, in the same way the fallen spirit is put in that slave 
get-up, which is the body, and sent to this penal institution, which is the world, on 
account of his sins. 
But just as those common folk among whom the nobleman was put do not 
notice that it is a punishment but are well satisfied, the same goes for these countless 
battalions of spiritless animal-creatures among whom the Christian was put; they are 
very delighted and satisfied, find it to be just a splendid world, regard the slave get-
up as a costume to deck themselves out in, find it splendid to eat, drink, crap, 
propagate. 109 
We have, if you will, the ~-reditus schema that we observed in Hegel and the early 
Kierkegaard, only here it bears far greater resemblance to Neoplatonism than anything else. 
Earthly life is a "penalty of suffering" imposed upon fallen, immortal spirits; the body is a 
slave outfit, the world a penal institution--a notion that occurs repeatedly in the final 
years."O The world is said to "have come into existence through a falling away from God, 
exists against his will ... is a world of freedom that freely fell away from him and that he 
wants to have back. This world, as far as God is concerned, is lost--that is once and for all 
decided. Everyone who is born merely increases the masses of the damned."lll From this 
IOSE.g., Knud Hansen, "Derandere Kierkegaard. Zu Seren Kierkegaards Christentumsverstandnis," infurum 
Kierkegaard. ed. Heinz-Horst Schrey, Wege der Forschung, vol. 179 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 140; K. E. Legstrup, Qpger med Kierkegaard, 133; and Heinrich Traugott Voge~ 
"Christus als Vorbild und Versohner. Eine kritische Studie zum Problem des Verhiiltnisses von Gesetz und 
Evangelium im Werke Soren Kierkegaards" (Inaugural diss., Humboldt University, Berlin, 1968), 261. 
I09Pap XII A 209 (JP 6:6881), translation mine. 
1I0Pap XII A 289, 292, 423; Xe A 202, 223, 224,420 (JP 3:3643,4:4733,6:6898; 4:3970, 4:5037, 2:1519); 
SV XIV 264-66 (Attack upon Christendom. 223-25). 
IIIPap XI2 A 434 (JP 2:1940), translation mine. Kierkegaard was not alone among his contemporaries in 
possessing Neoplatonist tendencies. Influenced by Jacob Boehme, both Franz von Baader and Schelling 
referred the sensible world's existence to a cosmic Fall. Kierkegaard owned some twenty volumes by von 
Baader, five by SchelJing, and possessed some knowledge of each thinker while yet a student (see H. P. Rohde, 
ed., The Auctioneer's Sales Record of the Libraxy of Seren Kierkegaard [Copenhagen: The Royal Library, 
1967], items 391-418 (by von Baader) and 763-67 (by or about Schelling). 
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bleak view of the utter incorrigibility of corporeal existence there derives the special 
criminality of procreation. l12 However great Christ's satisfaction for sin may be, it does 
not extend to the sin of knowingly bringing other immortal spirits into this realm where they 
must suffer existence as animal-creatures and in the end, in all probability, go to their dam-
nation.113 The late Kierkegaard is very explicit in his contention that redemption is not for 
this corporeal life. On the contrary, the elect few are saved from this life. This happens once 
they have satisfied the purpose for which they were given life in the first place: viz., "to be 
brought to the highest degree of weariness of life.,,1l4 
A second fatality of the schema of absolute subjectivity is traditional Christian 
ethics. We have previously noted how participation in the institutions that define public 
morality (marriage, family, congregation, vocation) is supplanted by individual duty to attain 
to absolute spirit. This loss of a universal Sittlichkeit results from the loss of reference to a 
world-grounding and ordering truth, as previously observed. In Lutheran dogmatics such 
universal morality has traditionally been understood by the designations, "orders of creation" 
and "law in its first use." Law, in this sense, denotes the creative will of God, with which 
man is commanded to live in conformity. The fact that this aspect of ethics goes by the board 
for Kierkegaard is eloquent testimony to the absence of significance that creation possesses 
Il2Pap Xe A 202 (JP 3:3970); SV XIV 254, 264-65 (Attack upon Christendom. 214,223). 
113Pap Xe A 242 (JP 4:4051). 
114Pap XI2 A 439 (JP 6:6969), emphasis added. Pap XII A 565 (JP 1 :728), and again, SV XIV 265 (Attack 
upon Christendom. 224). I would be remiss not to point out the similarity to Arthur Schopenhauer. Like 
Kierkegaard, he had nothing but scorn for Hegel. Somewhat like Kierkegaard, he considered life the original 
sin, and moreover, its own hell and punishment (SK considers the giving of life to be the sin). Like 
Kierkegaard, he advocated quenching the will to live through willed suffering and annihilation. And like 
Kierkegaard, he consigned the individual to the most complete isolation. The later Kierkegaard was not 
unaware ofthe similarities, though he found them overshadowed by even greater differences: Schopenhauer's 
Indian point of departure, his mendacity in recommending a'5cetic withdrawal without practicing it, and his 
view that this life just is suffering. (If this is so, then asceticism, which enhances the suffering, is really a 
perverse kind of eudaemonism, says Kierkegaard. In opposition to this SK contends that life is enj oyable, that 
Christian asceticism has the point of extinguishing the enjoyment, thereby causing life to be suffering.) 
Commenting on this similarity-in-difference, Kierkegaard prefaces a journal entry as follows: "A. S. 
(Remarkably enough, I am named: S. A. We are also surely inversely related.) is undeniably an important 
author; he has greatly interested me, and I have been surprised to discover, in spite of a total disagreement, an 
author who touches me so much" (Pap XII A 144 [JP 4:3877]; cf. Pap XII A 181 [JP 4:3881]). 
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for his thought. IIS SKIs anthropology envisages an abstract self that freely disposes over 
the world and itself; sovereignty is vested in isolated, "deworlded" subjectivity.116 This 
totally ignores, as K. E. Legstrup has pointed out, the "sovereign manifestations of life" 
(e.g., compassion and trust) that spontaneously well up in us, and make us what we in fact 
are, if not otherwise hampered by calculation.117 When Kierkegaard contends that abstract 
subjectivity is left to its own experimentation with itself, experimentally to construct itself, 
lI~ortensen, "En redeg0relse," 175-76. 
ll~is same acosmism--in its own way--holds true ofFichtean subjectivity. While Fichte may seem to give 
greater weight to intersubjectivity than does Kierkegaard (e.g., Fichtes Werke. 2 :316-17 [The Vocation of Man, 
173-74]), the intersubjective moral universe is really the affair ofInfinite WiIl--each person has enough to do 
with the observance of his or her particular duty. As frequently mentioned, the natural and intersubjective 
domains possess importance only insofar as they provide the instrumentality and field for the Ego's free, self-
positing activity. And in this respect, finite subjectivity is no different than infinite subjectivity. It operates as 
a microcosm unto itself, its self-productive activity mirroring that ofthe Ego: "Ohne Aussicht auf irgend einen 
begreiflichen undsichtbaren Zweck, ohne Untersuchung, obaus meinem Willen irgend etwas Anderes erfolge; 
als das Wollen selbst, soIl ich gesetzmassig wollen. Mein Wille steht allein da, abgesondert von allem, was er 
nicht selbst ist, bloss durch sich, und fUr sich selbst seine Welt" (2:290 [142]). Cf. 2:311 (167). 
1I7L0gstrup, Opg0rmed Kierkegaard. 95-96: "Kierkegaard did not give the sovereign manifestations ofHfe 
a thought. And this is no accident. He is forced to ignore them in order to maintain self-reflection's role. For 
that the manifestations of life are sovereign means that in them the person is--ac; a matter of course--himself. 
The person does not need to reflect upon his own act of making himself independent, he does not need to reflect 
upon the act of becoming himself, he has only to realize himself in the sovereign life-manifestation--then does 
the life-manifestation, not reflection, see to it that the person is himself. Kierkegaard is mistaken when he 
supposes that only by means ofa religious reflection can the person solve the task of becoming a self, ac; if we 
were not fitted with sovereign life-manifestations that solve the task for us .... But what has become of the 
sovereign life-manifestations? If they are notto be found in Kierkegaard, then ~mething must be found in their 
stead! And so there is--namely, philistinism. The sovereign manifestations of life are swallowed up by 
conformism, drowned in that existence wherein the one apes the other. The alternative with which Kierkegaard 
everywhere operates is either to live in relation to the infinite idea, orto live in conformity. The demands that 
are made upon us are either eternity's or conformity's .... But the alternative is false. The sovereign life-
manifestation, too, has a claim upon us and can have it becauc;e it is definitive; it is not we who first form it out 
of indeterminate mental abilities." 
And again, (p. 102): "The capital error in Kierkegaard--which the existentialists, those philosophical 
as well as theological, have inherited--is that he and they with him reserve solely to the individual's choice, 
decision, and freedom the power to make life definitive, as if our existence were not already in advance 
something definitive in each of its so to speak anonymous life-manifestations. What alone is up to the 
individual's choice, decision and freedom is either to fulfil that which is definitive, is already there in advance 
with the sovereign life-manifestation wherein the individual consummates himself--or to disregard that which 
is definitive." 
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he in reality advocates either affectation or outright dishonesty. \18 The result is the inclos-
ing reserve [Indesluttethedl that, on his view, can only be overcome by delivering oneself 
up entirely to the eternal's miraculous intervention. But because this solution is abstractly 
conceived, lacking every reference to "the possibilities for healing that factual life offers 
with its possibilities for spontaneous unfolding of life" in the created orders, the reserve is 
only deepened. Such possibilities "lie beyond Kierkegaard's perspective since the factual, 
the temporal and earthly life has nothing to do with eternity. It exists only to be sacrificed, 
not to be lived.,,119 
But as we have also observed, specifically Christian love of one's neighbor also goes 
by the board. Certainly this does not appear to be the case when one reads certain works of 
the middle period. For example in the discourse, "The Joy of It--That the Poorer Thou Dost 
Become, the Richer Thou Canst Make Others," we encounter what seem to be straightfor-
ward statements of Luther's "faith active in love." We are told that the spiritual goods--faith, 
hope and love--cannot be selfishly kept to oneself; rather they inexorably communicate 
themselves to others.120 Likewise in Works of Love the essence of Christian love is said 
to be that of "loving forth" love from others, and in so doing, building them Up.121 The 
discourse, "You shall Love Your Neighbor," designates Christianity "the true ethic,,122 
precisely because there is nothing of preferential love, and hence egoism, in it. On the 
contrary, Christian love seeks selflessly to benefit all without distinction. On the other hand, 
118Ibid., 101-2: "The person that Kierkegaard describes says: When I speak and act, I experiment with my 
speech and action, I am not in my reply or action, I am always outside it. But this is impossible; one of two 
things happens. Either he is, in his speech and action itself, the affected person that he is. Affectation has 
become his second nature. And it is a vain conceit in which he is ensnared when he believes that, because he 
puts on an act, he is outside his speech and gestures, as if his affectation were only a play while he himself is 
supposed to remain outside it, intact--i.e., unaffected. He is deeply involved in his affectation, not merely with 
skin and all, but with himself. Or the person is notoriously outside his reply or action as the liar, hypocrite and 
deceiver who pretends that his reply or action is true, sincere and honorable." 
119Ibid., 103-4. 
120SV X 119-28 (Christian Discourses, 119-28). 
121SV IX 201-15 (Works of Love, 199-212). 
122Ibid., 53 (64). 
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it has also been observed that such nonpreferentiallove is enjoined principally for the sake 
of one's own relationship with God. To be sure, the elimination of the distinction "mine" 
and "yours" accrues to the neighbor's good. Yet Kierkegaard characterizes this not so much 
as an act of love intended to benefit the neighbor (this is, as it were, an incidental result) as 
an act of self-renunciation whereby God is won.123 Nonpreferentiallove is presented as 
but another instance of dying to temporality's ensnaring relationships, by which proceeding 
one more and more attains to "spirit." 
In journals of the later Kierkegaard this tendency naturally becomes more 
pronounced. Again and again "dying to" is presented as the principal Christian duty. Christ 
himself provides the paradigm for this. To be sure, he died in order to redeem us. And 
equally certain, he alleviated earthly need. Yet it is Christ's exemplification of what it means 
to exist as spirit under the conditions of existence, not his embodiment of selfless love, that 
captivates Kierkegaard.124 The alleviation of human need in which Christ engaged while 
on earth, for example, is entirely subordinated to his embodiment of "absolute spirit" before 
us humans.12S Christ came, we are told, in order to introduce the qualification, "spirit. " 126 
In his role as model he expressed what it means to have died to the world: "For Christ did 
not lecture about dying to the world, rather he himself is, existentially, what it means to die 
i23See, e.g., SV IX 346 (Works of Love, 335) where SK says of self-renunciation that it has "its own 
intrinsic reward, although in addition it also has the purpose, through praising [Christian] love insofar as one 
is able, ofwinning men to it." Cf. also p. 256 (251). Kierkegaard acknowledges both purposes of Christian love. 
But he ever places the accent upon self-renunciation, not self-renunciation for the sake of the neighbor. This 
is a direct consequence of his understanding of persons as isolated sUbjectivities whose duty it is to attain to 
spirit. 
12'1.0gStrup, Qpg0rmed Kierkegaard. 34: Kierkegaard "proceeds from the assumption that eternity lived in 
temporality, the divine lived in the world, must be a life in suffering. Therefore the God in time had to be 
crucified, and that not first at Golgotha but from the beginning on. The whole of his life had to be a life in 
suffering, from first to last." Mortensen endorses this assessment of the a priori necessity of Christ's sufferings, 
based upon what are essentially ontological grounds ("En redegmelse," 78). 
125See Pap X2 A 86 (JP 1 :347) where Christ's relief of human need is described as an assuagement, not of 
the need itself, but of the far greater suffering that he inflicts by bringing the qualification of "spirit" to bear 
in such concentrated form: "If for only one single day Christ had expressed what it is to be absolute spirit, the 
human race would have blown up." See also Pap XJ A 393 (JP 4:4894). 
126Pap XI2 A 246 (JP 4:4359). 
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to the world.,,127 The collision that he evoked was the collision between temporality and 
etemity,128 between "animal-being" and "spirit-being.,,129 
Within the framework of absolute spirit, then, Christian ethics ceases to be a matter 
of faith active in love, and even less a matter of conformity to God's will within the orders 
of creation. Instead, Kierkegaard's idealist premises lead him to exchange Luther's ethic of 
vocation for an imitatio piety that is of unparalleled rigor: imitating God in his perfectly 
realized subjectivity. Luther's ethic is regarded as an adulteration of true Christianity.130 
Certainly Kierkegaard's critique of Luther's two kingdom teaching is mounted in part on the 
basis of his ethical rigorism and commitment to the theol02ia crucis. Yet we see that there 
is another dynamic at work as well--one that is most unlutheran in its origins.13l Here 
127Pap x3 A 171 (lP 2:1864). 
12BPap xe A 130, p. 142 (JP 2:1447): "The suffering, that it must be, is bound up with God's majesty. His 
majesty is so infinite that only the paradoxical can designate it or be the expression for it, and the paradoxical 
is: to be so majestic as to have to make the loved one miserable .... The suffering is bound up with the fact that 
God and man are qualitatively different and that the collision between temporality and eternity within 
temporality must yield suffering" (translation mine). 
129Pap Xe A 246, p. 256 (JP 4:4359): "Spirit put together with an existence as animal-creature yields 
suffering, the more spirit the more suffering" (translation mine). 
130Pap X A 394 (JP 3:2541). 
DIThe best light that is to be put UpO:l SK's rejection of life within the orders of creation stems from the 
observations on the theologia crucis broached in chapter six. There it was argued that it is impossible for the 
Christian to exercise a secular office in a Christian way without suffering the world's reprisal. While, for his 
part, Luther can certainly envisage such conflicts in practice, he will not admit of any conflict in principle 
between the perfonnance of secular and religious duty. God cannot possibly have intended the annulment of 
his Old Testament laws concerning national, congregational, and family life by a new standard of conduct 
proclaimed by Christ. Rather, by means of the one God rules with his "left hand," by means of the other he 
rules with his "right." On Luther's view, Christ's demand that his followers renounce all earthly goods 
(including family ties) was intended to be fulfilled, not by an actual external disavowal of family but by an 
inner process of renunciation--an absconditum whereby one possesses, but as though one does not possess. 
Accordingly, all the while that one remains externally bound to family and other relationships (per God's law 
in its first use) one secretly withdraws from these and so fulfills Christ's command. Thereby the Pauline injunc-
tion, "having nothing and yet possessing aU things," is realized {see Werner Eiert, Das christliche Ethos 
[Tiibingen: Furche-Verlag, 1949], 343 [The Christian Ethos, trans. Carol 1. Schindler (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1957),262]). 
Kierkegaard himselfheld this position early on (cf. Fear and Trembling's "knight offaith" who makes 
the double movement of resignation and faith, as well as the Postscript's "knight of the hidden inwardness" who 
relates absolutely to God while relating relatively to everything else). Luther's two kingdom ethic, in fact, fit 
well with Kierkegaard's view that inward appropriation of the relationship with God is incommensurable with 
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above all it becomes exceedingly clear that while Kierkegaard has brilliantly deployed 
Luther's theology of the cross in order to secure Christianity from speculative idealism's 
pantheistic melding of God and man, this same idealism (in transmuted form) has reasserted 
itself with a vengeance, the theolo~a crucis having been only partially deployed. Where 
Kierkegaard has drawn but one lesson from the incarnation, viz., that it is an offense to 
reason, Luther has drawn a second: that corporeality has borne the divine and thereby 
demonstrated its commensurability with it. This truncation in meaning that the incarnation 
outward expression. But as becomes evident in later writings, the mature Kierkegaard decisively rejects the two 
kingdom teaching. In part this is due to his awareness of the "fig lear' that the hidden inwardness had become 
for Lutheranism's "refined epicurism." But more seriously, it is due to his realization that the Christian's inner 
heterogeneity is not only incommensurable with outward relationships, but incompatible with them. His 
thinking seems to be as follows. Although the fallen world continues to be God's creation, held in a state of 
preservation by the restraining influence of God's law, this law hao; itself been taken captive to the powers of 
destruction and assumed its place among them. Luther and Paul share this view, at least as regards the law's 
second use: sin has taken the proclamation of the law as an occasion to awaken evil desire within us; 
accordingly, the law can only reveal the presence of sin and in so doing condemn--it has no transformative 
power. But Kierkegaard sees this as true of the law in its first use as well (it, too, has come to signify 
"sinfulness," to recall SK's claim regarding temporality and sensuousness). The orders of creation, though 
preserved after the fall, are preserved in an impaired state. Hence Kierkegaard poses the question: is it not 
inconsistent of Lutheran ethics to consider faith and renunciation an absconditum that does not come into 
conflict with the law in its first use when the latter does not represent the orders of creation as God established 
them, but as sin has corrupted them? And what of Luther's teaching that the Christian must needs suffer the 
world's opposition? If he had held it with consistency, he would have affirmed that the world has enshrined 
itself in the orders of creation so that these are now so vitiated by egoism that the Christian cannot but come 
into conflict with them. Certainly Christ and the apostles did, and this is proof that the true Christian will, too. 
Accordingly in Judge for Yourself! (p. 170 [SV XII 441)) Kierkegaard makes much of the fact that Christ had 
no bond of connection--not with a wife nor mother nor brothers--not even with his disciples, since to do so 
would be to disobey the commandment to serve God alone. 
While this account has recourse to Kierkegaard's theologia crucis premises in attempting to explain 
his rejection ofthe law in its political use, those premises cannot explain the extreme position in which he lands 
so that all human society is denied and "the theological horizon of creation lost" (Anz, Kierkegaard und der 
deutsche Idealismus. 77-78). In the final analysis recourse must be had to Kierkegaard's idealist understanding 
of the person as isolated, "deworlded" subjectivity. Wilhelm Anz writes: "Die Geistesexistenz Kierkegaards 
ist ganz ungeborgen, sie kennt nurden absoluten Aktus des Existierens, in dem aile vorausliegende Wesenheit 
negiert wird. Gemessen an diesem Mal3stabe mul3 jede Weise naturbafter Humanitat, also das Erotische und 
die Ehe, und mul3 die geschichtliche Gemeinschaft, also Staat und Gesellschaft ... den Sinn verlieren, den sie 
innerhalb des zweckma!3igen Ganzen einer Welt hatten, die immer noch als Analogie zur SchOpfung verstanden 
werden konnte. Jetzt erst werden christliche Geistesexistenz und humanes Dasein unvereinbar. jedoch 
nicht deshalb. weil Kierkegaard der radikale Christ ist, als den wir ihn kennen, sondern weil er das 
Grundprinzip des modernen Denkens: das absolute (d. h. das aus sich selbst beginnende und seiner 
unbedingt machtige) SelbstbewuOtsein in die christlklte Gewissenserfahrung mitbringt und, von ihr 
angetrieben, iiberspannt. Nunmehr ist der Mensch zu einem Wesen geworden, das nicht leben und nicht 
sterben kann, weil es nirgends mehr Geschopf sein darf und Gberall der SchOpfer seiner selbst sein mu13" (pp. 
74-75, emphasis added). 
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undergoes in Kierkegaard's thought is due, at least in part, to his retention of the framework 
of absolute subjectivity in his anthropology.132 But this retention--and its resultant recast-
ing of man all too much in God's image--could have been avoided if the incarnation's 
sacramental character had been seriously addressed at the outset. 
In any case, from the extremeness of the similitudo Dei that Kierkegaard's 
anthropology presupposes there devolves the most overtaxing effort to emulate God's 
absolute subjectivity. Anz observes: "This infinite actualization on the part of the person is--
Kierkegaard says so himself--an Uberspanntheit. The human being is not equal to the infinity 
of his person; he cannot be at all equal to it."m This being the case, an ineluctable 
suffering attends the human being's stupendous efforts at imitating God.134 Here we have 
the ideational component of which we spoke at the conclusion of the preceding chapter 
when we summarized the sundry factors that were responsible for Kierkegaard's remaining 
standing at the cross. Kierkegaard cannot get beyond Easter eve for the simple reason 
that his conception of "spirit existence" will not allow him to. Nothing but the most 
unremitting striving and suffering is possible within the framework of absolute subjectivity. 
This absurde Ubermenschlichkeit Anz considers to be "the internally necessary consequence 
of the existential dialectic.,,13s It is a consequence that, as we shall see in our concluding 
chapter, has a fateful bearing for Kierkegaard's grace teaching. Anz, points the way in which 
that teaching must tend when he observes: 
132The insignificance that SK accords the world is not simply traceable to his absoluti7.ation of the self in 
the manner of idealism--it owes to his pietistic disdain for vulgar corporeality as weU. It is the latter that, at 
least in part, prompts Kierkegaard to exchange a romantic version of idealism for one that is Manichaean in 
outlook. 
133Anz, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus. 74. Cf. "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," 95-
96. 
I34Pap Xl A 279 (JP 1 :334): "I constantly return to this dialectic: Christ comes into the world in order to save 
men, to make them etemaUy happy ... and yet Christianity itself teaches that to be a true Christian is, humanly 
speaking, to be the most wretched of aU, that consequently Christianity makes a person, humanly speaking, 
more wretched than he would otherwise be. This I have understood only in this way, that there is a collision 
between the divine and the human qualities, that ... to be drawn up so high, is for a human being the greatest 
possible suffering, just as it would be for an animal if it were treated as a human being or if it were required 
to be a human being." 
135 Anz, "Philosophie und Glaube bei S. Kierkegaard," 105. 
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The more earnestly the believer recognizes in Christ the "Ideal"--Ideal means, 
however, the unity of the temporal and the eternal put to every person as his task--the 
more must the relationship of believing obedience (the acceptance of judgement and 
grace) be transformed into a relationship of contemporaneity or imitation. Con-
temporaneity can, within the horizon of the existential dialectic, mean nothing other 
than spirit-existence, life in the absolute moment. Kierkegaard has drawn this conse-
quence. In his late journals the teaching of forgiveness appears as a "Christianity in 
man's interest" that stands lower than "Christianity in God's interest," or the 
contemporaneity in which the spirit-existence stands with God. Such a spirit-exis-
tence is a higher order of human being since it has overcome the contradiction 
between spirit and body; it is, as Kierkegaard says, "burnt out into spirit" [Pap X3 A 
483 (JP 6:6683)]. Such "superhuman" spirit-existences cause Christiani~ to be true 
for the first time; they bring forth existential truth out of the doctrine. 13 
From this conception of authentic Christianity as "spirit-existence" there issues an 
understanding of grace as "indulgence"--a rather late development in Kierkegaard's thought 
that signals the revocation of Luther's teaching on grace. This is not a development that 
Kierkegaard had, in the beginning, intended.137 Nonetheless, "in the polemical defining 
of the opponent, as soon as grace is interpreted as 'world' [Le., as continuing attachment to 
the world], as renunciation of existential truth, the dialectic gains a compelling force against 
which Kierkegaard's own original knowledge of grace and forgiveness is unable to 
resist.,,138 It is the nature and extent of this revocation of Kierkegaard's earlier grace 
understanding that we seek now to make clear. 
D1bid., 104-5. 
I37Anz cites Pap X I A 246 (JP 2: 1852): "I must now be very careful--or rather, God will be very careful--that 
I not be led astray by gazing all too one-sidedly upon Christ as model. It is the [first] dialectical moment in 
relation to the next one: Christ as gift, as that which is granted us (to recall Luther's standing division). But 
dialectical as my nature is, it ever seems at the moment of dialectical passion as though the opposite notion did 
not exist at all--and then it comes, precisely for the first time and the most powerfully" (translation mine). 
D8Anz, "Fragen der Kierkegaardinterpretation I," 69. 
CHAPTER NINE 
THE COMPROMISE OF LUTHER'S TEACHING ON GRACE 
IN THE POLEMIC AGAINST LUTHERANISM 
We have observed that the later Kierkegaard considers Luther's ethic of vocation an 
adulteration of Christianity's true ethic: the imitation of Christ, who was absolute spirit. We 
indicated that the reformer's teaching on grace also comes increasingly under attack as 
encouraging craven attachment to the world. Luther's recognition of the enormity of 
Christianity's requirement and the necessity of grace resulted in a "knocking off with respect 
to the New Testament's, particularly the Gospels', requirement for being a Christian."l 
Compliance with the unconditional demand laid down by Christ in the New Testament was 
no longer recognized as feasible. The criticism that Kierkegaard directs at Luther is not that 
he arrived at this true insight (God's standard being, after all, unattainable ).2 It is rather that 
he recast Christianity in terms that toned down its demand and moreover implied that God 
had been forced to abandon his standard in order to accommodate human incapacity.3 On 
IPap XS 88 (JP 2: 1922). This "knocking ofr' meant that Christianity was translated from "God's interest" 
(Christ's perfect life) into "man's interest" (the atonement)--Pap ~ A 499 (JP 2: 1911 )--resulting in a 
deemphasis of imitation. The reader is referred to the concluding section of chapter 6 for detailed discussion 
of this aspect of SK's Luther-critique. 
2Pap XS A 88, 96 (JP 2:1922, 3:2898) and Pap XII A 297 (JP 3:2551). 
3"Luther understood the matter as follows: no human being can endure the anxiety that his striving is to be 
decisive for an eternal blessedness or eternal damnation. 'No, no,' says Luther, 'this can only lead to despair or 
presumption. And therefore (mark this well!) therefore (for Luther clearly alters New Testament Christianity 
by virtue of this "otherwise humanity must despair") therefore, neither is it so. You are saved by grace; calm 
down, you are saved by grace--and then see to it to strive as best you can'" (Pap XII A 297 [JP 3 :2551 D. Not 
only did Luther unwarrantably reduce Christianity by representing it principally as reassurance rather than 
unconditional demand, he did away with martyrdom and celibacy thereby domesticating what did remain of 
Christianity's demands, rendering them attainable to the one who "strives as best he can." That is to say, Luther 
effected a reduction of Christianity both in absolute and in relative terms, and did so on the basis of "human" 
considerations to which God had no choice but to accede. 
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his own authority Luther rescinded Christianity's absolute standard, prematurely exempting 
himself and his hearers from a judgement that should extend for the duration of life itself. 
In so doing, he epitomized the seditiousness of the human spirit that, reasoning by its own 
lights, sets itself up as absolute in the place of God.4 
Despite his criticism that Luther usurped the divine prerogative by taking it upon 
himself to reduce Christianity's demands, and despite his criticism as to the su bstance of the 
Lutheran reduction (Christianity as, foremost, reassurance and a tranquil domestic life), 
Kierkegaard nevertheless expresses agreement as to the need for a reduction. Yet it is 
precisely this characterization of grace as a "reduction" (or "indulgence" as he is wont to call 
it) that begs for clarification, for it flies in the face of Kierkegaard's repeated denunciations 
of "reduction" and "indulgence peddling."s More disturbingly, it seems to imply that the 
gospel is tantamount to a scaling down of Christianity's requirement--one that effectively 
leaves the Christian in a state of continued subjection to law, albeit an attenuated law. Such 
talk of "reduction" immediately arouses Lutheran suspicions. What Luther effected was not 
a reduction of the New Testament's requirement for being a Christian, or a "scaling down" 
of what could realistically be expected of human beings. What he effected was none other 
than a total abrogation of what could be expected, the total rescission--not reduction--of 
what God requires of man for justification. What is the meaning of this strange use of terms 
by Kierkegaard, who contends that God's "indulgence" occasions no change in his absolute 
standard, it remaining the standard by which we are judged and impelled to flee to grace for 
our righteousness in toto? Why does Kierkegaard himself speak of a scaling down? It is the 
aim of this concluding chapter to elucidate this confusing state of affairs by placing the later 
Kierkegaard's remarks about grace within the soteriological framework of absolute spirit. 
We shall discover that grace in that context does not signify the perfect righteousness that 
we receive from God here and now, but rather a provisional indulgence that God grants us 
from striving in accordance with the demands of absolute spirit. 
4Pap xrt A 297 (JP 3:2551), XII A 572 (JP 3:2554) and XI2 A 194 (JP 3:2555). Cf. Pap XII A 87 (JP 
3:3618). 
5E.g., SV XII 410 (Judge for Yourself!. 132), Pap X2 A 460 (JP 1:516), and Pap ~ A 340 and 618 (JP 
2:1901 and 2:1486). 
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Certainly Kierkegaard is against indulgences in any crass sense of that term. For 
example, he spares Bishop Mynster no criticism for having suppressed Christianity's ideal 
requirement, "reducing" it in effect to that of bourgeois rectitude. In so doing, Mynster had 
sought to absolve himself and his hearers of all responsibility for submitting to divine judg-
ment.6 Similarly, Kierkegaard can fault Luther for having "reduced" the New Testament 
requirement to that of "striving as best one can" in the context of one's secular calling while 
relying upon grace for acceptance with God. Luther's recourse to grace was based upon the 
purely human consideration that "otherwise a man must despair.,,7 Consequently he threw 
off Christianity's unconditioned requirement that must judge the Christian for the duration 
of his life unless rescinded by God himself. "Reduction" as practiced by Mynster or even by 
Luther therefore signified the suppression or passing over of Christianity's unconditional 
requirement which, on Kierkegaard's contention, should be proclaimed in all its rigor and 
received with the humble admission that it is too high for us humans. 
On the other hand, Kierkegaard can speak positively of Luther's "reduction" when 
understood in the context of such proclamation and admission. As we have seen, some 
provision must be made for human incapacity. While Christianity's demand may in no way 
suffer attenuation, neither can the compliance of human beings be realistically exacted. 
"Reduction" in this sense can mean nothing less than total abrogation or rescission of the 
requirement as Luther understood it. 8 Kierkegaard agrees on the necessity of such rescission 
in absolute terms: if we are to be saved at all, it can only be by grace, sheer grace. 
Moreover, he can also agree on the need for a reduction of Christianity's demands in relative 
terms: the tasks put to one Christian cannot be identical to those put to another. It is just such 
a divinely authorized relaxation of Christianity's standard relative to the specific individual 
6Pap X2 A 75 (JP 6:6503). 
7Again, Pap XII A 297,572 and XI2 A 194 (lP 3:2551, 3:2554 and 2555). 
8Again, Pap XS A 88 and 96 (JP 2:1922 and 3:2898). 
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that Kierkegaard has in mind when he employs the term "indulgence" in its "positive" 
9 
sense. 
On that usage "indulgence" signifies not Luther's notion of a total and complete abro-
gation of Christianity's requirement, but a partial dispensation from it. Numerous texts from 
the Papirer employ the term "IndlJI~nts" in this sense. In each instance it designates an 
arrangement whereby one is released from striving in accordance with Christianity's strictest 
demands. to Still other texts speak of the same kind of relaxation of Christianity's standards, 
9It is to be noted that the expression, "indulgence"--like "reduction "--is generally used by Kierkegaard in 
a pejorative manner. Yet Kierkegaard always uses the term Aflad in such contexts (Danish Lutheranism's 
typical designation for Catholic indulgences), thereby distinguishing it from indulgence in the positive sense 
(lndulgents). As for the expression, "knocking ofr' or "reducing" (at slaa af paa), Kierkegaard uses it in 
connection with the "good" and "bad" reduction alike. That he nevertheless makes a distinction is reflected in 
a statement such as the following: "The truth is that the official proclamation has inadmissibly knocked ofr'--
Pap X3 A 483 (JP 6:6683), emphasis mine. 
IOPap X2 A 184, p. 146 (JP 6:6528): "What [Anticlimacus] has to say is something that we human beings 
would rather have consigned to oblivion. But yet it must be heard. Not as though everyone should do it or that 
blessedness should be made dependent upon whether I do it--oh, no. I acknowledge, after all, that my life does 
not express this either; but I humble myself under it, I consider [my life] an Indulgents. and my life has unrest." 
Pap X2 A 241, p. 182 (JP 2:1399): "That of which all Christendom and I have need is for one to step 
forward who, by being thoroughly strict toward himself, dared to be strict toward us so that we could be 
prompted to strive as well as to appreciate the Indulgents." 
Pap X3 A 72 (JP2:1476): "The requirement is the universal, what applies to all, the standard by which 
each is to be measured. The requirement is therefore what is to be proclaimed; the teacher's task is to proclaim 
the requirement, and so to cause unrest; he dare not reduce the requirement. The Indulgents is not to be 
proclaimed, neither can it be proclaimed since it involves entirely different things for different people and is 
their inmost private understanding with God. The proclamation ofthe requirement is to drive the people to God 
and Christ in order to see about finding out what Indulgents they need, what they dare pray for by way of 
Indulgents before God, all the while that the requirement's proclamation constantly keeps them close to God." 
In this entry God is said to be "the only DiSPensator over grace." A Dispensator is one who is authorized to 
grant a dispensation or make a special allowance. 
Pap X3 A 187, p. 148 (JP 1: 174): "It is my conviction (and I have never understood Christianity in any 
other way) that as strict as it is, it is also just as lenient. It is not granted to everyone, and neither is it 
unconditionally demandt:d of everyone, that he should live in poverty and abasement in the strictest sense. But 
he must be honest. he must sincerely confess that such a thing is too high for him and then in childlike fashion 
rejoice over his more lenient conditions since in the final analysis grace is the same for all .... As little as my 
own life resembles an ascetic's, just so little have I in the remotest way obligated any other person to lead such 
a life or passed judgement on a single person for not doing so--I who have, only in so small a way according 
to my powers, sought to obligate myself a little bit, and in any case have sought to make an admission 
concerning myself, and being mindful from the beginning that I am without authority. I have no suggestion to 
make as regards the religious establishment, not a single one. I am of the opinion for that matter that it can go 
on as it is if only each and every one, before God, would make an admission and force himself to remember 
it. But to my way of thinking what has demoralized Christendom and particularly Protestantism is that a clergy 
that is in conformity with worldliness down to the slightest particular has, instead of confessing that Christianly 
speaking it is an Indulgents. reversed the relationship and made this worldliness into something that is 
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albeit in other terms. For example, Pap XS A 64 (JP 2: 1492) refers to grace as a sort of ad 
hoc arrangement that is reached with God concerning the extent of one's liability to keep 
Christianity's demands. Here "grace" is simply a dispensation that one seeks from God--a 
dispensation over which God exercises sole disposa1. ii Other forms of expression as well 
indicate a graded continuum along which Christians are ranged as regards the degree of 
'Christianly speaking' far higher and truer than the true renunciation, i.e., truly living in poverty and abasement. 
The world has seen through this and this is why the clergy is without influence." 
Pap Xl A 347 (IP 2:1787): "Christian order of rank: (I)Ifyou possess means and would be perfect, 
then give everything to the poor. (2) If you possess means and would apply it toward one or another beneficial 
undertaking, this too is good. (3)lfyou possess means and would use it for the enjoyment oflife--but mark it 
well--in an admissible way: well, Christianity tolerates this. --(4) If you are to acquire--then Christianity would 
rather that you restrict yourself to the necessities in order to have all the more time for religious purposes rather 
than using a lot of time on acquiring in order to have all the more to consume. Christianity is suspicious of the 
acquisition of money. At the same time, Christianity is still lenient if you will understand it as an Indulgents 
that you are allowed to use so much time on acquiring. But if you make acquisition into life's serious concern, 
then you have fallen away from Christianity." 
Pap Xl A 437 (JP 3:3318) Regarding Christianity's requirement to suffer for the truth and maintain 
heterogeneity to this world: "The most lenient suggestion seems to me that one, at the very least, submit to it 
being said without anyone therefore being condemned, but that every individual, like I myself, be directed to 
grace and Indulgents." 
Pap X" A 377, p. 223 (JP 6:6778): Concerning the challenge that Practice in Christianity's "Moral" 
presented to the religious establishment: "This is the formula for an established Christianity: it is an Indulgents. 
'grace' must be brought to bear here. If the establishment does not view itself in this way, if it does not bring 
grace to bear here, then we are in disagreement." (Translations mine) 
IIPap XS A 64 (JP 2: 1492): "'Grace'--The Christian requirement is infinite. It must be proclaimed. Everyone 
must, as concerns grace which also is to be proclaimed, apply to God himself and come to a personal 
understanding with God in his own conscience concerning where and how he resorts to grace. But I have no 
right to say to another person whose life does not express the requirement, 'Put your mind at ease by means of 
grace.' No, no, grace is the prerogative of God's majesty; God alone has the right to say to the individual, 'There 
is grace.' It is mine to proclaim that there is grace, infinite grace, but I dare not [decide] for another person 
where he dare apply grace so as to diminish striving or offer reassurance in that respect. The matter is different 
in relation to a dying person, for there is essentially no question of a striving for him. But this is the frightful 
deception that runs throughout all of Christendom: that the human authority has taken possession of 'grace' and 
now trades in it, at times selling it for money, at times winning lovableness and esteem among people by 
confirming them in their carefree enjoyment oflife--for there is, after all, grace. No, no! This is the Christian 
exertion that must not be altered: that every person, as regards grace, must apply to God, come to an agreement 
with him, and that no person shall dare want to be an intermediary between God and another person as regards 
grace. Hence the infinite requirement is to be proclaimed--in order to chase the people, each and every one, to 
God--for there (so, too, does the proclamation, after all, sound) there is grace, but no person has the right to 
say to another: spare yourself, there is after all grace. But as stated, grace has been regarded in Christendom 
as an enormous deposit, a sort of testamentary deposit over which we people then mutually dispose. It is 
forgotten that God is not a deceased person--he lives and he reserves to himself the rightto be the only one who 
disposes over grace. To him and him alone must every individual therefore apply. And every Christian 
proclamation must refer the individual to him, 'for there is grace, infinite grace'" (translation mine). 
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observance that is required of them. For example, Kierkegaard can employ the notion of a 
"Christian order of rank" (christeli~ Ran~forordnin~) in this regard. Atop the order are those 
who are "true Christians in the strictest sense"--i.e., those who have not compromised with 
the world in any way and have therefore given themselves up to martyrdom. By comparison 
the rest of us have "been let off more easily.,,12 We belong to the ranks of "the Christians 
on the more lenient terms. ,,13 SK includes himself under this head, acknowledging that he, 
like most people, wants to be a Christian "on as easy terms as possible.,,14 The easiest terms 
of all are those on which one acknowledges Christianity's unconditional demand and admits 
that one's failure to strive in accordance therewith is "not really Christianity at all" but "a 
very toned-down conception, something distantly related to Christianity. "IS In all of these 
texts what is at issue is the notion of "getting off easier" by means of grace.16 
Even this rather substantial catalogue of terms, however, does not exhaust the means 
by which Kierkegaard develops the notion of grace qua "dispensation." The concept "grace 
12SV XII 208 (Practice in Christianity. 227). Cf. Pap X' A 296 (JP 6:6761) where SKcontrasts "Christians 
in the stricter sense" (those for whom Christ is Prototype in the stricter sense) with "Christians in the attenuated 
sense" (those for whom he is Prototype only in the sense of "humbling in the direction of inwardness"). Cf. also 
Pap X3 A 656 (JP 3 :2958) where he challenges each and every one to ask himself the question: "Dare you, here 
before God, dare you claim that you are a true Christian in the strictest sense? I guarantee that there is not a 
single one. Each one says: 'No, good Lord no, I flee to grace and am in a relationship of striving'" (translation 
mine). The notion of "what it means to be a Christian in the strictest sense" is first broached in the "Moral" of 
Practice in Christianity (p. 67 [SV XII 64]); that of being "essentially Christian" (a relationship of strict 
imitation in the situation of contemporaneity) a couple of pages prior. 
I3Pap X3 A 187 (IP 1: 174), quoted above as regards those who do not live in poverty and abasement. See 
also Pap X3 A 654 (JP 4:3829). 
14Pap X3 A 483 (IP 6:6683). Cf. Pap Xl A 272, p. 181 (JP 6:6389) where SK confides, "I believe, without 
saying too much about myself, that I am about the lowest of the lowest, in the eighth class." 
ISSV XII 417-18 (Judge for Yourself!, 141-42). Cf. pp. 464-66 (196-99) and 473 (207). 
16Pap X3 A 560 (JP 3:3757): "Really to renounce this entire life, to stake everything solely upon a future life 
so that one only gets trouble and toil and sufferings in this life--this is the most strenuous existence. Now then, 
perhaps someone finds this too difficult--well, then one sees to it that one gets off more leniently by means of 
grace, by praying for oneself, etc. But what have human beings come up with? They have come up with the 
impudent invention that staking everything in this way upon a future life is a very imperfect existence ... the 
perfect is the easier, or the easier is in addition the more perfect. See, this is an impudent rebellion against 
Christianity--and it is here that one must step in. This other lie is the dangerous one .... This lie is namely that 
of taking Luther's entire work in vain, it is that of transforming of Luther's spirituality into insolent worldliness" 
(translation mine). 
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at the first place" that he coins in the late journals likewise suggests such an understanding 
inasmuch as it can be applied in order "to spare with respect to the utmost of striving.,,17 
And still other expressions point in the same direction. For example, Kierkegaard can refer 
to grace as a "concession" shown by God to man's weakness.18 He can call it a "mediation 
for which one must pray"--Le., a moderation of Christianity's demand.19 He can speak of 
"Christianity in God's interest" as "the true Christianity" by comparison with which 
"Christianity in man's interest" is a "toned down accommodation.,,20 
If one seeks the point in Kierkegaard's published works at which grace is depicted 
as indulgence for the first time, the "Moral" to Practice in Christianity immediately comes 
17Pap ~ A 446 (JP 3:2559): "The more that a person stands by God, the closer that he comes to him, the 
more that he wills as God wills--then the more severe everything becomes, the more he suffers in this world. 
That this is so is certain. This is Christianity, is spirit, it lies in God's majesty, it cannot be otherwise. That God 
is nevertheless--or rather, precisely here--infinite, infinite love is just as certain. Oh, blessed are those glorious 
ones who are able to endure having to do with God in this way. That their salvation nevertheless also is 'grace' 
is equally certain; for this is again the expression of majesty: no one can be saved, except by grace. But these 
glorious ones do not have grace at the first place, their lives express the exertion of spirit in the strictest sense; 
and while they themselves acknowledge before God that they are saved by grace, we others should bow deeply 
before them. Then comes the next relationship. A person acknowledges how frightful it is to come quite near 
to God (which is nevertheless God's demand), but confesses his weakness, confesses that he dare not--at least 
as yet--and so inserts 'grace' in at the first place so that grace is also permitted to spare [him] as regards the 
utmost of striving. With this, too, God in his infinite love will involve himself--but then he wills honesty, truth, 
wills that one shall confess how matters stand. One shall humbly confess straight out that the problem lies deep 
in me, that I am afraid to be spirit in the strict sense and therefore withdraw a bit. The problem with the sermon 
is this rubbish about me 'wanting to so very much.' Nonsense. No, it is I who would rather not--and this God 
will forgive me in 'grace.' Infinite love that he is--he will even have to do with a person on this condition." 
Cf. Pap XS A 43 (JP 6:6832), infra, n. 31, where "all of us in Christendom who have some Christian-
ity" are said to apply grace "at the first place--not merely 'grace' in relation to the past, but grace in relation to 
the demanded venture"--in order to exempt ourselves from it. Kierkegaard notes: "And then comes the rub, 
that then God nevertheless wills to have to do with us." Cf. also SV XII 418 (Judge for Yourself!. 142) where 
Kierkegaard speaks of "introducing ~ in another place, namely, for coddling myself in human sympathy 
for myself." (All translations but the last are mine.) 
ISPap X3 A 393 (JP 4:4894) speaks of praying to God that he not "be too hard on" one, requesting whether 
specific things "might not be conceded [indrommes]"--and then, for the rest, abiding by his decision. Pap X3 
A 658 (JP 2:1415) too speaks of "concession," only here it is the institutionalized church that is the 
Concession--given "on account of our frailty." The church is said to have come about by each individual, at 
one or another point, having "struck a compromise [slaaet a() in respect of being a Christian in the strictest 
sense." 
19Pap ~ A 385 (JP 2:1617). 
20Pap ~ A 137 (JP 4:4764). 
309 
to mind.21 There the lifting of the demand is represented as indefinite, if not permanent, in 
duration based upon its proclamation together with the bare (but sincere) admission of one's 
distance from it. Increasingly, however, Kierkegaard came to regard dispensation so 
conceived as illicit, for its terms--bare admission without the slightest attendant effort in the 
direction of discipleship--made of it crass indulgence [Aflad].22 In offering dispensation 
on those terms Kierkegaard had, in effect, announced a "spiritual moratorium" on striving 
with which he was not comfortable.23 Hence he subsequently modified his position to that 
21SY XII 64 (Practice in Christianity. 67): "'And what does all this mean?' It means that each individual in 
quiet inwardness before God is to humble himself under what it means in the strictest sense to be a Christian, 
is to confess honestly before God where he is so that he still might worthily accept the grace that is offered to 
every imperfect person--that is, to everyone. And then nothing further; then, as for the rest, let him do his work 
and rejoice in it, love his wife and rejoice in her, joyfully bring up his children, love his fellow beings, rejoice 
in life. If anything more is required of him, God will surely let him understand and in that case will also help 
him further .... [B]ut this is required of everyone, that he before God shall honestly humble himself under the 
requirements of ideality." Cf. Pap X2 A 184 and Jr A 377 (JP 6:6528 and 6778), cited above, which describe 
the dispensation offered by Practice in Christianity precisely as Indulgents. See also the second discourse of 
Part III of Christian Discourses, which anticipates Practice in Christianity's "Moral" (SY X 188-89 [Christian 
Discourses, 194-96]). The latter text, as illuminated by Pap YIII1 A 572 (JP 3:3744), expresses the conviction 
that God extends to most individuals dispensation from striving in accordance with ideality's demand: "The 
requirement is for all; but only of some individuals is it required in particular" (translation mine). 
22"My earlier thought was: 'If the establishment can be defended at all, then this is the only way: by bringing 
judgment upon it poetically (hence by a pseudonym) and then by drawing upon "grace" raised to the second 
power so that it would become Christianity, not merely finding forgiveness for the past through grace, but 
through grace finding a kindofindulgence [Aflad] from the imitation of Christ proper and the exertion of being 
a Christian proper. In that way truth will enter into the Establishment after all, it will defend itself by 
condemning itself, it will acknowledge the Christian requirement, will for its own part make an admission 
concerning its distance (and that, without being able to be called a striving in the direction of drawing closer 
to the requirement) but it will flee to grace, "also with respect to the use that one makes of grace.'" ... Now, 
on the contrary, I am quite assured of two things: both that the Establishment is, Christianly speaking, 
untenable; that each day that it exists is, Christianly speaking, a crime. And that one is not permitted to draw 
upon grace in this way" (SY XIV 80-81 [Attack upon Christendom. 54-55], translation mine). 
It is interesting to note that Judge for Yourself!. written three years prior to this public retraction of 
Practice in Christianity's "Moral" but four years after the "Moral" itself, still offered the "Moral's" lenient terms 
of dispensation--though one must suppose with far less ingenuousness. No doubt this accounts in large part for 
why SK never published that work during his lifetime. The offer there reads: "Yes, Christianity is lenient, in 
the form of an admission--note this well: in the form of an admis.<;ion!--it can spare the single individual much 
when he humbly admits his own condition, can also spare him this truly Christian venturing when he humbly 
admits his own condition" (SY XII 384 [Judge for Yourself!, 101-2]). It is to be noted that the demand that 
Kierkegaard makes in Judge for Yourself! is once again particularly leveled at the clergy (pp. 405-7 [126-29] 
and 479 [212]). 
23Eduard Geismar [S0ren Kierkegaard, hans Livsudvikling og Forfattervirksomhed. 6 vols (Copenhagen: 
G. E. C. Gads Foriag, 1927-29),4: III and 116] goes so far as to express doubts aoout Kierkegaard's original 
sincerity in offering such terms of dispensation. Nor are his doubts totally without foundation. Two years after 
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of a provisional lifting of ideality's demand based upon the ceaseless struggle of conscience 
to detennine whether dispensation is to be sought at all in a given situation.24 Indulgence, 
so conceived, applied solely to each individual and was based upon his progress in 
Christianity, and hence, upon individual capability. 
Clearly the background for this "indulgence" understanding of grace is Kierkegaard's 
"parent-child" model of divine-human relations: God must provisionally suspend all or part 
of the requirement as an accommodation to the "child's" level of development. The 
requirement ever exists, but compliance with it is not immediately demanded; indeed, its 
ramifications are not fully made known at the outset.2S The sum of the matter is that in 
imputing grace qua "reduction" to Luther and in speaking of it as though it were a kind of 
"indulgence" himself, Kierkegaard is not deriding these concepts per se, but rather the failure 
to safeguard their integrity by placing them within a framework wherein Christianity's full 
requirement is proclaimed and its hearers are actively engaged in the task of striving to attain 
to maturity--i.e., spirit. 
the pUblication of Practice in Christianity. Kierkegaard acknowledged that the conditions that he had set forth 
in the "Moral" for compromise with the establishment had been, from the outset, only tentative, and their 
tenability, dubious at best. In his own mind, they were subject to almost certain supersedure from the very 
beginning (Pap X A 639 [JP 4:4524]). 
24 S J ,,4 5 3 Pap X A64(JP2:1492),supra,n.ll,aswellasPapX A 72 (JP2:1476),supra,n. 10. PapA A 9,pp. 
411-12 (JP 4 :4688) describes the rhythm and incremental progression thatthe Christian life assumes as a result 
of the provisional dispensation: one strives to the point of pain in one's attempts at "dying to," then gives way 
a bit--convalescing, as it were--only to renew the exercise, strengthened by the previous exertion. Pap XS A 39, 
p. 43 (JP 2:1433) warns of being too impatient to do without the proffered indulgence: "As always, I say to 
myself and to everyone: do things gently; if it becomes too difficult for you, then move down into a lower 
relationship with God, yet in such a way that you again begin where you left off. You are not under law, 
though, but under love" (translation mine). 
2S" A human being is a frail creature, not able like the God-man to know everything in advance, from the first 
moment, his suffering and the certainty and necessity of his downfall, and yet capable of living day after day, 
quiet, devoted to God, as if only everything good were in store for him. A human being must be handled gently, 
and that is why a person is given his task little by little; he is little by little pressed more and more firmly into 
the greater and greater effort of the test and examination" (SVXII 172-73 [Practice in Christianity, 186]). Anti-
Climacus goes on to describe the Christian's "upbringing" in the manner of a parent-child relationship. It is a 
process of gradual acclimation to the rarified air of spirit. J0rgen Bukdahl has demonstrated the vast importance 
that this notion has in SK's understanding of divine-human relations ('''Indmmmelsen'. Dens plads i S0ren 
Kierkegaards kristendomsforstaaelse og vrekkelsesaktion," Dansk Teologisk Tidskrift 26 [1963]:96-124). 
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It is apparent that Kierkegaard's concept of "upbringing" or "training" in Christianity 
stands in close relation to the idealist soteriology outlined in the previous chapter. The link 
between the two is not to be denied: in Pap X2 A 219 (lP 2:1473) Kierkegaard freely trades 
between the "sociological" terms of the training metaphor and the "ontological" ones (tem-
porality and eternity) of the idealist schema.26 Moreover the net result as regards the grace 
concept is the same: on both metaphors grace is described as a temporary dispensation or 
"indulgence" from meeting ideality's demands.27 It is clear that this understanding of grace 
that increasingly manifests itself in the latter half of the authorship derives from the under-
standing of man as emergent spirit (or metaphorically, as emergent "adult") who must 
26"Actually 'grace' relates to the composite of temporality and eternity that man is. When a solid is rotated 
all too rapidly spontaneous combustion can result. So, too, when eternity's and ideality'S demand bursts in upon 
a person in a flash and requires itself ofhim--then he must despair, go crazy, etc. In such a condition he must 
cry out to God: 'Give me time, give me time.' And this is grace--this is after all why temporality is called the 
time of grace. In eternity one cannot actually speak of grace. But temporality is, you see, precisely in one sense 
agony--and yet divinely speaking it is the time of grace. Faith, which relates to and resorts to grace, passes 
through salvifically. In faith there is rest. Faith relates to grace, and see, now exactly the opposite thing occurs: 
now there is, in one sense, absolutely nothing to hurry about--everything has, after all, already been done. Here 
lies the atonement, satisfaction for sins. Only thus can a wretched human being be kept striving. For in order 
to have the courage to strive he must rest in the blessed assurance that everything has already been decided, 
that he has conquered--in faith and by faith. So he begins to strive; but faith, relating to grace, is ever 
immediately ready to strengthen him patiently to strive, ever giving time, the time of grace. Oh, but if a human 
father (or mother) already has difficulty enough accommodating himself to his child, what a wonder of patience 
for God in heaven ... to have patience with a human being's--striving!" (translation mine). 
271n Pap X2 A 241 (JP 2:1399) where the "upbringing" and idealist schemata are again simultaneously 
present God is said to exhibit fatherly patience--Indulgents--toward the "child" whom he is slowly but 
successively weaning from enjoyment of the created world. Yet at any moment he could place the child over 
into a "stricter division," requiring him to become "spirit" in earnest. Similar in tenor is Pap ~ A 473,pp. 295-
96 (JP 1 :251): "Yet God is, you see, also in this way infinite love--not suddenly, as it were, all at once 
assaulting a human being and demanding of him that he be spirit, for then a human being would have to perish. 
No, he handles ever so gently, it is a slow operation, an upbringing; there come many moments where [the 
person] gets a breather, where God in a finite way strengthens the patient--but then onward. And there is one 
thing that God requires unconditionally at every moment: honesty, that he not reverse the relationship and 
demonstrate his relationship with God or the truth of his cause by pointing to good fortune, success, and so on--
no, the opposite is the case: that he confess that this breather is given on account of his weakness, as an 
Accommodation on the part of God, something that he also will perhaps have to do without at a later moment--
in order to come further. Moreover, the honesty is required at every moment ofthe patient that he immediately 
put it down as a debit in his relationship with God each time that he uses his shrewdness to procure a little 
alleviation, a little relief--that he then, for heaven's sake, not become cocky on account of his shrewdness--for 
then the God-relationship vanishes altogether andhe may perhaps become one ofthose unhappy ones for whom 
everything succeeds in this world--because God's punishment is upon them so that he has absolutely nothing 
more to do with them" (translation mine). 
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progressively revoke every tie to the finite, the temporal and the corporeal, but who needs 
time to do this. 
However "gentle" or "lenient" this way of conceiving grace may be (for it is love that 
deals thus with the child, be it now sternly, now indulgently), it seems to me that it dichoto-
mizes law and grace in a way that tacitly revokes the latter. At any time either forgiveness 
or the modified demand obtains. When "indulgence" is declared, then the requirement--at 
least a portion of it--is provisionally put out of force. Kierkegaard considers such a 
temporary reprieve from striving in accordance with ideality's highest demands to be 
mercifully devoid of law and aptly applies the synonym that so smacks of antinomianism: 
"indulgence." Yet by positing this type of" grace" he has dissolved the simul relationship that 
obtained in the theolo2ia crucis (the atonement as continually present under the law's 
accusation, rescinding its demand qua demand without abrogating its intent).28 In its place 
Kierkegaard has installed an alternating sequence wherein at one moment grace silences 
the law's accusations, but at another moment the law (albeit mitigated) annuls grace.29 
Contrary to his intention, in place of the alternatives, either an easy conscience or a stultify-
28Clearly the conferral of full satisfaction for sin through the atonement does nothing to remove God's 
demand per se. On the contrary, such satisfaction is given precisely that the demand may be fulfilled--a thing 
that "the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do" (Rom. 8:3-4). Luther interprets this Pauline teaching to 
mean that the law cannot be fulfilled so long as it is experienced as law. What the atonement does is to rescind 
the law qua law, and establish a gracious striving born of the Spirit in its stead. Yet the atonement does not 
rescind the law qua God's gracious will for our lives. 
2~.B., Luther, too, knows of alternating seasons of law and grace. Like Kierkegaard, he considers these a 
practical necessity of the Christian life, not its ideal etatus. In his exposition of Gal. 3:23-25 and 4:3 he 
contrasts the "time oflaw" with the "time of grace." The latter is ushered in by the "advent of Christ," an event 
that must occur not once in the Christian's life, but daily, hourly, yes, continually (WA 40\ 524-38 and 550 
[LW 26, 340-51 and 360]) because of the tenacity of the flesh in which the law finds repeated occasion to 
reassert itself; consequently its tyranny over the conscience must constantly be overcome by faith (W A 401526 
[LW 26, 3432]). This similarity to Kierkegaard is matched by yet another one, for Luther acknowledges that 
the law, despite its terrors, serves a gracious function: it is the custodian given for our own good until we shall 
have reached the age of majority and been fully entrusted with the promise. That is to say: it is given to rebuke 
our flesh, denying it free reign and driving us to grace. With the introduction ofSK's category, "indulgence," 
however, the similarities end, for this category ascribes to the law a gracious function that is nowhere to be 
found in Luther: the proffered indulgence is said to reassure, not accuse. Luther would deny that this is 
possible. As an attenuated form of law, indulgence can only accuse--it cannot extend the "time of grace" 
wrought by its precursor, forgiveness. Where Kierkegaard advocates recourse to indulgence on the heels of 
forgiveness, Luther advocates continued recourse to forgiveness. He can do so because, contra Kierkegaard, 
he regards Christ's atoning office as never forsaking the Christian, not even when concealed under the aspect 
of law that the impending venture so readily assumes. 
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ing rigorism, the category "indulgence" in its own poor way affords both. Yet it ineluctably 
tends in the direction of the Jatter. Under the guise of rescinding Christianity's absolutely 
unattainable demand it lays down a moderately unattainable one. Moreover, because indul-
gence from the full force of the law is only provisional, rigorism is certain to win the day, 
Christianity coming to stand under the sign of the law. In the end there is no respite from fulfill-
ing the highest demands of "spirit.,,30 
The "indulgence" or "upbringing" metaphor for grace that we have hitherto traced 
is to be located during the first half of the late period, between 1848 and 1852. After 1852 
we still find it, but with the difference that the tenn, "InduI2ents," is replaced by the desig-
nation, "grace at the first place" (Naade paa fRlrste Sted). This new notion is to be understood 
in connection with its companion concept, "grace at the second place." The latter grace has 
to do with the past--it is forgiveness for sin already committed--whereas the fonner one 
pertains to the future, specifically to our response to the renewed demand that comes on the 
30Per Lenning writes: "Where Kierkegaard ha<; gone awry ... seems to be that, by his talk of grace as'indul-
gence,' he entirely overlooks the fact that the gospel makes man's impotence and God's sovereign love into the 
principal--and in relation to the law, new--point of departure. Thereby he stands in danger of making the gospel 
into a second rate Christianity, while the law's demand, or even more accurately, the demand for discipleship, 
becomes what is primary and actual. It is not said straight out that in order to be a Christian one ~ fulfill this 
demand; it is not even said straight out that it might be possible for anyone to fulfill it. But with this the 
possibility is nevertheless opened that the demand, as primary and principal Christianity, can come to force the 
joyous message into the shadow to an ever increasing degree" ("Samtidighedens Situation." En studie i Seren 
Kierkegaards kristendomsforstaelse. [Oslo: Forlaget Land og Kirke, 1954], 195). 
Now an entry like Pap X2 A 219 (JP2:1473)might seem 10 give the Heto the contention that law gains 
the upper hand on this schema, for SK is after all very explicit in acknowledging that "there is, in one sense, 
absolutely nothing to hurry about--everything has, after all, already been done. Here lies the atonement, 
satisfaction for sins. Only thus can a wretched human being be kept striving. For in order to have the courage 
to strive he must rest in the blessed assurance that everything has already been decided, that he has conquered--
in faith and by faith." It is clear, though, that grace here means Christ's death and righteousness that ever and 
always satisfies the law's demand; it does not mean the "time" that is granted the individual for bringing 
himself into compliance with that demand through its provisory rescission, as the context would indicate. It 
seems that in this entry Kierkegaard is mixing two paradigms that are fundamentally incompatible. On the one 
paradigm it holds true that only by means of the full satisfaction for sins can the wretched human being be kept 
striving. On the other paradigm the opposite conviction is expressed: that only if the wretched human being's 
feet are "kept to the fire" (with remissions) can he be kept striving. The fact that the former schema is 
ostensibly affirmed does not preclude its tacit subversion by the latter. 
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heels of the forgiveness just received (hence the alternative designations: "grace in relation 
to the future," or "grace forwards," vs. "grace in relation to the past," or "grace back-
wards,,).31 
llPap XS A 43 (JP 6:6832): "It is not true, as mockers and freethinkers boldly assert or as semi-cultivated 
people despairingly or rebelliously sigh or rage, that no such Spirit exists who, when one calls upon him, 
entirely recreates a person, renews him, gives him strength for renunciation, every manner of renunciation. No, 
that is not how it is. Such a Spirit really does exist. But thc fact is that, for the one who understands this, it is 
so terrifying to call upon this Spirit that he dare not, especially one who from childhood on is pampered by 
grace, pampered by everything being sheer leniency. For he must in this way get quite another God-concept, 
oh, and his prayer must become quite another than that to which he was accustomed from childhood on and 
which was such a blessed thing to him. Take a picture. There is a winged horse, for example--more than 
winged, of infinite speed. If you but mount it, then you are in one second more than a world's distance from 
this world and its way of thinking and its life and its conceptions, and the understanding of your contemporar-
ies. The freethinkers, the mockers, the semi-cultivated people attract attention by denying that such a horse 
exists--all under the deceitful hypocrisy that if there were such a horse they would surely be ready to mount 
it. I speak otherwise, I assume--in order to stay with the picture--that such a horse exists, but 1--1 dare not mount 
it. Oh, and here lies the difficulty for all of us in Christendom who, however, have some Christianity. We are 
not able to deny that such a horse exists, that it is only waiting for us to abandon ourselves to it: then it would 
surely take care of the rest. Oh, but we dare not. And then here comes the rub, that God will nevertheless have 
to do with us. And it is in this manner that I think that in Christianity one applies 'grace' at the first place--not 
merely 'grace' in relation to the past, but grace in relation to the demanded venture. But as said, it is so infinitely 
difficult for one who has been brought up in Christianity from childhood on to come out of this since he is 
pampered by'grace'--and 'grace' nevertheless is and remains that by which a person is saved, even the apostle." 
Pap XS A 44 (JP 2:1919): "Imagine a person who is aware of his guilt and offense. For a longtime he 
goes about in quiet despair and broods repentantly over it: then he learns to flee unto grace--and everything, 
everything, everything is infinitely forgiven him. Blessed! But just as he now, as it were, walks out of the 
sanctuary where he heard this word of grace, closes the door behind him and now is to begin, what happens? 
Let's see. Just as this infinite grace was proclaimed to him, it was also said to him, 'Now begin a new life'--and, 
oh, he found this demand to be so reasonable that he felt, in inexpressible gratitude, that this did not even need 
to be said to him. Now, then, he is to begin. Now introduce ideality's demand (and now it was, after all, an 
entirely new life that he was to begin): in the very same moment he cannot move a muscle, but no matter what 
he undertakes he assumes much more than a new guilt, for that which he does, be it even his best, is nothing 
but wretchedness in relation to the ideal. So in the same moment that he, so to speak, closed grace's door and 
went out full of the holy purpose to begin a new life (ah, blessedly moved by the thought that now, since 
everything was forgiven him, now he must never ever come into that condition again): in the same minute, in 
the same second, he is in the process of beginning upon a new guilt--under the form of doing the best that he 
can do. He must then in the same second, go back again and knock on grace's door. He must say, 'Infinite grace, 
oh, have mercy on me for already being here again and having to ask for grace; for I understand that in order 
to find peace and repose, in order not to perish in hopeless despair, in order to be able to breathe, in order to 
be able to exist at all, I not only need grace for the past, but grace for the future.' See, this is grace at the first 
place that I am talking about. And 'the Spirit' is there for this purpose. And the Spirit is the Comforter. He is 
not merely quickening, giving power to 'die to'--but also the Comforter in relation to 'imitation.' Christ is the 
Redeemer. This is constantly in relation to the past. But in the same instant he is 'the Pattern' for the future. Oh 
here, then, comes the difficulty. For measured by the criterion of 'imitation' this first step of my future will 
again cause me to need the Redeemer--indeed, I cannot even come to begin because I am choked by anxiety. 
So 'the Spirit' is the Comforter." 
Pap XS A 96 (JP 3 :2828): "In order for a person to be able to express the unconditioned unconditional-
ly he must have an immediate relationship to God--God must say to him in concreto what he is to do so that 
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he is exempted from all responsibility with regard to what his task is, what he is to do, so that he is completely 
without compunction if God commands him, for example, to fast for ten days which tum out to be lethal, etc., 
etc. It is different with us ordinary people who have no immediate relationship to God but must ourselves see 
about finding out what we are to do in concreto. on our own responsibility .... From this one sees that the New 
Testament is not regulative for us ordinary people without further ado. That is to say, those existences that the 
New Testament presents are an entire quality different from being an ordinary person. Here the doctrine of 
'grace' breaks forth. When I do not have an immediate relationship to God such that he in concreto tells me 
what I am to do in concreto. then in order to find rest and peace for my soul I must have grace at the first 
place. Grace at the first place! What frightful sufferings and struggles does this word call to mind! And yet I 
would not wish a single one of these sufferings away; for God be praised and thanked that I have, in one sense, 
found it so difficult to become aware of grace--one can take it in vain all too easily. But it is right: grace at the 
first place, grace concerning the future, not merely concerning the past. What does grace at the first place, grace 
in relation to the future mean? It means: since I am only an ordinary person and do not have an immediate 
relationship to God but must, on my own responsibility, see about finding out (in concreto) my task, what I am 
to do--then I must use my understanding as best I can and be responsible in this regard, and on the other hand, 
even if I use it to the best of my ability, ab, this is nonetheless folly--ergo I must have grace at the first place 
if I am not, quite literally, to go crazy or else despair. Luther is, next to the New Testament, the truest figure. 
What does Luther express? Luther expresses a halt, an act of reflection. In him humanity or Christendom 
reflects upon the fact that between the God-man and us other human beings--indeed, between the apostle and 
us other human beings--there is a qualitative difference and that 'grace' must therefore be brought to bear. The 
first Christians, the old church fathers, did not understand matters in this way; they naively went right after 
imitation. Honor and praise be unto them! But at the basis of all their striving, though, there is a failure to see 
that there is a qualitative difference between the God-man and an ordinary person, that an ordinary person 
cannot (even if he ever so sincerely wanted to) or dare not altogether straightforwardly and as a matter of 
course decline his life according to this paradigm. There is therefore, compared to the oldest Christians, in one 
sense a reduction [Slaaen at] in Luther as regards what it means to be a Christian. In another sense there is an 
advance as regards the nai'vete that an ordinary person, however sincerely he might desire it, can have the God-
man as his pattern as a matter of course. Luther effected a reduction [~. What I reproach him for is that 
he did not more strongly make this known." 
Pap XS A 101 (JP 2: 1493): "An immediate GOd-relationship; Grace at the first place or forwards; 
that which is objective. So we ordinary people do not have an immediate God-relationship [and] cannot 
therefore unconditionally express the unconditioned [but] constantly also need grace forwards since even the 
most sincere beginning is always an imperfection as compared with ideality's demand [and] consequently, as 
it were, a new sin. Hence, grace at the first place. But then the need is again felt all the more deeply for 
something objective. And this is offered, after all, in the sacraments, in the Word, though not magically. [in the 
margin: cf. the next page: Grace at the first place]." 
Pap XS A 103 (JP 2: 1494): "Grace at the first place. This applies even in relation to what is 
objective--the sacraments and the Word. Take the Lord's Supper. As I now think about wanting to go to the 
altar--well, I confess that I have not hitherto succeeded in going to the altar worthily. I regret this. Grace is 
offered me. This is grace at the second place, grace backwards, in relation to the past. But now I am to go once 
again to the altar--am I now worthy? Dare I now say, 'I am worthy?' And yet this must be required of me out 
of gratitude for the grace in relation to the past, must it not? See, there we have it! The sacrament promises and 
certifies grace to me, but I must have grace in order to dare to make use of the sacrament. It cannot be 
otherwise unless I have an immediate relationship to God so that he immediately says to me, 'You are to go to 
the altar at 4 PM today,' for then I have no responsibility. As with the Lord's Supper, so would it also be shown 
to be with baptism were we not baptized as children. At what point do I dare say that now I am worthy to 
receive the baptism that will assure me of grace in relation to the past? See, this is why in earlier times they 
postponed baptism for as long as possible. Tertullian warns against rushing into baptism. But already Basil, 
for example, encourages one to let oneself be baptized, the sooner the beUer. In general every understanding 
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One is tempted to identify "grace at the second place" and "grace at the first place" 
with distinctions that Kierkegaard makes elsewhere--viz., "grace" and "grace in relation to 
grace," or "grace" and "'grace' in relation to the bad use I make of grace." Yet the concept 
pairs are not equivalent: the latter pairs refer to the almost instantaneous recourse that must 
be had to forgiveness for the unworthy use made of forgiveness. That is to say: they refer to 
repeated applications of what Kierkegaard comes later to call "grace at the second place," 
grace that is given after the fact of sin.32 Nevertheless, these other distinctions are not 
of Christianity was, in the most primitive time, marked by imitation, but also by resting in the naIvete that an 
ordinary person can have the God-man as pattern in this way without further ado. One postponed baptism for 
as long as possible; one supposed that baptism only rendered satisfaction for the past, that satisfaction for the 
later sins must be rendered by good works, that martyrdom secured the forgiveness of sins even better than 
baptism" (translations mine). 
32SK distinguishes between "grace" and grace "in relation to the use of grace" in the Preface to Practice in 
Christianity (SV XII xv [Practice in Christianity. 7]). In addition one may cite: 
Pap X2 A 198 (JP 2:1472): "The fact is, grace is not a cut-and-dried provision, settled once and for 
all. One needs grace again in relation to grace. Consider a person to whom grace is promised--the gracious 
forgiveness of all his sins, God's compassion. Well and good, but tomorrow is a new day, as is the day after 
tomorrow, and perhaps he will live another fifty years. Now comes the difficulty: does he from this moment 
on, at every moment, use grace worthily? Ah, no. So grace is again needed in relation to grace. The easiest 
thing is to die. The difficulty is to live. In grace everything is intensively concentrated--death's situation is yet 
another moment. But if! am to live, then the infinite decision again becomes dialectical as in this relationship: 
that grace is needed in relation to grace." 
Pap X2 A 451-52 (JP 2:1654-55): "Christ a<; model is still a form of the law. yes the intensified 
law .... But then Christ dies--and his death is the atonement: here is grace. The Holy Spirit whom Christ will 
send is now actually the one who grants dispensation by means of grace--the grace that Christ acquired. From 
this comes the title, 'the Comforter.' A person will, you see, not only need grace in relation to the past. That is 
how one usually thinks of it. It goes as follows: 'All your sins are forgiven, satisfaction has been made.' Well 
and good. But if! do not die tomorrow it will soon become evident that, despite 'grace' having been bestowed 
on me, I am very far from having been pure and perfect since that time. To that extent, therefore, the matter 
has become even worse. For before I received the grace, I at least always had the comfort that there was still 
grace. But now I have even misused the grace. Ergo, I again need 'grace' in relation to the bad use I make of 
grace; and so on, ad infinitum. Grace is the infinite wellspring--and the Holy Spirit the one who grants 
dispensation, the Comforter--the Comforter also in this regard, that Christ as Pattern is, after all, a demand to 
which no human being is equal. As long as Christ is visibly present a<; Pattern he cannot prevent himself from 
becoming judgement. His life, therefore, has a double side: he is Pattern--then he dies, and now he is trans-
formed, he becomes forever 'grace,' also in relation to our imperfect striving to resemble 'the Pattern.' Note: 
It was therefore a profound consideration when in the earliest time one would not let oneself be baptized until 
one lay upon one's deathbed. One understood that, humanly speaking, Christianity is the life-view for which 
only one situation is favorable: that of death. The difficulty appears when one is to strive. One postpones the 
reception of grace until [the striving] is past. Then one receives it. Now satisfaction has been made for 
everything. Then one dies blessedly. But this is either melancholy or, I suppose, it is even worldly shrewdness 
that takes Christianity in vain" (translations mine). 
This last entry speaks of repeated applications offorgiveness ("'grace' in relation to the bad use I make 
of grace") referring to the Holy Spirit as our Comforter in this regard. Yet it is at the same time a reference to 
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unrelated to the "grace at the first place"f'grace at the second place" one in that they seek 
a solution to the dilemma that our need of grace remains as great in the aftermath of forgive-
ness as it was prior to it.33 In the case of "grace at the first place," however, there is a 
recognition that some sort of grace other than forgiveness is requisite vis-a.-vis the future. 
What is the premise that prompts Kierkegaard to identify a species of grace that is 
distinct from forgiveness and has exclusive application to the future? It seems to be that each 
time we call upon God for forgiveness, Christ's atonement wipes clean the slate of the past. 
Yet it can ~ be invoked in relation to the past. It can do nothing to remove or moderate 
the requirement that immediately reasserts itself on the heels of the forgiveness just 
received.34 Neither can it afford forgiveness for guilt that is to be incurred in the future--
"grace at the first place." One tip-off thatthis is so is the comment: "A person will, you see, not only need grace 
in relation to the past." Yet another indicator is the reference to the Holy Spirit as Dispensator: i.e., one who 
is authorized to grant special dispensation (cf. Pap X3 A 72 [JP 2:1476], supra, n. 10, where God is said to be 
Dispensator as regards the granting of grace qua Indulgents). This is the other sense in which the Spirit is the 
Comforter: "the Comforter also in this regard, that Christ as Pattern is, after all, a demand to which no human 
being is equal." The Spirit mediates special dispensation that is calculated to encourage us in our future striving 
to imitate the Prototype. This is possible because Christ has become "forever 'grace,' also in relation to our 
imperfect striving to resemble 'the Pattern.'" 
33Cf. Pap XS A 44 (JP 2:1919), supra, n. 31. 
Mp X2 5 S ap A 451-52 (JP 2:1654-55), supra, n. 32. Pap X A 44 (JP 2:1919) and Pap X A 103 (JP 2:1494), 
supra, n. 31. In addition: Pap XS A 27 (JP 2:1918): "Directed to the past, or in relation to a past life--yes, even 
if it were the most punishable life ever lived--it nevertheless holds good that there is grace, it is forgiven you 
by virtue of faith in the atonement. So infinitely generous is grace. Let us now direct our attention to the other 
side, and see, here grace restrains--namely when it becomes a question as to what life I will now lead in the 
future. Am I able, by relying upon grace, to sit back and aim at an entire life concerning which I myself must 
confess that it does not at all come into contact with the actual Christian exertion, 'imitation'? Am I permitted 
this? ... Or is this not to take 'grace' in vain? As already stated, in relation to a past life there is now nothing 
to do, that's just how it is; consequently there I lay hold of grace and this is how grace wills to be laid hold of. 
But now, as regards the future. What daily existence corresponds even remotely to the Christian demand? Or 
does it, I suppose, resemble it somewhat to live in a worldly way like all the others and then once a week during 
a quiet hour to listen to a sermon or to preach oneself'? ... Am I allowed to live in the same way tomorrow, am 
I allowed to become aware that I cannot order my life in any other way, that it must remain more or less the 
same even if! were to become 70,000 years old?--for if that were the case I would merely make a simulated 
movement during a quiet hour each Sunday, and consequently not budge from the spot. Am I allowed to do 
this by virtue of grace?" (emphasis added). 
Pap XS A 68 (JP 3:3773): "The one who does not hate father and mother and his own life, etc., 
is not worthy of me. 'But I don't do this! Oh, but it is just because I am not worthy of you that I come to you. 
You are, after all, my Savior and Redeemer; were I worthy of you I would, as it were, need you less.' Quite 
correct. One can pray in this way and this prayer is also heard. But at the same instant it sounds again: 'But from 
now on you must begin to hate father and mother and your own life, and so on. That is to say, there is 
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such guilt is, as it were, guilt for which there is no remedy as yet (though such remedy will 
be available at such time as it is needed). Still, some sort of grace is needed in order that we 
not be overcome by anxiety at the prospect of the guilt that our new efforts are bound to 
incur. This Kierkegaard calls "grace at the first place." What is it? 
In Pap XS A 44 (JP 2: 1919, supra, n. 31) we are told that "grace at the first place" is 
comfort for the future, derived not from Christ the Redeemer but from the Holy Spirit. The 
Spirit is said not only to quicken us, empowering us to "die to," but to relieve the anxiety that 
would otherwise prevent us from even beginning upon this task. He is "Comforter" in the 
sense that he stands in as surrogate for Christ the Redeemer, whose visage perforce becomes 
that of Christ the Pattern in the wake of forgiveness. The all important basis of the comfort 
that the Spirit affords remains unclear (e.g., whether it rests upon the assurance of future 
forgiveness, or upon a scaling down of what is required of us). However, it is evident from 
Papirer entries following this one that "grace at the first place" has to do with the a priori 
impossibility of knowing what is required of one, and hence denotes a necessary reduction 
in Christian ideality.35 
Notwithstanding that "grace at the first place" is a reduction, it by no means induces 
quietism but rather action undertaken on one's own responsibility, and with it, humble flight 
to grace. Consequently, far from being "indulgence" in the crude sense, "grace at the first 
place" contributes to recurrent striving, subjection to law in its spiritual use, and authentic 
constantly forgiveness for the past by virtue of grace, but not exemption from the future, not exemption from 
striving--and mark this well--so that this becomes serious, my life being ordered in such a way that I can come 
to strive." 
Pap XI2 A 242 (JP 4:4051): "All talk about Christ having made satisfaction for original sin is no proof 
at all that Christianity wills the propagation of the race. For all atonement and satisfaction is surely ever 
backwards, not forwards. As in relation to actual sin, if one's sin were to steal, then the Atonement renders 
satisfaction for the past, but this surely does not mean that one can steal as much as he plea'>es in the future. 
And the same applies to the satisfaction for original sin--it surely does not mean that the person can now in the 
future make merry to his heart's content as regard,> propagating the race. No, Christianity blocks this with the 
single estate. 'There is satisfaction for your father's guilt by which you came to be,' it says. 'But stop now. 
Satisfaction does not mean that should have an entirely free pass in this regard'" (translations mine). 
35Pap X 5 A 96,101 and 103 (JP 3:2898,2:1493 and 2:1494), supra, n. 31. Also Pap X5 A 88 (JP 2:1922) and 
Pap X5 A 95 (JP 4:4479), infra, n. 36. 
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appropriation of grace qua forgiveness. 36 "Grace at the first place" operates like Indul~nts 
l6pap XS A 88 (JP 2:1922): "Christ is the Pattern. This is true and is no doubt what must be especially 
enjoined in our day. But neither is he the Pattern in such an entirely straightforward way, for he is 
heterogeneous by an entire category to what it means to be a human being pure and simple. And yet he is the 
Pattern. What does this mean? It means that in being the Pattern he is moreover intended to teach us how we 
need grace. At bottom it is this transformation, or the successive stages of this transformation, that constitute 
the motive force in the history of Christianity. In the same measure that one more and more becomes aware 
of how infinitely ideal the Pattern is (indeed, that it is a quality heterogeneous), in that same measure must 
grace be brought more and more to bear. By contrast in the earliest period, and naively so in the Middle Ages, 
one went right after imitation and copying the Pattern. Luther then called a halt. I am now in the situation of 
thinking it necessary to introduce grace at the first place, as I call it. And what I actually take exception to as 
regards Luther is that he did not more definitely and clearly note, with regard to his understanding of grace, 
that there was a reduction [der ... blev slaaet af] of the New Testament's, and particularly the Gospels', 
requirement for being a Christian. It is not against the reduction [at der slaaes af] that I direct my objection--this 
can be the case inasmuch as every step forward toward the ideal is a step backward. But then it must be noted 
and 'grace' be introduced more strongly, that is to say, not in empty platitudes, butthatthere be a careful settling 
of accounts. Not even 'the apostle' is an entirely straightforward pattern. That is to say, I or a person cannot 
order my life in conformity with his life completely as a matter of course .... If a person who does not have 
an immediate relationship to God ... wants to copy him as a matter of course, then this is a crime. The apostle 
himself must, in a certain sense, humanly shudder at what he does qua apostle; but he has nothing more to say 
than: God impels me to do it. And yet 'the apostle' is the pattern. But the fact that the pattern is thus an 
irregularity has certainly been arranged by God both in order duly to intensify the people in the exertion of 
imitation and in humility, and to test and judge the presumptuous one who would, as a matter of course, 
resemble the pattern. No, the patterns cannot be copied as a matter of course. And in general, the older that the 
world and human race become, the more intellectually developed it becomes. But the more intellectually 
developed it becomes, the more ideal its conceptions of God and the God-man also become; butthe more ideal 
these become, the more difficult imitation becomes and the more one must be pressed in the direction of fleeing 
to grace .... The latter is what I have wanted and do want: I want to introduce the Christian requirement, 
imitation in all its infinity in order to press in the direction of grace." 
Pap XS A 95 (JP 4:4479): "An immediate relationship to God-ordinary humanity .... We human 
beings do not ordinarily have an immediate relationship to God. His will is proclaimed to us in abstracto in his 
Word, etc., but I am not told (this concrete I), 'You are to do this and that under these concrete circumstances.' 
No, each individual must, so to speak, translate God's command in concreto. And this happens, among other 
things, with the aid of the understanding. Every ordinary person ... is responsible in this way for using his 
understanding and for how he uses it. Consequently, is a person to use his understanding also in relation to 
doing God's will? Why certainly. To want to venture in such a way that one's understanding must say to one, 
This is certain destruction,' is to force oneself upon God, is to intend to have an immediate relationship to 
God, ... is to tempt God. But if a person is to use his understanding in this way, do we not then have complete 
worldliness that uses its understanding egoistically, as well as cowardice? No. As regards the latter, it is after 
all clear enough that a person is by no means exempted from venturing just because it seems to him that he 
is venturing out into his destruction. No, when one ventures destruction can be possible. That is what is called 
'venturing.' As regards the former, Christianity teaches after all that a person is to hate himself, and really there 
is no danger that he will come to use his understanding egoistically. Meanwhile, no ordinary person can venture 
in the same way as the one who has an immediate relationship to God. He dare not; indeed, he shall not. For 
the one who has an immediate relationship to God is exempted from all responsibility and has merely to obey 
the orders. If the orders are to rush to his destruction: he is not responsible. Since on the other hand every 
ordinary person bears a responsibility not to rush into certain destruction, and since it can in tum be difficult 
for him to discern where it is certain destruction and where not, and since he shall nevertheless venture and also 
hate himself--there is here an enormously difficult situation that can at every moment really teach a person to 
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in that it denotes dispensation from striving in accordance with Christianity's strictest 
demands. Where "grace at the second place" (forgiveness) reassures us with regard to our 
past failings, "grace at the first place" reassures us as regards our future ones by scaling 
down what is expected of us. Such a scaling down is necessary because we cannot in 
principle know what God's actual expectations are unless he reveals them to us in concreto. 
As with Indul~ents, it is presupposed that God's expectations are not simply identical with 
ideality's highest demands; in a concession to our frailty he does not hold us accountable for 
all of spirit's demands, all at once. By limiting what is required of us he empowers us to 
strive to the very best of our ability. In a word: "grace at the first place" continues the "train-
ing" metaphor, not altogether rescinding spirit's demand that we "die to," but instead offering 
a moderation of it while duly keeping us in striving. As with Indul~ents, its abuse at the hand 
of Christendom is roundly criticized: it was never intended by God to be a pretext for ex-
empting ourselves from all striving.37 The possibility of this abuse notwithstanding, 
Kierkegaard remains convinced of the need of some such "grace" since, unlike Christ and 
. the apostles, we ordinary individuals have no immediate relationship to God such that we 
could know his will with complete certainty. Our lack of immediate instruction dictates that 
we use our understanding as best we can and, for the rest, that we not be held too strictly to 
account for our failure to venture in accordance with Christianity's strictest demands.38 
"Grace at the first place" therefore constitutes a "reduction" of Christianity's demand to a 
point at which ordinary individuals without an immediate relationship with God can be held 
·bl 39 responsl e. 
feel that he needs grace. At times it can even be necessary to spare oneself and in this way to use one's under-
standing--but then one must immediately report this to God" (translations mine). 
37Pap XS A 27,43,68 (JP 2:1918, 6:6832, 3:3773), supra, nn. 31 and 34. 
38Pap XS A 88,95,96, 101 (JP 2:1922, 4:4479,3:2898,2:1493), supra, nn. 36 and 31. See also Pap X3 A 
617 (JP 4:4951), where "resting in 'grace'" means not daring the radical venture since, for the ordinary 
individual, the immediate relationship to God that would justify this is lacking. 
39Pap XS A 88 and 96 (JP 2:1922 and 3:2898), supra, nn. 36 and 31. SK's statements about grace for the 
future are not without a certain ambiguity. I have come to the conclusion that he means something akin to 
"indulgence" by them. To be sure, a few texts admit of the possibility that he means the assurance of future 
forgiveness. As previously mentioned, Pap XS A 44 (JP 2:1919), supra, n. 31, can mean this, though it is by 
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The bifurcation of law and gospel that we observed in Kierkegaard's Indul2ents 
conception is manifestly present in his "grace at the first place" one, for the latter rubric is 
but another designation for attenuated law. Because grace qua forgiveness applies only to 
the past, anotht;r kind of grace is needed for the future.4o We are told that such grace is the 
antidote to the anxiety that the individual experiences when, upon joyfully and gratefully 
departing the sanctum of forgiveness, he is at once confronted with Christian ideality and 
his own incapacity. At such time Christ ceases to be the Redeemer (for he is such incessantly 
only in relation to the past), becoming solely our Prototype, and another figure, the 
Comforter, comes to dispense "grace for the future.,,41 But is such "grace forwards" a real 
antidote to the revisitation of law in the person of the Prototype? Is not, rather, the 
withdrawal of Christ the Redeemer and his forgiveness an event that leaves us hopelessly 
no means clear that it does; and Pap X2 A 451 (JP 2:1654), supra, n. 32, is likewise ambiguous about the 
"comfort" that the Spirit affords vis-a-vis future striving. Certainly a number of texts assert that forgiveness 
is granted--even despite one's refusal to venture at all (e.g., Pap X' A 446 and X5 A 43 [JP 3 :2559 and 6:6832], 
supra, nn. 17 and 31). The question however is this: can one count on this being so in advance, or is this to 
presume upon grace? My sense is that Kierkegaard wants to rule out the very possibility of an advance resort 
to forgiveness lest we coddled human beings make all too ready use of it. In this regard we do well to heed Pap 
X5 A27 (JP2:1918), supra, n. 34, where grace "directed to the past" is said to forgive, but directed to the future, 
to restrain (bolde igjen) so that grace is not "taken in vain." This function of reining in presumption, together 
with the fact that, in Kierkegaard's mind, the expectation of forgiveness just is presumption, leads me to 
believe that he does not intend "grace at the first place" in this sense. Moreover, the praise that he accords 
Tertullian and the earliest Christians concerning the postponement of baptism (Pap X2 A 452 and X5 A 103 [JP 
2:1655 and 2:1494], supra, nn. 31 and 32) offers an indication that forgiveness is not to be presumed upon for 
the future at all--not even by a Tertullian! 
In addition to these considerations I regard one other ac; completely compelling: viz., that throughout 
his life Kierkegaard was obsessed with what God expected of him byway of the voluntary venture. This was 
the more important issue than forgiveness itself, and one is inclined to think that it was so because, despite his 
better understanding, he predicated forgiveness upon it. In order to demonstrate the centrality of this issue one 
need only recall the passionate self-revelation of Pap X5 A 96 (JP 3:2828), supra, n. 31: "When I do not have 
an immediate relationship to God such that he in concreto tells me what I am to do in concreto. then in order 
to find rest and peace for my soul I must have grace at the first place. Grace at the first place! What frightful 
sufferings and struggles does this word call to mind!" This was the crucial issue that Kierkegaard had to have 
decided in order to avoid taking grace qua forgiveness in vain. In lieu of accurate intelligence concerning God's 
precise will for him, grace at the first place served the function of reac;suring him that he was being held to a 
lesser standard than Christ and the apostles, that ifhe strove in accordance with that lesser standard he would 
not be taking grace in vain and thereby shutting himself off from the possibility of forgiveness. Clearly this 
is something very different from the expectation of forgiveness. Andjust as clearly, it is a resort to law in order 
to gain reassurance about one's prospects for forgiveness. 
40Pap X2 A 452; X5 A 27, 44, 68,103 (JP 2: 1655; 2:1918,1919,3:3773,2:1494), supra, nn. 31, 32 and 34. 
41Pap X5 A 44 (JP 2:1919), supra, n. 31. 
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bereft of comfort? And is not the anxiety that ensues heightened still further by the circum-
stance that one can never be sure that the venture (or lack thereof) that one undertakes on 
one's own responsibility really is rendered acceptable by "grace at the first place?" For how 
can one be sure when exempting grace leaves ordinary individuals in the dark as to what 
their "orders" are, and hence, as to whether an exemption is, in fact, in order--for it is 
presumed that we have orders from God from which we have not been exempted42 --orders 
for the transgression of which there is no recourse to forgiveness, at least not "in the first 
place." 
How different this is from Luther's teaching. Far from being brought to a full stop 
in the wake of forgiveness and besieged by anxiety at the prospect of new sin for which the 
present forgiveness does not apply,43 Luther maintains that the Christian can venture forth 
in the confidence that every act done in faith is acceptable to God; he needs no other grace 
than the forgiveness that renders every act pure in God's sight.44 Granted, this is an ideal 
42Pap XS A 95, p. 110 (JP 4:4479), supra, n. 36. 
43Pap XS A 44 (JP 2: 1919), supra, n. 31. 
44See Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther. trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1972),5-6: "Just as God--paradoxically--accepts me as righteous and looks upon me with favor even though 
I am and remain a sinner, so God also accepts and approves my works. Empirically, what the Christian does 
is never so good as to be right and acceptable in the sight of God, for man's sinful nature continues to 
contaminate everything he does. Nevertheless, the deeds are right in the sight of God because in his grace he 
approves them--cven as he approves the man who in faith lays hold of his wondrous grace and favor. It is by 
virtue of this justifying 'yes' of God that the Christian is given, through faith, a good conscience about his 
works. In and of itself, in an immanent sense, his conscience is not good; it only becomes a good conscience 
in a paradoxical way--through the word offorgiveness, God's act of justification. Christian behavior, therefore, 
however imperfect and sinful it may be in and of itself, is good because it is grounded in the assurance of a 
prior 'yes,' in that divine approval which the Christian does not have to seek because it has already been given. 
This is why the Christian can go ahead and act in confidence and joy, even though his works are still impure 
and imperfect. It goes without saying that in all this Luther is thinking of men who are trying to obey God's 
commandc;. He is not speaking of intentional disobedience but of obedience, however fragmented and defective 
that obedience may be in actuality." Althaus cites a number of Luther texts in which it is maintained that, 
through the act of justification, God is able to regard the believer's imperfect works as good: W A 39n, 188 (L W 
34,304-05), WA 6, 205 (LW 44, 24), and WA 39\ 204: "All the works of men are evil and sinful, but God 
considers the works of the righteous to be good." This is possible because of faith: "Faith is the highest work 
because it hlots out these everyday sins and still stands fast by never doubting that God is so favorably disposed 
toward you that he overlooks such everyday failures and offenses" (W A 6, 215 [L W 44, 37]). 
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possibility; though every Christian has it, none are able to implement it as they might 
wish.4s Nonetheless, on Kierkegaard's presentation even the possibility of such cheerful 
confidence is excluded and he is forced to rely on a milder form of the law for reassurance. 
What is it that, at the deepest level, separates the later Kierkegaard's teaching on 
grace from that of Luther? Motivated by the fear of grace being taken in vain, SK has 
adopted the view that grace is not "a cut-and-dried provision, settled once and for all. ,,46 If 
by this Kierkegaard merely meant that the grace of forgiveness must continually be appro-
priated in faith, there would be no dispute. But he does not simply mean this, for he is 
suspicious about the manner of its appropriation, whether the grace thus appropriated is 
applied in such a way as to redouble one's efforts at striving, or to spare oneself altogether. 
He is, of course, aware that every use of grace is unworthy and itself in need of grace. Yet 
some applications are more unworthy than others. The use of grace as a carte blanche for 
engaging in whatever conduct one pleases is unconscionable--hence the notion that the 
atonement and forgiveness can ever be brought to bear against past abuses of grace (which 
now lie beyond human remedy), but that such forgiveness cannot be presumed upon for 
future ones (which do not). God is the sole dispenser of grace, and the grace that he gives 
he gives as needed41 and at his discretion.48 The insufficiency of past bestowals of grace 
for future needs creates a graceless present. Whether IIgrace for the future" is then mobilized 
in the attempt to mitigate the law's crushing demand is a matter of small consequence. It 
remains law all the same. 
4>rhis includes Luther, who himself recognizes that in moments of Anfechtung every shred of confidence 
falls away. H. G. Haile mentions an occasion recorded in the Table Talks (TR 2, 222, 19-23) on which Justus 
Jonas was marvelling at Paul's surety of faith. Interrupting him, Luther replied: "I don't think he believed as 
firmly as he talks. I cannot believe as firmly either, as I can talk and write about it" (Luther. An EXDerlment 
in BiograDhy [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1980], 305). 
46Pap X2 A 198 (JP 2:1472), supra, n. 32. Cf. Pap X2 A 223 (JP 2: 1474) where, contrary to the commonly 
held assumption that "'grace' is a dead decision, once and for all," SK contends that it is "an advance" upon 
which one must repeatedly draw during the course of striving. 
47Pap X2 A 451 (JP 2:1654), supra, n. 32. 
48Pap X3 A 72 and XS A 64 (JP 2:1476 and 2:1492), supra, nn. 10 and 11. 
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Heinrich Traugott Vogel, too, perceives a "graceless present" in SK's portrayal of the 
Christian life. He, however, attributes it to the extreme disjunction that is to be found in 
Kierkegaard's christology between Christ's office as exemplwn and his office as sacramen-
rum.49 On that christology Christ is represented as being principally demand during his 
life. so Grace comes into play only with his death.s1 This, together with the fact that 
Kierkegaard treats contemporaneity with the abased (Le., pre-Easter) Christ as "imitation" 
or "Christianity in the strictest sense," means that the situation of contemporaneity must 
needs be bereft of grace. Thence derives the characteristic rhythm of the Christian life that 
one finds in Kierkegaard: imitation of Christ the Pattern followed by flight to Christ the Re-
deemer. The "split personality" that Christ assumes on this schema leaves the Christian re-
peatedly forsaken by grace.S2 To this it must be said that Kierkegaard surely does his best 
to maintain the identity of "Pattern" and "Redeemer": these are aspects of one and the same 
Christ that, though experienced sequentially, are present simultaneously. Moreover the 
Pattern is frequently portrayed as assuming an initially gracious aspect owing to the forgive-
ness bestowed by the Redeemer.s3 Nevertheless SK's periodization of Christ's life into 
49Heinrich Traugott Vogel, "Christus als Vorbild und Versohner. Eine kritische Studie zum Problem des 
Verhaltnisses von Gesetz und Evangelium im Werke Soren Kierkegaards," (Inaugural diss., Humboldt 
University, Berlin, 1968), 179-88. 
SO"Christ as Prototype is still a form of the law, indeed the law intensified," Kierkegaard writes (Pap X2 A 
451, p. 321 [JP 2:1654]). Christ's life on earth was "the proclamation of law" (Pap X3 A 615 [JP 2:1884]). 
SIPap X2 A 361 (JP 2:1862), 451 (JP 2:1654), X3 A 276 (JP 2:1867), 278 (JP 3:3681), 409 (JP 2:1877),615 
(JP 2: 1884), 712 (JP 2: 1888). These texts verify the observation made in chapter seven that Kierkegaard allows 
no hint of Christ's risen and exalted state (both of which testify to his office as Redeemer) to show through in 
his earthly life. Not only is Christ's exaltation irrelevant to his life in its exemplary function, it all too easily 
distracts from contemporaneity with it. 
S2In Pap XII A 492 (JP 2: 1934) we read: "'The Prototype,' as it were, kills all, for no one attains to it. 'The 
Redeemer' wants to save all." 
S3Naturally, the gracious aspect at some point undergoes a Gestalt switch and comes to crush the imitator. 
But a great many texts speak ofthe Prototype's graciousness: SV X 47-48 (Christian Discourses. 45-46), SV 
XII 423 (Judge for YOurself!. 147); Pap IX A 153 (JP I :692); Xl A 279 (JP 1:334); X2 A 47 (JP 2:1857), 170 
(JP 1:349),219, p. 166 (JP 2:1473); X3 A 378 (JP 2:1875), 615 (JP 2:1884); and especially ~ A 491 (JP 
2: 1909), one ofSK's strongest statements of Luther's "gratitude ethic." Here the Pattern is graciously qualified 
by the Redeemer so that striving becomes a joyful possibility. In this entry there no hint of any need for "grace 
at the first placz." Rather the atonement is what is needed at every moment so that one's striving "is not 
transformed into an agonizing anxiety in which a person, as it were, 'burns up' and then comes least of all to 
325 
exemplum prior to his death and sacramentum subsequent to it, and his identification of the 
situation of contemporaneity exclusively with the former does adversely affect his under-
standing of the Christian's experience of Christ. The Redeemer makes his appearance in the 
aftermath of the failed situation of contemporaneity with the Pattern (in order then to grant 
comfort and forgiveness), not in its midst. In its midst Christ is conceived as exemplar of 
the demands of absolute spirit.54 
strive." SKspeaks ofthe blessed freedom from meritthat comes from "not being driven" by any demand at all, 
but instead being afforded grace ("Nothing in the sense of severity is demanded," he says; "rather, all is 
grace"). 
~is is apparent from other PatternlRedeemer texts. Pap X2 A 170 (JP 1 :349) presents the Pattern as in 
no way gracious, but as crushing demand. Here the dichotomization of Christ's two aspects is by all 
appearances absolute, the one in no way qualifying the other. Pap XS A 44 (JP 2: 1919) expresses this 
disjunction with the utmost clarity: "Christ is the Redeemer. This is constantly in relation to the past. But in 
the same moment that he is thus the Redeemer for the past, in that same moment he is 'Pattern' for the future" 
(without any hint of his redeeming office). The relationship to such a Pattern is, as Pap X2 A 276 tells us, one 
of obligation to imitate him. "Imitation" in this entry is not qualified as gracious owing to the continuing 
presence of Christ the Redeemer: on the contrary, it is couched quite simply in terms of obligation, pure and 
simple. But this can only lead to the Pattern's immediate assumption of an horrific aspect, as is illustrated by 
Pap X6 B 241 (JP 2:1863). In that entry the Redeemer is said, in the first instance, to help the Christian to 
resemble the Pattern. Accordingly, the Pattern's visage is rendered gracious by the Redeemer. But in the very 
moment that one commits oneself to the thus transfigured Pattern ("casts himself into the Pattern's anns")--in 
that same moment the Pattern assumes an horrific visage from which the would-be imitator "again shrinks 
back." 
From this brief survey of Pattern/Redeemer texts it is apparent that at times Kierkegaard conceives 
of the Pattern as qualified by the Redeemer so as to be "gospel"--but at times not. Naturally the fact that, in the 
latter instance, the Pattern is not gracious can signify that the law ever exercises its theological use, 
condemning Christians at such times as they fail to lay hold of Christ's atoning work by faith. Yet it is clear that 
SK's strict division of Christ's life and work into Pattern and Redeemer, together with his strict application of 
the Redeemer's work solely to the past, effectively prevents one from laying hold of that work in the present 
(intentionally so, so as to preclude the abuse of "grace"!). As such it insidiously moves Kierkegaard in the 
direction of well-nigh continual subjection to law. No longer is one allowed at every moment to perceive 
God's 'Yes' under and behind his 'No.' That perception is ever restricted to after the fact of sin. Worst of all, 
it is Christ himself who repeatedly speaks the 'No,' and only belatedly counters this condemnation with his 
'Yes.' 
In strictly periodizing Christ's life and death in such a way as to equate his life with "the proclamation 
of law," Kierkegaard has fallen into what Luther would regard as the most egregious of errors. It is one against 
which he strenuously warns: "Therefore Christ is not Moses, not a taskmaster or a lawgiver; He is the Dispenser 
of grace, the Savior, and the Pitier. In other words, He is nothing but sheer, infinite mercy, which gives and is 
given .... If you let Him be depicted to you any other way, you will soon be overthrown in the hour of 
temptation. The highest art among Christians is to be able to define Christ this way; it is also the most difficult 
of arts. For it is very hard for me, even in the great light of the Gospel and after my extensive experience and 
practice in this study, to define Christ as Paul does here [Gal. 2:201. That is how much this teaching and 
noxious idea of Christ as the lawgiver has penetrated into my bones like oil. On this score you younger men 
are much more fortunate than we older ones. You have not been imbued with these noxious ideas with which 
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This conception is not only contrary to Luther for whom Christ the Redeemer is ever 
present, graciously qualifying Christ the Pattern; it is contrary to the New Testament which 
portrays Christ's life in relation to his entire work, above all his atoning death. The humanity 
of Christ is not humanity pure and simple; rather it is existence "in the likeness of sinful 
flesh" (Rom. 8:3) for the sake of sinful humans. Christ is not simply human ideality, not 
simply "absolute spirit," not even simply the lex impleta [the law fulfilled]. Rather, he is the 
lex pro nobis impleta [the law fulfilled for US].55 The exemplary life of Christ is ever 
qualified by the atoning death of Christ--one may not prescind from the latter in one's lavish-
ment of attention upon the former. Naturally, the unity of these aspects is grasped solely by 
faith. Where faith is present Christ will never simply appear in the guise of law, but in that 
of the law fulfilled for me. Only the failure of faith can lead to a Christ that is purely an 
ethical ideal. 
Vogel's critique of Kierkegaard and my own are not unrelated. Vogel notes that "vis-
a-vis imitation that is based on a rigid, almost cruel picture of 'dying to' and suffering, grace 
now takes on the function of a least possible 'indulgence' from the full realization of 
imitation. But the factors of grace and imitation that have been disjoined on [SKIs] formu-
lation can hardly be brought back together again except at the cost of one of them. ,,56 Vogel 
is certainly correct in attributing the emergence of grace qua "indulgence" to SKIs frequently 
graceiess portrait of imitation. And he is correct in referring the gracelessness of imitation 
to the disjunction between Christ as Pattern and Christ as Redeemer. Yet it seems to me that 
Vogel has not adequately made clear the reason for this disjunction. He refers it to the strict 
periodization of Christ's life whereby Christ becomes the Redeemer and source of grace only 
after his death. This does not, however, get to the heart of the matter for, as we saw in 
I was imbued from boyhood, so that even at the mention of the name of Christ I would be terrified and grow 
pale, because I was persuaded that He was a judge. Therefore I have to make a double effort: first, to unlearn, 
condemn, and resist this ingrown opinion of Christ as a lawgiver and a judge, which constantly returns and 
drags me back; secondly, to acquire a new idea, namely, trust in Christ as the Justifier and the Savior" (W A 
401 298 [LW 26, 178]). 
SSyoge\, "Christus als Vorbild und Versohner," 179. 
~id., 220. 
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chapter seven, the periodization of Christ's life and neglect of the risen and exalted 
Redeemer serve the purpose of isolating the individual in the presence of the Prototype and 
thereby preventing grace from "being taken in vain." This is the ultimate reason for the dis-
junction. And this selfsame motivation also underlies the tenet that forgiveness can only be 
claimed after the fact of sin: here, too, consideration of the Redeemer must be deferred so 
as to safeguard imitation. The striking absence of the Redeemer in the moment of contem-
poraneity as well as the unavailability of forgiveness in the moment when confronted by 
spirit's demand, in turn, create the need for a second kind of grace--"indulgence" or "grace 
at the first place"--in order to render that demand to some extent tolerable.57 
SK's two "lines" of thinking as concerns grace lead to a confusing state of affairs. On 
the one hand a great many of his utterances are genuinely Lutheran. There is no hint of 
legalism in them, for talk of "striving" is set within the framework of Luther's "gratitude 
ethic" wherein faith perceives God's "Yes" behind his "No" and spontaneously gives birth 
to acts of imitation.58 On the other hand one finds the other tendency as well: viz., the 
S71t may be added that the introduction of "indulgence" or "grace at the first place" concomitant to the 
withdrawal of forgiveness vis-a-vis future striving only further deepens the gulfbetween the "Redeemer" and 
"Pattern" aspects that Kierkegaard otherwise wishes to hold together. Where forgiveness and the atonement 
recede into the past, so too does "the Redeemer," leaving one face to face with "the Prototype" in all its 
gracelessness. Consequently the introduction of "indulgence" or "grace at the first place" renders the split in 
Christ's dual aspect all but irremediable. 
S8A short sampling, indeed, would include Pap X2 A 208 (JP 1:983),239 (JP 2:1475); X3 A 322-23 (JP 
1 :1139-40),602 (JP 2:1883),667 (JP 2:1886),767 (JP 2:1892), 734 (JP 1 :993); Pap ~ A 12 (JP 2:2533), 352 
(JP 2: 1903), 459 (JP 2: 1909), 491-92 (JP 2: 1909-10); Pap X S A 8 (JP 2: 1489), 54 (JP 2: 1490), 58, p. 61 (JP 
3:3772), 62, p. 68 (JP 3:3530). All of these texts either repudiate servitude to the law or maintain that the 
receipt of grace issues in liberating gratitude and that this is the only true ground for imitation. I quote a 
representative text: "What does Christ require? First and foremost, faith. After that: gratitude. This gratitude 
is the disciple's 'imitation' in the stricter sense. But even the weakest Christian nevertheless has this in common 
with the strongest disciple--viz., thatthere\ationship isoneof gratitude. 1mitation' isnot a demand of the law, 
for then we would have legalism again. No, imitation is the stronger expression for gratitude in the stronger 
person. Imitation is not a demand of the law by which a wretched person is to torment himself. No, such a 
forced imitation is even contrary to Christ. He would, ifhe otherwise found gratitude in such a person, no doubt 
say to him, 'Don't let yourself get carried away, take your time, and in any case let it come as a joyful fruit of 
gratitude, for otherwise it is not "imitation.'" Indeed, one would even also have to say that such a dreadfully 
forced imitation would rather be a grimacing mimicry" (translation mine). From the published works, cf. SV 
IX 97 (Works of Love. 106): "'Christ is the end of the law.' What the law was unable to produce--as little as 
it could save a man--that Christ was. Whereas the law with its demand thereby became the destruction of all, 
because they were not what it demanded and only learned to recogni7..e sin through it, Christ became the law's 
destruction because he was what it demanded. Its destruction, its consummation--for when the demand is 
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tendency to separate grace from imitation, whether by the deferral of the appropriation of 
forgiveness until after one has dropped under the burden of imitation, or by the practical 
"bracketing out" of the exalted Redeemer from christology. The intent, as mentioned, is to 
prevent grace from being taken in vain. But these expedients presuppose that in order for it 
not to be taken in vain, one's feet must be "kept to the fire" of the infinite requirement and 
from there be repeatedly driven to grace.59 This is really exactly the opposite of Luther, 
for whom grace is taken in vain if it is followed by the renewed tyranny of the requirement. 
The fact that SK should fasten upon the requirement for the purpose of assuring that 
grace not be taken in vain no doubt is due to personal factors: his strict upbringing and the 
congenital sense of guilt that plagued his family. But it also is due to ideational ones: his 
unique understanding of "absolute spirit" as an overdrawn superhumanity that it is 
incumbent upon human beings to strain toward. Not surprisingly Torsten Bohlin has asserted 
that despite SKIs replication in his own person of Luther's "reformational experience, it has 
not been possible for him to appropriate, and still less, to give expression to, the entire 
content of that experience." As a contributing factor from the purely ideational standpoint 
Bohlin cites SKIs "abstract metaphysical point of view of the religious problem. ,,60 There 
can be little doubt that the understanding of man as emergent "spirit" has influenced SKIs 
christology, contributing to his identification of Christ as exemplar of "spirit" pure and 
simple. Latent in such a christology is already a tacit dichotomization of requirement and 
grace, for its one aspect (Christ qua Model) is fully self-contained, being derived from 
fulfilled, the demand exists only in the fulfillment, but consequently it does not exist as a demand." 
S9"The nonn is: for every higher degree of grace, law must also be made more rigorous in inwardness--
otherwise the whole secular mentality rushes forward and takes 'grace' in vain. And this is precisely what 
happened in the Refonnation" (Papx' A 230 [JP 2: 1484)). And again: "0, how the people have been wea."cned 
by this doctrine of grace!" (Papx' A 618 [JP 2:1486]). And again: "A rigorous proclamation of the law can 
result in demoralization, but the most dangerous demoralization is and continues to be the demoralization 
brought about by the use of grace" (Pap XS A 7 [JP 2:1488)). And finally: "No striving can acquire an eternal 
blessedness. Therefore it is by 'grace.' Here comes the danger once again lest 'grace' have a numbing, 
paralyzing, soporific effect--because it is after all vain to strive since it is, after all, by grace" (Papx' A 640, 
p. 460 [JP 2:1431)). Translations are mine. 
~erkegaards dogmatiska askiidning i dess historiska sammanhang (Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans 
Diakonistyrelses BokforIag, 1925),487. 
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premises that are exclusively philosophical-anthropological in nature. The requirement, 
"absolute spirit," and its embodiment, Christ, cannot but be viewed simply as requirement, 
simply as ethical ideal on such a schema; they can in no way be qualified by grace given this 
philosophical point of departure. And absent such qualification, both the requirement and 
its concrete exemplification can easily be identified with the law, pure and simple, that in 
its spiritual use drives to grace; more than this, they can readily be put to the use of forestall-
ing the abuse of grace. But on such a formulation of Christianity's requirement (to which the 
teaching of grace is, as it were, grafted on) the tendency to legalism is endemic: in its purely 
philosophical form it is a quasi-Neoplatonic pro2fessus toward the telos of "absolute spirit." 
While the christological teaching of Christ as Redeemer may seek to remedy this situation 
by making Christ the bestower of the "condition" for truth and identifying grace as the 
motive force for striving, its premises derive from elsewhere and are distinct from Christ the 
Model's existential-dialectical ones. Consequently there is nothing to assure that the 
marriage of frameworks will not dissolve. That such a dissolution does in fact occur is quite 
evident from SKIs later talk of grace as a provisory indulgence from meeting spirit's 
demands. With Luther, on the other hand, the matter is far different for Christ the Model 
already belongs to the sphere of gospel from the outset.61 
Whether one accepts this explanation for Kierkegaard's tendency toward legalism or 
not, there can be no doubt that something has impaired his ability personally to appropriate 
grace and to enter upon discipleship with gladness. He himself occasionally confesses the 
61Regarding this Regin Prenter writes: "We insert a question as to Kierkegaard's interpretation of Luther. 
Has Kierkegaard rightly interpreted Luther's view of the relation between law and gospel in comparing it or 
even identifying it with his own distinction between Christ as example and Christ as redeemer? Do Luther and 
Kierkegaard really presuppose the same conception oflaw--not to speak of the interpretation of the gospel? 
This is certainly not the case. Anyone who is familiar with Luther's thoughts on law and gospel will be startled 
when he learns that according to Kierkegaard the whole content of the law is Christ as example, i.e., the 
imitation of Christ. According to Luther Christ as example does not belong to the realm of the law at all, 
but solely to that ofthe gospel. In the realm of the law, Luther would say, Christ is exclusively the redeemer 
who has fulfilled the demand of the law on our behalf, the reconciliator who delivers us from the slavery under 
the law. The content of the law is the commandment of perfect love of God, i.e., unconditional faith and 
obedience" ("Luther and Lutheranism," in Kierkegaard and Great Traditions. vol. 6 of Bibliotheca 
Kierkegaardiana ed. Niels Thulstrup and M. Mikulova Thulstrup [Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Boghandel, 
1981],142-43, emphasis added). We sec [rom this that Luther's understanding oflaw and of gospel alike derive 
from the christological point of view previously enunciated by Vogel: viz., that Christ is the lex pro nobis 
impleta. 
330 
difficulty that he has had grasping the gratis character of grace.62 On other occasions he 
seems less cognizant ofthis difficulty. At such times he betrays the disquieting tendency to 
view the receipt of grace as the incurrence of a new, heightened obligation to respond in 
kind.63 From such clues it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that Kierkegaard has 
621n Pap ~ A 352 (JP 2:1903) and XS A 89, pp. 104-5 Kierkegaard testifies to his longstanding struggle to 
grasp the gratis character of grace, openly acknowledging the "quid pro quo" understanding of grace and 
imitation to which he is prone. Similarly, in Pap Xl A 784, pp. 493-94 (see next note) he writes of his 
heightened sense of obligation because of grace. And in Pap Xl A 324 (JP 2:2027) he acknowledges his 
tendency "too often" to regard Christ as an examiner who looked on to see how far he could get striving by 
his own powers. As an earlier cited passage of Luther's indicates, he was plagued by the same tendency. 
631n Pap X2 A 224 (JP 1 :984) SK speaks of an obligation (Fomligtelse) that is incurred by the gratis receipt 
of forgiveness. Unlike the ordinary concept of a will and testament (where the heir may do as he pleases with 
his inheritance), in the realm of spirit obligation comprises an essential element of the testatorlheir relationship. 
Where no sense of obligation to strive is felt, grace has been received "in vain." In Pap XS A 103 (JP 2: 1493), 
supra, n. 31, the receipt of grace is similarly said to place one under the obligation, out of gratitude, to live 
worthily in the future. 
In Pap X3 A 784, pp. 493-94 (JP 2:1482) SK addresses the difficulty that grace compounds one's 
sense of obligation rather than liberating one from it. His solution is to regard the increased sense of obligation 
as good, instilling a heightened sense of inadequacy and need of grace. Notably absent is any other sense but 
obligation and spiritual poverty: "Grace sharpening the law's demand. This can also be seen in this way: 
precisely inasmuch as grace is shown me and I am pardoned, precisely herein lies the requirement of, in tum, 
exerting myself all the more .... But here it applies that if I am not to drive a wretched person totally mad this 
must again be taken as inward deepening in grace, more and more intensely understanding how deeply I need 
grace. Incidentally, it is easy to see, as I have so often said, that the moment of death is the easiest situation for 
becoming a Christian or receiving grace since here the difficulty regarding the new striving falls away. IfI am 
to live, then there must begin a striving. This should be all the purer precisely in consideration of the grace that 
I received for the past. But see, soon or even immediately it becomes apparent that this [striving] too is in need 
of grace, and again in need of grace because it is so imperfect after having received grace. And so the matter 
is intensified. What does this mean? It means that one can respond in one of two ways: either in such a way 
that one nevertheless imagines himself to attain to perfection by his striving, or in such a way that one 
understands more and more deeply how much he needs grace. If I were to define Christian perfection I would 
not say that it is perfection in striving but that it is precisely the deep recognition ofthe imperfection of one's 
striving, and therefore precisely the deeper and deeper awareness of one's need of grace--not in relation to this 
or that, but the infinite need, infinitely for grace. Yet how easily can this again be taken in vain!" (translation 
mine). 
In the above entry Kierkegaard puts his finger on the pitfall to which he is prone when it comes to 
grace. The grace that he receives can, so far from liberating him, place him under an even greater onus to 
satisfy the law's demand. This pitfall can only be avoided by acknowledging one's moral bankruptcy at every 
point, one's "infinite need, infinitely for grace." Yet Kierkegaard is not able to do this, for his understand-
ing of grace as something disbursed retroactively and in quanta does not allow him to. Instead he must 
first have recourse to law (in the form of a scaling back of its demand--Le., grace qua indulgence) and only 
after his failure to measure up even to this attenuated version of Christian ideality is he permitted recourse to 
the complete satisfaction for sin that is alone commensurate to an "infinite need, infinitely for grace." Yet that 
satisfaction is exceedingly short-lived since it applies only to the past and, concurrent with its expiration, the 
law again reappears in intensified form lest the grace "be taken in vain." This explains why SK's sense of 
spiritual poverty can never give birth to a sense of spiritual riches. He has no resting place in grace where such 
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interpreted his own existential dialectic framework in a legalistic manner (progress in 
becoming "spirit" being motivated by the unrelenting requirement of straining toward 
ideality, rather than resting in grace). To this the proviso must be added that this schema, 
though legalistic, is not meritorious, for while it assumes that progress can and should be 
made in becoming "spirit" in this life, the person is not thereby justified: progress does not 
consist so much in advancing ever closer to the ideal as in coming to a deepened awareness 
of one's need of grace.64 This corresponds to Kierkegaard's constant repudiation of the 
notion of merit.65 Ever so subtly, Kierkegaard has retained the spirit of legalism. Law, 
under the guise of "grace" (indulgence), continues its domination of conscience. Yet this 
occurs without the "payoff' of legalism, merit.66 
We return to our narrative of the development of the late period. The issue with 
which Kierkegaard is grappling in his deliberations on "grace at the first place" (viz., that 
of how to prevent Luther's grace teaching from being taken in vain) is certainly a difficult 
one. He confesses during this period that he no longer quite knows what to pray for; his only 
prayer is that it might be made clear to him in what sense "grace" is to be applied. One thing 
he knows: Christianity's requirement must, at the very least, be brought to bear so that one 
can really come to feel to what degree one needs grace67 and therewith recognize how great 
riches are to be found, but is instead immediately whisked away to a new confrontation with law. 
64Pap X3 A 734 (JP 1 :993) and 784 pp. 493-94 (JP2:1482), above. See also Pap X3 A 186 (JP 1 :77), SVVlI 
459-60 (Postscript. 527) and numerous other places where Kierkegaard avers that true piety is signaled by 
retrogression into ever deeper sin-consciousness, not straightforward progress in holiness. 
65E.g., Pap Xl A 59 (JP 2:1383),507 (lP 2:1469), X2 A 188 (JP 2:1470), X3 A 269 (JP 2:1478), ~ A 123 
(JP 2:1143), 419 (JP2:1485), 456 (JP4:4680), 491-92 (JP 2:1909-10), XI2 A 301 (JP 3:2543), SVVII 110, 194 
and 351 (Postscript. 135,231 and 405), SV IX 364-65 (Works of Love. 353), SV XII 307-8 (For Self-
Examination. 16-17), SV XII 460-61 and 465 (Judge for Yourself!. 192-93 and 197). The texts could be 
multiplied at will. 
66E.g., Pap X3 A 353 (JP2:1480): "Christianity requires everything, and when you have done this, it requires 
that you shall understand that you are nevertheless saved simply and solely by grace" (translation mine). Such 
a conception of grace runs counter to that of the world, which reasons thus: "If it is to be works--fine, but then 
I must also ask for the legitimate yield I have coming from my works, so that they are meritorious. If it is to 
be grace--fine, but then I must also ask to be free from works--otherwise it surely is not grace. If it is to be 
works and nevertheless grace, that is indeed foolishness" (SV XII 308 [For Self-Examination. 16-17]). 
67Pap X5 A 81, p. 93 (JP 4:4700). 
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a debtor one is to it.68 As one might surmise, however, the solution to the question of how 
grace is to be applied becomes less elusive to him over time--and less Lutheran. Indeed, 
during the last two years his understanding of grace undergoes yet another metamorphosis 
with the result that grace is conceived almost exclusively as the opportunity that we human 
beings have, in this life, of voluntarily suffering the hell and punishment that we have 
coming to us (this world being neither more nor less than a penal institution) in exchange 
for eternal salvation.69 Such "infinite grace," as Kierkegaard calls it,70 sounds remarkably 
like law and would seem to represent the ultimate triumph of gnostic tendencies in his 
thought. By the time Kierkegaard pens his final journal entry,71 it is evident that the point 
has been reached in his own life at which grace qua "indulgence" or "reduction" has finished 
its work. Through the relentless visitation of suffering punctuated by periods of dispensation, 
God has brought him to that point of taedium vitae that is the hallmark of preparedness for 
eternity. It is a rare grace, reserved for the few who are to be saved, and one that sets the 
stage for the final realization that God is, and has been all along, sheer love. The one who 
can confess this at the very moment that God has transformed himself into the most 
diabolically devised cruelty has become as an angel, so qualified by spirit is he. By contrast, 
the majority of human beings remain so forsaken of grace that they live out all their days as 
animal-creatures, full of the zest for life. Kierkegaard refers to the process of purification of 
spirit via suffering in those who are being saved as their "punishment."n Whether he means 
this literally is difficult to say.73 A literal interpretation would of course land Kierkegaard 
in works-righteousness, as would the apparent synergism that is expressed in the entry in 
68Ibid. Also Pap XI2 A 284 and 367 (JP 2:1497 and 2:1504). 
69Pap XII A 545, XI2 A 181, 182,223,224,422,434,439 (JP 4:5032,3:2915,2:1501,4:5037,2:1519, 
1:731,2:1940,6:6969). 
70Pap Xe A 182,422 and 434 (JP 2:1501,1:731 and 2:1940), cited above. 
71Pap Xe A 439 (JP 6:6969). 
72lbid. Cf. Pap Xe A 181,223 and 224 (JP 3:2915, 4:5037 and 2:1519). Elsewhere Kierkegaard refers to 
such suffering as the "condition" [Vilkaar] of salvation (Pap XII A 545 [JP 4:5032]). 
HCr. entries dating from 1852-53 (Pap X5 A 6 and 29 [JP 3:3770]) where the sense is figurative. 
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question. However, a remnant of Lutheran-sounding entries in the final Papirer volumes 
(which, it must be said, are not terribly compelling) render a definitive judgement diffi-
cult. 74 
Yet the question of whether Kierkegaard, in the end, utterly disavowed the Lutheran 
doctrine of grace is perhaps of no such great moment. If, as this writer believes, the legalistic 
tendencies that became increasingly pronounced during the latter half of the authorship were 
not a function of the training-schema per se, but its interpretation within a conceptual matrix 
tending toward Neoplatonic ascent, then that schema--and the great works of the late 
authorship that embody it--may well prove serviceable in illustrating a vital aspect of 
Luther's own teaching on grace. The aspect to which we have reference is namely the 
"partial aspect" of the simul iustus et peccator formula. 
Wilfried Joest and others have developed this element of Luther's thought at length, 
observing that justification is by no means a merely forensic matter for Luther; rather, God's 
declaration of righteousness begins straightway to make inroads into the person's empirical 
condition so that one can speak of his becoming "partim iustus - partim peccator.,,75 This 
"partial" or progressive aspect of Christian existence is controlled by the "total" aspect 
whereby Christians are ever already in full possession of complete righteousness, or "~ 
iustus - totus peccator." That is to say, Christians' real righteousness is an outgrowth of their 
repeated appropriation of total righteousness through faith. Joest writes: 
Through the command that calls him to works, the "old man" becomes aware of his 
impotence and is driven to where the fullness of what he lacks, and of which he is 
incapable, is given: this is the training [Einiibun2] of faith. To the "new man," the 
command turns into the gospel that shows him at concrete points of reality what he 
can and may do out of the fullness that has been granted him: this is the performance 
[Ausiibung] of faith that can only occur when I--as the old man that I still am, and 
time and again am at the moment that the command encounters me--first let myself 
M I 2 Pap XI A 138,297; Pap XI 284,342,367 (JP 3:2905,3:2551; 2:1497, 2:1503, 2:1504). 
7SWilfried Joest, Gesetz und Freiheit das Problem des Tertius usus bei Luther und die neutestamentliche 
Parainese. 3d ed. (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961),55-82. Joest is by no means the only scholar 
to have stressed this. The reader is referred to chap. 1, n. 43 for a discussion of the relationship between 
imputed and imparted righteousness in Luther's doctrine of justification. There the centrality of the notion, faith 
"in-formed" by Christ, is pointed out. Christ's real and effectual presence in the believer through faith entails 
both a total righteousness coram Deo, and real, if partial, righteousness coram hominibus. 
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be called to training [Einiibum~]. The "exercise" [Ubun2] is not a continuous advance 
to perfection from a still imperfect beginning, but rather a constant return to the 
beginning that contains the completion in itself.76 
This way of conceiving the rhythm of the Christian life bears a remarkable similarity 
to Kierkegaard's, as outlined in Practice in Christianity. Einiibun2, or Ind0Wlse in Christian-
ity [acquisition through practice] is not, for Kierkegaard, a process of advancement in holi-
ness that occurs through one's efforts at imitation (Ausiibun2 or Ud0Wlse); rather it is a 
process of learning to flee rightly unto grace, humbled by the law.77 Faith being thereby 
strengthened, performance ensues, the deficiency of which eventually prompts us to flee to 
grace anew. These two elements taken together--Ind0yelse and Ud!2lVelse--constitute the 
Christian's "upbringing" (Opdragelse) in Christianity. 
Notwithstanding the nascent backdrop of aspiration and ascent that announces itself 
indirectly in the "spiritual moratorium" pronounced in the "Moral," the motive force behind 
the progressive aspect of Christian existence in Practice in Christianity is not "Ud0Velse" 
(imitation of the Prototype). It is, rather, the ongoing spiritual use of law together with 
faith's reception of God's declaration of righteousness. That is to say, the partial aspect 
of Christian existence is controlled by the total aspect whereby the Christian is already, at 
the outset of his striving, in full possession of righteousness. In Practice in Christianity the 
framework is not an Aristotelian one in which virtuosity in discipleship is acquired through 
"practice." Imitation is not the controlling factor, but rather the flight to grace. In Practice 
in Christianity the Lutheran concept of grace still dominates the moralistic one of provisional 
dispensation. Constant recourse to forgiveness amid judgement is what constitutes virtuosity 
in being a Christian. 
The sum of these deliberations upon Kierkegaard's notion of "upbringing" or 
"training" is that this notion captures something vital in Luther's own understanding of 
justification. Together with the recognition of the centrality of the cross in the Christian life, 
71bid., 120. 
77SV XII 62 (Practice in Christianity. 65): "It is along that way that you must go in order to learn and to 
practice [~] resorting to grace" (emphasis added). Not without interest (in view of our previous 
reflections) is the sentence's conclusion: " ... in such a way that you do not take it in vain." 
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it serves to forestall any misuse of grace that would lead to a "religious still-life without 
venturing out into the dangers.,,78 Kierkegaard need not have resorted to the notions of 
repeated declarations of forgiveness for past sins and provisional indulgences from future 
striving. Though Lutheranism's abdication of the task of realizing Christian ideality surely 
merited Kierkegaard's critique, such a critique could well have been mounted from the 
standpoint of Luther's teaching on grace, not shifted in aim and directed at that teaching. 
For, far from such abdication receiving the blessing of a presumed teaching of Luther's on 
cheap grace,79 it is immediately avenged by his teaching on law. And the law that becomes 
operative in such a circumstance inspires the very fear80 that Kierkegaard seems to have 
hoped to inspire by his teaching on God's extreme chariness with grace.8! 
7SPap Xl A 59 (JP 2:1383). 
79E.g., Pap XII A 134 (IP 3:2762). 
SO"So gehOrt die Furcht, die der noch verbleibenden Sunde gebuhrt, auf die Seite des Gesetzes, das urn eben 
dieser Sunde willen sein totendes Amt weiter ubt. Wie das Gesetz, so bleibt auch die Furcht, umje undje von 
Evangelium her uberwunden zu werden. Der Christ lebt zwischen Furcht und Gewil3heit nicht in einem 
Zwischenzustand, in dem er nur erst halb getrostet, halb noch geangstet ware, sondern in der steten Bcwegung 
des Glaubens vom ganzen Bedrohtsein zu der ganzen Gewil3heit. Bevor er zum Handeln, Kampfen und 
Gehorchen antritt, mu/3 diese Bewegung je schon vollzogen sein. Die Furcht vor der Sunde hat nur eine 
mittel bare Beziehung zu seinem Gehorsam; sie ist durch den Akt des Glaubens von ihm getrennt" (Joest, 
Gesetz und Freiheit, 123). 
SII.e., the teaching that grace is a quantity dispensed--or withheld--in quanta, and at God's pleasure. Such 
a teaching, as previously noted, is calculated to leave individuals at the mercy of the requirement (by leaving 
them at the mercy of God's decision to grant or withhold grace), and so, keep them in striving. Closely related 
to this doctrine of limited grace is SK's equally grim doctrine of limited salvation: "Christianity begins as 
follows: One is saved, perhaps only one among millions, one in the entire world. Now we have: We are all 
saved, all, dogs and cats almost so, too" (Pap XII A 260, p. 210 [IP 2:2058], translation mine). Cf. Pap,r A 
658 (JP I :540). In fairness to Kierkegaard, it must be said that he has not always felt this way: recall Pap X2 
A 428, p. 305 (JP 2: 1261), where he speculates that, at the moment of death, most people choose the right thing. 
On balance though, the later Kierkegaard is persuaded that nearly all belong to the massa perditionis--inc1uding 
his beloved Regine, a belief that he finds difficult to reconcile with his heart. Consequently he is tossed back 
and forth between two opinions: "The N.T. obviously rests on the assumption that there is an eternal perdition 
and--perhaps not one among millions is saved. We who are brought up in Christianity, we live in the 
assumption that we will all surely be blessed. There are moments when it seems to me ao; though I must lay hold 
of the former and then, in God's name, break with everything. I consider it, then there is one thing that prevents 
me: her. Of thi:; kind of Christianity she has not an inking. If I lay hold of it, go through with it, then there is 
a difference of religion between us. 'But how can you then doubt that this means that you are not to understand 
Christianity in this way'--this is what every person will say. Oh, but the N. T. is a frightful book; for it reckons 
just this kind of collision to belong to true Christianity. Thus do I fight. And then again there are moments when 
everything seems so infin::ely lenient to me, when I am inclined to think that my task is neither more nor less 
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Having said this, it must be stressed that the doctrine of grace set forth in the present 
chapter has been distilled from Kierkegaard's later utterances. Throughout most of his 
authorship Kierkegaard's attitudes are profoundly Lutheran. It is clear, in fact, that until the 
last year or two of his life SK regarded himself as a successor of Luther's on the ground that 
he was bringing to awareness a signal aspect of Luther's theology that had fallen into 
obscurity, namely, its orientation to the cross. For Kierkegaard as for Luther, grace is ever 
hidden under suffering and judgement. What frequently gives the appearance of legalism in 
Kierkegaard is often nothing more than the proclamation of law in its spiritual use for the 
purpose of inspiring the flight unto grace.82 Kierkegaard's intent is certainly not that of 
turning Christianity into law.83 Nor is it that of reintroducing merit along with imitation--an 
eventuality that is clearly anathema to him.84 Still one must ask whether he has not--against 
his own best intentions!--brought back into Christianity "the dread of not having done 
enough" and therewith the insidious notion of human initiative--even of merit--in the ways 
already indicated.a5 Indeed, one must wonder if his tendency to identify Christ qua Model 
almost exclusively with the law in its spiritual use, rather than with gospel, does not 
seriously compromise "the freedom of a Christian." Certainly the portrayal of the Christian 
life as faith's moment by moment overcoming of despair--its intrepid reliance upon the 
Redeemer punctuated by episodes of Anfre~lse--is a realistic one. But it is not the optimal 
one. The optimal one is one wherein Christ's example emboldens, not daunts. 
than to bring truth into our existence by our making it clear and frankly admitting that our Christianity is a 
toning down, that it is not demanded of everyone to be 'disciple'" (translation mine). 
a2E.g., Pap X3 A 528, 734;,r A 349, 352, 366, 431; XS A 42,58,62,64,88 (JP 1:993; 2:1902, 2:1903, 
2:1905,4:4380; 1:401,3:3772,3:3530,2:1492,2:1922). 
83Pap X' A 349 (JP 2:1902), XS A 58, p. 62 (JP 3: 3772), 62 (JP3:3530), 81, p. 94 (JP 4:4700), SV XII 474-
75 (Judge for Yourself!. 209). 
84SV XII 465 (Judge for Yourself!, 197-98). 
8SConsider an entry such as Pap X2 A 445 (JP 4:4333) which asserts that "the question in relation to 
Christianity is ever how far a person is to be transformed in the direction of becoming spirit before he dare 
appropriate grace." Our problem, Kierkegaard continues, is "this confounded rubbish, this weakness in which 
we others are caught up which causes us to spare ourselves much too much, and to rest in grace too early, and 
to rest in it from striving instead of resting in it to ever renewed striving" (translation mine). 
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Despite these shortcomings, Kierkegaard's application of the theology of the cross 
is a defining moment in the history of Lutheranism. In it, Lutheran theology's self-critical 
moment comes to expression. Sparked by impulses gained from his tradition, Kierkegaard 
undertook a critique of that tradition, in particular, of the theolo~a 2loriae into which it had 
degenerated with the emergence of scholasticism and the established, territorial church. To 
deny the authentically Lutheran character of Kierkegaard's enterprise is to deprive Lutheran-
ism of the critical vantage point of which it is perennially in need if its understanding of 
grace is not to degenerate into indulgence and its praxis into quietism. 
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